Second-Order Religious Discrimination: Who Can Complain?
Book chapter by Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen in the volume “Discrimination By and Against Religion, edited by Cécile Laborde, Micah Schwartzman, and Nelson Tebbe, published by Oxford University Press.
Link to the book on Oxford University Press' website
Chapter 6. “Second-Order Religious Discrimination: Who Can Complain?”
By Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198926924.003.0007
Abstract
Sometimes people complain hypocritically about being subjected to religious discrimination. They subject others—perhaps including those whose discriminatory conduct they are complaining about—to religious discrimination and fail to properly address their own wrongful religious discrimination. We might want to say that such hypocritical complainers (1) have no standing to complain about the religious discrimination to which they are subjected and (2) are nevertheless wronged when they are subjected to religious discrimination. However, (1) and (2) land us in a trilemma if we accept the general principle (3) that if one is wronged, one has standing to complain about it. The chapter argues that we should reject (3) and, thus, that hypocritical complainers about religious discrimination can be wrongfully discriminated against even if they are in no position to complain about it. Since hypocritical complaints about second-order religious discrimination—roughly: treating some religious groups’ religious discrimination worse than the religious discrimination of other religious groups (typically: one’s own group)—are common, this argument is relevant to many of the complaints about religious discrimination we see.