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Second-Order Religious Discrimination: Who Can Complain?

Book chapter by Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen in the volume “Discrimination By and Against Religion, edited by Cécile Laborde, Micah Schwartzman, and Nelson Tebbe, published by Oxford University Press.

Link to the book on Oxford University Press' website 

Chapter 6. “Second-Order Religious Discrimination: Who Can Complain?” 

By Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198926924.003.0007

Abstract

Sometimes people complain hypocritically about being subjected to religious discrimination. They subject others—perhaps including those whose discriminatory conduct they are complaining about—to religious discrimination and fail to properly address their own wrongful religious discrimination. We might want to say that such hypocritical complainers (1) have no standing to complain about the religious discrimination to which they are subjected and (2) are nevertheless wronged when they are subjected to religious discrimination. However, (1) and (2) land us in a trilemma if we accept the general principle (3) that if one is wronged, one has standing to complain about it. The chapter argues that we should reject (3) and, thus, that hypocritical complainers about religious discrimination can be wrongfully discriminated against even if they are in no position to complain about it. Since hypocritical complaints about second-order religious discrimination—roughly: treating some religious groups’ religious discrimination worse than the religious discrimination of other religious groups (typically: one’s own group)—are common, this argument is relevant to many of the complaints about religious discrimination we see.

Description of the book   

"Conflicts involving religion and equality have been salient in many countries in recent years. Although such conflicts are far from new, they have taken new forms. This novelty is partly due to the rise of conservative populism and the way it correlates with religious affiliation, and partly due to local specificity. Whatever the cause, courts and lawmakers have developed new approaches to free exercise as clashes have shifted and intensified. And experts - in law, politics, religion, and philosophy - have kept pace by developing new frameworks for understanding such problems as well as new proposals for solutions.

At least two dynamics are in play: claims of discrimination by religious groups and claims of discrimination against them. On the one hand, religious actors seek exceptions from laws and policies that guarantee equality, while on the other hand, religious actors may seek the protection of antidiscrimination rules. These two dynamics together raise deep questions of political theory. Is religious freedom best conceptualized as a liberty right or as an equality right, or both? Exactly what kind of equality should be afforded to religious actors-protection against discriminatory intent, discriminatory effects, or something more powerful than either of these? Should religion be given special constitutional or political solicitude, as compared to secular conscientious commitments, or is such consideration itself unequal and unwarranted?

This volume interrogates these questions from diverse perspectives, putting into conversation scholars who work in different fields of study and who live in various countries across Europe and North America. Together, its chapters capture the cutting edge of scholarship on questions of religion and equality.

Chapter 16 of this work is available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International open access licence. This part of the work is free to read on Oxford Academic and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations." https://global.oup.com/academic/product/discrimination-by-and-against-religion-9780198926924?cc=us&lang=en&#