DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12574

Abstract: Many believe that we have a duty not to discriminate when we act in certain ‘public’ capacities, for example when it is our job to select among various candidates for a job. In contrast, they deny that we have duties of a similar kind in our private lives, for example in our romantic lives. In this paper, we challenge this well-entrenched asymmetry. We do so primarily by canvassing and rebutting central arguments to the effect that acting discriminatorily, for example when we date, is something we have a right to, including arguments from: (1) freedom of association, (2) legitimate self-interest, (3) power and (4) love versus duties. In this way, we challenge a common permissive view regarding private discrimination.

Simone Sommer Degn's describtion of the findings:

Title: Do we have a duty not to discriminate when we date?
Answer: Yes

Our argument: In contrast to the widely endorsed common view, we argue that individuals have a moral duty to not discriminate in their private lives, especially considering the recent various outlines of weak moral duties (defended in three different papers by Xiaofei Liu (2015) Søren (2022), and myself (2023)). 

Four arguments usually arise when debating about whether we have moral duties in the private sphere:

1. the right to freedom of association
2. legitimate self-interest
3. power
4. love versus duties

We canvass and rebut each of the four arguments for believing that we do not have duties of anti-discrimination in our romantic lives. Upon scrutiny, we find that none of the arguments hold water in light of weak duties. Liberals have usually sensed a strong tension between key liberal values such as freedom of association, legitimate self-interest and anti-discrimination. The highlight of the paper is that we argue that weak anti-discrimination duties are, in fact, often conducive, if not necessary, for those (and associated) cherished liberal values.