Suspecting, Blaming, and Profiling: On Lloyd’s Epistemic Objection to (Racial) Profiling
In Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (10): 13-21 Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen comments on Alexandra Lloyds recent publication "An Epistemic Objection to Racial Profiling" https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-6cx.
In a recent article, Alexandra Lloyd (2021) offers a novel epistemic objection to racial profiling. According to this objection, racial profiling typically involves heightened suspicion of those being profiled, which in turns involves blame them, which again in turn requires full, justified belief that the relevant people did something blameworthy. Statistics cannot ground such belief and accordingly police ought not to engage in racial profiling. In this response to Lloyd, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen critically examine this novel objection.
You can read Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen's response here: “Suspecting, Blaming, and Profiling: On Lloyd’s Epistemic Objection to (Racial) Profiling.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (10): 13-21. https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-6cx. The SERRC’s ISSN number is 2471-9560.