Radicalization among Young Muslims in Aarhus

The Denmark School

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Islamism and Radicalisation – *the Denmark School*

The ambition of the Denmark School is to remedy the fragmentation between different fields of research in Islamism. The Denmark School wants to explore the phenomena of 'Islamism' in its different manifestations and to highlight the mechanisms of radicalisation processes among Muslim youth in Europe. One of the innovative approaches is the linkage between 'soft security' and 'hard security'. While other projects mainly focus on *terrorism*, this project first of all focuses on *Islamism*. The identification of Islamism requires a distinction between three possible phases: 1) ideology, 2) movements and 3) political regimes.

The study of Islamism in international relations is usually limited to treating only one aspect of Islamism as a transnational actor, namely terrorism and the corresponding anti-terror measures. But Islamist ambitions and strategies are expressed through a number of other means, such as foreign policy, boycotts, crises, strategic alliances and perhaps even the acquisition of WMD. These must be mapped in order to provide an empirical basis for studying contemporary Islamist world views and conceptions of international relations.

The Centre for Studies in Islamism and Radicalisation (CIR) is pleased to present the first research report on radicalisation among young Muslims in Aarhus, Denmark. The project has been conducted by Lene Kühle, associate professor at the Section for the Study of Religion and Lasse Lindekilde, assistant professor at the Department of Political Science, both of Aarhus University.

This project is part of a more comprehensive study with the same overall theme in several middle-size European cities: Lille (France), Leicester (UK), Parma and Verona (Italy) and Aarhus (Denmark). The other projects will be published as they are completed.

It is important to stress the independent character of these investigations. The projects have been carried out in accordance with the current standards for good research practice, and the Centre has in no way interfered in the research process. For the sake of harmonisation, CIR organized meetings between the researchers to discuss and prepare the practical questions related to the process of investigation. At these meetings, the participating researchers coordinated their research and elaborated a common interview guide.

In this delicate and highly sensitive field of research, carrying out interviews is a difficult task and the researchers have faced various obstacles during the process. The completion of the investigations has taken many months. The interviews have mainly involved three different groups: Young Muslims, religious leaders and social workers who work with activities and issues in relation to Muslims and immigrants on a daily basis.

The reports were finished during the autumn of 2009 and were submitted to an international evaluation committee for evaluation. Based on the comments of this committee, the researchers revised the original versions if necessary.

The reports exclusively reflect the findings by the researchers. They do not necessarily express the attitude or views of CIR. Comments from the readers to individual or collective reports are welcome.

Happy reading!

Mehdi Mozaffari

Head of CIR

Reports from CIR:

Radicalization among Young Muslims in Aarhus

Lene Kühle and Lasse Lindekilde

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Part I.
Radicalization among Young Muslims in Aarhus

Lene Kühle and Lasse Lindekilde

1.1. Introduction

Radicalization has increasingly set the agenda for Western understandings of Muslim minority groups. Events such as the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington in 2001, the Madrid bombing in 2004, the 7/7 terrorist bombing in London in 2005 as well as a series of arrests of juveniles suspected of planning terrorist attacks in the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark have convinced European governments and security services of the risk of Islamist terrorist attacks in Europe. Attempts to understand why terrorism occurs, and initiatives to prevent it, are often based on references to the concept of radicalization. The basic belief in regards to Islamist terrorists is that they gradually evolve from ordinary, peaceful Muslims into individuals who are capable of killing innocent people in the name of Islam. However, most definitions of radicalization do not confine the definition to active participation in terrorist attacks, but also include support for terrorism as an aspect of radicalization. Furthermore, governments are increasingly taking an interest in Muslim inhabitants and the risk they may pose to the cohesion of society and the foundational position of democracy. This threat is often perceived as a struggle against the totalitarian forces of Islamism and the undemocratic or antidemocratic methods or arguments on which Islamism, according to some commentators, is based. This struggle against extremist/totalitarian ideas and undemocratic/anti-democratic methods is increasingly becoming a part of the fight against radicalization.

It is well known that Aarhus – Denmark's second largest city – has hosted groups of radical Muslims associated with international terrorism. Michael Taarnby has written about this in his report *Jihad in Denmark An overview and analysis of the activities of Jihadis in Denmark 1990-2006*. Taarnby describes how the Western District Court in Aarhus in 1996 had three Egyptians on trial, Abdel-Hakem Mohamed Atia Soliman, Mohamed Shaaban Mohamed Hassanein and Mohamed Abdel Halim Mohamed Fahim. The trial uncovered the relationship between the three defendants and *Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya* and its spokesman Abu Talal, residing in Copenhagen. Taarnby claims that the court case showed not only that Soliman had fought in Afghanistan, but also that there were connections between the three Egyptians and the World Trade bombing in 1993 (Taarnby 2006: 13). Taarnby also mentions a court case on robbery committed to finance Islamist terrorism. Furthermore Abu Racheed, whom the Spanish security service claims is Al Qaeda's representative in Denmark, is currently residing in Aarhus. This illustrates that Aarhus has hosted international terrorists and jihadists. One of our interview persons for this research did in fact explain how Mujahedin, veterans from the war in Afghanistan, were not uncommon in the mosques of Aarhus in the 1990s. These people, undoubtedly a threat against peace

and stability in societies in the Muslim world, and perhaps also against peace and stability in Western societies, are, however, not the focus of this report.

Increasingly, politicians, media and government agencies have focused on another threat, namely the alleged threat to democracy posed by radical Islam. However, very little is known about this threat. It has been claimed that one particular mosque in Aarhus has urged Muslims to abstain from participating in local elections.[1] It is also obvious that a small group of women in Aarhus, perhaps as many as 30-40, wear the niqab, while a small number of marriages, perhaps 5-10, are polygamous – practices which are seen as conflicting with majority norms of gender equality and freedom of choice. These deviant behaviors are increasingly looked upon as threatening and in conflict with basic norms of Danish society. For example, the government party, the *Conservatives*, launched a proposal to ban the wearing of burqa and niqab in August 2009. To the extent that the effort to make people abstain from voting is based on threat of violence, this of course is a threat to Danish democracy. Yet the claim that the two latter practices is a threat to society is contentious, however. Is it necessarily a threat to society that a small minority has deviant practices and ideas?

A religious revival is unfolding in Aarhus; more Muslims return to Islam, and often attempt to live up to what they consider the requirements of their religion, in relatively comprehensive ways. This revival can be seen as a part of a larger cross-European trend, where many, especially young Muslims born in the West by immigrant parents, are said to 're-Islamize' (Shah 2004). The content of this re-Islamization differs, but it often entails skepticism towards the form of Islam practiced by the parents' generation and an urge to go back to the original, undistorted sources of Islam. This form of evolving Islam has been called 'accultural', 'globalized' (Roy 2002) and 'neo-orthodox' (Schiffauer 2007) and may entail some of the practices mentioned above.

Authorities note the religious revival with concern, as some academic studies indicate that Muslims who are willing to employ violence to reach political goals are drawn from the pool of highly religious, young Muslims, who practice such accultural or neo-orthodox forms of Islam. Some accounts describe how neo-orthodox Muslim milieus can work to turn young Muslims into radical Islamists and potential terrorists (Hemmingsen and Andreasen 2007). Such accounts are reinforced by concrete cases where accused or convicted Muslim terrorists have, for example, frequented mosques where neo-orthodox versions of Islam are practiced. However, the exact relationship between the religious revival and terrorism remains unknown. Other studies indicate that neo-orthodox, but integrationist Muslim milieus may serve as 'bulwarks' against radicalization rather than 'conveyor belts' as they represent a legitimate alternative to radical voices. Some studies downplay the role of religious convictions in radicalization processes, and point to how these convictions more often than not are used as a thin layer of justification spread over preexisting

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[1] JP Aarhus, 19 Nov 2005.

social and political frustrations and motives. Thus, marginalization, deprivation and feelings of discrimination vis-à-vis majority society may provide part of the explanation, but Muslims who are 'radicalized' are often fairly well integrated, and at least no more marginalized and deprived than the larger part of the Muslim community. Studies have failed to find any systematic psychological deficiencies of individuals who have partaken in terrorism or who have been convicted of planning terrorism (Sageman 2004), and while the impact of radical religious authorities – so called 'fertilizers' or 'radicalizers' – seem in some cases to have had an influence (see e.g. O'Neill & McGrory 2006), in other cases the process seems to be one of self-radicalization (Kirby 2007: 415). Likewise, while some scholars have stressed that radicalization processes follow distinct phases (see e.g. Wiktorowicz 2005), others dismiss such linear models. Thus, reviewing the literature on radicalization and Islam, it has been said that the pattern is that there is no pattern – there is no single model that explains how and why some young European Muslims become radicals.

The foundations on which our understandings of the processes of radicalization are built appear shaky: Is 'radicalization' even an accurate description of the processes taking place among European Muslims? Regardless of the lack of a firm foundation of the concept, books, courses and programs – a whole industry of de-radicalization has arisen. Policy makers in Europe, and elsewhere, have in recent years often felt obliged to formulate policies designed to combat and prevent radicalization. Denmark has been leading in these efforts. There has been an increasing agreement among policy makers that we need not only a comprehensive, reactive counterterrorism apparatus, but also policies that prevent radicalization processes from initiating and can reverse them if they do. In Denmark the concern about radicalization, and the feeling among policy makers that something needs to be done, have been fuelled by the fact that seven Danish citizens have been convicted on terrorist charges since 2001, and the fact that the Danish Police Intelligence Service has evaluated the threat scenario against Denmark as extraordinarily high, especially since the 2005/2006 Muhammad cartoons controversy. In January 2009, a government action plan was therefore formulated to 'prevent extremist views and radicalization among young people'. The national action plan was preceded in Aarhus and Copenhagen by local initiatives of de-radicalization in collaboration between the social administration of the municipality of Aarhus and the district police.

When research fails to find convincing answers to questions, as is the case with radicalization of young Muslims in Europe, it may reflect that the research is not scientifically sound or is based on limited or insufficient material. However, it may also be that the research question is the wrong one or at least wrongly posed, leading scholars to look in wrong places and in wrong ways. Prominent French scholar Olivier Roy has thus argued that 'the paradigms and models mobilized in the Western debate over Islam hardly reflect the reel practices of Muslims' (Roy 2007: x). According to Roy it is a serious problem that:

> As the political debate over potential danger allegedly represented by Muslims is more or less inspired by the intellectual debates about the 'clash of civilizations', the

help of sociology (that is, the concrete analysis of Muslim practices) is hardly sought – even though sociology is at pains to grasp the concrete forms of religiosity that characterize the practice of Islam within immigrant communities (Roy 2007: x).

Put differently, Roy is arguing that because the academic concern with Muslim minorities in the West today is driven largely by perceptions of Muslims as potentially dangerous, research has been steered by categories and assumptions, which are foreign to the practices and everyday lives of most Muslims. In terms of philosophy of science this is called 'etic' categories and descriptions, meaning research using a vocabulary produced by scientists and not the objects of research themselves. In contrast, sociological and ethnographic virtues of 'understanding' and 'emic' (the study and description of cultural practices from the point of view of the insider, not using an external, scientific vocabulary and categorization) are forgotten. Following this perspective there is a need to refocus research from the paradigm of explaining 'radicalization' among Muslims in terms of 'Islamism', 'terrorism' and 'anti-democracy' towards the unfolding of actual practices, tendencies, perceptions and categories as used and identified by Muslims themselves.

The research presented in this report aims to do exactly that. The purpose has been to investigate how Muslims themselves describe their religious practices and political orientations, how they perceive, understand, or do not understand, phenomena such as radicalization and de-radicalization. In a way, a part of the research strategy has been, in a somewhat naïve way, to confront young Muslims with external categories of 'radicalization', 'de-radicalization', 'Islamism' etc. and ask them to reflect on their own perceptions of these phenomena, and the relevance and usefulness of these categories. Thus, during interviews, interviewees have unfolded in their own language religious practices and political orientations, and to a large degree deconstructed the external categorization proposed by us as interviewers. By analyzing how Muslims themselves perceive and talk about radicalization, and how they deconstruct such external conceptualization by providing alternative distinctions, categories, valuations and topical focuses, we have tried to evaluate the usefulness and expedience of the concepts of radicalization/de-radicalization. Furthermore, we have used this opportunity to discuss how the external or 'etic' concepts might be modified to better fit and cover the internal or 'emic' concepts and categories of young Muslims. Finally, this has been done following the assumption that by taking Muslims' own perceptions, distinctions and categories seriously, we might learn something new about the nature of radicalization among young Muslims in the West, and the possibilities of de-radicalization.

More concretely, we have interviewed and observed young Muslims in Aarhus, not just the few who have been accused of or involved in violent acts, but some of the many who practice Islam in a neo-orthodox fashion (see also the methodological section below). Thus, the purpose of this study has not been to retrospectively reconstruct phases or processes of radicalization in concrete cases, but rather to discuss from a sociological perspective the boundaries of radicalization and the usefulness of the concept for under-

standing religious and political views more generally. In terms of concrete research questions the following questions have steered our research:

How do selected groups of young Muslims in Aarhus describe own religious practices and political convictions?

How do different groups of actors (young Muslims, religious authorities and social workers) perceive and connect/disconnect phenomena such as radicalization, de-radicalization, terrorism, jihad, Islamic state, Islamism, and democracy?

How useful is the concept of radicalization for understanding the religious revival, religious practices and political orientations of young Muslims in Aarhus?

What can we learn about the nature of radicalization and the possibilities of de-radicalization from asking young Muslims to reflect on these phenomena?

Case, methodology and data

The case chosen for this study is Aarhus, a medium-sized European city with a population of about 300,000. Aarhus is the second largest city in Denmark, and is known for its mainly young population due to the presence of a large university and several other large educational institutions. These characteristics render Aarhus a comparable case for the simultaneous research carried out in Lille (France), Parma and Turin (Italy) and Leicester (England). All projects are coordinated within the *Centre for research on Islamism and Radicalization* at Aarhus University.

A combination of multiple methods was chosen for this study. First, the core of empirical material presented in this report derives from 39 interviews with 45 people conducted in spring 2009 (see Appendix 1). Most of the interviews were taped, but five were for different reasons not. Three interviews were conducted over the phone while the rest were face-to-face interviews. Most interviews were conducted in Danish, but two interviews were conducted in a mixture of Danish, English and Arab. Except for a few citations from these interviews, all citations have been translated. It has been our goal to keep the tone of the statements intact. Consequently several Arabic terms appear in quotes from interviews in the following, and we have tried to translate and explain these expressions the first time they appear. The interviews focused on three groups of people: social workers (teachers, people involved with local integration projects, police officers and publicly employed social workers, i.e. street level bureaucrats), imams and religious leaders, and young Muslims.[2] An interview guide was constructed for each group in cooperation with the research teams in Italy, Britain and France. Table 1 shows the distribution of interviews car-

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[2] Who were not all that young, being between age 17 and 34. A couple of interviewees reflected on the issue of age. The general argument was that biological age does not matter, it is more a question of lifestyles: 'Well, people I meet and whom I identify with, I call them young' (Kamila). Kamila furthermore found that young people are energetic and 'thirst for knowledge', while older people withdraw and 'hope for the next generation'.

ried out across the three main categories and sorted by sex and religious orientation of interviewees:

Table 1. Distribution of interviews across main groups, sex and religious orientation

	Men	Women	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Social workers and more	7	6	6	7	13
'Young' Muslims	13	5	-	-	18
Muslim leaders	8	0	-	-	8

In practice the distinctions between the different categories of interviewees often tended to erode. Which interview guide was for instance the most suitable for a Muslim of Palestinian background in his 40s, who is heading a mosque in Aarhus, but who was educated and working as a social worker, and who could report about his own recovery of Islam when arriving in Denmark in the early 1990s as a teenage refuge from the Intifada? Or a young Muslim, who occasionally functioned as an imam as well as a role model in a municipal integration project, but who practiced Islam more or less as his parents do? Questions from the different interview guides were, thus, often combined and not all questions in the guide were posed in all interviews.

Alongside this project, a quantitative study of Muslims in Denmark was conducted by Marco Goli and Rezaei Shahamak. The survey touched upon a large range of topics, including religious practices, opinions on terrorism, Islamic state, Jihad and discrimination. The general results from this project are presented in Goli & Shahamak 2009 and are their achievement, but as we have had access to the material while writing, some of the results from this study will occasionally be included in the following to underline the general opinions of Danish Muslims on a specific topic.

The interviews were combined with fieldwork on: A 13-week course on Muslim doctrine, *aqida*, arranged by a Muslim youth organization; lessons on Islam for women (*durus*) in two mosques; several public meetings on Islam arranged by young Muslims; as well as repeated attendance at a private study group for young Muslim men. The field work helped situate the interviews in a wider context of young Muslims in Aarhus. Faith is by no means relevant to all young Muslims in Aarhus in terms of how they live their lives. Many are sociological Muslims, that is, people of Muslim descent who do not practice Islam on a regular basis. Some are practicing Muslims, but confine their religious practice to their home, though they may occasionally participate in Friday prayer or the *tarawih* prayer during Ramadan. Some do, however, take a more active and public interest in Islam and may for instance participate in teachings (*durus*) and/or private or public meetings on Islam. The activities of practicing Muslims in Aarhus are concentrated in different milieus. The largest milieu is constituted by the Turkish immigrants and their descendants; other large milieus are the Arab and the Somali milieus. However, we focus on

what we will term the Arab-Somali-Convert milieu (ASC milieu), an Islamic activist milieu that is particularly attractive for young Muslims. The participants in this milieu are primarily Muslims, who were either born in Denmark or – especially young people of for example Palestinian and Somali background – came to Denmark as young kids. Danish converts to Islam were obviously not born as Muslims, but chose to convert as young adults. This focus on the ASC milieu was chosen because 1) it is in this milieu that we find the most active Muslims in Aarhus in terms of arranged activities and involvement in internal/local debates about Islam; 2) this segment is most affected by the described religious revival in Aarhus; and 3) it is within this milieu that re-Islamization is most likely to take the form of neo-orthodox or accultural Islam (for a description of this milieu vis-à-vis other Muslim groupings in Aarhus see Section 1.3 below). According to much academic literature, political discourse and media reporting, this is the segment of young Muslims within which it is most likely that some individuals will show acceptance and appreciation of radical ideas. In other words, we have chosen to focus on a segment of the young Muslims in Aarhus who, rightly or wrongly, are often the kind of youngsters that politicians, security agencies and some academics have in mind when they formulate worries about the dangers of Muslim radicalization in the West. In this sense, our focus on the ASC milieu reflects that this segment corresponds somewhat to the Muslim 'target group' of official preventive de-radicalization measures in a Danish context. We have found it interesting to try to uncover exactly how this group of young Muslims thinks about issues of radicalization and de-radicalization. However, it is important to realize that the focus does not mean that this particular milieu a priori can be said to be 'radical' in any meaning of the word. That remains an empirical question. Furthermore, other milieus may exist in Aarhus, which has not come to our attention, and which would have been interesting to include in the study given the focus of our research. But we do not think that the existence of such uncovered milieus undermines the validity of the research presented here.

The choice of interview persons is critical for the results of a study that mainly focuses on interviews. A qualitative interview study generally does not aim for representativity, but it is vital to consider the interviewees vis-à-vis the general population. The interview persons were not chosen as representative in any statistical sense, but to correspond to different positions in the ASC activist milieu. Thus, we chose people who hold privileged positions in the milieu, either because of their religious credentials, such as imams and other religious instructors, or because of other merits stemming from their positions in e.g. new projects (mosques, organizations, Muslim businesses, etc.) or from their role as 'representatives' of the milieu vis-à-vis authorities (often due to their employment in public institutions). These people were selected for interviews as they were described to us as 'influential' or 'central' actors by gatekeepers with whom we were in contact, and who had relations in the milieu due to prior research or work. Some of these gatekeepers were Muslims active in the milieu that we knew from prior research, while others were non-Muslim. In addition the selection of interview persons aimed at covering 'ordinary' young

Muslims in the ASC milieu, i.e. youngsters who attend the affiliated mosques, arranged teachings and meetings on Islam, both in mosques and in private homes. Thus, specific mosques, groups and study circles were pointed out to us by gatekeepers as places where 'something was going on' in terms of Islamic activism. By reference of gatekeepers or by direct contact established through participant observation specific individuals attending activities in these settings were asked for interviews. After the initial contacts were made interviewees were selected also by means of 'snowballing', that is new interview persons were pointed out to us during interviews as 'somebody who would be good to talk to'. Often interviewees were very helpful in setting up appointments with friends or acquaintances. These youngsters held many different occupations. The majority of interviewees and people encountered through participant observation were students in primary schools, high schools or at the university. But the selection of interviewees also included unemployed, housewives, private and public employees. Four converts active in the milieu were interviewed. Generally, interview persons were selected to ensure inclusion of Muslims who could be categorized as 'radical' or 'radicalized' using existing conceptualization.

The ASC youth activist milieu in Aarhus is relatively small so the same names and persons kept popping up, both in terms of who would be relevant to talk to and who was to be considered 'radical'. This resulted in a feeling of relative coverage of the milieu at the end of the fieldwork. In fact, this self-referential closedness of the circle of interviewees can be seen as evidence that the targeted group of Muslims indeed makes up a relatively coherent and bordered milieu of Muslims in Aarhus across ethnic boundaries.

To be able to contrast the opinions of people involved in the ASC milieu with Muslims outside this milieu, three young female Muslims and three men who are not part of the milieu were interviewed and served as a sort of control group (see Appendix 1). The group of Muslim social workers, because they often engage in some of the issues covered by the Muslim activists, also provided information on how Muslims outside the ASC milieu view different topics. This group of control interviews was used to contextualize the statements and views expressed in interviews with members of the ASC milieu. Thus, by including these interviews we have tried to validate our findings with regards to the specificities of views and opinions of Muslims in the ASC milieu. The quantitative study mentioned above has been used in a similar way. However, the control group interviews have not been systematically compared to those of the ASC milieu.

Responsive sociology and the study of marginalized groups

The content of this report is an expression of 'responsive sociology', i.e. social research that reacts directly on themes that have received public attention (Jacobsen & Kristiansen 1999: 9). Thus, as described above, the logic of the research has been to go into the field and confront some of the young people who have often been the main targets of public debates regarding issues of radicalization and de-radicalization. The idea has been indi-

rectly to inform the public debate regarding such issues by giving voice and listening to central actors who so far have remained relatively silent. Responsive sociology of this kind always entails a huge risk of misunderstanding informants' motives and meanings, and instead applying the arguments and norms of the majority society. In the words of Matthew Herbert:

> Muslims are not animated by, nor do they organize around, the paired concepts that intelligence analysts are charged to impute on them, such as 'extreme'/'moderate' or 'violent'/'nonviolent'. Nor do Muslims make a critical issue of Islam's being a religion of peace or not. If these questions are not foremost in the mind of Islamic activists, the outside observer starts off-balance by giving them priority (Herbert 2009: 390).

The danger of this kind of ethnocentrism is particularly pertinent if a distanced researcher role is assumed or if interviews are short (Jacobsen & Kristiansen 1999: 9) or conducted for instance over the phone. Also, as the researchers are acting in response to a perceived societal problem, they carry the prejudices of society at large with them to some extent. This strengthens the ethical obligations of the researcher towards the subjects involved.

We have tried to steer free of this kind of ethnocentrism in our research by spending much time in the field and by conducting relatively long interviews (typically about 1.5 hours). In several cases the very categories of e.g. radicalization, de-radicalization or Islamism where discussed with our interviewees. In these cases, we used the point that these categories represent the view of majority society as leverage to make our interviewees present their own views on these phenomena, and offer often alternative categories, distinctions and focuses. This strategy worked well in most cases, although many expressed some initial reservation at participating in an interview on Muslim radicalization, but when they realized that the interview would provide a chance to speak their own views on these 'hot' issues, most accepted to participate. However, a few people we approached declined to participate, or became openly irritated as interviews proceeded, in most cases because the people approached could not recognize themselves in the 'etic' categories provided by us as researchers. As one interviewee said, 'Why do you interview me about this? I am not a radical' (Afif, 17 years). Thus, in a few cases our responsive sociology was perceived as carrying prejudice, and we were not able to explain the purpose of the research in a way that made sense to them. The value of framing the interviews in terms of radicalization was therefore ambiguous in relation to the participants in the ASC milieu, both because few knew the word and if they did they found it stigmatizing to them as practicing Muslims. The themes in these interviews were more in the direction of how they were living as Muslims and which aspects of life in Denmark they regarded as challenging for a Muslim.

This underlines the argument that responsive sociology is particularly problematic when the themes regard deviant or marginalized milieus. Deviant milieus are milieus were people are stigmatized (Jacobsen & Kristiansen 1999: 8). The Muslim milieu in Aarhus

may in this sense be regarded – at least to some extent – as a deviant milieu. This is maybe particularly true for the ASC Islamic activist milieu on which we have focused. It is in this milieu that practices that are seen as problematic and marking 'otherness' by the majority society are most widespread. These practices include long beards, traditional Muslim clothing, different forms of veiling, separation of sexes and polygamy. The stigma attached to such practices and Muslim identities in general has in Denmark been documented in several academic studies. Thus, recent studies of political debates on immigration claim that Muslims are increasingly singled out as a problem (Mouritsen 2005), and that Muslims in public debates are often positioned as 'the other' (Jacobsen 2008). Research has also indicated that the general description of Muslims in the media is mainly negative (Hussein 2003; Hervik 2002), and that Islam is often securitized, that is, presented as constituting a threat (Christensen 2006). A study of converts to Islam indicates that the public debates about the incompatibility of Islam and Danish society give the converts problems of reconciling their identity as Danes with the identity as Muslims (Jensen 2008).

Our interviewees often expressed feelings of stigmatization in regards to the coverage of Muslims in the media. In particular, many expressed a feeling that the media was constantly labeling Muslims. A few quotations illustrate the point:

> Then they call us terrorists, and sometimes they call us extremists and fundamentalists, but a foundation is what you are good at and if you practice Islam then you are inescapably a fundamentalist (Ali, 20 years)

> Whenever anything happens in the Muslim world everyone shouts Islamists, Islamists (Nasser, 20 years)

> I am partaking in this society and I read newspapers, right, and I know how the newspapers try to represent Islam and the young people who are returning to their roots, because they have no roots, they have no identity. These people, right, they [the media] attempt to represent them as fanatics and terrorists because there was this Glostrup case and other cases (Racheed, 42 years)

None of the interviewees regarded themselves as Islamists, extremists, radicals or fundamentalists. Due to the reluctance expressed by many interviewees towards such 'etic' labels, often used in public discourses on Muslims, the labels were rarely used in the interviews. The joint interview guides proved somewhat problematic for this reason, as these notions were directly or indirectly imposed in some questions, which often had to be reformulated. Thus, as interviewers we had to find a difficult balance between trying to make interviewees reflect on controversial topics of radicalization, de-radicalization and Islamism, and extracting their proposed alternative distinctions, categories and topics, while avoiding imposing any labels on interviewees.

Luckily this balance was achieved in most interviews. In contrast to a recent study on marginalized young men with immigrant background, which reported that interviewees

generally were very distrustful (Qvotrup Jensen 2009), most of our interviewees were willing to speak openly. We were at times confronted with suspicion of the agenda of the research, but were able in most cases to explain the purpose of the research in such a way that it made sense to interviewees, and mutual trust was established. As researchers we have had no reason not to believe the truthfulness of our respondents. In fact, interviews were often very open, personal and detailed in regards to rather sensitive topics. We rarely had a feeling that interviewees avoided answering questions or withheld information. It is necessary to underline this, because claims that Muslims have religious sanction to lie to protect their interests, termed *taqiya* (precautionary dissimulation), have become widespread. However, the use of *taqiya* outside small minority groups within Shia-Islam (and the Druze and Alevi) has never been documented, and the claim that *taqiya* exists as a general legitimation for Muslims to lie to non-Muslims must be considered absolutely unsustainable scientifically (see Lindekilde 2008).[3]

The structure of the report

This report consists of three parts. Part I contains our attempt to answer the research questions outlined above, and is written jointly by Lene Kühle and Lasse Lindekilde. As background, Section 1.2 introduces some theoretical and definitional reflections on the concept of radicalization. A general demographic map of the Muslim population in Aarhus is provided in terms of migratory backgrounds, ethnicity, age etc., and a general picture of Islamic activism in Aarhus will be drawn in terms of religious practices, mosque activities, Muslim organization etc. This background information (Section 1.3) can be used to situate the milieu of our focus, the ASC Islamic activist milieu in Aarhus. The empirical material is presented in Section 1.4, which aims to answer the posed research questions. Here the interviewed Muslims' perceptions and evaluations of phenomena like terrorism, Jihad, Islamic state, democracy and radicalization are discussed. Section 1.5 concludes with a discussion of how useful the concept of 'radicalization' is for understanding the religious revival, religious practices and political orientations of young Muslims in Aarhus, and what we can learn about the nature of radicalization, and the possibilities of de-radicalization, from asking young Muslims to reflect on these phenomena. We will make recommendations regarding the use of the concept 'radicalization', arguing the need to include in our understanding of radicalization two often overlooked distinctions.

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[3] *Taqiya* is currently being discussed within Shia-Islam also in Denmark (see http://www.shia-online. dk/ forum/ viewtopic.php?f=40&t=16698). Its applicability in the contemporary situation has been questioned for instance by Ayatollah Khomeini, who has argued that the era of *taqiya* has ended because Shias should no longer subsume under Sunni authority (Kuran 1997: 8). The same evolution may be taking place in regard to Alevis in Turkey, who traditionally have used *taqiya* to protect themselves from persecutions by the Sunni authorities (Çarkolu 2005). The birth of the conspiracy theory of *taqiya* has not yet been documented, but it seems likely that it is related to the controversies regarding Refah in Turkey.

Part II is written by Lene Kühle, and contains a critique of the theories of radicalization used in the Danish context and an outline of a new approach for discussing radicalization. The approach is twofold. Firstly, it is argued that radicalization should be understood as a collective rather than an individual process. Secondly, it is of paramount importance to have an understanding of the collectivity, in this case an Islamic milieu, in which radicalization may take place. This part of the report provides an empirical analysis of the ASC Islamic activist milieu in Arhus as a cultic milieu, a milieu of seekers, that is, and discusses the added value of such a perspective. From a scientific point of view it provides a framework for understanding the individual pathways to radicalism, which research so far has been unable to understand. From a policy view it is of great importance that the seekers in the cultic milieu deliberately seek counter-cultural ideas and values, and efforts to impose the values of the majority society on it is in all likelihood useless. Instead, efforts should focus on avoiding that interaction between the milieu and the majority society takes the form of conflicts and crises of confidence and legitimacy.

Part III is written by Lasse Lindekilde, and pays special attention to official de-radicalization initiatives. This part of the report investigates how different types of state-orchestrated de-radicalization initiatives are perceived by the potential target groups, in this case young Muslims, and how such policies interact with mobilization of Muslim voices in society, in particular mobilization into radical groups. The central concern has been to evaluate if the implementation of de-radicalization policies can be said to have potentially negative, unintended consequences, that is, that they could provide an impetus for mobilization into radical milieus, and if so, under what conditions. It is argued that three main positions on de-radicalization policies can be identified among young Muslims in Aarhus, and that one of these positions in fact does view official de-radicalization measures with skepticism and points towards potentially negative effects of their implementation. This part of the report concludes with some concrete recommendations for how best to avoid negative consequences of official de-radicalization policies.

1.2. Definitions of Radicalization and Corresponding Theories

Scholars, policy makers and practitioners are far from agreement upon a common definition of radicalization or a shared understanding of the process and causes of radicalization. Some define radicalization solely in terms of taking up the use of violence to achieve political or ideological goals, while others include the mere acceptance of such actions or undemocratic behavior and beliefs. The scope of the definitions varies greatly with the number of defining properties. Even though there is no consensus on exactly how radicalization must be defined, they typically pick defining properties from the same list and mix them in different ways.

As a way of teasing out the most common defining properties of 'radicalization', a small sample of definitions from influential research reports on radicalization, as well as the definitions proposed by Danish authorities, will be presented and discussed. The purpose

of this exercise is to bring about a minimum of clarity and structure in the connotations of 'radicalization', and to compare the Danish definitions, which will be the starting point for our discussion of the empirical material, to other definitions.

Especially in historical and political science, radicalization as a term has historically been linked to the concept of political violence. In short, radicalization was perceived to be the process whereby groups or organizations came to accept the use of political violence (della Porta 1995: 83-84; Merkl 1986). That the applied violence was 'political' meant that it entailed a claim or a statement vis-à-vis the public sphere, and was used in order to change society or achieve certain political goals. Thus, violence was neither private nor aimed at e.g. enrichment. This basic property of radicalization has been widened over the last 5-6 years, but remains at the core of the concept of radicalization. Thus, common to most definitions of radicalization today is the emphasis on the will to use political violence, including terrorism, as a means to achieve political or ideological goals. Since about 2004 the concept has, however, increasingly taken on a more specific meaning of a process in which individuals come to accept extremist world views or undemocratic means to reach a specific political goal.

Table 2 shows seven recent definitions of radicalization and summarizes the corresponding defining properties. The three first definitions stem from Dutch research reports on radicalization, in particular Muslim radicalization in Amsterdam, as the Dutch authorities were among the first to use the language of radicalization and implement de-radicalization measures. These reports, definitions and policies have been influential across Europe in recent years, and have been a source of inspiration in many countries, including Denmark. The fourth definition stems from a much cited report by the New York Police Department, which shows how radicalization is conceptualized across the Atlantic. The fifth definition is provided by the European Commission, which steers the EU's policies in the area. The last two definitions come from Danish authorities, respectively the Danish Police Intelligence Service and the Danish government.

Glancing at the definitions and the constituting defining properties in Table 2, we see that the definitions share many properties. However, it is also clear that the number of defining properties and, thus, the scope of the definitions varies a great deal. Much of the confusion and fuzziness of the concept of radicalization stems from these variations. Another problem is that radicalization in many cases is defined by reference to concepts such as 'extremist', 'terrorism' and 'democratic', which are in themselves contested concepts. For example, the NYPD definition of radicalization revolves around the term 'extremism', but the term is not defined anywhere in the report. The Danish government action plan also defines radicalization with reference to 'extremism' and provides the following definition:

> Extremism is characterized by totalitarian and anti-democratic ideologies, intolerance of others' views, enemy images, and divisions into 'them and us'. Extremist ideas can be expressed in different ways and may, in their extreme, lead to individuals or

groups using violent or undemocratic methods to achieve a specific political purpose, seeking to undermine the democratic order or engage threats, violence and degrading harassment of groups of people because of, for example, their skin colour, sexuality or belief (Regeringen 2009: 8)

Table 2. Sample of definitions of Radicalization and corresponding defining properties

Source	Definition	Properties
AVID, 2004: 14	'The (active) pursuit of and/or support to far-reaching changes in society which may constitute a danger to (the continued existence of) the democratic legal order (aim), which may involve the use of undemocratic methods (means) that may harm the functioning of the democratic legal order (effect)'	• Acceptance/support • Undemocratic/ violent means • Undemocratic goal
Slotman & Tillie 2006: 15	'an increasing loss of legitimacy for the democratic society, where the final form of radicalism (extremism) is seen as the antithesis of democracy'	• Directed process • Undemocratic/ violent means • Undemocratic goal
Municipality of Amsterdam 2007: 18	'the growing preparedness to strive for and/or support deep interventional changes in society that are at odds with the democratic legal order and/or whereby undemocratic means are employed'	• Directed process • Acceptance/support • Undemocratic goal • Undemocratic/ violent means
Silber & Bhatt 2007: 16	'local residents or citizens gradually adopt an extremist religious/political ideology hostile to the West, which legitimizes terrorism as a tool to affect societal change. This ideology is fed and nurtured with a variety of extremist influences. Internalizing this extreme belief system as one's own is radicalization'	• Directed process • Hostility to the West • Terrorism • Extremist beliefs • Individual
European Commission, 2008: 138	'The phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism'	• Terrorism • Extremist beliefs • individual
PET: Centre for Terrorism Analysis 2008	'a process in which a person is increasingly accepting the use of undemocratic or violent means, including terrorism, in an attempt to achieve a specific political/ideological goals'	• Directed process • Acceptance/support • Undemocratic/ violent means • Terrorism • Individual
Regeringen 2009: 8 (Danish government)	'Radicalization is the process by which a person gradually accept extremist ideas and methods and possibly supports organized groups'	• Directed process • Acceptance/support • Extremist beliefs • Individual

However, this definition includes several other terms which are not straightforward, such as 'totalitarian' and 'anti-democratic'.

The most widely shared defining property according to Table 2 is that radicalization has to do with a directed process. This process is described with the adverbs 'increasingly', 'growingly' or 'gradually', and must therefore be presumed to follow a linear direction, that is, following a solid path towards greater radicalization without large fluctuations, which inherently makes the concept of 'radicalization process' a pleonasm. The directed process aspect of many definitions of radicalization is linked to a theory of radicalization, which argues that radicalization unfolds through more or less distinct and succeeding phases (see e.g. Wiktorowicz 2005). The NYPD report suggests a four-stage radicalization process. Stage one is termed 'pre-radicalization', and is described as the situation before meeting radical ideology, in which the person is said to live an ordinary life and in any matter being 'unremarkable'. Stage two is called 'self-identification' and sets in when the individual begins to study Salafi literature due to a 'cognitive opening', which may be triggered by economic, social, political or personal problems. In stage three, 'indoctrination', the individual intensifies his study of 'Salafi-ideology' and begins to gather with like-minded persons often guided by a 'spiritual sanctioner' (Silber & Bhatt 2007: 6-7).

The final stage, 'jihadization', means that the individual accepts it as a personal duty to participate in jihad and may start planning a terrorist attack (Silber & Bhatt 2007: 7). Slotman & Tillie's report from 2006 is more reluctant to pose a specific phase model, but it does suggest that all radical groups have been on similar 'journeys of alienation'. Borrowing from Ehud Sprinzak (1990), they argue that radical groups pass through, first, a 'crisis of confidence', in which confidence between a group and the authorities is broken down, then a 'legitimacy conflict', in which the legitimacy of the existing, democratic system is discussed, and finally a 'legitimacy crisis', in which criticism of the system leads to dehumanization of people engaged with the system, and the development of a new morality in which members regard themselves as combatants fighting evil (Slotman & Tillie 2006: 16). Such phase models of radicalization have been criticized for hiding the fact that radicalization often happens without the individual e.g. coming into contact with radical groups – called self-radicalization – or it happens without any serious contact or study of extremist ideologies. Nevertheless, the phase-based theory of radicalization is spreading in these years together with the directed process definitions of radicalization.

Another widely shared defining property in the sample of definitions is the belief that radicalization does not have to entail active use of political violence or terrorism, but it is sufficient that an individual accepts or supports such activities. This addition means that a wide range of people, who do not participate in frontline violent activities, but who actively support it verbally or financially, or who more passively just accept it, come in contact with radicalism. This enlargement of the scope of radicalism seems to be a product of the increased focus on certain Muslim milieus in the West, which are not directly linked to violent jihadism or terrorism, but verbally express and preach support of violent Jihad, and give financial support to groups in the Middle East. An example of a Muslim community, which according to this defining property of radicalization was 'radical' was the

milieu around Abu Hamza and the Finsburry Park mosque in London. In Aarhus it has been discussed whether or not support of terrorism has been expressed or even preached by former imam Raed Hlayhel at the mosque on Grimhøjvej. In three definitions (Silber & Bhatt 2007; European Commission, 2008; PET Centre for Terrorism Analysis 2008) the support/acceptance of 'terrorism' is directly mentioned. Without going into detail, it is clear that this defining property introduces the important question of who defines what terrorism is.

The definitions in Table 2 also show that radicalization is increasingly defined in opposition to democracy. Radicalization poses a threat to the democratic order of the West. Thus, radicalism is not just about using or accepting political violence or terrorism, but also about using 'undemocratic' means or aiming for an 'undemocratic' goal, that is, believing that some societal system might be better than liberal democracy. It is often unclear what is meant by 'undemocratic means', but the term suggests that radicalization could include also such practices as abstaining from voting or encouraging others not to vote in democratic elections. Likewise, 'undemocratic means' could be taken to include harassment and threats of other groups in ways that make their participation in public debates and civil society difficult. There are claims that imams at the Grimhøjvej mosque in Aarhus have urged Muslims not to participate in local elections, and stories have circulated in the media of groups of young Muslim men who harassed young immigrant girls who were not wearing the veil and put pressure on others to come to mosque. With regards to 'undemocratic goals' it is more or less clear that this means aiming at, and believing in, the superiority of another societal system than the rule of the people. It seems plausible that the tendency to define radicalization in terms of having undemocratic goals can be seen as a product of the perceived threat to Western democracies posed by 'Islamist' groups, who are working to undermine the democratic order, and impose an Islamic state and the rule of God through the implementation of *Sharia*. In Denmark especially *Hizb ut-Tahrir* has been seen as an exponent of this position. The focus on undemocratic goals and (extremist) beliefs corresponds somewhat to an underlying theory of radicalization, which emphasizes the importance of ideological components in driving radicalization. What drives people to take up violence or other undemocratic means is the sharing of certain radical or extremist ideas, rather than e.g. structural conditions, situational escalations or organizational dynamics (for the view that all these elements matter see e.g. della Porta 1995; Wiktorowizc 2005; Olesen 2009).

Finally, Table 2 shows that radicalization is increasingly defined as an individual process. Traditionally, radicalization has been linked to a group or organization that takes up violence. The underlying theory of radicalization highlighted group dynamics and intensive interaction in driving radicalization. The recent focus on making radicalization an individual process suggests an alternative view of radicalization that puts more weight on changes in individual socio-psychological situations – so called 'cognitive openings' – as the initial impetus for radicalization. In this optic radicalization occurs because individu-

als become ideological 'seekers' when previously held beliefs and worldviews are challenged by social, economical, cultural, political or strictly personal experiences. Radicalization happens when an individual, for different reasons, starts looking for alternative ideologies, religious or political, and comes into contact with existing radical beliefs expressed by certain groups or charismatic 'leaders'. Thus, radicalization occurs when individual demands for radical views meet the supply of radical ideas. Making radicalization an individual process has put more responsibility on the individual, indicating that radicalization happens 'without a cause', and when people regard the use of violence as legitimate things happen only in the mind of the individual. This view disregards 'objective' causes, for instance in terms of external pressure. In earlier literature on radicalization, external pressure on a specific group was part of the explanation of why groups would radicalize (della Porta 1995). Moreover, even if a distinctly socio-psychological explanation of radicalization is sought, it must be combined with other theoretical perspectives (Olesen 2009: 10).

The two Danish definitions of radicalization, which will be used as the foundation for the discussion of our empirical material in the next sections, seem to be rather close to one another. If we supplement the definition of radicalization provided by the Danish government with the attached definition of 'extremism' presented above, the two Danish definitions share all the defining properties of 'directed process', 'acceptance/support', 'undemocratic means and goals', and 'individualism'. This makes the two definitions rather typical for the trends in defining radicalization outlined above. The Danish definitions have been criticized on different accounts (Nielsen 2009). Some criticism of the definitions, and the underlying theory of radicalization, will be outlined in Part II, which introduces another approach to understanding and defining radicalization. For the remainder of Part I, we will look at the answers these definitions give us when applied to the ASC Islamic activist milieu in Aarhus. To study radicalization we have to look for certain elements, which the definitions point to. According to the definitions of radicalization proposed by the PET Centre for Terror Analysis and by the Danish government, the elements to look for are, firstly, acceptance/support of violence to reach political goals, including acceptance of terrorism. The answers we received on these questions, including reflections on the concept of jihad, are discussed in Section 4.1. Secondly, we will discuss the extent of undemocratic beliefs, goals and actions in the milieu. Section 4.2 discusses the perceptions we encountered of e.g. voting, implementation of Sharia and an Islamic state. Part I concludes by suggesting some clarifications for improving the definitions in regard to these elements.

1.3. Mapping Muslims in Aarhus

The first wave of immigrants with a Muslim family background consisted for the most part of Turks who arrived in Aarhus in the 1960s and early 1970s to take up mainly unskilled jobs. The stop for labor immigration in 1973 brought this influx to an end, but was

followed by a period of family reunifications, where labor immigrants could bring their families to Denmark. In 1979 there were about 1200 Muslims in Aarhus of which about 1100 were Turks (Kühle 2003: 179). The Muslim population in Aarhus today consists of the labor immigrants from Turkey (and a few from Morocco and Pakistan), arriving primarily in the 1960s and 1970s and their descendants, refugees from Lebanon, Somalia, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan, who arrived in the 1980s and 1990s, their children, and a small number of converts to Islam.

Figure 1. Immigrants and descendants from Muslim countries in Aarhus January 1 2009

The exact number of Muslims in Aarhus is unknown. What is known with great precision, however, is the number of immigrants from Muslim countries and the number of children they have, even if the immigrant and their children have become Danish citizens. As most Muslims in Denmark are immigrants or children of immigrants from Muslim countries it is possible to estimate the number of Muslims in Aarhus. The statistics do not include adult children of immigrants who have become Danish citizens and whose children are born in Denmark as Danish citizens, but that number is so far rather small and probably mainly consists of people with a Turkish family background.[4] To reach an estimate of the number of Muslims in Aarhus, the number of immigrants and descendants of immigrants from Muslims countries could be used adding the number of 'third generation immigrants', born by parents with Danish citizenship, subtracting an estimate of the number of immigrants from Muslims countries[5] who are not Muslim, and finally adding the number of converts. The number of converts in Aarhus is not known, but taking into consideration that the number of converts in Denmark in 2007 was 2100-2800 (Jensen & Østergaard

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[4] http://www.dst.dk/TilSalg/Boghandel/Indhold.aspx?address=indvandrereidk2008

[5] About 10 percent of immigrants from Muslim countries in Aarhus are not Muslim (Kühle 2006: 41).

2007: 31) and about 10 percent of Danish Muslims live in Aarhus, an estimate of about 300 is given. Based on these criteria of calculation the number of Muslims in Aarhus is about 18,500.[6] The largest ethnic groupings among the Muslims are Palestinian/Lebanese[7] (4894) and Turks (4131).[8] Because the percentage of Muslims among the Lebanese is believed to be somewhat lower than among the Turkish population,[9] it is difficult to say which group is the largest.

Figure 2. National background of immigrants from Muslim countries in Aarhus

Among the young Muslims (16-25 years), the group of Muslim immigrants and descendants from Turkey is larger than the groups with a Lebanese background. The Turkish group differs from the other groups in that the great majority of young persons with a Turkish background are second generation immigrants, which means that they are born in Denmark by parents who migrated from Turkey. For most of the other migrant groups in Aarhus, the opposite applies: very few young Muslims which an Iraqi, Somali or Afghan background are born in Denmark. The group of young Muslims listed as Lebanese in the statistics, but which mainly consists of Palestinians, consists of about one third immigrants and two thirds second generation immigrants. However, because this group primarily arrived in the early 1990s many of the immigrant youths have spent most of their lives in Denmark and the difference between immigrants and second generation immigrants is perhaps not that salient. If the distinction is not made in regard to place of birth, but place of secondary socialization in terms of school time (place of living after 6th year),

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[6] Immigrants and descendants from the ten largest Muslims countries constitute about 20,400; 10 percent are subtracted and about 2-300 converts are added, a good estimate could be 18,500. See Kühle 2006 or Jacobsen 2008 for further details about this.

[7] The two groups cannot be separated in the statistics.

[8] The numbers refer to immigrants from one of these two countries or persons whose parents are immigrants from one of the countries. The number of people – mainly Turks, who may consider themselves to be of Turkish descent, but whose parents are born in Denmark and hold Danish citizenship – is not included.

[9] Depending on whether the Alevi among the Turkish group are counted as Muslims or not (see Kühle 2006: 39-40).

the picture changes. Many young children among the immigrants arriving from in particular Somalia and Lebanon between 1988-1996 will in the statistics be termed immigrants, but have no recollection of living anywhere else than in Denmark.[10]

Figure 3. Migration background of parents of young Muslims in Denmark

No of muslims 16-25 years

The number of Muslims calculated in this way represents an estimate of the number of people with a Muslim family background living in Aarhus. But many of these Muslims are not particularly religious or even religious at all. It may be problematic to impose a specific religious identity on people with no or little religious self-identification. French scholar Olivier Roy thus suggests that:

> Western Islam is not necessarily a 'liberal' Islam, but it is an Islam that considers itself as a faith community, based on a voluntary adhesion. To stress the voluntary dimension of such a faith community, we should avoid considering as 'Muslim' anybody with a Muslim background (Roy 2007: 60).

In Roy's opinion, we impose a religious identity on people with a Muslim background if they are described as Muslims if they are only Muslims by name and have no religious practice or a distinct religious identity. In the Danish situation results from surveys suggest that almost everyone from a Muslim background will self-identify as Muslim, though 30 percent of these will self-identify as 'not very religious' (Kühle 2006: 47). It is very difficult to come up with a number for how many of the nominal Muslims in Aarhus are actively religious. An estimate from 2003 indicates that about 1000 – primarily men – attend

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[10] There were for instance 155 6 year-old immigrants from Somalia in Aarhus in 1996 and 167 6 year-old immigrants from Lebanon in Aarhus. These children are today 19 years old.

Friday prayers on an ordinary Friday (Kühle 2004: 184), while about 20 percent of Muslims in Aarhus are members of a Muslim congregation (Kühle 2004: 178). An estimate has been made that about 1/3 of the nominal Muslims in Aarhus participated in communal prayer at the end of Ramadan in 2003 (Kühle 2006: 171).

Gellerup/Toveshøj – life in the ghetto

The majority of Muslims in Aarhus live in the neighborhoods of Gellerup and Toveshøj. Also the area of Rosenhøj holds many inhabitants with an immigrant background. These areas are often described as ghettos, due to the large number of persons outside the labor market. Immigrants and children of immigrants living in Aarhus are more likely to be outside the labor market than the general population, especially people with a background in Somalia, Iraq and Lebanon.

Table 3. Unemployment rates among 16-64 year-olds in Arhus[a)]

	2007	**2008**	**Change 2007-8**
Iran	8	6	-2.2
Iraq	15	10	-5.2
Lebanon	17	8	-8.2
Vietnam	6	3	-2.5
Somalia	24	17	-7.1
Other refugee countries	11	7	-3.9
Turkey	7	4	-3.1
Other migrant countries	8	5	-2.5
Sum of non-Western countries	10	7	-3.8
Western countries	4	3	-1.1
Denmark	3	2	-0.8
In sum	3	2	-0.9

a) http://www.aarhuskommune.dk/files/aak/aak/content/filer/borgmesterens_afdeling/ oekono-misk_ afdeling/statistisk_kontor/arbejdsmarked/arbejdsloesheden/Beskxftigelse_og_arbejds-lxshed_fordelt_px_herkomstx_2003-2008.pdf

Due to the long period of economic growth, unemployment rates have declined over 25 percent from about 24 percent among persons with a Somali background in 2007 to 17 percent in 2008; by one third for the Iraqi group and by half for the Lebanese group. Unemployment rates remain above average for most migrant groups, in particular for migrants and descendants from Somalia, Iraq and Lebanon. Information on the unemployment rates in the recent recession has been unattainable. To counteract the high unemployment rates among immigrants, several projects have been launched: the local government project, *Ungdommens uddannelsescenter* (UU; Youth educational center), which helps youths between 12 and 25 get an education. A private project, *Vejledningscentret for uddannelse og arbejde* (VCUA; Information center for education and work) was started by local interest groups and parents in 2004, while a third project, Shaqo Junior, was started

in 2008 as a youth section of Shaqo, which primarily helps adult Somalis attain a job or an education.[11] Shaqo Junior adresses a much broader youth group.

In contrast to the general trend of decreasing crime rates, particularly among the young, rates are rising in the Gellerup area.[12] Crime statistics in Aarhus are not calculated based on ethnicity or religion, but the general feeling is that many of the young criminals have a Muslim family background. Problems with one or more gangs have also been reported, especially Trillegårdsbanden has been mentioned in the media,[13] and gangs have had gun fights in Aarhus, although no way nearly as much as in Odense and Copenhagen.[14] Additionally, Gellerup and Toveshøj have on different occasions been the location of civil unrest with burning of cars in 2008. It has become a public symbol of some of the problems facing Gellerup that the local 'Folkekirke', the Church of Denmark congregation residing in Gellerup church, has had employed guards to stop vandalism and burglary in and around the church.[15]

To summarize, Aarhus may provide the kind of environment which French scholars call the 'banlieu', and Anglophones call the 'ghetto', which describes a location where a socially and ethno-culturally similar population lives in conditions of increasing physical degeneration, unemployment, poverty, crime, disorganization and lacking government institutions (Mikkelsen 2008: 79). The ghetto/the banlieu is exactly the kind of environment that some scholars describe as the background for radicalization in terms of exclusion and marginalization.

Religious practices: Mosques, teaching and religious authorities

The Muslim milieu in Aarhus is diverse. A journalist working since 2000 with topics concerning immigrants in Aarhus puts it this way:

> What I first noticed was an extreme division. First in terms of nationality, then within the different nationalities, different political divisions. That is, among the Turks there are the secular, Mili Görus groups and Fethullah Gülen, very much so and the same goes for the Arab group (Malene, journalist).

This division in different ethnic environments is similar to the organization of Islam in Denmark in general, where there has been very little contact between the different groups of Muslims until recently (Kühle 2006).

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[11] Aarhus Stiftstidende 30 Nov 2008.

[12] http://jp.dk/indland/aar/kriminalitet/article1737903.ece

[13] http://jp.dk/indland/aar/kriminalitet/article1545263.ece

[14] http://jp.dk/opinion/ordeterdit/article1530267.ece

[15] http://jp.dk/indland/aar/article1552543.ece.

Muslim organizations

If we by a Muslim organization mean an organization where the majority of members are Muslim, then there are a number of Muslim organizations in Aarhus, namely the many migrant organizations in Aarhus, which are grounded on ethnic background. Often ethnic organizations also have a religious dimension. According to a study by Lise Togeby in 2003, many of the migrant organizations in Aarhus occasionally have religious activities, but the membership tends to be limited to a specific ethnic background and the religious ingredient seems not to be at the forefront (Togeby 2003). A division of labor can be found among the Muslim organizations where most communities are ethno-nationally defined and concentrate on running local mosques, while a few organizations are truly multi-ethnic and participate in public debates about Islam and Muslims in Denmark (e.g. Islamic Faith Community, Democratic Muslims, Muslims in Dialogue, and Critical Muslims). However, there are surprisingly few Muslim youth organizations in Aarhus in comparison with Copenhagen and Odense. One organization is *Muslims in Dialogue* (MiD; Muslimer i Dialog) with about 100 members in Aarhus. Apparently in contrast to the situation in Copenhagen, the MiD in Aarhus primarily has female members. Muslims in Dialogue arranges seminars and social gatherings, for instance at Christmas. A very active organization is Dialog Forum, which was started in 2007, and whose members mainly have a Turkish family background.

Mosques

There are ten mosques in Aarhus. The oldest mosque, Islamic Cultural Center Mosque/ Islamisk Kulturcenter (Merkez) was established in the mid-1970s, and bought its space in an apartment in Christiansgade in 1979 with funds from the Muslim World League, though the imam soon came to be employed by Diyanet, the official Turkish state Islam.[16] Diyanet also helped with the establishment of a mosque in 1982 in Åbyhøj where they later hired an imam. Turks residing in the southern part of town founded the Turkish immigrant associations in Viby in 1986, which was also related to Diyanet, but did not house an employed imam. The Sultun Ayrup mosque in Nørre Allé emerged in 1989 due to a conflict in the Islamic Cultural Center. The mosque was established by Muslims with a Turkish background, but in contrast to the other Turkish mosques it is not associated with the Turkish state. Arabic Culture Association was founded in 1991, first with premises in Klosterport. Since 2000, the mosque has been situated in the basement of Lykkeskolen by Bazar West to be closer to Gellerup where many members live. Close by lies Ligheds- og broderskabsforeningen's (Equality and Brotherhood Association) mosque at Grimhøjvej, established in 1993. A group of members broke off from this mosque in 2008 and moved to new premises a mere 100 meters down the road in an old factory building which, unlike the Ligheds- og broderskabsforening, is owned (and considered a *wakf*) rather than rented.

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[16] From 1992 the Islamic Cultural Center was explicitly linked to Diyanet.

The changing ethnic composition of Muslims in Aarhus is shown in the formation of the Somali Family Association in 1993. The year after, it moved into the premises in Eckersberggade. After an internal conflict in 1997, about 30 of its members formed a new organization, Somalisk Opdragelsesforening, which is located at Gellerupvej. An Afghan mosque was established in 2007 next to Viby Torv.

None of the Muslim congregations in Aarhus were built as mosques, but have had to adapt to circumstances. Those who own their own premises have to a greater extent been able to decorate the rooms so they appear as a 'real' mosque, for example by using tiles as in the Sultun Ayrup mosque in Nørre Allé. Yet many Muslims in Aarhus long for the construction of a real mosque; that is, a mosque owned by Muslims and with the physical appearance of a mosque, inside as well as outside.

A diverse group of Muslims in Aarhus has formed the organization *Forening for Moske og Islamisk Kulturcenter* whose goal is to build a large mosque in Aarhus, which may hold as many as 1500 visitors (Kühle 2006: 30). The price is estimated to be Dkr 100 million and a fundraising campaign has been launched.[17] One problem has been to get the different Muslims groups, who hardly know each other, to cooperate. The project of building a mosque has thus entailed the establishment of an umbrella organization, Forbundet af Islamiske Foreninger, where many of the mosques and Muslim organizations are members. The city council has approved the plans to build the mosque and the 2009 district plan assigns an area in Gellerup for the establishment of a mosque and Islamic cultural center after six years of efforts.[18] However, the economic foundation is not yet sufficient.

Imams and religious authorities

There is no imam in Aarhus who is esteemed by all Muslims in Aarhus. In fact there is not even an imam, whose name is known by all Muslims in Aarhus. It is a widespread feeling among Muslims in Aarhus that there are few if any Muslim leaders in Denmark who stand out, and though some interviewees point to one or more imams in Aarhus that they respect, most would not say that these imams are uniquely qualified religiously. Of the ten mosques in Aarhus only the two Diyanet mosques have permanently employed full-time imams; two have changing imams from Turkey and the Middle East; and the other mosques have changing voluntary imams. Some interview persons in the Arabic milieu mention Radwan Mansour, one of the imams in the mosque at Lykkeskolen, as an important person, but his position derives as much from the success of the Muslim private school, where he is employed, and his general role in Gellerup as an energetic and skilled man, as from his religious qualifications. Several mention former imam Shaykh Raed, who held a prominent role in the cartoon crisis and left the city in the aftermath, disappointed by the course of events. Others mention Ahmed Akkari, the young spokesman of

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[17] http://mosquedenmark.org/

[18] www.moskeen.dk

the group of imams during the crisis, who used to hold a prominent position in Aarhus as a Danish-speaking imam, especially popular among young Muslim. Akkari has also left Aarhus and is now working in Greenland as a teacher.[19] Religious authority is, however, not confined to the mosques. There are some religious authorities in Aarhus, some of which may occasionally function as imams in the mosque, but whose primary duties are outside the mosque, where they function as religious guides, brokers in family conflicts and as teachers of Islam in private.

Other Muslim institutions: the Muslim free schools

Besides the Islamic organizations and mosques, other institutions also play an important part in the Muslim milieus in Aarhus. The most important are the Muslim free schools, which are subject to the general legislation for schools. Due to partial state funding (about 80 percent)[20] they constitute stable institutions for primary socialization of children as well as a job market for adult Muslims with the relevant qualifications (though by no means all employees are Muslim). There are three Muslim private schools in the municipality of Aarhus and one private school, Nilen, which primarily attracts Muslim children, but does not consider itself a Muslim private school as there is no teaching of religious subjects.

Table 4. Muslim, private schools in Aarhus

Name	Established	Number of students	Ethnic background of students	Website
Lykkeskolen	1992	202 (2006)	Palestinian, Somali, Iraqi, Kurdish	www.lykkeskolen.dk
Selam friskolen	1993	182 (2006)	Turkish, Somali, Arab, Bosnian, Pakistani	www.selam.dk
Den Moderne kulturelle skole	1998	110 (2006)	Palestinian, Somali, Iraqi	www.dmk-skole.dk

Source: Ihle 2007.

The number of students in the Muslim private schools is, as shown in Table 4, about 500, i.e. about 15 percent of the children aged 6-15 in Aarhus with a Muslim background attend a Muslim private school. There are some Muslim students in the Catholic private school in Aarhus,[21] but the bulk of students with a Muslim family background attend the public schools, where they on average constitute 10 percent, though students with a Muslim family background are concentrated on relatively few schools. There are no specific Muslim institutions for secondary education in Aarhus. Youth with a Muslim family background attend the public *gymnasium* (high school) and provide as many as 20 percent of the student population in some places. The number of Muslim students at Aarhus Uni-

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[19] http://www.kristeligt-dagblad.dk/artikel/296435:Danmark-Ahmed-Akkari-er-faerdig-som-imam

[20] http://www.friskoler.dk/index.php?id=395

[21] http://www.aarhus.dk/default.asp?Id=306&AjrDcmntId=3749.

versity is not known. A Muslim student organization was established in 2008. It has organized a couple of activities but is still in a process of institutionalization, and so far there has been little visible Muslim mobilization at the university. There is a 'silent room' in the main building, which, although it is decorated with Christian symbolism, is open for students regardless of religion and is apparently occasionally used for Muslim prayer.[22]

Some shops cater specifically to a Muslim audience. There are a number of halal butcheries and shops, especially in the 'ethnic' shopping mall Bazar Vest, and it is possible to buy Islamic decorations and clothing. There is no Islamic bookstore in Aarhus, but it is possible to get free booklets and buy books in some of the mosques. It is also possible to buy books off the counter from one of the butcher shops. Muslims in Aarhus who request Islamic literature would, however, buy it in Copenhagen or at an internet bookshop. Among the Muslims we interviewed, Islamguide.dk appeared to be the most popular supplier of books.

The Muslim milieu in Aarhus differs from the Muslim milieus in for instance Odense and Copenhagen on several measures. Firstly, the ethnic composition differs. Whereas there are large groups of Muslims of Pakistani descent in Odense and Copenhagen, and where mosques and organizations primarily catering to Muslims with a Pakistani background are prominent on the Islamic scene in these two cities, there are very few Pakistanis in Aarhus and no specific Pakistani mosque. There are also relatively few Bosnians in Aarhus. Unlike in Odense and Copenhagen, there are apparently relatively few Sufis – in particular within the Arab milieu[23] – and only relatively few Shia-Muslims, who by the way are not very publicly oriented. Until recently there have not been any active student movements, and the notorious Hizb ut Tahrir has apparently been unable to set up a base in Aarhus. The Aarhus Islamic youth movement is, unlike what appears to be the case in Odense and Copenhagen, not situated in specific youth organizations.

Religious revival in the Muslim community: the ASC milieu

It has become commonplace to describe the situation of Islam in the early 21st century as that of resurgence, a revival or an awakening. These terms all point to the same reality, i.e. that Islam today plays a much more pronounced role than 40 years ago, not only in individual lives but also in public life. American scholar Michael Barkun has suggested that a distinction is made between 'revivals' and 'awakenings' (1985). A revival is an episode or period of 'emotional outpouring of religious fervor', an awakening is 'a more profound and longlasting reorientation of values and thought patterns' (1985: 426). Where awakenings – at least in an American Christian context – tend to take roughly a generation, 30 years, revivals are more concentrated in time and, thus, more identifiable as events. The

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[22] http://www.mit.ps.au.dk/kanden/Enkeltnumre/Kanden_Marts2009.pdf

[23] The international Sufi school MTO has a branch in Aarhus, which mainly attracts people of Iranian descent. The Turkish group Dialog Forum also belongs within the Sufi tradition.

global reorientation of Islam that has been taking place in the Muslim world since the 1970s is therefore rightly described as a global Islamic awakening. Though the awakening began earlier, its impact was only noticed after the Iranian revolution in 1979; an event that shocked the world. The Islamic revolution in Iran changed the way people regarded the influence of religion in the modern world and redirected research in order to explain it. The Islamic revival is often equaled to the resurgence of political Islam or Islamism, but it is in fact much more than that: 'From Cairo to Kuala Lumpur, the resurgence of Islam manifested itself in personal and public life, in piety and politics. Many became more religiously observant in prayer, fasting, dress, and behavior' (Esposito 1999: 656). Muslims in various Muslim countries began to revive their religious identity and to take on or intensify their religious practice. Though it is difficult to put the awakening on a simple formula, it involves a rethinking of Islamic tradition and a search for sources and interpretation which could renew the attraction of Islam for its adherents. One of the best known Islamic scholars, Youssef Qaradawi, member of the European Fatwa Council and editor of Islamonline.org discussed the consequences of the awakening in the book *Islamic Awakening between Rejection and Extremism* from 1990, because he found that from an Islamic point of view, besides the obvious good aspects of the awakening, there were risks of extremism and excessiveness too:

> Excessiveness is too disagreeable for ordinary human nature to endure or tolerate. Even if a few human beings could put up with excessiveness for a short time, the majority would not be able to do so. God's legislation addresses the whole of the universe, not a special group who may have a unique capacity for endurance. This is why the Prophet was once angry with his eminent Companion Mu'adh, because the latter had led the people one day in prayer and so prolonged it that one of the people went to the Prophet and complained. The Prophet said to 'Mu'adh! Are you putting people to the test?' and repeated it three times (Qaradawi 1991: 12-13).

Qaradawi's point is well known in sociology of religion: revivalism may lead to fanatism and sectarianism if people get too caught by the winds of change.

Islamic revival in Denmark

Islamic revival is not confined to the Muslim World. Kepel dates the onset of the 'second evangelization of Europe', which he describes as an attempt to 'Islamize modernity', to around 1975 (Kepel 1994: 2). Other researchers have documented revivalism among Muslim minorities in Western societies since the 1990s (Cherribi 2003). Danish research on Islam has not paid much attention to the issue of Islamic revival.[24] In Denmark the notion

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[24] But many 'public intellectuals' have used the concept, see for instance the home page of the watch organization Dialogcenteret http://www.dci.dk/index.php?option=com_content&task= view &id=957&Itemid=34 and books by for instance Helle Merete Brix (2002). It is not uncommon for Danish Muslims to refer to a situation of revival or Islamization or re-Islamization (see e.g. Shah 2004).

of revival is mainly associated with the large religious revitalization movements of the 19th century, which formed the current religious milieu of Denmark by producing two main factions of the Church of Denmark, Grundtvigian and the Inner Mission movements, as well as many of the free churches.

Table 5. Experiences of becoming more or less religious

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
	'Have you become more or less religious within the last three years?'				
Valid	More religious	319	28.7	28.7	28.7
	Equally religious	459	41.2	41.2	69.9
	Less religious	219	19.7	19.7	89.6
	Either or	73	6.6	6.6	96.1
	Don't know	43	3.9	3.9	100.0
	Total	1113	100.0	100.0	

Little is known about the history of Islamic awakening in Denmark. Recent surveys document that about 20 percent of Muslims surveyed claim that they have become more religious in recent years (Afsar 2007).[25] The survey conducted by Shahamak Rezaei and Marco Goli resulted in a slightly higher number: 28.7 percent said that they had become more religious within the last three years. One article describing the results from a former survey uses the headline 'Young religious revival' because especially young Muslims claim higher levels of religiosity according to the survey.[26]

Another observation is that since the 1990s Muslim organizations have increasingly surfaced in the public debates concerning immigrants, replacing secular organizations like Ind-sam and Poem as representatives for the Muslim population (Mikkelsen 2008). A particularly noticeable (and contested) trend that has followed the entry on the organizational stage by young generations of ethnic minorities in Denmark is a shift away from ethno-cultural to religious organizations. There is a tendency for young ethnic minority members to become active in organizations where religion (Islam) is in focus rather than organizations built around ethno-cultural traditions. This tendency corresponds to the shift from focus on 'immigrants' to 'Muslims' which can be identified across Europe over the last decade, and which has probably been particularly visible in Denmark (Allievi 2006; Mouritsen 2005). Religion, in particular Islam, has become the main topos around which ethnic minorities organize in Denmark. The initiative among ethnic minority organizations at a political level is today clearly found among the Muslim organizations, which are becoming more and more politically active. The Muhammad caricatures controversy strengthened this tendency further.

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[25] 11 percent say that they have become less religious.

[26] http://www.jur.lo.dk/2004/32/Baggrundoganalyse/Ungmuslimskvaekkelse.aspx

Rather than following a trail of secularization, the Muslim world is thus in a process of re-Islamization (Esposito & Burgat 2003) and related to this, but also following its own path, is the Islamization occurring among Muslims living in the West (Esposito 2003: 11). This Islamization shows itself in a revival among hitherto non-practicing Muslims, who now return or for the first time begin to practice Islam as well as in a number of non-Muslims converting to Islam. The revival creates 'born-again Muslims', a term used by Olivier Roy and Peter van der Veer, among others, to emphasize the similarities between Muslims who have been re-Islamatized, paralleling the phenomena of Christians who have rediscovered their Christian faith. Other scholars use the notion of Islamic activists (e.g. Christensen 2001 or Wictorowicz 2001, 2003).

A Change Institute report from 2008, *Studies into violent radicalization*, done for the European Commission builds for its Danish part on interviews with about 30 young Danish Muslims, most of them affiliated with Munida, the youth organization of Islamisk Trossamfund, based in Copenhagen. The report clearly sees the Danish situation in terms of Islamic awakening and revival:

> The Danish context in particular illuminates a process of Islamic revivalism and a construction of shared immigrant identities based on an Islamic faith that can be identifiable from the fieldwork responses gathered by the Danish research team. (European Commission 2008: 96).

The study shows a clear pattern of religious revivalism in Aarhus, particularly in two milieus, the mainly Turkish milieu around Dialog Forum and the more diverse milieu (ethnically and religiously), which we have termed the ASC milieu. The report focuses on the activities of the latter, because the former – though of considerable interest – is Sufi-oriented and considered to be quite liberal (Yavuz 1999).

One definition of revivalism, constructed for the Christian context, but applicable to a Muslim context too, is that revival 'assumes some sort of decline, whether real or imagined, out of which the faithful are called to new heights of spiritual ardor and commitment' (Blumhofer & Balmer 1993: xii). This is a strong element in some of the interviews, where the world is seen as being not what it is supposed to be, and that this is because Muslims have left their religion:

> In Denmark and in other parts of the world we should, as you said, we should return to our religion, because we … we have lost many things … I am not free, and I think that bad people are given the possibility to rule the world. I think that he who rules the world should be good and consider all people in the world. Now he [the leaders] does not think about people, he thinks about himself and how he can get money and become famous (Mahmoud, imam)

> There are a lot of things which has been made legal, right. Well, Muslims are weak and that is why they have lost power in Andalusia, in the south of Spain. It was because we departed from the law of Allah, and everything went haywire. That is why

> Muslims are weak today, because we have left the original message. There is a hadith [a narration originating from the words and deeds of the Prophet} which says that when we are happy just to follow the tail of the cow and plough the soil, right and not act, then Allah will humiliate us until we return to our religion. Today Muslims are humiliated (Thomas).

Some of the interviews also express great confidence that people are in fact returning to Islam at the moment:

> There is the first three generation in relation to the hadith of the prophet, right. But gradually – 1427 years have passed since the Prophet migrated to Medina, there have been periods for the Muslims where things went downwards and they were sleeping tightly, but there were also periods where the Muslims woke up. And right now we are in a period, where the Muslims are waking up, right now (Racheed).

There is much that suggests that the revival is particularly strong among the women. Whereas there are many activities for Muslim women, courses, informal gatherings and more, there is less for the young men, and women play a prominent role in setting up activities for both genders. As far as re-Islamization in the Muslim world, the fact that women constitute a substantial part of the Islamic awakening has attracted considerable attention (Christensen 2001, Mahmood 2005). It is thus highly remarkable that men not only practice less, but also are much more integrated into the 'Danish youth culture' of drinking and dating:

> Unfortunately these days young men they have forgotten their religion. You may say. 'He is a Muslim' but then suddenly he is in a bar and frankly how much Islam is there in a bar? So they don't care a lot, not all of them, but many don't care (Kareem, 22 years).

Islamic activism

The consequence of the revival is Islamic activism: 'activism where Islam forms the ideological basis of an organization' (Olesen 2009: 9). The Islamic activism taking place in the ASC milieu in Aarhus is primarily focused on saving lost souls. The Muslims interviewed are frustrated about how young people with Muslim family background have become involved in crime and other kinds of illegal activities:

> Muslims are weak today because they have drifted away from Islam. Many can't even be bothered to pray. All those who are making trouble in Gjellerup or on Nørrebro they don't do Salat [prayer] and their parents are most likely not practicing. All the youngsters that come here in the mosque are either under education or working. Muslims need to start practicing their religion again (Thomas).

Some of the young Muslims interviewed suggest solutions for keeping the young 'nominal' Muslim off the streets:

It would be a good idea if a [real] mosque can be established. Because we young ones, right, we have some plans. If a mosque is established then we will invite all those young who make trouble to this place and we could do all kind of things (Talha).

Others have already been involved in patrolling the streets and calming emotions running high during the riots following the reprinting of the Muhammad cartoons in 2008:

I promise you, if we had not stopped the youngsters back then during the unrest, much more would have happened. It was us that stopped it – we patrolled in cars during those nights. They had sympathy for the Prophet even though they don't even pray and go to mosque. They walk the streets; they drink and smoke hash and stuff like that. But every Muslim loves the prophet. That is something deep in every Muslim. They wanted to burn things, but we stopped them. We have been running a patrol and been driving with the police at night, when there were riots here in Brabrand. That is what we have always done (Racheed).

One Muslim in his late 30s attempts not only to stop the youth, but also to bring them back to Islam. He therefore runs a study group for boys, who he finds walking the streets at night:

And step by step from this moment in the streets we find some respect, start to do something and then step by step they come to the house they knock the door. They say we want to sit with you to know who we are, because I ask them all the time; who are you? Example, if I am going to ask you who you are, you are going to say 'I am human'. I am … my name … bla bla bla. But we are not just human. We are the best made of God. We are [those] who control the body. We are supposed to care about this life. But can we be the opposite of that, what is that going to be? Evil? Devil (Abu, shaykh).

The reason for engaging in these kinds of activities is simple:

If I remove him from the streets, remove him from hashish, remove him from crime and find a place for him where he can be decent, then it is a good thing for me. I expect to be rewarded for that in the last days, right? (Racheed).

Some interpreters make a direct link between Islamization and the crime in the banlieu. Jespersen and Pittelkow for instance suggest that the claim of some criminals in the Swedish town Ronna that the town is theirs and the police has nothing to do there, is a sign of Islamist attempts to create Muslim enclaves (2006: 113). This claimed relationship between crime and the Islamist revival upsets the Muslims in the ASC milieu. Several of the interview persons worry about crime rates and understand them as a sign of the poor conditions of faith among Muslims in Aarhus. The criminal and rioting elements are not a part of the ASC milieu, but a target for mission initiatives.

The ASC milieu in Aarhus is dominated by what may be called Salafi currents, which advocate a return to the teachings of the Quran and the practices of the Prophet (sunna)

without the mediation of the traditional Law schools. The Salafi movement is preoccupied with the purity of faith and therefore rejects branches of Islam they feel compromise this, for instance Shia Islam and Sufism. The domination of Salafism makes it markedly different from the milieus in Odense and Copenhagen, who host strong Sufi-milieus. Asked whether there was a revival in Copenhagen as well, a Muslim from Copenhagen who had taught a course on Islam in Aarhus replied:

> Yes, but I do not think that it is primarily within Salafi. I have noticed it among our people too. Many young people have started to attend the mosque and really many of the more young, wasallah about 20-30 in the crowd, where there used to be 2-3. Well, they used to have contact to the mosques, but now slowly they come to be more practicing (Fadl, religious theacher).

The revival is difficult to catch objectively, but it may be an indication that whereas an estimate of participants in Friday Prayer in 2003 says 1000 (Kühle 2004: 184), a current estimate suggests that today the number is probably around 1500. The rise reflects partly the opening of two new mosques (and new larger building for one) and the growth in the absolute number of Muslims in Aarhus from 2003 to 2009 (from about 15,000 to about 18,500), but it may also suggest that former non-practicing are now taking up a religious practice.

Why a revival?

Why do awakenings and revivals take place? There are no definite answers. One renowned book in sociology of religion simply states that 'To remain successful, long after formation, religious groups rely greatly upon the tactic of revival' (Stark & Bainbridge 1987: 273). Yet the interview material makes it possible to investigate different indications of the background for the individual Muslim. First, it is well known that immigration often tends to be a 'theologizing experience' rather than a 'secularizing process' (Smith 1978: 1181) and several studies attest to the fact that migrants tend to attain higher levels of religiosity in their new settings (Duderija 2007: 143). Though this certainly does not apply to all migrants as some use the new setting to escape formerly prescribed religious behavior (Afsar 2007), it is not uncommon that migration leads to religious change. Some of the interviewees testify how the migration and resettlement in Denmark led them to a religious reorientation. Racheed was 'revived' in the early 1990s, when he lived in a refugee center in a small provincial town in Jutland. He and many of the other refuges in the center fled Palestine after the first intifada (1987-1993) and he tells how he along with other Muslims in the refugee center was sent on a journey for answer:

> He [his brother] was still in Lebanon then – and then he sent me some books and I started to read and acquaint myself with what it means to be a Muslim. Because the challenge, that is, the experience of being confronted with Danish society on a daily basis: 'Well, are you a Muslim?', 'yes, I am a Muslim', 'What does it mean to be a Muslim?' People often posed these questions to me – what does it mean? Well, for me

as a person it was a bit shameful not to know very much about my religion. This is partly why I started to turn to Islam – because I wanted to be able to answer people, because 'okay, I am a Muslim, but what do I know about Islam? (Racheed).

Yet for other interviewees the religious awakening is unrelated to the migration process as such because they were either born in Denmark or moved here as young children. Some were raised religiously, others were not, but some of our interviewees experienced how they changed while growing up and became more and more religious:

There was not a lot of praying at home. There was not so much religion … We were only Muslims by name. But when you grow up and you are called to Friday prayer and such then you learn a bit more and then you become more religious (Hamza, 19 years).

Research has focused on how some young Muslims find Islam attractive as an identity also because of the liberties associated with 're-Islamization' vis-à-vis their parents. The revival entails learning and studying Islam and being critical of the parents' form of Islam (Johansen 2002; Schmidt 2004):

I am not trying to be clever regarding the older Muslims, but I feel that they have a bad tendency to mix culture with religion. I personally do not know a lot about my culture except for weddings where we have to do a specific dance. And there is nothing more because I also feel that my religion is my culture and politics is my culture. And in that way I have only one religion, whereas they may mix it for instance in relation to female genital mutilation, where they will say 'but you must' and we will completely reject it because we regard it as completely ridiculous (Kamila, 19 years, came to Denmark as 1 1/2 years old).

Though some young Muslims felt that there was a difference between them and their parents' generation, the current revival in Aarhus does seem to bridge the generational divide and bring the generations together and return whole families to Islam:

Then for instance in a family, where he [the father] has a son, who has become religious, then the son tells him how great he feels. And then he tells his brother how great he feels after he has started praying and this is how people tell it: 'now I feel really great'. For me personally, when I am away from my God, I don't sleep well. I feel I am lacking something. But as soon as I start praying or reading the Qu'ran or something I feel really great. And that is God. God told us in the Qu'ran that the Qu'ran is like medicine for your heart. If you read it you'll feel great. If you are close you'll feel great. That is how it is with Islam (Talha, 20 years).

That I have started to come here [in a private Islam study circle for young men] has meant that we as a family have something to talk about; it has brought us closer together. I come home and share what I have learned (Afif, 17 years).

Many interviewees indicated that media attention to Islam and Muslims may play a big role in this:

> It may be caused by the fact that the media forces you to relate to different things and then you begin to explore your own identity: Who am I really? It may lead you to attend the mosque more often and other factors, you may get caught by something, you think about our existence ... Different things, different factors may play a part, but I do consider it a general tendency among the young (Imran).

According to some interviewees the Islamic revival is specifically connected to experienced hardship and political discourse: 'It is a fact that since The Danish Peoples Party gained influence in Danish politics in the last 10 years, Muslims in Denmark have become more practicing. We have not fallen asleep' (Thomas).

Another factor may relate less to the general phenomenon of being a Muslim in the Western world, but focuses more on the specific elements causing a revival in Aarhus. The most important was Shaykh Raed Hlayhl's arrival in about 2003:

> I continued to hear about this shaykh Raed, who had come to town (laughs) and it was certainly not everyone who were equally happy about this or about him. He became a key person in the Muslim milieu or at least the Arab part, in fact the rest – the Turks frankly did not care about it (Malene, journalist).

Shaykh Raed was by some interviewees regarded as someone, who unlike any other religious authority in Denmark, was alim, a religious scholar: 'I respect him very much. If you ask me who is the best in Denmark. He was ... I have been 13 years in Denmark, and I have never seen a man like him' (Mahmoud, imam).

Others, primarily Muslims outside the ASC activist milieu, were less happy with Shaykh Raed's work, in particular during the cartoon crisis, where they felt that he helped to polarize the debate:

> Yes it was Raed who ran the campaign and there is no doubt that many Muslims felt offended because [of the cartoons]. Then there was this debate about freedom of speech contra non-freedom of speech and a group of Muslims, both shaykh Raed and his group, and ... but almost all Muslims felt offended. Then they are placed in this box, well they are a threat against welfare society and against freedom of speech and such. And you say that the debate took place in a harsh atmosphere and a lot of 'are you against?' and many Muslims that were against the process led by Raed were quiet and felt trapped in this debate: well, either you are with us and love the Prophet or you are in the other camp. I found that very unpleasant (Imran).

Shaykh Raed left Aarhus in the aftermath of the cartoon crisis.[27] To some, his departure only amplified his reputation, as shown by the following sequence:

> A: He is down in Lebanon now, because he could not be bothered, because of the cartoon crisis. He thought what is it with this country, to do something like that? Then he just left, though he has a handicapped son, who he can't take care of down there. But he thinks if it is going to be this way then I will sacrifice it all

> Q: What was so great about him?

> A: He knows how to talk to people and he has Islam in his heart, really. If you think about that he has a handicapped son, and he has the chance to live here. It is hard. Then you think: you [he] have to choose between myself [himself] and religion and then I [he] choose the religion (Kareem, 22 years).

For some participants in the ASC milieu shaykh Raed did not play a particular role, either because they had entered the milieu after he left or because they got their inspiration from other sources. A few mention Abdul Wahid Pedersen as 'a good Muslim brother, he shows the way for a lot of people' (Ali, 20 years), some reject him because of his sympathy for Sufism, and others lack knowledge about him and have not formed an opinion: 'I have only heard his name' (Kareem, 22 years). Many mentioned the Egyptian scholar Youssef Qaradawi, who is the leader of the European council for Fatwa and research and editor of islamonline.net, but again he was not a general authority, and not even known by all participants in the ASC milieu:

> I have received education from the imam, you mention, Youssef Qaradawi. He gives lessons on the internet and on TV (Ali, 20 years).

> I have heard about Shaykh Qaradawi, but I do not remember in what connection (Pernille, convert).

> I don't know him, no. There are of course some scholars … from the time of the prophet; they are the ones that I look into (Ghaada).

For most of the Muslim interviewees, the religious authority was neither a local imam nor an alim (religious scholar), talib (a student of religion, someone who may become alim) or shaykh (authority) in Denmark, but a scholar in the Muslim world, which they have either read, seen on TV, listened to on the internet or heard on tapes. Many names were mentioned in this connection (see Table 6), but the most important point is perhaps that the authority is very individualized. There are hundreds of religious authorities on the internet and hundreds of lectures available there, on tapes or in books. There are no authorities in the ASC milieu to disregard any of these except the critical sense of the individual.

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[27] Shaykh Raed still has ties to Aarhus, as he occasionally communicates via Skype with his former congregation in a Somali mosque in Aarhus.

Table 6. Religious authorities mentioned in interviews

Youssef Qaradawi	Ibn Baz,
Anwar al Walaki	Ibn Uthamin/Othaimin
Al Albani	Zindani

Awakenings generally take place when interpretations of the basic ideas within a religion no longer are suitable for adherents as the societies and life conditions have changed. Awakenings mean a reorientation of the religion back to roots and a rejection of aspects of the religion, which may once have been central, but are now regarded as untrue to the fundamentals of the religion. It is more difficult from a scholarly view to say why revivals take place. In the context of the believers this question is, however, simple:

> Yes in fact this happened for this group and I can't tell you why. It happened suddenly, right, but as a believing Muslim, you know that it is the knowledge of Allah that we believe in. Allah wants us to wake up and worship him, because that is why we were created, right? [...] When you produce a car, the purpose of the car is to transport you back and forth. That is the purpose of it. But what is the purpose of me? This was how I was beginning to think: Why am I here? I read a poem by a Christian poet and he poses the same questions, but he did not come up with an answer. His name is Elia Abu Madi and he says 'I am here, why am I here, where am I going? Where do I come from? (Racheed).

Summarizing

Revivals are common phenomena in the history of religion and tend to lead to social change. The current Islamic revival is focused on the core elements of Islam, most basically the daily prayer (salat) and leads the revived to be occupied with the cultivation of their Muslim identity. Many feel the need to express their gratitude that they themselves follow a path that may lead them to salvation, but also sadness that others are deemed to suffer the fire of hell. The need to avoid the temptations of Satan is another important issue of the revived. The revival leads to the existence of what may be called 'born again Muslims', focusing on da'wa and therefore on the distinction between saved and condemned. This may make the 'saved' unpopular in other parts of the Muslim milieu, especially if aggressive missionary tactics are used. From the state's point of view revivals contain positive as well as negative aspects. A revival empowers people: The Lutheran revival of the 19th century gave farmers self-confidence and helped pave the way for democracy. On the negative side it is obvious that the enormous forces set loose by a revival may be uncontrollable by the state. One important question is the extent to which the fight against radicalization is really – at least partly – a struggle against ideas and actions coming out of the revival. It is evident that many theories of radicalization link the Islamic revival to radicalization through ideas of 'identity crisis' and 'cognitive openings' among young seeking Muslims in Western Europe, though they are not always conscious about

it. The emphasis on the revivalist elements of radicalization may not change the determination of governments – for instance the Danish – to work to counter radicalization, but it may help frame an understanding of how and why things are happening and how unwanted effects may best be avoided. The next sections will apply the definitions of radicalization used in the Danish context to the ASC milieu and discuss their usefulness and possible clarifications.

1.4. Applying official definitions and corresponding theories of radicalization on the ASC milieu

In the following we will look at the answers the official Danish definitions of radicalization give us when applied to the ASC Islamic activist milieu in Aarhus. According to the definitions of radicalization proposed by the PET Centre for Terror analysis and by the Danish government (see Table 2), the elements to look for are, first, the acceptance/support of violence to reach political goals, including acceptance of terrorism. The answers we received on these questions, including reflections on the concept of jihad, are discussed in following section, 'Terrorism as jihad?' Second, we will discuss the extent of undemocratic beliefs, goals and actions in the milieu. The section entitled 'Un- or antidemocratic actions and attitudes' discusses the perceptions we encountered of e.g. voting, implementation of Sharia and an Islamic state.

'Terrorism' as jihad?

The first question we will address empirically is the extent to which the Muslims interviewed accepted the use of violence to achieve political goals or supported terrorism. The answer was unequivocal: There was substantial support for organizations which according to the US and EU terror lists are considered terrorist, not only among the young Muslim interviewees, but also among Muslim leaders, Muslim social workers and the five young Muslims outside the ASC milieu who were chosen as a control group. Support for organizations in the Muslim world, which are generally perceived as adversaries by Western authorities, was overwhelming and perhaps the clearest result of this study. Just about every interviewee with a Muslim background, regardless of religious or political opinions, supported or accepted the legitimacy of one or more organizations, which Western authorities and intelligence services (for instance PET) consider terrorist organizations.

Support for Hamas

Many Aarhus Muslims have a Palestinian background, so it is not surprising that Hamas plays such a prominent role among Muslims in Aarhus. Hamas is a Palestinian organization, established in the 1930s with roots in the Muslim Brotherhood. It emerged as a distinct political movement in 1987 and won the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006. However, Hamas' questioning of the peace treaty with Israel as well as the ongoing con-

flict with its rival party Fatah, which is supported by Israel and the US, has destabilized the Hamas government and led to warlike situations in Gaza, with the outages in January 2009 as the most recent episodes.[28] Support for Hamas was widespread among the interviewees. A couple of examples:

> They are the kind of people who defend Islam. And attempt to protect children and wives and such … who will be raped and killed in Israel. And there will be small children growing up, being born in prison and don't know what is going on in society. The case is that Hamas tries to help here and to the extent that they try to help we agree with them (Talha, 20 years).

> It is my opinion that Hamas is not a terrorist organization. You see, we forget that it is an occupation and it is the first time in world history that the international society protects an occupying power instead of protecting the people who are occupied and you may say ... as a resistance movement they have the right to weapon and to defend themselves (Imran, 43 years).

The particular support for Hamas was obviously grounded in the Palestinian presence in Aarhus. Hamas is considered a terrorist organization by EU/US authorities, and the Danish intelligence service, PET, explicitly mentions Hamas as an example of a terrorist organization.[29] The categorization of Hamas is indeed a very complex thing.[30] In June 2009, former American president Jimmy Carter urged President Barack Obama to remove Hamas from the list of terrorist organizations. In the opinion of professor in global politics and Islamic Studies, Peter Mandaville:

> Hamas is a complex and controversial entity. It has been variously described as a political movement, a terrorist group, and a social welfare organization. The difficulty in analyzing Hamas arises from the fact that it is, in fact, all three of these things – but not reducible to any of them (Mandaville 2007: 201).

For many interviewees Hamas is the best hope for the future of Palestine, but support for Hamas is also – for reasons of extension of the argument – principal support for any Muslim movement perceived to be in a similar situation, that is, supported by the population, but regarded as terrorist by the Western world.

Taliban

Taliban, an Afghan movement, literately meaning the students, emerged in 1994, took over Afghan government in 1996 and ruled until they were expelled from power by US forces in 2001. After their removal from power, Taliban has been fighting a guerilla war against US and NATO forces (including Danish troops) and has recently experienced re-

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[28] http://www.cfr.org/publication/8968/

[29] http://www.pet.dk/upload/microsoft_word_-_terrorfinansiering_i_danmark_-_final_15_9_08.pdf

[30] http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/06/16/bomb-plot-carter-gaza-discovered/

surgence also in Pakistan.[31] Opinions on Taliban were diverse. Some interviewees supported Taliban whole-heartedly, as shown by the following sequences:

A: Because in the law of time of Taliban, in the law of Sharia, did you find, or hear on television that any kind of drugs in these five years, have started coming out of Afghanistan? There's nothing …

Q: You said that Taliban would be the sort of, the closest to perfect?

A: The best, the best of this, of this time (Abu, 38 years)

Q: You mentioned Taliban? They are perhaps the people closest to it [achieving an Islamic state]?

A: Yes they are closest. 100 percent. Well, what they are fighting for is to make a Sharia state; that is evident. Saudi-Arabia is far away, very far away, though it says on the government agenda that they in fact … they do other things than Sharia. There is a Sharia trait, but it is just not enough. You must ground Sharia 100 percent. And that is what the Taliban is attempting as far as possible (Pernille, 18 years).

Others took a less enthusiastic approach to the organization:

There are good things that Taliban does and there are bad things. One of the bad things is that they kill civilians and fight against their own people: they do kill Afghans too. But you can say: They do it – as I interpret it – because their goal is that Sharia law will be introduced in Afghanistan. That is of course something good. But they apply violence to achieve it, and I find that to be very wrong. If for instance you look at the Iranians, who come from Iran to Europe, they are Muslims that ... If you look at how they were in Iran, they were completely covered, because they were forced to, but when they come to Denmark they reject Islam completely and who is to blame? It is the people who forced them. That is why I think it is very important that you as a Muslim know that it is illegitimate to force anyone to anything. Because if I force anyone to do something and he will do it because of me and not because of God then he will not achieve any rewards for it at all. He will become … I will be punished for having forced him. And that is what is so wrong … It is a good idea to have people following Sharia, but if you use the wrong tools, then your case will be weaker (Yusuf, 20 years).

However, the differences in the support for Taliban reflect not so much a difference in adherence to values, but rather a difference in what information about Taliban is true and false, as shown by the following sequence:

Q: But isn't it true that Taliban has been pretty close to Osama Bin Laden?

A: No

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[31] http://www.cfr.org/publication/10551/taliban_in_afghanistan.html

Q: No, in no way?

A: Not true, not at all (Abu, shaykh).

Another interviewee emphasizes that she considers much of what the media says about Taliban to be untrue and that she therefore is upset with one of her teachers, who she finds is spreading media lies: 'He says that Taliban kills small girls who want to go to school. But that is a rumor rather than the truth, right. So then I become like: "Watch out what you are saying"' (Pernille, 18 years). Others defend Taliban by arguing that there are also 'false Talibans', that is, people who join Taliban for the wrong reasons:

A1: There will always be good guys and bad guys and that goes for Taliban as well as for anything else. There will also be someone: 'OK, Taliban rules and if I am not a Taliban I might get killed. So I'll be Taliban, even though I am not [adhering to their ideas]'. Do you get it? Maybe they are the ones we hear about?

Q: So you think that there might be false Talibans?

A1: Yes, someone who don't quite get it, who just destroy and rape and whatever (Kareem, 22 years).

A2: Someone who is corrupt, that might be the case.

Q: But the idea of Taliban is ok?

A2: Y*es* (Mette, 18 years, convert).

The fact that people support an organization therefore does not mean that they necessarily condone all of its actions. Their support may regard only part of the objective, as was the case with Yusuf, they may contest the truth of the information regarding the organization available through Danish media or they may find that although they support the overall goal of the organization, the actual actions of the organization may not always live up to the standards set.

Al-Shabaab

Al-Shabaab, literately meaning 'the youth', is a recent Somali movement, erected from the breakdown of the Islamic Courts Union, which ruled parts of Somalia for six months in 2006. After the defeat of the Islamic Courts Union by the Transitional Federal Government backed by Ethiopian forces, factions from the Islamic Courts Union joined the more militant Al-Shabaab in a guerilla-style organization, attempting to regain power in Somalia. Al-Shabaab has claimed affiliation with Al Qaeda since 2007, and Al-Shabaab and Al Qaeda have apparently pulled together to declare the struggle to expel Ethiopian forces from Somalia. Experts find, however, that the link between Al-Shabaab and Al Qaeda is weak, if existing at all, and perhaps more of a move to attract wider support for the Soma-

li cause. Nonetheless this affiliation has earned Al-Shabaab a position on the US list of terrorist organizations.[32]

On December 6 2008, the Danish daily *Politiken* published an article on Somalis living in Denmark who returned to Somalia to fight with Al-Shabaab. On that occasion *Somalisk Forum i Aarhus*, an umbrella organization for Somali organizations in Aarhus, issued a press release questioning not that Somalis are returning to Somalia to fight, but condemning terrorism en bloc along with the 'illegal and cruel Ethiopian occupation of Somalia, supported by among others the US.'[33] One of our Somali informants explains his own position vis-à-vis Al-Shabaab like this:

> I do not agree completely with Al-Shabaab's ideology, but I consider them to be fair people who have created peace in the areas they control. Many Somalis support Al-Shabaab today because of the fair way they treat the people and their abolition of clanism which is a sort of illness in Somalia (Idris).

Another interviewee agrees that Al-Shabaab has had a lot of followers, but that this has changed now, due to their militancy. 'People are crying now. There is zero support for Al-Shabaab. There is no-one you can rely on' (Hakim, Somali).

The citations presented above are chosen to illustrate another point regarding support for so-called terrorist organizations: support is conditioned on the behavior of the organization. The interviewees generally frame their support in terms of what they consider the best candidate for a peaceful future for the country they or their parents were born in. Support is most often not chosen for ideological reasons and may therefore quickly be lost if the organization no longer seems to be the best choice for a good future, because they for instance are too militant. Asked about the support for Al-Shabaab among Somalis in Denmark, one interview person, thus, explained how Al-Shabaab has lost much of its former popularity among Somalis:

> Q: But Al-Shabaab has defended Somalia against Ethiopia?

> A: Yes and in this way they did have some followers. But people are suspicious. What is their purpose of seizing Somalia? Why do they keep on fighting? (Hakim).

The situation in Somalia is followed closely by many Somalis living in Denmark, who generally seem to have lost any hope of ever returning to their home country.

Iraq

For some reason there seems to be less direct emphasis on Iraq among the interviewees, though Iraq is often mentioned along with Palestine, Afghanistan and Somalia as places where resistance movements are labeled as terrorist by Western governments and media.

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[32] http://www.cfr.org/publication/18650/

[33] http://www.stoettekredsen.dk/pdf%20filer/somali%20mod%20terror%202008-12-10.pdf

For one interviewee Iraq provides a particularly striking illustration of how the media deliberately manipulates the news currents to fit the agenda of Western governments:

> In my opinion Al Qaeda is murderers but there are attempts to mix things up. Al Qaeda is perhaps 1000 people that work within Al Qaeda, the Islamic … the one called Moqawama al-Islamiya (Iraqi National Islamic Resistance Movement) in Iraq, they are about 100,000. They have nothing to do with Al Qaeda. But when we see in the media that there are bombs against civilians, there are about 100 actions against the Americans, the American armies and about 100 actions by the American armies, but we don't see them. We only see the bomb that explodes in a mosque and there are 40 people killed and they do this consciously because they say 'ok, listen we are fighting terrorists, right?' We only see murderers that plant bombs in mosques and malls and more, but we don't see the real resistance. That is done to legitimize, that is, that it is a legitimate occupational power that people all over the world are shown on these pictures. So we'll say 'ok, that is fine'. So they think that it is legitimate that they are there. But to me Al Qaeda is a bunch of murderers. They don't have principles and they have different agendas, but there are 100,000 or so [members of] liberation movements that fight for their country and want to liberate their country, but we don't hear anything about them (Imran).

Critiques of US/Western policies

The interest in the development in the Muslim world and the support for the 'terrorist' movements lead to a critique of Western and in particular American foreign policies, which are regarded as very imposing and aggressive:

> There was the Islamic Court Union. They ruled the country for six months. It was peace and quiet. They cleansed the cities of problems. The West and the US were surprised. It lasted until suddenly the US – and I don't know about Europe – would not allow the Islamic Courts Union to have power – for what if it would spread to Ethiopia? … But how come we are not allowed to mind our own business? Why can't we be left alone? Why does the US always interfere? (Hakim).

> People wanted democracy [in Somalia]. Democracy means that you have to be elected by the people, right? That you need to stand together and those who get the majority vote govern, right? Isn't that what it means? You know that, right? When they voted in Somalia and the people voted for Sharia they got Sharia. Do you see any reason then why the US and other countries would interfere in Somalia to promote democracy? They were elected to judge according to Sharia. They were democratically elected to implement Sharia. That was the choice of the people (Ali, 20 years).

> There is this … and I feel this all the time, that in for instance the Arab countries, there I think all the time that the USA wants to dominate and I can't support that: Mind your own business; that is how I fell. Well the USA is so engaged in … well the Iraq

war and the thing with Afghanistan. It may be that it helps, but clean up at home: How many ghettos do you have? How many wars? How many live on the street? How many teenage girls get pregnant? ... Personally, I hate it when people talk about how the US saves the world because I simply do not believe it (Maryam, not active in the ASC milieu).

The critique regards in particular how the US government uses the notion of terrorists to label their opponents, as show by the following quotations:

The USA kills civilians: 'Excuse us, it was a wrong bomb', 'Sorry our planes missed' and all that crap we listen to. It is ok. You are excused. But when someone else by mistake kills innocent people, then they are terrorists (Ali, 20 years).

The greatest terrorist in the world is the USA (Nasser, 20 years).

One of the problems is that nowadays we are in a situation where people, [the US], will accuse religious people of terrorism and attack them for no real reason (Mahmoud, imam).

I think it is wrong to go to other people's country in our uniform and our weapon and then force them to follow our law and power and when they try to shoot me, then they are called terrorists. They are freedom fighters not terrorists (Kareem, 22 years).

But for many the bulk of the critique is how the Western governments in the opinion of the interviewees often appear hypocritical when they claim that they promote democracy:

The US – for instance – supports regimes which are in fact dictatorships and not democratic in any way. And you ask yourselves why anyone would want to go on that side and others on the other side. So that is the reason that some people hate and will not accept the West. I shall not mention any countries specifically, but we know that … if we for instance take Gaza, and what happened in Gaza with Hamas, then everyone knows that there was a democratic election, but the West did not accept it … Though there was a democratic election, it was attacked and nobody wanted to recognize it (Hassan, social worker).

Some discussions on radicalization emphasize the importance of anti-Western rhetoric among radical Muslims (see e.g. the Silber & Bhatt definition in Table 2). But to criticize Western foreign policies does not necessarily constitute a critique of Western values:

And even though I am not a Palestinian, I am from Tunisia, the Palestinian-Israeli history is part of my life and of my background as a Muslim and it is ... and what affects me is the Western hypocrisy. On the one hand they want to talk about democracy and that we are a civilization which must, an enlightened civilization which must ... we bring democracy. We bring human rights, we bring justice. We must create justice in the world. We must change the world. But what you experience is the opposite. And

that is in Iraq, the US experience with Iraq or Israel, who breaks every rule and who doesn't give a shit about the international community and bombs civilians and women … it is horrible (Imran).

The critique of Western policies in general and US policies in particular is, thus, very much focused on the perceived double standards of the West, which on the one hand claims to promote democracy, but on the other hand does not respect democracies, if the vote of the people does not go their way. One interviewee explicitly states that her critique of Western policies is not to be understood as anti-Western:

Well, that I don't like the USA does not mean that I do not like the people. It is because I do not like the government and the way they do foreign policy. I don't like the way … I feel that we are looked down on and it is not because I have anything against Western culture. Good heavens, I live in Denmark (Aisha, 18 years, not active in the ASC milieu).

After having criticized the Danish engagement in Afghanistan and stated how it would not be allowed for him as a Muslim to fight with Danish forces against the Taliban, Kareem explained that:

If I stay here in Denmark and Germany attacks Denmark then I will fight with the Danish military against Germany. I will be allowed to do that (Kareem).

And his wife added: That would not be haram because then he will be protecting the place where he is staying. It is his country and mine (Mette, convert).

Conditions for support

Though almost all Muslim interviewees to some extent supported one or more of the organizations regarded as terrorist organizations, it is important to emphasize that this support is firstly conditional on a feeling that the militancy is not excessive, but that only the necessary amount of violence is used and that civilians as far as possible are left unhurt. The evaluation of the different organizations generally follows the idea that 'someone who kills other people is a bad guy' (Talha), but that the use of violence may be legitimate in situations of resistance against occupational forces. The general logic is that it is acceptable to kill someone in war, but that it is not legitimate to kill civilians. Secondly, support may therefore change if the situation changes, that is, if the organization begins to use violence in a way which is illegitimate. Thirdly, the support to the organization is often carried by a critique of the policies of Western government in the Muslims world. The general critique was that Western governments – in particular the US government – would interfere excessively with the developments in the Muslim world, often randomly support some regimes and fight others, regardless of the support from the population and that this maneuvering was hypocritically termed 'fight for democracy'. Some also felt that the media is an accomplice in this and helps to cover up the true conditions. Fourthly, the critique of Western policies in the Muslim world generally did not take the form of anti-

Western rhetoric. The support for the organizations was most often posed in terms of democracy: Ali's comment represents the argument very well: that the Islamic Courts Movement won a democratic election, and that is the background for him to question the legitimacy of interfering with them. Support for different 'terror organizations' is therefore not necessarily associated with a general acceptance of violence regardless of context. All interviewees would agree that violence is only acceptable in situations of war, though the evaluation of what constitutes a situation of war may vary. Support for Hamas, Al-Shabaab and Taliban was for some interviewees of a 'secular' character. The different organizations were considered freedom fighters to a smaller or larger extent. The discussions on radicalization have focused on people who are considered political as well as religious radicals. Slootman & Tillie, for instance, single *salafi-jihadis* out as the target for their discussion as those 'who theoretically defend the use of violence' (2006: 5). But does the reference to jihad constitute a particularly problematic framework?

Jihad

Jihad is a traditional Islamic concept. Historically, several variations of the concept may be distinguished. Defensive jihad, which in particular concerns a struggle against one's inner ego (nafs) is the current mainstream interpretation; another, the Islamist jihad, is nowadays the most familiar in the West (Sedgwick 2007: 11). Some of the more religiously engaged consider the fighting in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia to be jihad:

> This is jihad – we need to call things what they are. Danish and American soldiers invaded Afghanistan, which is Muslim territory, it belongs to us. Of course it is allowed to shoot at them. Danes also reserve their rights to defend themselves. We even travel far away and say: 'We have attacked Afghanistan or Iraq to defend ourselves'. There is always this double standard for what is allowed for us, but what the others cannot do (Thomas, convert).

> We believe of course that the thing about doing jihad, making war, is a part of being a Muslim. We must defend our faith, defend our aqida, defend our family. So I do think that those who rebel in Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine, I do think it is completely legitimate (Martha, convert).

The interviewees who considered participation in the wars in Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq or Palestine to be jihad all took great effort to explain that the jihad in this connection means participation in a Muslim army similar to the NATO army:

> We often forget that Europe is one big entity today. We have NATO. If one country in Europe is attacked all countries in Europe will attack and defend, right? Why is this allowed for Europe and not for Muslims to do the same thing – it is exactly the same principle when some Muslims go to Iraq and fight. In fact, Europe imitated the principle from the Caliphate (Racheed).

The sheer fact that the jihadist is considered part of an army is in fact what makes killing legitimate:

It [going to Afghanistan or Somalia or Palestine on jihad] is like it is in the American military. It is fine with them. They cannot kill Muslims in the US. That is illegal, but if they go to Afghanistan it is ok, because there is a war there. It is the same … at least I have this understanding of it as military and as a Muslim I am obliged to help and if this [going on jihad] is the only way I can help, then it is fine (Yusuf, imam).

It was emphasized, however, that the call for jihad was in no way a free invitation for unconstrained violence:

There are some very clear rules that should be fulfilled before you can go on a jihad – rules of engagement right? Of course, if Muslims are attacked they are allowed to defend themselves – no doubt about that. Why should Muslims not be allowed to shoot back? Israel has occupied Palestine, which is a crime – even UN says so – and then they defend themselves. For that they are carpet-bombed and the entire international community says that that is fine (Thomas, convert).

For some it was important to emphasize that participation in jihad may be considered obligatory: 'Jihad is an obligation' (Thomas). Along the same lines a few argue that: 'To fight for Allah, to do jihad that is one of the greatest forms of worship' (Martha). Some express how jihad is linked with a longing:

I would wish for it [to die in jihad]. But the question is whether I will attain [it]. … Then you will enter Paradise and you may bring a certain amount of witnesses, acquaintances with you to Paradise. And then you will get virgins and a house in Paradise. At any rate you will feel well (Kareem).

The realization that jihad was obligatory combined with the longing to do jihad, or even die in jihad, did not mean, however, that the interviewees were about to pack their bags and go:

However, I don't know shit about firing a gun, I never tried it, but you can do jihad in many ways. They also need money, let's put it that way. We can't contribute with the same. The Afghans are born with a gun in their hand (Thomas).

Well, I am not considering going anywhere. Now I live happily with my wife and such (laughs) … but the day the Jews really enter Lebanon or Palestine then I would have no reservations about going down there. That is my duty (Kareem).

Asked why he wasn't considering going to any of the other battlefields, he replied that in some way he was obliged to, but 'it is more difficult there because I don't know what is going on … there will be shots suddenly and …' (Kareem).

Some Muslims living in Denmark are interested in going on jihad, and it is known that some have already done so. Slimane Hajj, 'the Danish prisoner in Guantanamo', who

lived in Aarhus before he went to Afghanistan, is one example of a Danish Muslim going on jihad, and he is apparently not the only one. But rumors are that the fighters in the Muslim countries were not always too happy to receive fighters from Europe: 'You risk being sent back, right? … and well, you really need to be trained in war to go into that' (Thomas). It is therefore generally considered better to support the wars in the Muslim world in other ways, for example by sending money. Some Muslims would also prefer this kind of help: 'As long as I can do something where I don't have to kill anyone I'll prefer that' (Yusuf). But because of the general sympathy for the 'resistance movements' in the Muslim world, a Muslim will not necessarily meet great opposition, in for instance the ASC milieu, if he or she declares his or her intension to go on jihad.

Terrorist actions in the West – views on Al Qaeda

An overwhelming majority of the interviewees to a certain extent found terrorist actions acceptable in the conflicts of the Muslim world. Only one would not completely rule out that a terrorist action in the Western world could be legitimate. The entire sequence is here quoted at length:

> Q: So in that way you would say that it could be justified – as Denmark is engaged in for example Afghanistan – to carry out actions in Denmark as well?
>
> A: Possibly, I will not make myself judge over that, however, I believe that it will be better to end the war down there.
>
> Q: In that way the actions are directed against soldiers?
>
> A: Yes, to begin with. If that does not work you can then maybe do something somewhere else. Because that is the reality in a democracy – if you want to describe it briefly it means by the people, to the people, for the people. The real power lies with the people, not the prime minister or the general, they only do what they are told, and it is the majority that has decided that they should be given power. When the people are making the decisions they should also accept responsibility for their actions.
>
> Q: In that way the Danish people is a legitimate target?
>
> A: Yes and no. I don't know – I cannot answer that, because there are many factors involved. You also need to assess if such an action would be good or bad – would it hurt Muslims more than it would benefit them? It would probably hurt them more (Thomas).

Another interviewee could not follow the logic that Danish civilians, as responsible for electing the government, may be a legitimate target at all:

> A: Again as a Muslim in war – let me take an example – the Palestinians in Palestine against the Jews … I am not allowed to – as a fighting Muslim, fighting against the Israeli – to kill old people, kill small children, and kill civilians. You are not allowed

to. So when the prophet (*saws*) he called jihad on those who fought against him, there were rules that he would follow. So you may say that if you are to act in accordance with him, it is impossible to fight in a country like Denmark. Or commit an act of terror in Bruuns Galleri [shopping mall in central Aarhus] because there are some … well again it is an odd way of thinking, which I cannot relate to at all. To bomb Bruuns Galleri or a train or a bus because there are some warriors in Afghanistan, some Danish warriors in Afghanistan.

Q: It does not add up?

A: Not at all. At least it doesn't add up in my head (Yusuf).

Most interviewees had no sympathy for terrorist attacks in the Western world. One Muslim in his 30s who had a study group for young Muslims in fact said that he was careful not to tell the youth that jihad in his opinion is obligatory at the start of the study group:

A: Not at this moment, not at this moment, because …

Q: When? When then?

A: I cannot tell you when. When he can understand the difference between the jihad in Iraq and here.

Q: You're afraid that they would do it here or what?

A: That is because of the mind of the young. They cannot understand everything that I say to him.

Q: The difference?

A: The difference between if he be here and he be there (Abu, shaykh).

For this interviewee the ban on terrorism in Denmark is due to the existence of what he conceives to be a contract between him and Danish society. He acknowledges that Danish society has received him, and taken care of him, and engaging in terrorism against Danish society would be a breach of this contract. This interpretation is also supported by an imam, not partaking in the ASC milieu (Fadl), and though the terminology of a contract was not widespread, the idea of a terrorist action in Denmark was generally absolutely unappealing to our interview persons.

Summarizing

Concepts of radicalization typically do not distinguish between support for terrorism in the Muslim world and support for terrorism in the Western world. The interviews with Muslims in Denmark seem to suggest that they generally make a very clear distinction between the two phenomena: where many of them support one or more organizations in the Muslim world which are considered terrorist organizations, only one of the interviewees did not see the situation in Denmark as fundamentally different from situations in the Muslim world, because Denmark is not a war zone. Similarly there is a line between

actively engaging in violent action and being supportive of those who do engage in it. The report from the Change Institute suggests the same, namely that the emphasis on support for 'terrorist' organizations in the Muslim world seems to erase the line between radicals and others because the narrative to a certain extent is shared: 'Violent radicals employ many comparable narratives to that expressed both by those with radical views and those who would be considered "moderate" or even "progressive"' (European Commission 2008: 98).

The connection between the different situations and developments in the Muslim world and situations and developments that the notions of radicalization used in the Danish context tend to be problematic on two levels.

First, it may block our access to understanding what the phenomenon of radicalization is really all about. French sociologist and expert on Islam Olivier Roy thus notice the growing role of European Muslims in terrorist acts (Roy 2007: 52), but warns about seeing the radicalization of European Muslim youth as:

> a spill-over of the crisis in the Middle East (Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq). But in fact the chronology of events, the geographical origin of the radicals and their own claims most often contradict this assumption. No Palestinian, Afghan or Iraqi has been involved in terrorist actions in Europe (Roy 2007: 53).

In Roy's opinion radicalization in Western contexts is a phenomenon which must be understood in the context of Muslim youth seeking identity and action in a situation that does not differ much from what earlier created left-wing terrorists. Emphasis on opinions and critiques which are shared by a broad group of Muslims hardly helps scholars win a deeper understanding of the phenomenon.

Second, the interviewees' support for alleged terrorist organizations in the Muslim world may leave Danish Muslims in dilemmas concerning which camp to support. In a group discussion with the control group, three young girls, who are not active in the ASC milieu (Aisha, Ayan, Maryam), although rejecting al Qaeda and Bin Laden as religious authorities would not completely reject Bin Laden's authority as interpreter of the world order:

> A1: It may be that he has attitudes, which many share, but the way he …
>
> A2: The political …
>
> A1: Yes, exactly the political, the way he … When you live in Afghanistan or in a country that … I don't say that I understand him, but try to understand where he comes from and what he really wants. I am not saying that I support him, and I am not saying that I am ok with the religious part, but he has some good things which I share …

Similarly Ghaada, who has expressed very strong opinions about the illegitimacy of using the notion of jihad to legitimize violence even in war, says:

In some ways I understand him well. He has so much anger and he feels that nobody does anything – helplessness. Muslims are bombed time after time, and there was Iraq and such and without a reason. So he'll pay back in such a way that people can see 'oops', that is what you are doing to yourself. Though you call him a terrorist, you yourself have bombed Iraq. But the trouble is: Who is a terrorist? So I think that he has done this to say, 'Listen, it might be that you bomb without a reason, but so can we. Here you are, then you can learn how much fun that is' (Ghaada).

In relation to the stance taken vis-à-vis for instance PET, support for some of the organizations denoted terrorist leads to frustrations. When asked about the fact that Hamas is on PET's terror list, the following interchange took place in one of the group interviews with young Muslim men (Talha, Nasser, Hamza and Ali):

A1: They have lots of people on their terror list.

A2: We don't care what PET has [on their list].

A3: I don't give a damn what PET has. I have my own opinion. And we have freedom of speech and we may state our opinions. This does not mean that we are fans of this group, but I feel sorry for the children and the people in the country, wherever they are.

A2: Well, in fact, we have PET on our terror list.

A4: Yes we do (laughter).

The conclusion on the first element of the definitions of radicalization used in the Danish context – acceptance/support of terrorism – is therefore discouraging. If the definition is applied as it stands, the extent of Islamic radicalization is huge and not confined to the Muslim milieu at all, but extends far into certain leftwing parties, who support what they consider resistance movements in the Muslim world. But maybe it is not as one scholar suggests, 'the case that Islamic terrorists are simply those who are designated as such' (Herbert 2009: 389). To some of the interviewees, labeling certain organizations as terrorist appeared to be tactics of delegitimizing opponents in war rather than an objective classification. But some of the interviewees suggest that it may be possible to apply objective criteria for judging who are to be termed a terrorist, and that the killing of civilians would be a prime criterion. To insist on the current definition is not helpful for building alliances in Muslim milieus for joint efforts to fight radicalization.

Un- or antidemocratic actions or attitudes

The second element we will discuss empirically in the conceptualization of radicalization is the increasing existence of undemocratic or antidemocratic attitudes or actions as a defining property. Both 'undemocratic' and 'antidemocratic' are used in debates on radicalization, but it may be fruitful, as it will become clear from the following analysis, to make a distinction between them. Undemocratic attitudes and actions may be understood as atti-

tudes or actions that do not support democracy. Antidemocratic may be used to describe attitudes and actions that directly undercut democracy. An example may illustrate these delicate distinctions. Democracies are dependent on the existence of voting systems and on the willingness of its citizens to participate in voting actions. Some countries have made it a formal duty to vote in elections. This is not the case in Denmark where citizens are encouraged to vote, but are not obliged to. A large majority of citizens still choose to participate in elections. There are voters who abstain from voting, but most are not driven by ideology. It is well known, however, that a small group of citizens abstain from voting on ideological or religious grounds, most conspicuously Jehovah's Witnesses. There are also Muslims who abstain from voting on religious grounds. The individual decision not to vote on ideological/religious grounds may be termed an undemocratic action. Efforts to convince others of the illegitimacy of voting, but not putting pressure on them may still be considered an undemocratic action. If actions are taken to affect other people's individual decisions to vote or not, this would be antidemocratic, that is an action that attempts to undermine the foundations of democracy.

The debate about Islam and democracy tends to focus on the choice between Sharia or a democratic constitution. The results from the interviews in Aarhus indicate that this distinction may not be the most adequate to describe opinions concerning democracy and Islam, which are much more subtle than an either-or indicates. A better approach may be to focus on how different Muslims in different ways find it possible to live in a democracy while being a practicing Muslim. The opinions expressed in the interviews may be divided in three groups.

One stance on the relationship between Islam and democracy is that they are not contradictory. Islam either does not concern form of government or regards democracy as being supported by or even embedded in Islam. The interviewees did not see any problems in being a Muslim as well as a democrat, and, in fact, found questions suggesting that there were, far-fetched. Support for democracy is according to studies (Tænketanken 2007: 53) the most prevalent among Muslims in Denmark, but probably not the most common among the interviewees in the ASC milieu.

The second position is that there may be problems associated with being a practicing Muslim in a democracy, but that these problems may be solved. One interviewee explained his stance on voting:

> It [voting] is not sunna, but it is one of the things where people disagree, where some say that in particular here in the non-Islamic countries, it may be dangerous to vote, because you will vote for someone who does not follow the words of God and in this way support them and that is why they say that it is forbidden to vote. And then there is this other group which says that the reason that we vote is that there are two groups: One group which is very much against Muslims and another which supports Muslims. If we support the group that supports Muslims we will make things easier

for us. There are two roads and you choose yourself which one to follow ... I follow the one that votes … Some will say that it is illegal, some will say that it is legal, but as long as we follow an imam who considers it legal (Yusuf).

This position does not endorse democracy unconditionally, but Yusuf feels that it can be defended that Muslims vote. A similar position is taken by Kareem, who states that:

It depends upon whether there is a small purpose. Better not vote for Pia Kjærsgaard for instance. If there are two candidates: Pia Kjærsgaard for instance and someone who is a little better than her and Pia Kjærsgaard, she will win, then you must vote to save yourself (Kareem, 22 years).

The third group consists of those who simply say that the specific action of voting is haram:

I do not vote at elections because I consider it kufr to do so. That is why I keep very much away from it (Pernille, 18 years, convert).

Voting is not allowed. Because God says in the Quran that legislation is for him and for him alone. Therefore democracy is an ideology next to Islam, that is, Islam is ideology which you must implement in society, right (Thomas, convert).

A few are undecided about whether they should vote or not:

The rules – well there are not really any Islamic rules concerning this – and that is the problem. Every time there is an election there is this huge discussion whether Muslims should vote or not. But firstly we live in Denmark and we live in this way according to the rules … It is a bit like this: Some will vote, others will not. But some think that one should vote because this is the country we live in and what we are living according to, and as such you should have influence (Ghaada, 19 years).

Though Ghaada is not unsympathetic towards voting, she feels that she will probably not vote in the next election unless:

If there is a very good politician. If someone shows up and you'll think that he has something, there is something about him. Like Obama or something. There is something about him, so then I might. If that happens then yes (Ghaada).

But the rejection of the action of voting does not necessarily mean a rejection of the ideas of democracy. This is also the case with Mette, who finds that: 'One should not vote for laws which are not Sharia' (Mette, 18 years, convert), but also emphasizes that democracy in the more substantial sense is endorsed by Islam:

I don't really think that we can compare them [democracy and Islam]. Well, Islam is not really democratic. We have a law book and if you are to make a Sharia state then – like in a court of justice where there is the constitution – then there will be the Quran. It is not particularly democratic because there is only one who decides and we do not need to ask why. But in relations between people, I think Islam is highly demo-

cratic. Also in marriages, though many think that this is not the case and that it is the husband who decides everything. But that is not the case at all. (Mette)

Ideas of democracy can therefore not be reduced to simply voting behavior, and other aspects of life may also cause trouble for someone truly wanting to live only under the law of God. One example is payment of taxes, which is difficult to avoid, but which can be legitimated through the notion of niya, intension:

> Yes it is haram to pay the kind of tax through a non-Islamic state ... as we have a tax in Islam that is zakat. But this tax [to the Danish state] goes to among other things the military and to Folkekirken [the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Denmark]. These are the kind of things that we should not pay for … but if my niya is such that if I could be released from paying then I would not pay, then you have not committed anything haram [by paying] (Pernille).

There are in fact a lot of other aspects of living in a democracy than just voting, and though some Muslims find that it is in principle problematic to engage with democracy as a Muslim, there are ways that allow the individual to navigate in a democratic society. However, these problems are generally left to the individual. The issue of democracy did not seem to be very much on the agenda in the ASC milieu and was in this way not of any major importance as a distinction between groups – for instance of 'radicals' or 'non-radicals'. Many, but not all activists in the ASC milieu would find it challenging to combine life in a democracy with living as a practicing Muslim, but anyone would have his or her own individualized strategies to deal with the challenges of democracy.

Islamic state

Questions concerning the relationship between democracy and Islam tend to come down to issues regarding an Islamic state. It was very difficult to get answers to these questions, because the interviewees felt that their answers would stigmatize them in Danish society. One group of otherwise quite knowledgeable Muslims thus declined to respond to questions concerning their opinion on an Islamic state and Sharia: 'We don't have knowledge about that. You will have to make contact to an imam' (Ali, 20 years). Many interviewees felt that the concepts of an Islamic state and Sharia were the most misrepresented in Danish media:

> Q: But isn't it a dream for many Muslims to live in an Islamic state? Is it your dream to live in an Islamic state?
>
> A: You are thinking about Sharia? (laughs) Okay, well, I would like to … well, but when people talk about Sharia, then they only think, when you say Sharia, then you'll see this picture [shows how hands are cut off] but that is not what constitutes Sharia.

However, most interviewees would agree with Thomas, who says: 'Of course we would like an Islamic state – if a Muslim does not want that he is a hypocrite' (Thomas, convert). This position was even shared by Ayan, who was part of the control group of young Mus-

lims outside the ASC milieu, but who found that: 'Well, all Muslims dream about an Islamic state, but it is not something we are working on' (Ayan). The Islamic state Muslims are dreaming of is the ideal society. Some mention how there would be free food, and no need to lock the doors as there would be no crime, no criminals and perhaps joint property rights.

Others thought in a more abstract way: 'Actually, what is an Islamic state? … But an ideal state for me is a place where there is room for diversity and where competences are paramount' (Aisha,18 years, not part of the ASC milieu). Generally ideas about an Islamic state were vague and diffuse and not something that was going to come along tomorrow: 'There are a couple of things which are more important before we erect an Islamic state and it is not on my to-do-list' (Aisha).

There was general agreement that there is no real Islamic state in the world today, as shown by the following two sequences:

A: There is nowhere in the world where Sharia is practiced except for Somalia. It is the only country which has [had] Sharia legislation.

Q: Would you say that there is an Islamic state today?

A: Not today (Ali, 20 years).

Q: Well, but which country is closest, if there is a country which is close at all?

A: In fact I don't know. That is, I have not studied it, because I have accepted the conditions that I live under in Denmark and I don't dream that much. I am a very realistic person (Racheed).

A few would point to either Saudi-Arabia or the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan as good examples:

Q: But what about Saudi Arabia for instance, they call themselves a Muslim state?

A: It's not far away from the truth, they follow some and keep some, but the country [that] was before had that law hundred percent.

Q: Which country?

A: Afghanistan.

Q: Afghanistan?

A: At the time of the Taliban (Abu, shaykh).

A small group of Muslims find it almost unbearable to live in a society that is not an Islamic state: The only solution they can think of is to migrate, thereby in fact following the example of the Prophet, who in 622 did the hidjra, emigration from Mecca, where he was persecuted, to Medina (Yathrib), where a group of Muslims where already living. The

attraction of migration was evident for this convert (Thomas), who however had nowhere to go:

A: Well, basically I would like to move. I have said this often, but there are several different ideas, it changes all the time, where we are going, that is. I have a huge dilemma, right because there is not one place where we can move. Regardless of how much politicians, Arab leaders or such they go on and on about how they are Muslim and how they take care of the interest of Islam, but it is a lie. Even in Saudi-Arabia they do not use the law of Allah. They do some terrible things.

Q: So there isn't an Islamic state today, then?

A: No, there is not.

Q: Where would you want to live if you were to choose freely?

A: Well, I would prefer to live in Mecca and Medina, there is no doubt. They are the best places on Earth, or Jerusalem for that matter.

Pernille, an 18-year old convert also tells about some of her friends, many of whom are also converts, who feel like this: 'Well, you can do like hidjra [migration], that is go somewhere which is closer to being an Islamic state' (Pernille).

Because they – like Thomas – really have nowhere to go, they choose to establish their own Islamic state inside the four walls of their apartment and only rarely come out. Pernille, however, prefers to live a more extrovert life while staying in Denmark:

I would also like to move to a country which is closer to an Islamic state, but on the other hand, I am not saying that we should isolate ourselves from this society. We shouldn't say that we will not walk the streets, or speak Danish or educate ourselves, that we don't want to do anything. If you don't learn the language, how can you teach others about Islam, if you know what I mean? You have to … There is someone who thinks like this: I want an education. I really want a good education. Because if you are not educated then you are nothing in a Muslim country. We need doctors. We need smart people in a Muslim country. We can't all just sit around (Pernille).

In the situation of living in a non-Muslim country Pernille adopts a strategy of internalizing *Al Wala Wal Bara,* love and hate for the prophet, which she interprets as 'Sharia in your heart':

When we are in Denmark, we'll just say that al wala wal bara has to be inside us because we can't just say: 'We want Sharia! You must wear a veil now, come on! Shut down the music!' … Really you just can't do that (Pernille).

The fact that she is a convert and Danish is her native tongue means that she envisions herself as having a special role as a Danish Muslim:

I am Danish and speak Danish well, so I think in one way that it is my duty to work for Islam in Denmark. I cannot create a Sharia state, I can't, but I could try as far as possible to – what can you say – do some da'wa [mission] – that is Islam in Denmark. Someone has to do that. We can't all be locked up in Afghanistan, all us who are religious … We need to come out in the world. That is our duty (Pernille)

Islamic state in Denmark?

The establishment of an Islamic state in Denmark was perhaps the question that received the most unanimous answers. None of the Muslims interviewed thought it a realistic goal:

However, those who believe that Muslims in Denmark want to establish an Islamic state here have eaten too many toxic mushrooms in their youth. It is unrealistic – it would be logical to establish an Islamic state where Muslims are in majority and strongest. Besides, it is too cold here (Thomas).

I'll say it again: One cannot implement Sharia in Denmark unless there are Muslims who want Sharia – a majority. We can never be 10 people who want it – it is very unrealistic. And this fear should not exist here – Muslims in Denmark are not here to implement the caliphate (Racheed).

We don't claim that we want to transform Denmark into a Muslim state. We are guests in Denmark and its fine and we take care of Denmark as well as any Dane and it is obligatory for us as Muslims to behave properly and be grateful for the hospitality we have met (Ali).

Save a few, the interviewees were in fact relatively happy with their lives in Denmark, if what the interviewees consider a media smear campaign is disregarded:

I feel fine in Denmark. I really don't have any problems. I wish that we had a mosque, where we could pray together, a common prayer. We don't have that yet of course, but I am hoping (Yusuf).

In summation, the idea of an Islamic state was important for the interviewees in the ASC milieu, as well as for some of the interviewees outside the milieu. None of the interviewees saw it as a realistic goal to establish an Islamic state in Denmark, because an Islamic state according to the interviewees can only be established voluntarily and by consensus: 'Then my grandmother would have to convert. And she won't', as one 18 year-old convert explained. The results broadly support the conclusion in the report from the European Commission, which concluded that among Danish Muslims:

the concept of a Caliphate is commonly presented as a conceptual or idealized concept rather than a practical aim by some of the interviewees and is envisaged as being realised somewhere in the Muslim world and not in Europe (European Commission 2008: 68).

Basically, few thought that a Muslim state had already been established in the Muslim world. For a few the brisk establishment of an Islamic state was necessary as they found it painful to live in a non-Islamic state.

In relation to the general discussion of the presence of undemocratic or antidemocratic sympathies, the general conclusion is that some of the interviewees hold undemocratic convictions. They considered it to be *haram*, forbidden, to vote in elections and some of them also have problems with other aspects of Danish society, for instance taxpaying. The convictions were not always that deep-felt, and were not anti-democratic. It was not the democratic society as such that was a problem, but the fact that it was not Islamic. Some of the Muslims who most strongly felt the need to live in an Islamic state had plans to emigrate. Others looked for ways to accommodate their problems with democracy, because they wanted to stay in Denmark.

1.5. Moving forward? Conclusions and recommendations

The purpose of the research presented in previous sections has been to investigate how members of the ASC Islamic activist milieu in Aarhus describe their religious practices and political convictions. The idea has further been to confront, through 'responsive sociology', this segment of the Muslim milieu with the topic of radicalization, and ask how interviewees perceive this phenomenon, and how they themselves connect/ disconnect it to other phenomenon such as 'terrorism', 'jihad', 'Islamic state' and 'democracy'. We have tried to distill through a conceptual analysis the most typical defining properties of radicalization (Section 1.2). By reviewing a sample of influential definitions of radicalization we found that the trend in defining radicalization is to see it as 1) a directed, 2) individual process 3) including the acceptance or support of terrorism, 4) and/or the use of undemocratic means. The definitions of radicalization in a Danish context, put forward by the Danish government and by the Danish Police Intelligence Service, share these defining properties. During interviews these different defining elements were more or less directly touched upon, and we tried to uncover how interviewees related to these issues, and not least, how they suggested alternative distinctions, conceptualizations and relevant topics. The underlying aim has been to see what we can learn about radicalization, and the possibilities of de-radicalization, by critically applying official definitions of radicalization to the empirical material gathered within the ASC Islamic activist milieu in Aarhus.

Our main result is that if we accept the defining properties of radicalization in official definitions, in particular the defining properties of 'acceptance/support of terrorism' and 'undemocratic means/goals', then there are indeed many 'radicals' among the interviewed members of the ASC Islamic activist milieu in Aarhus. However, we also found that if we listen to the categories, distinctions and conditions put forward by Muslims themselves there are good reasons to modify and specify these defining properties.

We found that almost all Muslim interviewees to some extent accepted or supported the actions and/or goals of different organizations such as Hamas, Taliban and Al-Shabaab, which are found on lists of terrorist organizations in the West. The differences in opinion between Muslim interviewees inside and outside of the ASC milieu were on this matter not prefound, but ideological support for Taliban was only found within the milieu.

Likewise, we found that many, but not all of the interviewees within the ASC milieu (in contrast to Muslims interviewees outside the milieu) held some sort of undemocratic attitudes. When confronted with the hypothetical choice between living in a society based on democracy or an Islamic state based on the divine rules of God implemented through Sharia, many chose the latter. This result – that there are many 'radicals' in the Muslim activist milieu in Aarhus – is in sharp contrast to the perceptions among the interviewed young Muslims, imams and religious authorities, and social workers, who describe radicalization as a very marginal and distant problem. A social worker working closely with young Muslims puts it this way:

> Q: So if I were to conclude on what you have been saying, then the whole debate, the whole focus on radicalization does not relate that much to the reality as you experience it?
>
> A: No I don't think, no.
>
> Q: It is not a pressing issue?
>
> A: No […] At least I don't think that it is a wish from below that one will say that we should focus on it.
>
> Q: And then you say, yes ok, if that is so then of course you will attend a course on it?
>
> A: Yes, if that is something we have to do, then of course, we'll do it (Lotte, non-Muslim social worker)

The problem of radicalization is by many experienced as constructed, as something that authorities are pushing rather than a real issue and problem on the ground. A few quotes illustrate the point:

> I think we live in a radical time. All over, people are leaning more and more towards the radical positions. Therefore we also experience a few people of Muslim descent in Denmark who cannot come to terms with the society they live in and who hold radical views. They are few, but they exist. So, yes, some sort of radicalization exists, but it is not a specific Muslim problem and it is not a problem of the dimensions that the authorities want us to believe. Issues of ordinary crime, gang culture and unemployment are much bigger challenges that we are facing. And they have nothing to do with Islam (Taamir, imam).
>
> What the Danish Secret Service sees as a threat – the young man talking about jihad and bin Laden I don't see as threat. I can show you 2600 of those in my home village

in Pakistan and several dozen here in Denmark. They talk like that. But they don't mean anything by it. It is not rooted in real ideological beliefs, but more in despair and a sense of crisis (Naadir).

There will always be a group of youngster who do not like the surrounding society. They have different norms or they will invent different norms. We have far left activists [de autonome] here in Denmark. In every society there will be groups who do not like the structure of society, the way it is put together. We also find them among the youth with a Muslim background. I see that as a natural part of the picture. They are not revolting because they are Muslims, but because they are young and because they don't like the way our democracy functions in practice. Not because they don't like democracy (Majid, social worker).

During interviews it was often argued that what is perceived as radicalization by the surrounding society is rather the expression of youthful frustrations, revolt and solidarity with populations in the Muslim world – expressions that lack any deep ideological foundation. The study of radicalization in Denmark conducted in 2008 by the Change Institute for the European Commission, supports this view and concluded that levels of radicalization in Denmark were low and that there was 'no evidence that violent radical narratives have normalized into mainstream discourse' (European Commission 2008: 98).

What our empirical investigation has shown is that there is a large discrepancy between the way radicalization is defined officially and the way radicalization is perceived within the ASC milieu in Aarhus. Put another way, we can say that there is large gap between the content of the official and academic 'etic' categories of radicalization and the 'emic' categories put forward by young Muslims active in the milieu, religious authorities and the social workers close to them. Building on the assumption that we might learn something new about the phenomenon of radicalization by taking serious the way young Muslims themselves perceive radicalization and related issues, we have tried to map out the distinctions, categories and conditions put forward. Two results seem particularly important.

First, we found that interviewed Muslims in most cases support or accept the use of terrorism, but only in a very conditioned manner. Most importantly all interviewed, but one, made a clear distinction between the actions of organizations working to protect the populations and defend territories in the Muslim world from what they saw as US or Israeli aggressions and indiscriminate use of violence, and actions meant to harm civilians in the West. Thus, the actions carried out by different organizations, such as Hamas and Taliban, were not seen as terrorism, but rather as defensive struggles against unjust occupations. In this view going on jihad to support these struggles was deemed legitimate. However, the support and acceptance of these struggles in the Muslim world were further conditioned on civilians not being killed and that the use of violence was not excessive. The violent actions against civilians in the West, as carried out by Al Qaeda, were dismissed

by all interviewees, but one, as dreadful deeds. Several interviewees dismissed explicitly the Al Qaeda logic of making civilians in the West legitimate targets as they are responsible for e.g. the war in Iraq because they voted for the leaders who made the decision to go to war. However, some interviewees showed a degree of understanding for the overall political goals of Al Qaeda – their battle against the suppression of Muslims and the occupations of Muslim territories. In general, the support and acceptance of 'terrorism', we found, are more often than not a conditioned support for certain political goals (e.g. peace and freedom), and not unconditional ideological affirmation of all (violent) means.

Our position here is that we cannot just overhear all the conditions for accepting violence as a means put forward by interviewees. If we do that we will lump together a widespread sense of injustice in relation to the situations in, for example, Palestine, Afghanistan, Somalia and Iraq among Muslims, and non-Muslims, with the very rare support of indiscriminate killings of civilians in the West by e.g. Al Qaeda. This cannot be expedient, neither from an academic nor from a policy perspective. Too many details and distinctions are lost, and we put Muslims in a difficult situation of not being able to support or accept the fighting of e.g. Hamas without being labeled as 'radicals' who pose a potential danger to the democratic order in Denmark. On the other hand, if we accept that a distinction is necessary in the defining properties of radicalization, between support or acceptance of violence in defensive warlike situations in Muslim countries, and violence imposed in an indiscriminate manner against civilians in non-Muslim countries, we realize that radicalization in the West should not be seen as a mere spill-over of conflicts in the Middle East as sometimes suggested. The vast majority of Muslims make a clear distinction between the two, and support or acceptance of defensive violence in the Muslim countries do not lead to acceptance or support of violence against civilians in the West. We believe this is an important insight, which has to be reflected in the way we define radicalization.

Secondly, we found that several Muslims in the ASC milieu held *un*democratic attitudes, in the sense that they did not participate actively in elections for ideological reasons, and that they would hypothetically prefer to live in an Islamic state based on Sharia rather than a society rooted in a democratic constitution. However, none were actively *anti*-democratic in the sense that they were actively working towards the implementation of Sharia or the creation of an Islamic state in Denmark, nor did anybody think this was a realistic or even a desirable goal. The fight for a truly Islamic state should be fought where Muslims are in the majority, and without the use of force. Thus, anti-democratic activities were only seen as legitimate when they were sanctioned by the majority of people in the involved territory, as it e.g. happened in Somalia. Paradoxically, anti-democratic activities and goals had to be democratically sanctioned to be legitimate in the eyes of most interviewees.

Once again we take the position that these conditions and distinctions put forward by interviewed Muslims, in regards to undemocratic and anti-democratic means and goals

cannot just be overlooked. In contrast to anti-democratic activities, undemocratic attitudes and passivity towards democratic practices hardly represent a danger to the foundation of democracy in Denmark, but they can certainly be viewed as unwanted from a democratic perspective. Nevertheless, it seems important to distinguish between the two in order not to lump together the relatively many Muslims, and Jehovah's witnesses for that matter, who out of religious beliefs want to stay out of democratic practices, and who dream of a society based on God's rule, with the very, very few who would actively work to undermine democracy and who believe that Denmark will one day be an Islamic state. No interviewees in our sample held such views, and an important insight from the study is that many Muslims are able to navigate between religiously driven undemocratic attitudes and passivity, and anti-democratic activities. Obviously most Muslims outside the ASC milieu have no problem with participating in democratic elections, and see no conflict between Islam and democracy. Within the ASC milieu, and similar groupings in Aarhus and elsewhere, the tendency to abstain from voting may have become more widespread in accordance with the diffusion and intensity of the Islamic revival in recent years. As more come to practice Islam in a neo-orthodox way, more have accepted that Muslims should not participate actively in Western democracies. However, it is important to notice that there is no automatic connection between this religious belief and anti-democratic behavior. Fact is that among the youngsters affected by the Islamic awakening in Aarhus there is little, if any, resonance of the active fight against the democratic order in Denmark. If we do not recognize these facts, we risk confusing religious revival and 'born-again Muslims' with radicalization. This is one of the consequences of defining radicalization as the antithesis of democratic attitudes, as it is increasingly done, and this will not further our understanding of the phenomenon of radicalization.

Although our interviewees generally did not perceive the concept of radicalization to be the most useful tool for addressing problems, some of them did find that there were problems in the Muslim community with issues of social control and religious bullying. One interviewee, working in a local youth club, described a concrete situation:

> A: We had a group of young men who stopped the girls who wanted to attend one of our parties for girls here at the club. This was two-three years ago. They were hanging around outside and were pushing the girls not to attend parties, and trying to convince them to stay at home.
>
> Q: Did you talk to them?
>
> A: Yes.
>
> Q: What did they say?
>
> A: Well, they said that the girls were like their sisters, and that they did not want them to go to parties, because it would harm the girls, as people would start to talk bad about them, people would gossip (Jamaal).

Such attempts at social control – the application of social pressures to achieve a certain type of behavior in other people – were described in a handful of our interviews. However, that social control is a widespread problem is claimed in a recent study of equality among Muslim women in Denmark:

> One issue can be identified, which all respondents have had to deal with: Social control. Some have internalized this way of thinking, and have maybe started exercising social control, others have wanted to criticize such practice, but have not dared. A few have broken away from social control and have experienced deep conflicts with family and other networks, conflicts which have cost social exclusion and in some cases violence. Social control is an important issue from the perspective of equality as boys do not seem to be subject to the same control, but are rather to large extent the ones who exercise the control (Maïa Consult 2009: 206, our translation).

It is typical for the descriptions of social control in our interviews, however, that such control and religious bullying are seen as phenomena that were more common 3-5 years ago in Aarhus than today. In fact, most of the instances described refer to the period when Shaykh Raed Hlayhel was an influential imam in Gjellerup. More often than not Shaykh Raed, or his close companions, was mentioned as the source of the social pressures:

> Once I was organizing a demonstration against the Iraq invasion, and I had picked a few people to speak at the demonstration, including a Muslim woman called Nadyia. At one point I received a phone call informing med that Raed had said that Nadyia should not speak at the demonstration – it was not suited for a woman to speak in public when men were present. I got very upset as I thought it was completely inappropriate that he would say something like that. I told them that we stood by our decision. However, what happened was that Nadyia heard what Raed had said and then she called me and said that she did not want to give the speech after all ... In this way Raed functioned as a controller in the community (Muhammad, not part of the ASC milieu)

One interviewee told how Shaykh Raed and his followers had a practice of making home visits to families who they believed were not coming to mosque often enough and try to convince them to come to mosque more regularly. The interviewee did not consider this undue pressure, however (Salah). When asked about it, all our interviewees dismissed that any imam or other religious authority in Aarhus today had the same status or influence as Shaykh Raed had before he left Aarhus. Many said that there is no religious 'controller' in the community today who is able to use their position and authority to exercise social control.

The kind of social controlling and religious bullying described above is from the perspective of equality and freedom of choice a serious social problem. In a community where social group pressures are widespread, fear and coercion develop. However, it is probably more useful to address this kind of problem in terms of a battle between conservative re-

ligious values and liberal progressive ones rather than as signs of radicalization. It is important to recognize that social control and group pressure based on religion are not particular Muslim phenomena. It is text book knowledge that 'Religion is a potent force for social control' (McGuire 2002: 244). Social control has also characterized, and to some extent still does, some communities, e.g. small rural communities also in Lutheran Protestant Denmark. French scholar Olivier Roy has put it this way:

> Europe is now facing the same challenge: how to deal with Islam as a 'mere' religion. But the emergence of Islam as a mere religion does not create a divide between 'East' and 'West' but a realignment between conservative and religious values on one hand, versus progressive and liberal ideas on the other hand. But values are not the expression of a given culture (Roy 2005:7)

There is a tendency in public discourse in Denmark, and elsewhere, to equate expressions of social control and religious bullying with signs of radicalization. Following the definitions of radicalization such behavior is seen as signs of radicalization as it is covered by the fuzzy 'undemocratic means' property. However, in our opinion little is won by including social control in the definition of radicalization. The only aspect of social control which is relevant for discussions of radicalization is when social control is directed against the democratic system, i.e. attempting to coerce people to abstain from voting. The threat against democracy embedded in this tends, however, to be forgotten when anti-democratic behavior is lumped together with other kinds of social control.[34] All social groups exercise some kind of social control and sanction as a way of reproducing norms – this is a standard sociological insight – and it should not matter if the social control is based on religion or any other normative system. Social control can be more or less explicit, but there is nothing to suggest that explicit social control, as described in our interviews, should be any more effective or problematic from a democratic perspective than the kind of political culturing that takes place in e.g. many work places, where membership of certain unions is sanctioned. We believe that such instances of social control and culturing are more accurately captured with reference to the fight between conservative and liberal values than by the discourse of radicalization.

Summing up we recommend, based on our conceptual analysis and empirical results, the following conceptual clarifications:

1) The tendency to define radicalization in terms of 'support or acceptance of terrorism' should be delineated to include the distinction between support/acceptance of the use of violence in defensive warlike situations in Muslim countries, and violence imposed in an indiscriminate and offensive manner against civilians in non-Muslim countries.

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[34] If it can be verified that Hizb ut Tahrir has threatened voters and candidates for the local election 2009 this should be taken very seriously (see http://www.lorry.dk/moduler/nyheder/showreg-video.asp?dato=09-11-2009&cID=1&vId=512825

2) The tendency to define radicalization as the antithesis of democracy, making 'unde-mocratic means' a defining property, should be avoided, or at least delineated by reference to the distinction between *un*democratic and *anti*-democratic behavior.

In general we recommend more caution in distinguishing religious awakening and certain political sympathies from radicalization. Part of what authorities and some researchers regard as radicalization may from another point of view be regarded as a widespread critique of international political affairs combined with a revival of Islamic practices and identities. We believe that by paying attention to the concrete recommendations above this can be partly achieved with regards to the definition of radicalization. However, it is just as important that such clarifications and distinctions are made visible in public debates and in the discourse of the political elite. Here academics working in the field have a responsibility to highlight nuances, conditions and distinctions. Only by taking these refinements seriously can we hope to reach a better understanding of the phenomenon of radicalization and the possibilities of de-radicalization.

Part II.
The Cultic Milieu: A Framework for Understanding Radicalization Processes

Lene Kühle

Part I of this report discussed radicalization as defined in the Danish context by PET, the Danish Police Intelligence Service, and the Danish government and suggested improvements within the conceptual framework by making a distinction between support for terrorism in warlike and oppressive situations and the use of terrorism in situations of peace. This distinction builds on the important difference between using violence against civilians and using violence against soldiers on the battle field. Another important distinction is the one between undemocratic and anti-democratic ideas and actions. It was suggested that there are big differences between avoiding participation in democratic practices, whenever possible, which was the content of the notion of 'undemocratic', and the more active denunciation of democracy, the 'anti-democratic' ideas and actions, which would constitute an attempt to directly abolish democracy. We would argue that only the presence of the latter constitutes a threat against democratic society. These recommendations may improve the usefulness of the concept for practical reasons, but the concept of radicalization may still be problematic as the point of departure of a scientific theory of radicalization for two reasons.

First, it does not allow for the realization that the actions and world views in the Muslim world may be very different from the Muslim actions and world views in the Western world. The processes of radicalization in Western societies and in the Muslim world overlap, of course, to the extent that some European Muslims either join the jihad somewhere in the Muslim world or support it financially, and that some radical Muslims in the Muslim world may plan terrorist attacks in the Western world (Bakker 2006, Taarnby 2006; Neumann 2006). Some scholars argue, however, that not only does the situation in the Muslim world and in Western societies differ – the Western world tends to have relatively stable and well-functioning democracies for instance, while democracies in the Muslim world tend to be unstable, corrupt and illiberal – but also the motivation of Muslims in the Western context and in the Muslim world respectively differs widely. One scholar, Farhad Khosrokhovar, thus argues that jihadism in the Muslim world and jihadism in the West are completely different phenomena and that the 'scheme governing the forms of martyrdom characteristic of these neo-ummas is very different to that governing the behavior of the desperate young men of Muslim societies' (Khosrokhavar 2005: 151). The same position is taken by Olivier Roy, who finds that: 'The Western-based Islamic terrorists are not the militant vanguard of the Muslim community; they are a lost generation unmoored from traditional societies and cultures, frustrated by a Western society that does not meet their expectations' (Roy 2007: 56). Even scholars who emphasize the global

aspects of jihad find that global jihad is a 'powerful metaphor' (Neumann 2006: 76) carrying the jihadist world view as much as a reflection of reality. In fact, the call for a 'global war on terrorism' and the call for a 'global jihad' are similar calls to the extent that they emphasize the unitary character of phenomena around the globe. Both these calls may, however, tempt us to ignore the differences and take the homogeneity of the phenomena as a given fact and not something that ought to be established empirically. A sound scientific approach will be open for the study of both similarities and differences.

Second, the concept of radicalization focuses on how individuals come to take on 'radical' opinions or condone the use of violence, yet it does not appear recommendable from a scientific point of view to focus too much on radicalization as an individual process. It may, at this point, be relevant to emphasize that the 'original' concept of radicalization came from political science, where it has been used to discuss political violence in counter-cultural milieus. The way the concept of radicalization has been employed in political science may be described in this way:

> Radicalization can occur on both the individual and organizational levels. In some cases, only some individuals within an organization will opt for a radical approach (typically creating inter-organizational conflict). In other cases, an entire organization can develop a radical approach. Radicalization therefore primarily occurs within organizations, i.e. after recruitment has taken place (though there are examples of individuals committing radical acts without being part of an organization; …) (Olesen 2008: 9).

In the recent discussions of radicalization, which primarily have related to Islamist radicalization, radicalization has changed from a primarily collective concept to a primarily individual concept. Interest has focused on charting the process from being an ordinary Muslim to being a radical or extremist and the concept seems to be used synonymously with 'conversion into radicalism'. The present concepts of radicalization have, thus, moved away from the original understanding of radicalization, where radicalization is a collective process of change in discourses and orientation of groups, milieus and societies to an understanding of radicalization as an individual process. The emergence of the current individually based concepts of radicalization, is probably related to the fact that current approaches to radicalization are policy-motivated rather than 'science-driven', guided by academic research. The current policy approach to radicalization is, however, problematic from three perspectives. From an empirical perspective, research on (Islamic) radicalization, which has mainly focused on micro-level analysis, has been tremendously unsuccessful so far (Kirby 2007; Sageman 2008). Basically, the only outcome of this research is that the individuals' roads towards 'radicalism' have no patterns: It is impossible to predict who will become radicalized. From a pragmatic perspective, it is therefore time to change horses from an individual-oriented approach to a more collective-oriented approach. Secondly, the focus on the individual is problematic from a theoretical perspective. Micro-level analysis tends to build on the assumption that 'radicalized individuals'

are very different from the rest of us – either psychologically or in their backgrounds (traumatic events, for instance), both of which are empirically unsustainable (Sageman 2008: 18-19). It also assumes that people have very clear intensions with what they do and that their opinions are relatively stable and steadily grounded. But theories of identity tell us that this is not always the case, in particular not for young people. As part of a youth rebellion, some young people become for instance 'hyperreligious' (McGuire 2002: 63) or in other ways assert identities separate from their 'child identity'. Rebellion or resistance is very much part of youth culture (Rabi 2005). Some of our interviewees who are working with young people warn against taking the opinions of the young too seriously:

> We should always remember that it is young people we are dealing with, who are looking for an identity. And it may be that one day they regard Bin Laden as an idol because that is where they are right now. The next day, they think something else. We should be careful not to take them too literally. But at the same time, we should have a good impression of when they are crossing the line (Louise).

A similar stance is taken by Lotte, who also has daily contact with young Muslims and who warns that 'we must be really careful that it [the focus on radicalization] doesn't get out of hand. It is young people we are dealing with' (Lotte). By stressing that she is dealing with young people she emphasizes that, in her experience, young people try out different identities and the debate on radicalization may become 'a bit absurd. Of course we should not educate terrorists or accept that kind of thing. But I think that we should be open to different opinions. If we all become too similar, I find that to be just as dangerous' (Lotte). Since opinions – in particular among young people – are not stable, it is furthermore methodologically problematic to assume a stable identity as 'radicalized'. Thirdly, the problems concern, of course, also the methodological difficulty of finding the relevant 'radical Muslims' and the problems associated with convincing them to participate in an interview study. Most research has consequently relied on demographic data, written documents and on interviews with friends, parents etc. It is Sageman's sustaining argument that radicalization can be studied neither as an individual phenomenon nor exclusively on the societal level. 'Both micro and macro approaches to the study of terrorism have severe limitations. Nor can we combine them to create a more comprehensive picture' (2008: 23). It is Sageman's argument that radicalization can neither be understood in terms of general societal processes of for instance marginalization nor in terms of individual conversions to radicalism. It is necessary to understand the dynamics of the concrete environment in which radicalism takes place.[35] In Aarhus, the relevant environment to discuss in this context is the ASC milieu. The fact that the ASC milieu is exactly a milieu and not an organization or a group complicates this shift of perspective, however.

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[35] Unfortunately, Sageman retains a basically individualized concept of radicalization: 'this process of transforming individuals from rather unexceptional and ordinary beginnings to terrorists with the willingness to use violence for political ends' (2008: viii).

2.1. The ASC milieu

It is important to emphasize that the ASC milieu, as described in Part I, is not linked to terrorism. It is in fact upsetting for most participants in the ASC milieu that Islam is often associated with terrorism:

> Terror, that is not Islam at all. So I am a bit: What are you doing? If you are doing terror, then stop it. And I do think that if he [any of the convicted on terrorism charges in Denmark] has done it and if there is evidence that he has done it, then of course he should be punished (Ghaada).

Though some participants do express sympathies for organizations that appear on international terror list they are on this matter, as discussed in Part I, not very different from the other Muslims interviewed. For both groups a clear distinction is made between the 'terrorism' of resistance taking place in war in the Muslim world and the 'real terror' of terrorist attacks in peaceful Denmark. The support for the first and the lack of support for the latter is as such not specific to the participants in the ASC milieu.

So far, research has been conducted under the assumption that Islamist terrorism is not an isolated phenomenon completely disconnected from other parts of the Islamic tradition, theologically and socially. It is obviously distressing for many Muslims that what they consider to be for instance a religion of peace or justice has been 'hijacked' by radicals who use Islam to legitimate killings of civilians. Yet, this appears to be the social reality. One of the best-known scholars on radicalization, Quintan Wiktorowicz, explains it in the following way: 'Al Qaeda and the radical fundamentalists that constitute the new "global jihadi movement" are not theological outliers. They are part of a broader community of Islamists known as "Salafis"' (2005: 75). In the Danish context, it also appears that the convicted in the Vollsmose/Odense case and the Glostrup and Glasvej cases were part of the general Muslim milieu in and, perhaps more precisely, around specific mosques. In the journalistic rewriting of the events leading to the arrests in the Vollsmose case, the efforts to buy materials to construct a bomb seem to alternate with Quran readings in the mosque and they apparently were seen as constituting a dawa (mission) group relating to the mosque (Gotfredsen 2008). This does not, of course, mean that the imam, the mosque board or other people attending the mosque knew what the Vollsmose group had been up to, but it does appear that radical groups in Denmark have emerged 'around' specific mosques. The ASC milieu in Aarhus is not a conveyer belt for terrorists; it is a milieu where young Muslims search for authentic knowledge about how God wants them to live as Muslims. But on the other hand, it appears to be relatively similar to the milieu, which for instance the convicted in the Vollsmose case were frequenting. Additionally, some of the interviewees had connections to individuals involved in the Vollsmose milieu. The ASC milieu is in that way a milieu which most likely is monitored by for instance PET, a fact which participants in the milieu occasionally referred to.

The function of mosques and imams in Western contexts are often misinterpreted. At least in Denmark, it is not a general trend that 'mosques are largely defined by their imams' (Olesen 2009: 19).[36] In fact, the majority of mosques do not have a permanent imam and if there is a permanent imam, he is often either an unpaid volunteer living in Denmark or a paid, educated imam staying on a visa for a couple of years (Kühle 2006). Discussions on Islam in the media often depict the mosques as something akin to the Evangelical-Lutheran Church of Denmark with educated salaried imams serving a relatively well-defined congregation. But this picture simplifies the function of mosques. Only in a particular type of mosque, the 'sheikh mosque', do the imams define the profile of the mosque (Kühle 2006). None of the mosques in Aarhus can be defined as sheikh mosques[37] and there are no imams who all activists in the milieu know or will even have heard of. Likewise, the deficiency of qualified imams means that most mosque boards would be willing to accept as imam almost anyone willing and able to do the job, which means that mosques often do not have very clear profiles. The job of mapping the different profiles of the different mosques is not made easier by the theologically based indisposition of participants to see the mosque environment in this way: 'But it is still – and this is what people don't understand – regardless of how much I disagree with a Muslim, I am still his brother and he is my brother' (Ali).

The ASC activist milieu in Aarhus is related to five mosques. The two mosques centrally placed in the milieu would occasionally be referred to as 'Arab mosques', but both mosques attract a more mixed group of Muslims, including many converts, because of their many activities, which are often in Danish. One or two Somali mosques that function as outskirts of the milieu also have a lot of activities. One of the mosques would for instance have courses for women in Arabic, Quran and Islam, Monday to Thursday, but because activities tended to be conducted in Somali, few non-Somalis would attend. One of the Somali mosques is situated in the centre of the city – as is another Arab mosque – and they are therefore attended by many, when they are downtown for other reasons. Many of the activists in the milieu would therefore reply like Kareem:

Q: So it is a matter of chance which mosque you'll attend?

R: Yes, there is not a particular one that I am attending (Kareem, 22 years).

The reply reveals only part of the reality, however. The mosques Kareem occasionally attended would be chosen among the three to five mosques mentioned above. Though he

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[36] In a review essay on Muslim authority in Europe, Frank Peter finds that 'most studies put the emphasis on the relative decline of imams, criticise the obsession of policy-makers with this group of actors, or point to "new" Islamic actors, such as preachers, as their partial replacement' (Peter 2006: 111).

[37] Lighed og Broderskabsforeningen was considered a sheikh mosque when Shaykh Raed was heading the mosque, but after he left, the mosque does not have the characteristics of a sheikh mosque anymore.

may know of the existence of other mosques, he would be unlikely to attend the prayer in one of the Turkish Diyanet mosques, whose imams are employed by the Turkish state, or in the Afghan mosque for that matter: They would be much too oriented towards a specific national background for his and other activists' taste. There are of course activists in the milieu who would only attend prayer, courses or gatherings in one mosque, but many would not discriminate between them: 'If I could make it work then I would just go. There was not a particular place where I would go. It was like this, if there is a course [on Islam], then I would go there' *(Ghaada).* The two Arab mosques most centrally placed in the milieu, were both considered Salafi. One of the Somali mosques was also considered Salafi, but some of the interviewees suggested that Salafism was in fact even more prevalent, 'Well, it is not only the three mosques that you mention which are Salafi, so are the others' (Kareem). It was the general impression shared by people outside as well as inside the milieu that 'almost all' young practicing Muslims with a Somali-Arab-Convert background in Aarhus were Salafis. This may seem to be in contradiction to the conclusion in the 2008 report from the Change Institute, that:

> [t]he research in Denmark indicates that the global movements such as Salafism, Hizb ut-Tahrir and Caliphate State do not seem, in an organized way, to have gained a foothold in the Danish society. The complexities and variety of Salafi thinking, such as striving towards living a life as a 'good Muslim', is also noted (Change 2008: 68)

But if the words 'in an organized way' are underlined, the discrepancies disappear. Neither *Hizb ut-Tahrir*[38] nor *any other Salafi movement* has been able to establish themselves in Aarhus and although the ASC milieu is a mainly Salafi milieu, this is in an individual rather than in an organized way.

It may be an important aspect of this, that it was essential for many of the interviewees to underline that Salafi was not to be understood as a group identity as such. Salafi was not something you could be, but something you would hope to become:

> I don't really think that you can call yourself Salafi because Salafi is huge and means that you follow the right path (Khaled).

> Well, the meaning of Salafi is the one who guards. It does not mean anything. We cannot choose to be Salafi. When we are dead they call us Salafi, which means the one who came before you. That is the only thing that Salafi means (Ahmed).

> But we are not Salafi. We don't have a creed. We just have our reliable source, that is the Quran and the Sunna of the Prophet and then we follow the Prophet. We don't have a specific name for ourselves (Ali).

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[38] Hizb ut-Tahrir has in fact tried to establish themselves in Aarhus but have – apparently because of opposition from the Islamic establishment in Aarhus – been unable to enter the Muslim arena in Aarhus. There are of course individual Muslims in Aarhus who find Hizb ut-Tahrir appealing.

Another position was taken by Bilal who argues that most Muslims are aware of the necessity to return to the ways of the Prophet and that 'this is why, you cannot say about someone that he is not salafiya. Even though it [the concept of salafiya] is not mentioned in the Quran. Because anyone who says that they are following the path of the prophet, they are salafiya, right?' (Bilal). Emphasizing that Muslims differ in their practice of Islam, many interviewees did, however, reluctantly accept the categorization as Salafi:

> No, but it is not like I would say that I [belong to] a group or something or that I am ... because I am, as it is, a Muslim. I would prefer to say that I am a Muslim, but the trouble is that Shi'as would also say, 'I am a Muslim', a Sufi would say 'I am a Muslim'. Everyone says 'I am a Muslim' so you are in kind of need to ... establish that I am not a Shi'a, I am not a Sufi; you may say that you are Sunni, following the Salafi path (Pernille).

One of the interviewees had some problems with the fact that the notion could be used to label a specific group of Muslims. Replying that he was not a Salafi, he said,

> If someone asks me then I will reply just as I have done to you. I am a Muslim. I was never to be categorized within any groups and I never will be. But it gives the media an opportunity to write something again. They love it. If they hear that there is a group called Salafi, then they will immediately write that there are these two very different groups that disagree. But it is nonsense. We are all Muslims (Ali).

The reluctance to take on a Salafi identity may also be one of individual resistance to be framed within a defined identity: 'Ok, but I feel right now that I don't need to put a label on myself and say, "well, I am this" or "I am that", but [just say] "I am a Muslim"' (Kamila). A Dutch researcher studying Muslim groups on the web faced a similar problem regarding identities. On her blog, she presented arguments for retaining the notion of Salafi, but refraining from the notion of Salafist:

> Relating back to my initial somewhat careless use of 'Salafi' or 'Salafist', I have come to the point of not using 'Salafist' (or Islamists) for my research anymore since it suggests membership in a party or something similar. Furthermore, no activists I have encountered have used the term Salafist, Islamist or Salafism so far. So I am left with the terms Muslim, salafiyyah and Salafi. However, to resort to 'Muslim', which is the self-ascription of all activists as the lowest common denominator, is not a solution in my opinion. It is too general and indiscriminate in order to be helpful for my ethnography. After all, there are by far enough Muslims who outright reject the salafiyyah thought. Nobody can claim to do research about Muslims in general.

> Instead, I talk about 'activists inspired by the salafiyyah' in order to name the group of activists I am interested in. Admittedly not the most elegant solution. This label includes those who do not like to be called Salafi and those who really want to be called Salafi. When talking about individuals I will have to see how they describe themselves and take this into account (Becker 2009).

Following this argument, the ASC milieu in Aarhus is not a milieu full of Salafists (or Islamists for that matter), but a milieu occupied by activists inspired by salafiyyah. Some of these activists embrace the identity as Salafi, but many do not. They are, however, all engaged in conjuring up the frameworks of their life as Muslims taking their point of departure in the Quran and the exemplary life of the prophet.

The report from the Change Institute concludes that activists inspired by the salafiyyah do not create large organizational structures, but rather create smaller structures where face-to-face interactions are important:

> Salafism is fissiparous and has similarities with un-churched Evangelical Christianity, producing small communities based around charismatic religious leaders (sometimes religiously trained, sometimes lay) who align themselves with more senior scholars who stand somewhere within the Salafi spectrum (Change 2008: 111).

The ASC milieu in Aarhus is very much a grassroots milieu. The comparison between Salafism and un-churched Evangelical Christianity applies well in the case of the ASC milieu in terms of the 'unorganized', except that the ASC milieu lacks charismatic religious leaders. It holds no strong organizations and no positions regarded as authoritative among a wider group of activists. This does not mean that there are no authorities. Pernille, for instance, pointed to a Muslim living in Aarhus who she would follow because 'He is the only alim in Denmark'. Most other participants in the milieu had never heard about him, because he is not interested in a public role as an imam. His interest is mainly to study and write books on Islam. Other points of reference are the different imams; in particular those who also act as teachers tend to draw small groups of young Muslims, which may be considered their herds (until they drift on to somewhere else). It is also easy for any individual who possess knowledge about Islam to contribute with presentations in any of the meetings in the mosques or to set up study groups privately or in the mosque. The ASC milieu is therefore a basically unorganized milieu and can only with some difficulty be understood with reference to the aims and goals of organizations. The unorganized character of small Islamic youth milieus like the ASC milieu is probably not unusual for Muslims in Europe. There is a general lack of knowledge about how Muslim organize in the minority situation and that is probably the cause of many misunderstandings concerning the conditions of Muslim in Europe. For the study of radicalization it leads to a specific problem because the unorganized character of the milieu makes it more difficult to do a study. It is a well known fact that religious organizations facilitate research because they (usually) provide a coherent world view and have leaders and members who (normally) can be reached for interview. Of course there may be diversity within an organization, there may be factions and dissidents; the mere fact that there is an organization provides some kind of standard of measurement. The ASC provides none of this. It consists basically of a number of individuals with individual ideas and goals. Yet there are some 'strings' connecting the individuals, which the same time distinguish the participants from other Muslims. But the ideas and norms of the interviewees differed on many

matters, that of democracy being a good example. The 'strings' are therefore not normative, but rather based on a parallelism of goals and aims. The participants in the milieu are all religious seekers and their goal is to live the way God has prescribed. An approach that takes its point of departure in this realization will be the best to grasp the character of the ASC milieu.

2.2. The concept of a cultic milieu

Some studies on Islamic activism have a deliberate point of departure in social movement theory (Olesen 2009; Wiktorowikz 2002: 189). This approach places Islamic activism in the context of general social activism and emphasizes the similarity between Islamic movements and other types of movements. Other researchers have placed Islamic activism in Europe in the context of sociology of religion, emphasizing the religious elements of Islamic activism. Identity formation among young Muslims is increasingly studied in terms of a general process of secularization and individualization, and the establishment of mosques is seen as examples of 'denominationalization' or 'congregationalization'. The process through which the practices accommodate to the European context: The imam takes on a priest-like position, the mosque organises like the churches and more (Cesari 2004: 127-131; Maréchal 2003: 99). Recently, it has been suggested that Islamic terrorism and radicalism in Europe may be well captured by comparison with the research on sects, cults and new religious movements. Marc Sageman builds his arguments in *Understanding Terror* on a comparison between entry into Al Qaeda and a new religious movement, but also Farhad Khosrokhovar and Mark Sedgwick, among others, have argued that Islamic radicalism may be grasped by focusing on the similarities with cults/new religious movements like Aum Shrinrikyo, for instance (Khosrokhavar 2005: 151; Sedgwick 2007: 18-19).

Where these researchers have focused on the actual terrorist cells and movements, the discussion on radicalization goes much further. It also focuses on support for what is perceived as terrorist movements and undemocratic or anti-democratic opinions, which in no way resemble the tight social control or commitment of for instance members of the Aum Shrinrikyo, the Aumians. Different religious associations have traditionally been discussed using the concepts of 'sect' and 'church', which were introduced as sociological concepts by Ernest Troeltsch and Max Weber in the early 20th century. Best known are of course Weber's divisions between church and sect, where the church encompasses mass religiosities, the sect organizes the religious sect virtuoso/the religiously qualified. Weber's typology focuses on inclusion and exclusion or the extent to which membership is based on choice or whether members are born into the religious group. Troeltsch supplemented the concepts with that of the 'mystic', which according to Troeltsch is non-institutionalised religiosity per se. Howard Becker took his point of departure in Troeltsch's mystic, when he, in 1932, suggested the concept of 'cult': A cult is a loose organization of people with a private, eclectic religiosity. However, there is also another

meaning of the cult as a new, dissenting (or foreign in culture), religious tradition. The notion of cult became accepted in sociology of religion, though it became derogatory in the public,[39] but it proved difficult to study. Cults, unlike churches and the denomination, were seldom lasting phenomena. Often, they would emerge, flourish and then die out quite soon. In order to establish firmer ground under the study of cults, Campbell coined the notion of the 'cultic milieu' in 1972 to describe a counter-cultural environment in a society where different religious and philosophical currents flourished and intermingled and occasionally provided the background for formation of cults. Campbell understands the cult as an organization encompassing unorthodox deviant views and which, unlike the sect, does not have firm organizational forms of fixed dogma. Campbell presents the cultic milieu as a methodological tool to enable the study of cults. The main problem has, according to Campbell, been the difficulties associated with studying something transitory as the cult. The cultic milieu is much more tangible: regardless of the wax and wanes of particular cults, the cultic milieu is a 'constant feature of society' (Campbell 1972: 122). Unlike other religious organizations, cults and people active in the cultic milieu do not form firm groups with aligned beliefs: 'Members do not act in common as a group so much as share 'a parallelism' of spontaneous religious personalities' (121). The idea was that the cultic milieu was a stable and perpetual part of society, which could be studied along with the different religious cults it would breed in order to understand non-mainstream religious movements in a society.

Campbell understands the concept of the cultic milieu as 'the cultural underground of society' (Campbell 1972: 122). In a Western context, the cultic milieu has historically consisted to a large degree of mysticism, but has also incorporated any emergence of alternative religiosity from belief in flying saucers over neo-shamanism to new-age spirituality (124). Campbell does not find this surprising, given that what Campbell regards as the basic beliefs associated with the mystical position, unity of consciousness and life, need of spiritualization of the individual, emphasis on the erotic and sexual, rejection of materialism have been denunciated by the Christian traditions. It is therefore no wonder 'that we should find that they flourish in the cultural underground of an officially Christian society' (Campbell 1972: 125). Though mysticism is central to the cultic milieu described by Campbell, it must be assumed that this is historically contingent and due to the fact that Western Christianity generally has suppressed mysticism. In Buddhist and Hindu societies where mysticism is regarded as central elements in religion, other elements would have to be found in the cultic milieu. Pre-Christian pagan traditions also exist predominantly in the cultic milieus of Christian societies.

But the world has changed since Campbell wrote about the cultic milieu. Some of the ideas and beliefs 'delegated' to the cultic milieu, due to its clash with dominant main-

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[39] Since the 1960s, the notion of cult has had a very negative meaning in English, while sect is a more respectable name (opposite in Danish where 'sect' is highly negative).

stream beliefs, are now less controversial. Many of the ideas of the cultic milieu of 1972 are now proliferated by mainstream media and shared by a large percentage of the population in many countries. Where does this leave the concept of the cultic milieu? Some researchers find that the notion of the cultic milieu may still be utilized to describe the New-Age spiritual 'nebuleuse mystique-esoterique' environments and the religious phenomena usually referred to as cults (Mayer 2006: 99). Others find that the concept of the cultic milieu is perhaps better restricted to phenomena that are truly countercultural, regardless of whether these phenomena would in any way qualify as cults. This position has been promoted by Jeffery Kaplan and Helen Löow, who in an edited book from 2002, *Cultic Milieu. Oppositional Subcultures in an Age of Globalization*, provide evidence for the value of the cultic milieu in studies of a row of radical movements ranging from neo-Nazism, radical nationalism, racism to environmentalism: 'Cultic milieu theory suggests one key to understanding the linkages between the wide variety of parading malcontents' (Kaplan & Löow 2002: 4). The collection of papers put emphasis on a milieu of seekers and a diversity of co-existing countercultural ideologies which may prove useful to an understanding of Muslim radicalism. So far, the concept of the cultic milieu has primarily been used to describe the emergence of alternative religiosity from belief in flying saucers to neo-shamanism. But these kinds of beliefs are not the only ones which may create counter-cultural currents (and these concrete ideas may in fact become less alternative). Kaplan & Löow suggest that the concept of a cultic milieu should not be limited to the study of the substantial beliefs that Campbell looked into but that it may in fact be used as an analytical concept in studies of neo-Nazism and radical racism. There may be several cultic milieus in one society with different ideas but similar in the extent to which they are milieus of and for seekers. The claim that the ASC milieu may be considered a cultic milieu with its diversity of coexisting counter-cultural ideologies is a crucial point of departure for an understanding of its structure and working.

2.3. The ASC milieu in Aarhus as a cultic milieu?

To what extent can the ASC Islamic activist milieu in Aarhus be studied in a useful way in terms of a cultic milieu? It appears to live up to the two main characteristics of a cultic milieu: First, it is deviant. The value and norms of the Muslims interviewed are deviant on a series of issues. Significant issues from the view of the general population, religiously, polygamy, for instance, was accepted (but not always embraced), but also politically, where organizations generally regarded as 'terrorist' by Danish authorities were generally, at least conditionally, embraced in particular if the aim of the organization is to establish an Islamic state. It may be argued that the Muslim milieu in Denmark as such is deviant in certain aspects – for instance, support for organizations considered terrorist by Western governments was also widespread among the Muslims outside the ASC milieu, but the values and norms and actions of the activists in the ASC milieu were certainly more deviant in the sense that the Islamic identity was put forward and emphasized. The milieu definitely has strong 'counter-cultural' aspects (see Roszak 1968) in terms of ac-

tions: praying, reciting the Quran, and in terms of life style: wearing Islamic clothes, reading Islamic literature. The Muslims in the milieu had different ways of dealing with the tension between the mainstream 'Danish' way of life and the Islamic life style. Unlike 'traditional' counter-cultural subcultures, the deviance is not necessarily chosen for its deviance and its element of protest. The way in which society, and in particular the media, demonizes Islam was an important element in many of the interviews:

> There is the beard for men and the veil for women, and when a girl enters school [after having put on the veil] everyone will ask 'did your parents force you to do this?', 'No, it is not my parents', 'Are you sure about this?' It is both the teachers and the students, because they have learnt from the media that Muslim girls are forced to wear a veil, but they are not. Nobody is forced to wear a veil, particularly not in Denmark, because you cannot force anybody to anything. You cannot. Everyone lives like they please and the media must know that (Talha).

There were, however, different strategies for privatization of religion. Flagging the deviance was thus an individual strategy for some, while not for others. One interviewee, the 18 year-old convert Pernille, thus initially chose to wear the niqab (though confronted with the problems that her school had with her outfit, she agreed to take it off on the school premises), and boldly confessed her love of jihadi nasheeds and her admiration for Osama Bin Laden: 'but for sure I regard Osama bin Laden as a mujahid [one who fights in jihad], that is I believe that he is a freedom fighter' (Pernille).

Yusuf, on the other hand, found that he could not defend wearing the beard, which would in his own opinion clearly mark him as a practicing Muslim:

> Yes, it is sunna [habitual practice] to wear a beard and that is why I keep a little bit of it. But I look at it in this way. I study medicine and a doctor with a long beard will perhaps not work. Especially if he is a surgeon. But sunna, of course it is sunna. It is 100 percent sunna, and if I claim that it is not sunna I am contradicting religion. It is sunna and if you want to be 100 percent correct then you will wear a beard (Yusuf).

The fact that many of the ideas expressed in the ASC milieu may be considered marginal in some sense nullified the differences between positions:

> Yes, maybe the fact that there are not so many Muslims in Denmark [matters]. There are [so many] in a Muslim country, and there is therefore more room for discussing creeds and discussing opinions, whereas in Denmark, Muslims have to stick together more, because we are not so many. That is why the positions become – more – 'neutral' like (Kareem).

Second, the ACS milieu lacked, as mentioned, clear organizational structures. Certainly, the mosques were organized and did have hierarchies, but the authority and charisma of the imams were not absolute in any way. Due to the inability to get a long-term visa for an imam, one mosque would change imam quite often (every month even), while the oth-

er mosque had steady, voluntary imams, who however failed to achieve reel positions of authority: 'There are some in Aarhus, but it is not like they do what they have studied. They do not follow it 100 percent and then they have not studied enough. They have only a small amount of knowledge and you cannot call them shaykh. They [shaykhs] are just not there' (Talha).

The imams mentioned by the interviewees were described as funny, entertaining, good to talk to and 'good for the young' rather than authoritative. Their authority as well as all other authorities could always be questioned by knowledge from other sources: Opinions of other shaykhs in Aarhus or internationally, books, internet pages could for instance be used as authorities. Both Arab mosques were very open to new initiatives and the mosques could easily be used for Islamic purposes. The mosques as organizations therefore resemble the organizations described by Campbell as: 'organizations for "seekers" offering aid, support, facilities and a form of fellowship to those in search of truth" (1972: 127). Similarly, the Muslims occupying the cultic milieu would actively seek knowledge from different sources. They would read books on Islam, and many would also listen to tapes or read and discuss Islam on the internet. The books and websites mentioned varied greatly, though there were also repetitions (for instance islamonline.net). The media consumption by the participants in the milieu is at the same time diverse and central to the working of the milieu. In this sense, it reflects the cultic milieu as described by Campbell: 'the cultic world is kept alive by the magazines, periodicals, books, pamphlets, lectures, demonstrations and informal meetings through which its beliefs and practices are discussed and disseminated' (1972: 123). Though the ASC milieu is obviously very different from the cultic milieu described by Campbell, it shares the two main characteristics, deviance and lack of organization, which Campbell placed at the heart of the cultic milieu. We may therefore describe the ASC activist milieu as a specific form of collective, namely as a cultic milieu because it lives up to the defining properties. Yet the concept of the cultic milieu also has other connotations. Kaplan and Lööw emphasize the importance of two concepts for the working of the cultic milieu: tolerance and seekership: 'The sole thread that unites the denizens of the cultic milieu – true seekers all – is a shared rejection of the paradigms, the orthodoxies, of their societies. Beyond this element of seekership, the cultic milieu is a striking diverse and remarkable tolerant ethos' (Kaplan & Lööw 2002: 4). The emphasis on tolerance and seekership may not immediately ring true. But to what extent does the ASC milieu share some of Campbell's other characteristics of the cultic milieu?

Tolerance and mathabs

Is the ASC milieu in Aarhus tolerant? In one way it obviously is not. For Muslims navigating in the milieu, the acceptable is obviously only what is acceptable by Islamic standards. Thus, it is not acceptable to bring alcohol or pork to the potlucks at the mosque – to take obvious examples – and participants are expected to dress decently. It is a major concern

of Campbell's to establish the extent to which the characteristics of the cultic milieu, tolerance for instance, are immanent in the concept of the cultic milieu or whether they are due to the specific face of a cultic milieu consisting mainly of mysticism. He finds that both tolerance and seekership are well supported by the mystic tradition, but also by the other traditions present in the cultic milieu. The importance of the legitimation of tolerance by the traditions in the cultic milieu leads to the question of what kind of tolerance Campbell's cultic milieu supported. Was it a all-encompassing tolerance? Campbell suggests that it is not. The tolerance is not extended to orthodoxy and dogmatism, for instance (1972: 122), and racism, sexism etc. would probably not be accepted either. The ASC milieu could likewise be described as tolerant though certainly within limits. The key word to the tolerance in the milieu may surprisingly be Salafi.

Salafi is a notion derived from *salaf al-salih*, literally 'the pious ancestors', which refers to *sahaba*, the contemporaries of the Prophet who encountered him in a state of *iman* (belief), as well as the first three generations[40] of Muslims. Salafism has been described as 'a transnational effort for religious purification, connecting members of an "imagined community" through a common approach to Islam' (Wiktorowicz 2001: 20) and has been immensely successful, not only in terms of attracting many followers, but also by influencing other Islamic movements, for instance the Muslim Brotherhood. A Muslim observer of the Muslim youth milieu in Denmark thus points out that one important distinction is between soft Salafis, the *ikhwani Salafis*, who combine a background in the Muslim Brotherhood with Salafi ideas, and the *najdi Salafis*, who orient themselves more towards Saudi-Arabia, either supporting the Saudi regime or any of the dissidents critical of the regime (Shah 2004: 40-41). Salafis claim their exclusive reliance on the sources of the Quran and hadith. Salafism is occasionally said to reject the later tradition of following a *madhhab*, a traditional school of Islamic Law. The traditional schools of law, Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi, Hanbali refer to different methods of settling issues of interpretation. Traditionally, a Muslim is supposed to adhere to one of the law schools in order to follow a consistent interpretation of Islam, but the *madhhabs* have not been considered as adversaries, but rather as different paths to the same goal. It is an important aspect of Salafi thinking that it is pointless to restrict oneself to just one maddhab: 'For a religious scholar simply to follow, in an unexamined manner, the lead of an earlier jurist is to avoid the obligation of making sure that a given ruling is in accordance with evidence and has been arrived at through the proper methodology' (Mandaville 2007: 246).

Another characteristic of Salafism is that Tawhid, monotheism, is at the core of Islam. Tawhid, usually translated as monotheism, has different aspects. Particular the second element, *tawhid al-asma'wa al-sifat*, a belief in the unity of the names and attributes of God, is a source of disagreement, because it is taken to mean that when it for instance is said

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[40] Occasionally, salaf al salih refers to the three first centuries or the period of the three first Caliphs.

that God has hands, this means that he has hands. The hands are not like human hands of course, because God and man are incomparable, but they are real hands and not hands in a metaphorical sense (Wictorowitcz 2001: 114). Salafis are therefore known to have a literalist interpretation of Islam (Mandaville 2007: 246).

Religious pluralism has traditionally been institutionalized in Islam through the concept of maddhab, schools of law. It is – as discussed earlier – perceived to be one of the defining characteristics of Salafism that Salafis reject madhhabs. Yet for most of the interviewees in Aarhus, the proposition was not that they were rejecting the madhhabs, but rather that they were combining them:

> We follow all madhhab. We follow the one who has the strongest proof from al Quran or sunna or the friends of the prophet. We do not follow any madhhab 100 percent (Ali).

> But the aqida, that I follow it is, how to put it, a mixture of all of them. We don't take one person and follow him, we follow the person who has the evidence. If there is a person who does not have evidence then we will not take [knowledge] from him even if he is the person we follow as long as there is another person who has evidence either from the Quran or sunna (Yusuf).

> You take from ulama the strongest arguments, the arguments which appear strongest. It is not like we are only Hanafi and you cannot pass that boundary if you know what I mean. It is very much like this: We have the four schools of law and then you'll like take the strongest on all levels. The different [schools of law], there may be some Shafi, and then you add some Hanbali and then … It is simply to follow the first three generations, because they are closest to the Prophet and in this way it is the straight path, and I find it very logical. At other points it has been a bit like, well, they contradict each other, well ok, where is tawhid in this, monoteism that is, where you follow the ulama, who calls for salaf as-salih (Pernille).

> And if you are Salafi or if you are Hanafi or you are Maliki or whatever you are. For me it does not matter. They are all the same. The reason that there is so much diversity is that it makes religion stronger ... It may be different schools, but the idea remains the same. It is only making the idea stronger and there is no one who will say, 'No that is not true' because in this school ... (Kareem).

This kind of tolerance is surprising, because generally Salafism is often described as inevitably intolerant:

> Salafis are united by a common creed, which provides principles and a method for applying religious beliefs to contemporary issues and problems. This creed revolves around strict adherence to the concept of Ttawhid (the oneness of God) and the ardent rejection of a role for human reason, logic, and desire. Salafis believe that by strictly following the rules and guidance of the Quran and Sunna (Path or example of

the prophet Muhammad) they eliminate the biases of human subjectivity and self-interest, thereby allowing them to identify the singular truth of God's commands. From this perspective, there is only one legitimate religious interpretation: Islamic pluralism does not exist (Wiktorowicz 2006: 207).

There are limits to the tolerance. Kareem extends his tolerance to the law schools of Sunni Islam: 'But of course there are other groups, like Shia and such. But we keep them apart. In our eyes they are not Muslims' (Kareem). Others distance themselves from Sufi. The boundaries were perhaps not always as one would expect. This interviewee, who considered himself a moderate Salafi, and who fiercely rejected the legitimacy of violent jihad in Denmark, described his limits not in terms of moderate or extreme but in terms of *sifat-allah*, the attributes of Allah. A certain mosque and a certain teacher are thus acceptable because they belong to 'the good side of Ashari – that is they say that there is only seven attributes, no, I mean they believe in all the attributes, but they order them under seven (main) attributes' (Yusuf).

Seekership and knowledge

The notion of knowledge is perhaps the strongest element in the milieu. Correct knowledge is the most valued cultural good, the status of people tended to be determined by their level of knowledge and the search for more knowledge was considered the most esteemed quest. The notion of seekership was therefore central though perhaps in a different way than Campbell describes it. The cultic milieu he describes 'appears excessively individualistic' (125) and as rejecting 'the importance of the fellowship of believers' (125). The ASC milieu is on the surface the opposite as it emphasizes the element of fellowship and explicitly rejects excessive individualism. In relation to fellowship, this is strongly emphasized in the ASC milieu: 'And this is also why, whenever you meet a Muslim, though you don't know her at all, then we are just ... we know that we share opinions. I know when I see a girl with a veil that we are in agreement …' (Mette). In relation to individualism it is obvious that it is absolutely not up to the individual to define the rules:

> Yes, there are many things, but she did not really understand that for him it is ibadat [worship/ritual], he thinks it is ibadat and then she says, 'Is there anything wrong with that? Is it haram to do ibadat?' No it is not haram if you do it according to sunna, but if you invent it yourself, then it is. That is, what has been invented after the constitution of religion – that is bida. But that she could not understand. Again she says, 'What if my intention was to do ibadat?' Yes, but you know, that is if you have received knowledge, then even if your niya is ibadat, then it is still haram … it may be that your niya is to do ibadat, but if it is not ibadat, then it does not matter what your intention is ... But of course if you are completely ignorant, then it is like this in Islam: Everyone thinks that Allah is all-knowing, and he is all-forgiving and all-merciful. So she will not be punished for it, because she did not know (Pernille).

The relationship between community and individualization is of paramount importance in the study of Muslims in Europe. The discussion is not about whether there is in fact a process of individualization of Islamic belief and practice, because there is consensus that there is. The discussion is rather about what the notion of individualization implies and whether individualization will necessarily lead to a liberalization of Islam or whether individualization may in fact coincide with a relative stability of dogma (Peter 2006: 107). The developments in the ASC milieu seem to suggest that 'individualization within Islam' (Fadil 2008) does not necessarily mean liberalization and that the Salafi emphasis on 'the strongest evidence' may in fact be a strong carrier of individualization without liberalization.

Campbell speaks of one united cultic milieu that 'includes all collectives …' (Campell 1972: 122). But is this really so? Does a single cultic milieu encompassing all deviant ideas of a society do the job? Yes and no. Kaplan & Lööw find that Campell's idea about the cultic milieu may be too restricted on this area:

> The cultic milieu in this sense may be seen as a vast, imaginary urban landscape inhabited by many neighbourhoods. Ideas flowed easily between neighbourhoods in 1972, and with the explosion of Internet communications in the present day, ideas move with unimaginable speed to an ever increasing audience of consumers. Seekers, however may not be as fungible (Kaplan & Lööw 2002: 6).

Kaplan & Lööw's intention with this description is to underline the existence of different cultic milieus as well as the possibility that forces within the different milieus, though they 'do not act in common as a group ...' (Campell 1972: 121) may still 'mobilise and materialise for same cause despite widely different ideas' (2002: 6). Though this, according to Kaplan & Löow, was 'unlikely in 1972 [...] now it is the norm' (2002: 6). The issue of homosexuality is a good example of an activist in the ASC milieu borrowing arguments and ideas from other counter-cultural milieus. A 19-year old female Muslim thus quoted from a famous Christian anti-gay bumper sticker to make her argument against homosexuality: 'God created Adam and Eve, not Adam and Steve' (Kamila). It is likely that similarities between certain statements about Israel and Jews and well-known anti-Semitic statements may be found. A similar point regards conspiracy theories, which are said to flourish in cultic milieus (Mayer 2006: 198). This is especially the case in relation to heterodox science, where 'the deviant science meets the deviant religion' (Mayer 2006: 98). This parallelism may be reflected in a few statements of support for anti-Darwinism among the interviewees.

Many opinions exist in the ASC milieu. As discussed in Part I, support for organizations regarded as terrorist by Western authorities is prevalent in the milieu as are undemocratic opinions. The above-mentioned example of issues where people in the ASC milieu seem to share opinions with other counter-cultural milieus would be in relation to homophobic and anti-Semitic opinions. Examples of opinions would be opinions that in some way re-

flect the ASC milieu's status as a cultic milieu. Though the presence of support for alleged terrorist organizations, undemocratic, homophobic or anti-Semitic ideas may be troubling for public authorities in liberal democracies, they can hardly be regarded as signs of radicalization. They are effects of political dissent as well as the Islamic revival and its societal position in a cultic milieu. Radicalization is something different. Radicalization has traditionally been seen as a process in which a group or social movement becomes increasingly hostile towards the state and eventually legitimises violence against the state. Though the notion of radicalization tends to be used in relation to groups or movements, it may also be applied to a cultic milieu. The question of radicalization may now be rephrased into two questions:

1) Which factors explain 'recruitment' into the ASC milieu?

2) What may cause radicalization of the ASC milieu?

2.4. Causes for joining the ASC Milieu

Why do people want to participate in the ASC milieu? There are of course different individual reasons, but a few explanations came up in many interviews. For the Muslims themselves, the question is often quite simple: The practice of Islam was highly rewarding for them in many ways; in particular salat, the daily prayers and the reading of the Quran were important and the foundation of religious life among Muslims in the ASC milieu in Aarhus.

> Islam is my life. In this way, when I get up, I live after it, when I sleep I live after it. If it was not for Islam I would not have a life. Islam is my life and that is what I live by every day. When I get up and when I think and when I act ... (Ghaada).

Some interviewees emphasized the direct physical effects of prayer:

> For me personally, when I am away from my God, I don't sleep well. I feel I am lacking something. But as soon as I start praying or reading the Qu'ran or something I feel really great. And that is God. God told us in the Qu'ran that the Qu'ran is like medicine for your heart. If you read it you'll feel great. If you are close you'll feel great. That is how it is with Islam (Talha).

> It means a lot to me, because I find that the prayer in Islam is the foundation for it all. In fact it is not only a prayer, it is a kind of meditation. In 'gymnasiet' [high school] you may become stressed occasionally. But as I pray five times a day, it is like I meditate five times a day and it helps me a lot with removing the stress and avoid depression. Because you sort of rely on God and hope for all good things. And the prayer is also important for me because it is like a conversation between God and the individual herself. I do not for instance need a Catholic priest to be a mediator between me and God. I can go wash myself and say 'God is greatest', do my prayer where the intension is to meet God and tell him the things that I really need, and the things that I need forgiveness for. And when I die there'll be a lot of tests and I hope that I'll go to

Paradise. I am hoping for his mercy. Because you won't go to Paradise due to your good deeds. You will go to Paradise due to the mercy of God (Kamila).

The actions associated with being a practicing Muslim were basically individual. But it was often said that it would 'give more points' to pray together. Though communal prayer was often an aspect of the gatherings, it was not the fundamental aspect.

Knowledge is the single most important concept to understand the ASC milieu in Aarhus. The Muslims find that Islam is more than just an individual and subjective faith. Islam is objective truth. Many emphasize how their interest in natural science led them to become practicing Muslims. What convinced them of the truth of Islam is how the Quran addresses scientific subjects. Thomas tells how he, when he converted five years ago, was particularly struck by how the Quran could describe the evolution of the fetus:

> ... yes, that is in particular the thing with the fetus, that is very detailed and something you can only see in a microscope, which according to what I know was invented late in the 17th century (Thomas).

> For instance it says in the Quran and in fact I think it is only 50 years ago that criminal justice in Denmark began to use fingerprints. It was realized that there is something individual with all people, but this is said in the Quran that every man and every woman has individual [traits] ... (Mette).

> One of the things that struck me was the way the Quran describes the big bang for instance (Martha).

The quest for knowledge is basically individual, but knowledge is often acquired when it is transferred from one person to another. The general expression is that 'he/she has given me this knowledge', regardless of whether this 'present of knowledge' is transferred through books, the internet or through personal contact. The ASC milieu is described as a place where there is competition to achieve most knowledge:

> ... we create a strong cohesion and community for us, where we can speak together and sort of compete among ourselves, 'Have you read this?', 'When do you come to the Quran school', right? (Kamila).

For another interviewee, the milieu is a place where young Muslims can get help to live as Muslims in Denmark, but also a fun place to be. She had participated in an event arranged by a Muslim organization outside the ASC milieu and found the atmosphere unwelcoming:

> Those who knew each other greeted each other and that was that. I felt that it was … I just thought that it was wrong because when they make an open event like this there should be someone to greet those they have perhaps not seen before ... there was no atmosphere at all (Ghaada).

She herself had set up a network for Muslim girls between 12 and 19 in the ASC milieu: 'We are a group of girls who "click". We have a lot of fun together' (Ghaada). So for many participant – maybe particularly the girls – the milieu provides opportunities of friendship and someone to share the daily aspects of life with. The 'pull' factors in the milieu are therefore the way that Islam provides participants with well-being, its scientific qualities and the community of friendship it provides for participants. But are there any 'push' factors, factors in Danish society that is, that are rejected in the milieu, the rejection of which may provide a particular attraction for people? For some participants in the ASC milieu, the selection of an Islamic identity was clearly associated with a de-selection of Danish youth culture; not Danish culture as such, but specific aspects of the general youth culture, namely dating, drinking and excessive attention to appearances (fashionable clothes, make-up). An interviewee employed at an educational institution sees this very clearly: 'One of the big challenges is to find something they can share. Alcohol is the pivot of Danish youth culture and that is what the others reject' (Louise).

One of the Muslim interviewees mentions the Danish alcohol culture as the main negative aspect she can think of:

> Well, it is often, when I discuss with my class mates about what they are going to do for the Easter break. 'We are going to drink', they'll say then. Then I'll think: 'Are you not going to do anything else?' 'No, we are going to drink, we are just going to get drunk, we are just going to drink our brains out, we are going to drink until we can't remember anything we have done.' Then I am just a little bit like 'what are you getting out of that? Well, it is fun'. Then I just think, when you are young, you are not going to be young forever. I just think that while you are young you should be doing things you can look back on. Because the time you have now, that time is not gonna come back. Every minute that passes, is a minute that will never come back. And I think that time is something really valuable. And if you don't ... if you just take everything for granted, then suddenly you are thirty years old and you'll be thinking 'Gosh, I haven't really achieved anything in my life'. Then you'll think: 'It is your own fault because you have spent your youth on partying Friday, Saturday, Sunday and having a hang-over Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday. Of course there are some who drink and still get something done and get an education, but except for the thing with getting drunk there isn't really anything [that I am unhappy with] (Kamila).

The importance of and the separating effects of the focus on alcohol consumption among Danish youths is also noticed in a report made by Maïa Consult for the Ministry of Gender Equality (2009: 44-46), though the report emphasizes that not all young Muslims regard the drinking culture in similar ways. Some felt that the alcohol consumption was 'excessive', others felt that it was not such a big problem. The overall conclusion of the report is, however, that the parties and the Danish alcohol culture are alienating and inhibit the social intercourse with non-Muslims (Maïa 2009: 204). The young Muslims were generally puzzled about the meaningfulness of drinking so much alcohol, in particular when the

hang-over – both physically and mentally – is taken into account: 'It does not tempt me at all' as one girl of Palestinian background explains it (Maïa Consult, 2009: 44; our translation). The rejection of alcohol consumption and the party life of Danish youth is an important issue in the milieu. The rejection is done on the moral ground that this is forbidden by Islam[41] (a position completely shared by about half of Danish Muslims, see Table 7), but is also coupled to a sense of relief: Rejecting participation in the youth culture saves the individual from the dangers of becoming addicted to alcohol and drugs and becoming involved with crime and gangs; a social reality which many of the them are familiar with from their life 'in the ghetto'.

Table 7. Attitudes towards certain practices

'Do you agree or disagree with the following? You may occasionally drink alcohol and still be a good Muslim'				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Agree completely	154	13.8	15.9	15.9
Agree partly	82	7.4	8.5	24.3
Either or	74	6.6	7.6	32.0
Disagree partly	73	6.6	7.5	39.5
Disagree completely	553	49.7	57.0	96.5
Don't know	34	3.1	3.5	100.0
Total	970	87.2	100.0	
Missing	143	12.8		

Source: Rezaei & Goli.

There were far more activities for girls than boys in the ASC milieu, which was explained with reference to the need to provide specific spaces for young Muslim women:

> It is peculiar that there are so many events for the girls, when this is not the case for the men. But I think it is like this: Men can go anywhere they sort of want to. They don't need to think about the women or anything. I think it is taken care in this way because you'll think: Women need a lot of events that they can attend. But the men can go to the mosque whenever they like (Mette).

For the women it was a particular attraction that the ASC milieu was very gender segregated. Some of the gatherings and *durus* (classes) were for both sexes, but most were not and in the gender-mixed activities men and women would sit separately and remain relatively separated also during breaks. The general feeling was that it is better if genders are separated. Evaluating a gender-mixed course on Islam she had been following, Ghaada thus found the content to be good, but the overall ambiance to be lacking femininity: 'It

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[41] The different youth clubs are rejected on this basis: They are educating to the Danish youth culture, which with its emphasis on alcohol and dating (and possibly even crime) is educating to a decadent life according to the standards of many Muslims.

wasn't "girlie" enough' (Ghaada). The interaction between the young women is very emotional and caring and they feel that the atmosphere is much more relaxed when there are no boys/men around. The gatherings thus provide the girls with a space for this kind of emotional affection. Yet the most important attraction of girls-only gatherings may be that they provide a safe space, where the young women do not risk ending up in what may be considered inappropriate situations according to the logic of their parents and the general Muslim community (see for instance Maïa 2009: 206).

2.5. Radicalization of a cultic milieu

Having discussed how the ASC Islamic activist milieu may be understood as a cultic milieu, the question of radicalization may be approached. The problems of current definitions of radicalization being too focused on individual processes and not emphasizing the inter-personal level are partly caused by the fact that radicalization tends not to happen in organizations but in more unorganized and network-like settings, which it has been difficult for research to grasp. The introduction of the concept of a cultic milieu solves this problem. The cultic milieu is exactly the social setting needed to change the outlook of approaches to radicalization from individual processes to a more collective phenomenon. But how can a cultic milieu become radicalized? Which processes and phenomena can influence the general constitution of a cultic milieu?

Some definitions of radicalization will focus on radicalization as a process in which the ideas and narratives expressed by individuals, or in a cultic milieu, increasingly include more radical ideas and narratives. The notion of radical mentioned in this definition is problematic, however. Radical is not only a relative concept; radical may be used in a religious as well as in a political way (Mandel in press). To single opinions out just because they differ from the commonsensical is problematic in a liberal democracy. For instance, Denmark has had quite wide limits of tolerance, among other things expressed in the way freedom of religion and freedom of speech have been practiced. Denmark is well known for allowing for instance neo-Nazis to organize and work in the country; a tolerance that has also generally been extended to Islamic organizations. Efforts to ban Hizb ut-Tahrir have been rejected twice by Danish authorities, despite verdicts in 2003 and in 2006 (for threats on fliers against the prime minister and against Jews).

Furthermore, focusing on the presence of individual deviant ideas is a misreading of the constitution of a cultic milieu:

> Ideas unacceptable to the social, cultural and political mainstream flourish. This is not to say that they find acceptance. Most indeed, are heard and rejected, many are criticized, most are ignored. But they are heard and exchanged and passed on from belief system to belief system, from leader to leader and from seeker to seeker (Kaplan & Lööw 2002: 4).

Some researchers have therefore suggested that radicalization should not focus on the actual content of the ideas as much as it should highlight the 'mode' in which radical ideas are expressed and the extent to which the ideas may be borne out in life in a way which may threaten the constitution of society. One approach in this direction is viewing the process of radicalization as a process of securitization (Staun 2009: 7). Securitization is a process in which 'the processes by which "something" (a reference object) is deemed threatened and security action is taking in its defence'. Many objects can be securitized (Laustsen & Wæver 2001: 148).

A similar approach is taken by Ehud Sprinzak (1990) (whom also Slotman & Tillie, discussed in Part I, draw from). Based on a study of the Weathermen, an extreme Leninist group which declared war on the US government, attempted to build a Leninist vanguard and set up a red army in 1969, Sprinzak sets up a three-phase model of radicalization. The first phase consists of a 'crisis of confidence', in which the confidence between a group and the authorities is eroded in the course of a specific conflict between a specific group and specific rulers or policies (Sprinzak 1990: 80). The crisis of confidence may be continued in a 'legitimacy conflict', in which the criticism previously stated leads to a questioning of the very legitimacy of the whole system. A sign that a crisis of confidence has emerged is that the challenge group comes to suspect 'erroneous rulers' of deliberate policies of misleading the people (Sprinzak 1990: 81). The final state, the 'crisis of legitimacy' is the culmination of the process of radicalization and describes the situation in which criticism of the system extends and develops into a dehumanization of people engaged with the 'rotten, and soon-to-be-destroyed, social and political order' (Sprinzak 1990: 82) and the development of a new ethics in which the group regard themselves as warriors combating evil. This final phase is determined by the occupation of the radicalized group with a 'nonexistent "fantasy war" with authorities and expend themselves in a struggle to win it' (Sprinzak 1990: 85).

Radicalizing events

Sprinzak emphasizes the effects of conflicts with the authorities for initialising processes of radicalization. The same has been emphasized in studies of radicalization of radical left-wing groups in Italy (della Porta 1995) and from numerous studies of conflict and violence in relation to religious groups where

> violence grows out of escalating social confrontations between, on the one hand, an apocalyptic sectarian movement, and on the other, ideological proponents of an established social order who seek to control 'cults' through emergent, loosely institutionalized oppositional alliances, typically crystallized by cultural opponents (especially apostates and distraught relatives of members) (Hall 2003: 378).

Hall suggests that the risk of violence increases if the cultural opponents succeed in mobilizing government representatives or the media (ibid). The ASC milieu may, due to its individualized character as a cultic milieu, not easily undergo collective processes of radi-

calization in full. But it is possible that the general key note of the cultic milieu may undergo part of the radicalization process and increasingly come to regard for instance state and government representatives with mistrust. That may enhance the risk of violent mobilization to emerge from the milieu. But what kind of events may initiate processes of radicalization of the cultic milieu?

One major event influencing the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims in Denmark is the cartoon crisis. The crisis, which put Denmark on the world map in recent years, did in fact begin in Aarhus and involved two Aarhus-based imams on the front seat, Shaykh Raed and Ahmed Akkari. The cartoon crisis changed the constitution of Muslim life in Aarhus:

> I think that the cartoon crisis has been ... for better and for worse… a good thing because they, the debate it caused, the heavy debates, has created a kind of conscience, where a lot of Muslims are beginning to think that there are other opinions, and that someone may in fact go very far, and how should one relate to that. If other drawings are done, I think that many Muslims will deal with it differently. I hear many people say: 'Let them do it. We should not make heroes out of them' And what is the artistic quality in the cartoon? But it has been a healthy process for better and for worse, though many Muslims find that we should have dealt differently with it. We should perhaps write in the media, we should use democratic methods. We should be stronger among us as Muslims. We should create internal debates and more, so it has in my eyes been positive in many ways (Imran, social worker).

Surprisingly the cartoon crisis did not come up in most interviews and seemed to be in the past for many participants in the milieu. Yet the cartoon crisis played a part as the background for the event that was mentioned in almost all interviews, which occupied the minds of many Aarhus-based Muslims in the spring of 2009, the Tunisian case.

The Tunisian case

The event that initiated the Tunisian case was the arrest in February 2008 of three men, residing in Aarhus, on charges of planning to kill one of the cartoonists, Kurt Westergaard. One of the men, a 40 year-old Danish citizen of Moroccan origin was released after interrogation, while the other two men, both Tunisian citizens, were expelled from Denmark without a trial.[42] One of the Tunisian men left the country immediately, while the other man was unable to return to Tunisia and remains in Denmark under the conditions of 'exceptional leave to remain'. Because of the public upheaval and fear caused by the fact that he was not incarcerated, but was free to move around the streets of Aarhus, where he might in fact accidently run into Kurt Westergaard, the man he allegedly plotted to kill, a special law was enacted, known as the Tunisian Law, which meant that persons present in Denmark under the conditions of exceptional leave to remain are obliged to

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[42] http://jp.dk/uknews/article1263133.ece

report to the police on a daily basis so that the police knows their whereabouts. In reality the law meant that he had to show up in Sandholmslejren every day, a fact which would in reality make it impossible for him to continue his ordinary life with his wife and children in Aarhus. Many Muslims inside and outside the ASC milieu were upset: 'PET has taken two completely innocent people' (Hakim). This case was widely discussed in the Muslim environment in Aarhus:

> R: There has been some discussion. Some will say: Why is this way chosen instead of dialogue and who has permitted them to plan a murder? 'Who has given that fatwa?' And right now it is a bit ... many are talking about how it has become a jungle out there where a lot of people are giving fatwas – now I'll permit myself to behave in this way. But how can anyone choose this kind of action. There has been some discussion. Anyone can do a fatwa to legitimize an action or shouldn't you have a frame of reference?

> Q: So the opinion is that they have made the fatwa themselves, or?

> R: A lot of people think that they have been treated unfair: There is no evidence, just a conspiracy theory. A scenario is taking place where Islam and Muslims are attacked and that there is a political agenda behind this (Imran, social worker).

The discussion was not least fueled by the fact that both Tunisians (and their wives) were well-known in Aarhus.

> For me, it could be anyone except those two, because I know the wife of one of them. She is one of my friends and she has told me about it on a personal level, right, and I can really see that this has been done completely idiotically (Mette).

The Tunisian case did seem to constitute a crisis of confidence to the extent that many felt that their confidence in the authorities was eroding due to the case:

> There has been a law made especially for him. A basically inhuman law. A law which also basically surprises me in the Danish society … yes, which surprises me because I have always had this view of Danish society and how it is. Like rosy. I have always regarded it as rosy and without flaws, but that is not the case at all (Mette).

> It is a breach of human rights. 100 percent. Also the European Union's [The European convention of human right]. I can't understand how people can be quiet about this case. It is like ... Kenya now (Kareem).

> What I am so shocked to learn is that PET are allowed to just put you to prison … One of the things we fled from in Somalia was injustice …and we thought that we ended up in a place where there has been democracy for the last 100 years. And then you do the law on terror and all … The Danes have overreacted. There is nothing (Hakim).

The Tunisian case may in this way be said to have radicalized the ASC milieu. Though the case left some people in the milieu indifferent, the majority seemed to be very emotionally affected by the case, expressing disappointment with the actions of PET and the Danish authorities, but the disappointment did not lead to a complete de-legitimization of the institutions (see also Part III):

> I respect PET and I respect what people do when they do their jobs properly, but I think that according to the legislation in Denmark you cannot be punished before evidence is on the table. And this case is the case that I have laughed most about in my whole life, because I once trusted that when a man is convicted in Denmark, then he is convicted 100 percent right and fair and I trust that we have a really strong legislation in Denmark and the juridical power is really strong, right? The courts are strong and the verdict is only made on the basis of 100 percent strong evidence. And PET chooses not to present their evidence because they fear that people will find out about their working methods! That is the biggest pile of rubbish that I have ever heard. And that is regardless of whether it is a Tunisian or … regardless of everything. If you are convicted then I think it should be fair. That is what we believe in … justice ... yes … (Ali).

> I have always looked upon Denmark as the best country and I still think that it works well, but just things like … a man who is not allowed to comment on anything, but just gets imprisoned and they will not even tell why they have imprisoned him ... (Mette).

The Tunisian case has for the majority of people involved in the ASC milieu not led them to question the legitimacy of the system, the second phase in Sprinzik's model.

Some, perhaps mainly outside the ASC milieu, tried to draw a lesson from the Tunisian case:

> He has become a superstar, that man; I don't remember his name [Kurt Westergaard]. Yes, Westergaard after those Tunisians were arrested [for plotting to kill him]. He came from nothing to a superstar in the world. … And a lot of people say: It is us who made him a superstar. We should not have given him any, what should I say, we should not at all have given him or others the opportunity to become very known or famous, because when you see the content ... I mean it is not exactly an artistic … it is not a piece of art (Imran).

While others just felt that the case may have taught him to keep quiet:

> I feel sorry as hell for them. They were very mad and then they said 'let's do it' but it did not mean anything. I have said loads of stuff. I am just happy that there is no-one who has … I have said all kinds of things. I just think that they have reacted in the same way (Kareem).

Regardless of which lessons there are to be learned from the Tunisian case, it appears to have had a big impact on many Muslims living in Aarhus. And as a crisis of confidence, it may from the perspective of Sprinzak's model of radicalization be regarded as the first phase in a process of radicalization. As the case appears to be more or less closed now, it may not develop further, but the lack of confidence the case has created may mean that new events with radicalizing potential will evolve quicker and easier into conflict and crisis of legitimacy for smaller or larger sections of the milieu. Other cases, including the convictions in the Vollsmose case did not seem to have the same radicalizing effect on the milieu. One interviewee did find that 'Odense it is a big fine laughing game' (Abu), but most interviewees were not so sure what had been going on:

> On the other hand I know someone who says that it is all myths. That they have not arranged anything, that it was just a rumor and that the police had set it up and turned to them and that it was not their stuff and all that kind of things, but that I don't know. I just hope that the convictions are based on genuine facts (Kamila).

Surprisingly, taking the resentment due to Western military actions in the Muslim world, Danish engagement in the war in Afghanistan where also civilians may have been killed seem not to have a separate radicalizing effect on the milieu.

> No [they do not kill civilians], not the Danish military. They just drive around and don't do a lot. It is the American military that does it. The Danish military is more like 'we will go for a drive and then back to the base', so that is good (laughs) (Kareem).

> Well, I can understand it. Because we are 'small little Denmark' and if we have the US by us, then if something happens, then it is good. And that is probably why they have done it … But I think even though you are small you should be able to take care of yourself. … I do think that Denmark is an accomplish in many things [in the war]. But the Danish [military] is very clever. They have not been caught in anything, directly (Ghaada).

Interviewees seem to have trouble reconciling the realization that Danes are in fact generally nice and peaceful people with the Danish army participation in the war. If, however, processes of radicalization evolve further, Danish engagement in the actions of war may change significance and instead be regarded as aspects of a general war between 'good' and 'evil'.

2.6. Conclusion

Radicalization has become an important policy agenda in many Western societies, including Denmark. Part I of this report applied current definitions of radicalization – though problematic in many ways- to the largest and most active youth milieu in Aarhus, the ASC milieu. The agenda of Part II has been different. Where Part I included suggestions to 'mend' the concept, Part II suggests that a completely new approach to radicalization is necessary if the phenomena is to be understood. A better understanding of the phenome-

na is not only imperative for scientific reasons but also vital for drafting appropriate policy measures. Part II suggests that Colin Campbell's concept of 'the cultic milieu' could contribute to this understanding. The cultic milieu, originally used to describe a milieu inhabited by a wide variety of ideas ranging from mysticism over neo-paganism to neo-shamanism and to beliefs in flying saucers, may be released from a milieu containing exactly these ideas and come to describe a milieu which is deviant and countercultural. Ideas will flourish freely and Campbell does in fact assign an important function to the cultic milieu as a 'major agency of cultural "diffusion" facilitating the accommodation of "alien" cultural items into a host culture' (Campbell 1972: 130). The main argument is that the ASC Islamic activist milieu in Aarhus may be regarded as a cultic milieu similar to the milieu studied by Campbell. The ASC milieu is of course different in many ways, which is not surprising from Campbell's aspect as 'the nature and extent of such a milieu and the precise form of its relationship with the dominant orthodoxy are by contrast subject to much variation' (ibid). According to Campbell, the ASC milieu has, as a cultic milieu, a function as a '"negative reference group# for the spokespersons of cultural orthodoxy' (ibid), which may facilitate adherence to dominant paradigms. Though the cultic milieu is deviant and may contain 'radical ideas', it does not in Campbell's opinion threaten the stability of the dominant society, and is as such probably of little interest to politicians and policy makers.

A further suggestion in Part II is that a cultic milieu may become radicalized. Based on Sprinzak's theory of radicalization it is suggested that the cultic milieu, or parts of it, through crisis of confidence followed by a legitimacy conflict, culminating in a crisis of legitimacy may end up in a situation where the use of violence against the state is considered legitimate.

Fortunately processes of radicalization of the ASC milieu in Aarhus have not gone that far yet. But it is obviously of paramount importance that issues regarding the milieu are handed in ways that do not trigger crises or conflicts of confidence or legitimacy.

Part III.
The Relationship between De-radicalization Policies and Radicalization Processes among Young Muslims in Aarhus

Lasse Lindekilde

3.1. Introduction

Academic scholars, policy makers and practitioners are far from agreement on a common definition of radicalization or a shared understanding of the process and causes of radicalization. Some emphasize religion as a driving factor in radicalization, while others view religion as a thin layer of justification spread over social and political motivations. Likewise, some argue that radicalization represents a process with distinguished phases, while others deny this linear model and emphasize the diverse trajectories of radicalism. Despite this lack of clarity and rooted understanding of the problem, policy makers in Europe and elsewhere have often felt obliged in recent years to formulate policies designed to combat and prevent radicalization. After the terror attacks of 9/11 we saw a wave of new anti-terrorism policies across Europe, which gave authorities enhanced scope for investigating and cracking down on potential terrorist activities. With the Madrid and the London bombings came a growing concern with 'home grown' terrorism, and policy makers and academics are becoming increasingly aware that we need not only a comprehensive reactive counterterrorism apparatus, but also policies that prevent radicalization processes from initiating, and can revoke them if they do. In other words, focus has shifted from operative or reactionary measures towards more preventive measures against radicalization.

In Denmark, two factors have fuelled the concern about radicalization and the feeling among policy makers that something needs to be done: since 2001 seven Danish citizens have been convicted on terrorist charges; and the Danish Police Intelligence Service has evaluated the threat scenario against Denmark as extraordinarily high, especially since the 2005/2006 Muhammad cartoons controversy. This has resulted in the formulation of a government action plan on 'prevention of extremist opinions and radicalization among youngsters' in January 2009. The action plan outlines 22 concrete initiatives of de-radicalization distributed on seven main focus areas: 1) direct contact to youngsters, 2) inclusion based on duties and rights, 3) dialogue and information, 4) strengthening of the democratic community, 5) special efforts in deprived neighborhoods, 6) special efforts in prisons, and 7) promotion of knowledge, collaborations and partnerships. The action plan aims at countering radicalization in all aspects of society, and is not designed to target Muslim radicalization in particular. However, few would deny that the fear of Muslim radicalization was the main reason for the action plan, and that young Muslims are the primary target group. The de-radicalization initiatives in the action plan are diverse and wide-ranging. A large part of the initiatives aim at eroding the breeding grounds of radi-

cal groups by targeting discrimination and marginalization in society. Another group of initiatives aims at constructing and supporting alternatives to radical ideologies and milieus by, for example, strengthening incorporation, democracy and civic education, and by giving identified youngsters specific job offers or traineeships. Yet other initiatives aim at impeding the active recruitment to radical groups by tightening surveillance, collaboration between schools, social institutions and police, contacts to local associations as well as the implementation of a special approval process for religious authorities working in closed institutions. The de-radicalization action plan is in its entirety characterized by an attempt to combat radicalization in all phases of the envisioned radicalization process and in regard to almost all potential causes of radicalization. The initiatives aim at individual predispositions, organizational structures as well as the wider political climate in Denmark.

The national action plan was preceded in Aarhus by local de-radicalization initiatives in collaboration between the municipal social administration and the district police. In 2007 the first steps were taken towards the implementation of radicalization as a new 'parameter of concern' among police officers, social workers and other employment groups who work with young people in the municipality, i.e. school teachers, street workers, parent groups and employees at youth centers.[43] The basic idea has been to make radicalization another layer in the crime preventive measures targeting youngsters in the municipality, e.g. focus on drugs, shoplifting, aggressive behavior and truancy. In 2008 an information center on radicalization and de-radicalization, following the example of similar projects in Amsterdam (see Municipality of Amsterdam 2007), was established. The information center serves as an arena where frontline workers can seek more information and ask questions, as well as report, through a hotline, on specific incidents or cases that cause alarm.

The question raised in this part of the report is what effects we should expect these de-radicalization initiatives to have in practice. Thus, the purpose of this section is to investigate how different types of state-orchestrated de-radicalization initiatives are perceived by the potential target groups, in this case young Muslims, and how such policies interact with the mobilization of Muslim voices in society, in particular the mobilization into radical groups. The central concern of the research has been to evaluate whether the implementation of de-radicalization policies can be said to have potential negative, unintended consequences, that is, that such policies could provide impetus for mobilization into radical milieus, and if so, under what conditions. This concern stems from the potential risk, identified by academic scholars, some policy makers and intelligence agencies, but rarely researched, that the focus and pressure on selected groups via the implementation of such 'repressive' policies can create counter-pressures. The actual research questions raised in

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[43] http://www.nyidanmark.dk/da-dk/Integration/magasin/nr_2_2008/radikalisering_tages_i_oploebet.htm

this part of the report, which will form the basis of an evaluation of the risk of counter-productive effects of de-radicalization policies, are:

- How are official de-radicalization policies perceived by young Muslims in Aarhus?
- What are, according to Muslims themselves, the likely effects of official de-radicalization policies on the attitudes and behavior of young Muslims in Aarhus?

Before we turn to the empirically based answers to these questions, the next section provides an overview of existing theoretical ideas and research on the relationship between official policies designed to combat radical mobilization and processes of radicalization. This overview provides a theoretically founded introduction to the phenomenon of de-radicalization and the problem of potentially negative, unintended consequences of official de-radicalization policies.

3.2. Theoretical reflections: the relationship between de-radicalization policies and radicalization processes

In the last couple of years, the academic literature has shown increasing interest in the following types of questions: How do people engaged in radical or violent activities leave such activities behind? How does terrorism end? Under what conditions can radicalization processes be revoked? How can the de-radicalization of groups or individuals be promoted? The last question is particularly pertinent for the research presented in this part of the report. The academic interest in these questions has developed naturally in the wake of the huge interest over the last 5-8 years in how individuals come to embrace radical ideologies and actions. However, the questions of the dynamics of de-radicalization are still very under-researched (important exceptions are Bjørgo & Horgan 2009; Ashour 2009). A beginning shift in research focus towards issues of de-radicalization can be observed, and an important motivation is that policy makers demand a more informed basis for drafting policies to prevent radicalization. Furthermore, this new research has been driven by an increase in the number of relevant data sources. In the last 5-8 years we have seen a large increase in detained and convicted radicals in prisons who have lent themselves to research. Among these people a growing number has publicly denounced their actions and convictions, many writing autobiographies, which offer interesting narratives for understanding the dynamics of de-radicalization.

The challenge of established radical groups facing European and Middle Eastern societies has brought together bureaucrats, security agencies, religious authorities, civic organizations and academics in what could be called 'de-radicalization coalitions'. The different actors have recently been deeply involved in formulating, debating, modifying and implementing de-radicalization strategies targeting especially Islamic radical groups. The prudence of de-radicalization for Muslim and Western societies on the one hand, and the diversity of actors involved in the 'de-radicalization coalitions' on the other hand, have created an emerging policy field where different actors, with different agendas, motiva-

tions and interests, interact to formulate and implement de-radicalization policies. Put bluntly, initiatives for de-radicalization policies can come either from 'above' through state officials or security agencies proposing policies and setting out guidelines for action (the case with the Danish action plan), or de-radicalization initiatives can be formulated and implemented from 'below' by civil society actors such as NGOs, religious authorities and ex-activists from radical groups (e.g. the programs of the *Active Change Foundation* in Britain).

De-radicalization: an emerging research field

Despite the growing interest, coalition building and the improved data for research, the dynamics of de-radicalization are probably even less well understood than the dynamics of radicalization. Like radicalization, de-radicalization is a contested and ill defined concept. What is clear is that it is just as complex a process as radicalization. De-radicalization is frequently used without specifying the expected outcome of de-radicalization processes. As a minimum of clarification we can say that de-radicalization, like radicalization, can occur on at least three levels. Thus, an individual can undergo ideological de-radicalization where ideological convictions and worldviews are altered in a more pluralistic and less confrontational direction. De-radicalization can also occur as a change in behavior and actions, for example by giving up frontline fighting and violent activities. Finally, de-radicalization can be organizational in the sense that an individual disengages from a radical organization or that the leadership of a movement dismantles the radical organization/wing of the movement (e.g. *al-Gama al-Islamiyya* in Egypt). Obviously these processes of de-radicalization do not have to occur simultaneously, and one can imagine how a violent jihadist could reform his ideologically based outlook while remaining a member of a radical organization, and how an individual could disengage from violent activities, but remain ideologically convinced of the legitimacy of violent means (Horgan 2009: 27).

The reasons for individual or collective de-radicalization on one or more of these levels are many and interact in complex ways, as do the determinants of radicalization. The trigger of de-radicalization can, for example, be experiences of disillusionment (corrupt leaders, disagreements over tactical priorities etc.), changed individual circumstances (imprisonment, family establishment etc.), fading organizational resources (recruits, money, contacts etc.) as well as changed structural circumstances (increased official repression, increased inducements, cease fires etc.). As indicated, the priority here is to investigate to which extent official de-radicalization policies, as a part of the environment of radical milieus, can successfully promote de-radicalization. We are particularly interested in the potentially negative effects of de-radicalization initiatives, a question which is barely touched upon in the academic literature. One exception is *Measures of Counterterrorism and Their Effect on Civil Peace*, a report by the consortium of researchers behind the project 'Transnational terrorism, security and the rule of law' financed by the European Commis-

sion from 2008. Based on a four country comparison, the report concluded that no direct link could be determined between counterterrorism efforts and radicalization. However, it also concluded that 'various counterterrorism measures are perceived as discriminatory by some Muslim groups, and the sense of discrimination may enter into the structural breeding ground of radicalization together with other factors. Thus, it can be concluded that some counterterrorism measures may have an indirect impact on radicalization processes' (TTSRL 2008: 24). Characteristic of this report, and other scarce work on this relationship, is that it is based on interviews with research specialist of counterterrorism, civil servants responsible for monitoring processes of radicalization and NGO representatives monitoring the human rights situation in a country, and not the main 'target group', young Muslims. The research presented below is an attempt to correct this bias.

De-radicalization is in this report used in the widest meaning of the term. Thus, when talking about de-radicalization policies we are referring to initiatives which have either (or both) a preventive aim, such as the Danish government action plan from 2009, or a focus on disengagement from already radicalized activities. This inclusive definition of the term de-radicalization is somewhat in contrast to the Danish authorities' terminology, where for example the national action plan is not thought of as de-radicalization initiatives, but as prevention of radicalization and extremist views. However, our standpoint is that there seems to be good reasons not to separate the work done in this area into too many different sub-areas. One of the dangers is that the different initiatives (prevention and disengagement) will not be sufficiently coordinated, and that the actors involved in implementing policies are not closely collaborating. To use the vocabulary introduced above, the danger of keeping apart the different elements of de-radicalization measurements is that a strong and coherent de-radicalization coalition will not form.

Mechanisms of negative, unintended consequences

While the recent literature on de-radicalization has little to say about the potential risk of de-radicalization policies working against the intention, other areas of research have some insights to offer. Although using different conceptualizations, research on social movements, in particular research on the relationship between state repression and mobilization, seems of interest for the topic at hand here. Studies of how repressive state policies have affected the mobilization of dissident voices in democratic settings have clearly shown that state repression can be perceived, not as a hindrance or heightened risk of mobilization, but rather as an opportunity or impulse for further dissent (Davenport et al. 2005). For example, studies of the development of terrorist factions of the student movements in the US, Germany and Italy have underlined the importance of personal experiences of police brutality and repression in determining individual trajectories of engagement (della Porta 1995; Sprinzak 1990). Rather than giving up dissent and protest, the confrontation with police acts as catalyst of further engagement and radicalization. On a group level, shared experiences of repression can act as a uniting force and promote the

development of collective identities of 'revolutionaries' or 'avant-gardes' (della Porta 1988).

Other studies have shown how excessive state repression has 'backfired' on authorities leading to widespread, increased support for the suppressed group/movement. Backfire can be described as the public reaction of outrage, often disseminated by media coverage, to a perceived unjust use of state violence (Hess & Martin 2006). Through media coverage a feeling of injustice is diffused from those who were present to those who were not. Historic examples are the Tiananmen Square massacre in China and the Sharpeville massacre in South Africa. A more recent event, which included elements of backfire mechanisms, was the Danish government's handling of the Muhammad cartoons controversy (Lindekilde 2009a).

Yet other research on the relationship between repression and mobilization has indicated that repressive policies might backfire on authorities in a delayed manner. Policies might at first glance seem to work according to the intention, but may in the longer run have counterproductive effects. For example, the increased surveillance and crackdown on suspected Muslim communities and mosques in Europe and the Middle East following the 9/11 attacks have pushed operative radical networks towards new strategies of recruitment and communication based more on on-line networks than on real life networks (Roy 2007). Thus, recruitment into radical Islamic groups has not disappeared, but has taken on a form which is even more difficult for state authorities to control. Likewise, the intense focus on airport security in the aftermath of 9/11 seems to have reshuffled the action repertoires of radical Islamic groups away from plane hijackings towards train bombings.

Most descriptions of backfire mechanisms in the literature deal with instances of excessive state violence. However, some research has indicated similar mechanisms at play with policies perceived by target groups as intensively discriminatory and suppressive, without necessarily being violent. Examples are the report on counterterrorism measures mentioned above as well as research on the development of the black civil rights movement in the US (McAdam 1982), religious oppositional mobilization in the Middle East (Wiktorowicz 2003) and Latin America (Smith 1996). These studies basically show that state policies that, intentionally or unintentionally, discriminate against certain groups of the population may lead to counter-reactions and increased mobilization among these groups. In other words, forms of 'soft repression' might also backfire (Ferree 2005). In a Danish context, research has shown how perceived discriminatory policies, such as lower social benefits for immigrants, rules designed to combat arranged marriages and tightened rules of naturalization, together with a rather negative depiction of Muslims and Islam in public debates, lead to an increased awareness of Muslim identities and increased Muslim mobilization (Hervik 2002; Lindekilde & Mouritsen 2007). Thus, it is a fact that 'Muslim' has become the main organizing identity among young people of immigrant descent (Mikkelsen 2008: 137). In accordance with this literature, 'authority and media treatment of Islam

and Muslims' was in a recent survey the number one cause for thinking more about religion among Danish Muslims (followed by death in the family and the Israel/Palestine conflict). Whether this development is negative or not obviously depends on the eyes that see.

Intervening variables affecting perceptions of de-radicalization policies

Common for the research presented above on the relationship between repressive policies and mobilization of dissent, is that it shows that the effect of policies to a large degree depends on how they are perceived by the targeted groups and society at large. Thus, whether repressive policies are perceived as legitimate/illegitimate, discriminate/indiscriminate, justified/unjustified, discriminatory/non-discriminatory etc. to some extent determines if the policies will work as intended. This is a fundamental insight which will also steer the research presented below on the potential effects of de-radicalization policies among Muslims in Aarhus.

Obviously perceptions of policies are shaped by the content of policies – the actual rules and measures applied – which in and by themselves can be viewed as e.g. discriminatory, humiliating or too far-reaching. However, it is often not the rules and measures per se that cause negative perceptions among the affected groups, but rather the way the policies are implemented in practice. For example, while few had something against visitation zones as a means to combat street violence and gang crime in certain areas of Copenhagen, the way the visitations were carried out in practice offended local residents. Thus, the practices of policing matter (della Porta & Reiter 1998). Likewise, the perceived legitimacy of rules and measures of e.g. integration depends on the way initiatives are presented to target groups by 'street level bureaucrats' such as social workers, school teachers, street workers and state partners among local associations (Lipsky 1980). We expect that the same counts for policies of de-radicalization.

De-radicalization policies, as well as other policies, are never formulated, presented and implemented in a political vacuum. It is important to realize how the larger political context of de-radicalization policies may influence the way they are received and perceived (Lindekilde 2009b). As the research presented below indicates, many Muslims in Aarhus perceive local and national de-radicalization initiatives in the light of the current government's continuous 'value battle' with especially Islam and Muslims, and the government's involvement in the 'war on terror'. Thus, many Muslims seem to be skeptical towards the de-radicalization initiatives as they perceive them as a part of a larger development towards anti-Muslim sentiments in Danish society.

A final factor, which has been shown to affect perceptions of de-radicalization policies, is media coverage of relevant groups and initiatives. Ruud Koopmans has shown how the media coverage of certain groups acts as a 'discursive opportunity structure' for policy makers, which invites or discourages repressive measures against certain groups (Koop-

mans 2005). Likewise, the way new state initiatives are described and evaluated in the media may also invite or discourage specific perceptions of these policies.

3.3. Perceptions and effects of de-radicalization policies among Muslims in Aarhus

Building on the data gathered through interviews and field work among Muslims in Aarhus, the following will give empirical answers to the questions of how official de-radicalization policies are perceived by young Muslims in Aarhus, and what, according to Muslims themselves, the likely effects of official de-radicalization policies are on the attitudes and behavior of young Muslims in Aarhus. Given that no piece of research, to our knowledge, has investigated Muslim perceptions of de-radicalization policies in a direct and systematic manner, the strategy of presentation has been to give as much voice to the interviewees as possible. The novelty of this research makes the investigation rather explorative and descriptive. However, the perceptions expressed by Aarhus Muslims on issues of de-radicalization policies will be evaluated against the outlined theoretical insights on the formation of perceptions and the possibility of negative, unintended consequences. The final section of this part of the report presents, following the results of the empirical analysis, a number of recommendations on how to avoid 'backfire' from de-radicalization initiatives.

In the empirical data, i.e. the interviews, three main positions on de-radicalization policies among Muslims in Aarhus emerge. Each position comprises different views and perceptions of concrete de-radicalization policies and their effects, but they are bound together by a shared evaluation of the positivity/negativity of de-radicalization measures and of the extent and nature of their effects. The first main position views de-radicalization policies as rather unimportant and irrelevant to the interviewees' lives. Interviewees expressing this position show indifference towards or unawareness of the de-radicalization initiatives, and some question the necessity of such policies. The second main position views de-radicalization policies in a more positive light, but underlines that the likely effect of the policies will be small. Common for this view is the perception of de-radicalization policies as only symptom treatment. Several of the interviewees see initiatives directed at combating the breeding ground for radicalization in society, i.e. anti-discrimination policies, as positive, but also as insufficient in terms of combating the real causes of radicalization. The third main position views the official de-radicalization measures with skepticism and points towards potential negative effects of their implementation. This position is, from the point of view of policy makers, the most problematic and worrying, and this is where the potential for negative, unintended consequences of de-radicalization policies is present. For these reasons this position will be given the most attention in the following.

In the 17 interviews with Muslims in Aarhus, in which perceptions and evaluations of de-radicalization policies were discussed, the three outlined positions were seldom articulated in pure form. Most often the three positions mix in the discourse of individual inter-

viewees. For example, several interviewees expressed both a degree of positivity towards some of the initiatives of de-radicalization, and a degree of skepticism and fear that other initiatives may have negative, unintended consequences. Table 8 shows the frequency of the three main positions on de-radicalization policies in the interviews:

Table 8: Frequency of main positions on de-radicalization policies within conducted interviews

Position on de-radicalization policies	Position 1: Indifference/unawareness	Position 2: Positive, but insufficient	Position 3: Negative consequences
Presence in interviews	6	9	15

The distribution, which should not be seen as representative of Muslim perceptions in general, shows that all interviewees but two express skepticism towards official de-radicalization policies or fear that the policies may not work according to intentions. At the same time about half of the interviewees expressed more positive evaluations of the entire de-radicalization effort or elements of it. Six interviewees find de-radicalization policies irrelevant to the life worlds of most young Muslims in Aarhus.

In the following the content and internal nuances of the three main positions will be elaborated in turn.

Position 1: 'I don't think they care. They care about other things'

Obviously the first condition for having an informed opinion about specific state policies is that you are aware of their existence. Given the novelty of de-radicalization policies, both the national action plan and local initiatives in Aarhus, this was not always the case in the conducted interviews. For example, when a study group of five young Muslims (aged 16-19) was asked about opinions of de-radicalization policies, the first reaction was the counter-question: 'What policies?' They simply did not know about the new initiatives, and after an explanation, the general attitude was indifference. One guy, of Afghan descent, said: 'What does this have to do with me? I don't care about politics – I care about my religion' (Khalid, 17 years). The quote shows that de-radicalization polices are perceived as pure politics – something that does not affect the everyday life of a young Muslim. A general distance to the Danish political sphere can be sensed here. However, irritation with being confronted with the issue of radicalization is also present. These young men had a hard time understanding why they, as good, practicing Muslims were being interviewed about such issues. The sense of irritation and stigmatization expressed by these youngsters connects their general indifference towards de-radicalization policies to a more negative perception, characteristic of the third main position described below.

The two main reasons for unawareness and indifference towards de-radicalization initiatives among the interviewees were, first, the novelty of the initiatives, and, second, the

interviewees' preoccupation with other, more relevant issues. An employee at a youth centre engaged in proactive, street-level outreach said:

> I don't think the youngsters have heard about these things, I don't think it is something they talk about. I don't think they care. They care about other things – being good Muslims and the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan (Jamaal, 34 years).

Other interviewees expressed in a similar way how issues of de-radicalization and their potential effects ranked low in the minds of young Muslims in Aarhus. International conflicts involving Muslim countries and local crime and unemployment are viewed as much more salient than radicalization/de-radicalization:

> It is my experience that the young Muslims in Gjellerup are more concerned about all the talk about crime here than about the talk about radicalization. Crime is more in focus. The media always describe Gjellerup as a dangerous place and they feel that they are out to get them in that way. But when there is talk about radicalization they don't get that feeling, because; 'radicalization does not concern us – what do we have to do with radicalization?' (Jamaal, 34 years).

Generally radicalization is perceived as a very marginal phenomenon among Muslims in Aarhus, leading some to question the premise that radicalization is an acute problem and, thus, the relevance of installing de-radicalization measures. Another interviewee said:

> I think radicalization among Muslims in Denmark is a marginal phenomenon, and I am in doubt whether these measures are necessary or not. If all that we hear about the terrorist cases in Denmark is true, then okay. But we don't really know, because it is all very secretive. Based on very little, the Secret Service is raising the threat level in Denmark, and politicians then think we need to do this and that. It is a slippery slope – it is overkill (Naadir, 33 years).

Following this line of reasoning it is difficult to really evaluate the relevance of the political initiatives of de-radicalization as we hardly know whether radicalization among Muslims is in fact a growing problem. In this perspective the de-radicalization policies are at best irrelevant and at worst counterproductive as they are viewed as an unbalanced reply to a marginal problem (see also position 3 below). Other interviewees suggest more directly that the need for de-radicalization policies is grossly overestimated by authorities and politicians, either because of a lack of hard facts about the extent of radicalization processes, or because some have an interest in making radicalization a pressing issue:

> These initiatives are acts of panic. Of course, a country needs to protect its citizens, but one should not act in panic. I don't know if the politicians are having nightmares or if they see things, you know, but fact is that they get out of bed and put forward some kind of policy proposal or package. But maybe they also see some kind of advantage in making radicalization a big problem (Racheed, 42 years).

According to our interviewees, those who benefit from an atmosphere of fear of radicalization among young Muslims in Denmark are, first of all, the *Danish People's Party*. The party is perceived as gaining electorally from this situation due to its long-lasting skepticism towards Muslim immigrants. Secondly, a few interviewees mention the possibility that the Danish *Police Intelligence Service* could have an interest in inflating the threat scenario from radical Islamic groups in Denmark due to resource allocation and budgetary concerns.

A few interviewees expressed the view that maybe it is for the better that most young Muslims don't know about the de-radicalization initiatives:

> Most young Muslims don't know that these initiatives exist, but they might feel some of the consequences. They don't know about the bigger picture behind – all the policies and action plans – but they feel the actual consequences of some of the local initiatives. It is probably a good thing that they don't know about the fuller picture, because this could create an outcry (Naadir, 33 years).

The implicit logic behind this position seems to be that even though young Muslims don't know about specific de-radicalization policies, they are likely to feel the consequences of such initiatives through, for example, more surveillance and more questioning from authorities, so if young Muslims knew that these were coordinated efforts they would react negatively. Thus, according to these interviewees, the risk of 'backfire' is smaller in cases where young Muslims are not able to link experienced repression to a larger political will.

Generally we can say that the link between knowledge and relevance of de-radicalization policies is crucial in the first identified position among the interviewees. Young Muslims use their knowledge of the milieu to create a counter-image of the problem of radicalization in which de-radicalization policies become irrelevant and other issues much more salient. It is also characteristic for this position that knowledge produced by authorities about radicalization is perceived as biased and used to increase the relevance of de-radicalization policies (for a similar point see Schiffauer 2008). Finally, we see how the lack of knowledge of de-radicalization policies is paired with a sense of indifference towards the initiatives, a sense that 'this does not concern me'.

Position 2: 'This is fine, but it is like curing cancer with Aspirins'

About half of the interviewees expressed a positive evaluation of elements of the de-radicalization initiatives taken locally or on a national level. Common for these interviewees was the recognition that radicalization is not a growing problem, but an actual danger among some small groups of young Muslims in Aarhus, and that preventive measures therefore may be necessary. However, this recognition is not linked to full endorsement of all de-radicalization measures, or necessarily to the conviction that the measures will be effective. One view highlights the positive aspect in putting radicalization on the agenda:

I think these initiatives are ok, because we experience that a few youngsters go in that direction. So of course we want to talk to them about this. It is good that knowledge is created … These are preventive measures. We don't want another Madrid or 9/11. That is our task as parents and inhabitants here. It is our duty to try to create a picture in the minds of the young that it is okay to be practicing and believe, but don't let anybody take advantage of you, and know the limits. It is our task as adults and parents to create this knowledge in the young, and I am very pleased that we have started to talk about this, and that awareness have been created (Jamaal).

In this perspective, official de-radicalization policies can be an opportunity to initiate a local debate between parents and youngsters about potential risks of 'blind following' and 'over-believing' as one interviewee puts it. This is a delicate issue, and an issue which can be difficult to raise by parents who sometimes know less about Islam than their children. In these situations a little outside help may be appreciated by parents. A local street worker puts it this way:

I have discussed Islam with some of the youngsters in the streets – about how they understand things. When I come across something I go to their parents. Because they will be very grateful that somebody says, 'Hey, be careful, your son is beginning to believe this and that'. One should believe and practice Islam, but one should not be 'over-believing'. It is very important that the youngsters understand this. These initiatives can help focus attention and raise the debate (Jamaal).

Generally a positive evaluation can be detected of the fact that official de-radicalization policies have a preventive focus, and represent a balanced attempt to counter radicalization processes, including more 'soft measures' of, for example, anti-discrimination, dialogue and inclusion. Several interviewees seem positively surprised by the comprehensive nature of the policies. A former imam in Aarhus puts it this way in his written hearing response on the draft of the national action plan against radicalization:

I am positively surprised by the content of the action plan. I would like to express praise of the working group behind this draft, because they have included varying perspectives on the problem, and make clear that extremism is a general notion, which also includes groups of ethnic Danes on the left and the right of the political spectrum, and is not exclusive to young Muslims … Generally I applaud what I have read as balanced, nuanced and comprehensive (Taamir).

However, this positive evaluation does not mean that interviewees necessarily think that these soft measures of de-radicalization will have much effect. Often the positive evaluation of the content of measures is conditioned upon a balanced implementation in practice. For example, several interviewees regard dialogue between authorities and key resource persons in the Muslim community as important in the battle against radicalization, but the effect depends on how this dialogue is carried out:

> I think dialogue is necessary – dialogue with everybody. But the way we are having this dialogue in Denmark is awful. There are large gatherings where people talk without listening. It is rather monologues. I know; I have been there. However, if these dialogue fora were to become more focused I think they could in the future secure the kind of trust among actors and partners that is necessary to deal with a crisis situation if one were to occur. This would be very important (Naadir).

If dialogue meetings are used by authorities to hold monologues on what Danish society is all about, and what can and cannot be accepted in the name of democracy, or if Muslim representatives use the occasions only to vent frustrations and criticism, then the positive potential of these meetings will not be realized. A community leader involved in several Muslim organizations in Gellerup said:

> I am a member of the Arabic Culture Association here in Aarhus, and we are in dialogue with PET [Police Intelligence Service] twice a year. They come and the imams talk about different problems in the local area. This is good – there is a dialogue. One needs to listen and be listened to, and be informed about other perspectives … I know of several examples where the imams have been able to reason with young people so that they did not overreact or do something stupid. So they play a very important role. Authorities have to recognize their role and support it more. It does not help when politicians call for imams to get special education on democracy as Louise Gade [former mayor of Aarhus, eds.] did during the Muhammad cartoons crisis. This is lack of respect (Majid, 47 years).

As indicated by the quote, dialogue takes mutual respect and recognition. Only then will dialogue lead to something positive.

Other examples of conditioned approval of elements of the de-radicalization policies found in the interviews are opinions about the use of preventive talks with youngsters, and the enhanced focus on teaching democratic values in public and private schools. Reflecting upon the use of preventive talks in cases where authorities have reasons to believe that an individual, or a group of individuals, are undergoing a radicalization process, one interviewee argued:

> I have met several young people where I think such a talk would have had a positive effect. I have seen it work. However, the effect depends upon who is doing the talks – it should not be the frightened social worker, but the police. And it is essential that this does not become a slippery slope where everybody who takes their shoes off to go into the mosque needs a preventive talk. For this to work we have to be very careful with the techniques that are used and the kind of presumptions that we bring into such talks (Taamir).

Three things are important in this quote. First, the positive effect of preventive talks is conditioned upon the right people carrying out these talks, i.e. people with the necessary training, competences and knowledge. Secondly, it is important that the talks are carried

out by somebody who can distinguish signs of religious orthodoxy from signs of radicalization. Thirdly, the techniques of interrogation/discussion are highlighted. Another interviewee expressed concern that some police officers seem to use preventive talks more as 'fishing expeditions' than as opportunities to 'warn' young Muslims (Amr, 35 years). Only if these conditions are met, and pitfalls avoided, will preventive talks work in a positive manner.

With regard to the enhanced focus on teaching democratic values in public and private schools, one interviewee stated:

> It is all fine, but I think the effect of more education in democracy in the schools will be minimal. Because if the youngsters are not part of local democracy in practice how are they going to understand the concepts. Democracy cannot be taught, it needs to be practiced (Majid).

There is a perceived gap between theory and practice, which is viewed as impeding the effect of an otherwise good initiative. If the theory and practice of democracy are not linked, democratic inclusion will remain abstract and distant.

On a more general level, a common perception in the interviews is that de-radicalization initiatives are fine, but insufficient. As one interviewee put it, de-radicalization policies are like 'curing cancer with Aspirins' (Naadir). Thus, through de-radicalization policies some of the negative effects of failed societal integration can be kept at arm's length, but they will not cure the system. Most interviewees holding this perception also believe that it is positive that the de-radicalization action plans include measures that aim at the more fundamental problems of discrimination and marginalization, but they are viewed as small, insufficient steps in the right direction. Some see these initiatives as old wine in new bottles:

> I think that in many institutions and authorities, people are already doing what they can to combat such tendencies. So I don't really know if it is necessary with such a specific action plan. It does not help much to bundle existing initiatives together and give it a nice title about radicalization. That will not solve much of the problem (Taamir).

Others recognize that the action plan entails some new measures aiming at the structural breeding ground of radicalization, but share the view that these are far from sufficient:

> It is fine with these extra preventive initiatives, but I think we have to think of the total picture, education, the job market, housing etc. to really combat the problem. Everything has to be revised in order to prevent radicalization (Majid).

What is needed is a fundamental change in the way of viewing the problem of radicalization towards a much wider understanding of the causes of radicalization. Behind this view one can detect a theory of radicalization that lends causal weight to feelings of de-

privation stemming from different forms of discrimination and lack of recognition. One interviewee argues:

> The problem lays in the foundation of society, in the basic structures, in the lack of understanding of Muslim culture. There is a need for much more widespread understanding of the fact that there is no necessary link between being a practicing Muslim, even an orthodox Muslim, and radicalization. It is just not that simple. We need much more nuances. But when you see the other as an enemy there is no room for nuances. One can come up with as many initiatives to combat radicalization as one likes, but as long as this basic fact is not understood their effect will be minimal. And this will take time – it takes time to change the basic climate of debate in Denmark (Taamir).

To solve the real causes of radicalization we need to stop viewing Muslims as enemies and potential threats, and change the way we talk about these issues. Before such a fundamental change occurs, the fight against radicalization will be lost in advance, and well-meant de-radicalization policies will just be drops in the ocean. Following this line of reasoning, the authorities' focus on radicalization/de-radicalization is flawed as it obscures more fundamental problems:

> I think this extreme focus on radicalization will fail and at one point authorities will do their own evaluations and see that these initiatives had very little, if any effect. They will realize that they are still left with a lot of other and more pressing issues and problems that have not been solved because of the focus on radicalization (Umar, 28 years).

Summing up we can say that the second main position on de-radicalization initiatives among Muslims in Aarhus is characterized by 1) a generally positive view of the comprehensive nature of the action plans; b) a conditioned positive evaluation of specific initiatives, and 3) a belief that these initiatives will have little or no effect on the fundamental problems that cause radicalization. In this perspective de-radicalization policies are little more than necessary symptom treatment of a deeper-lying problem.

Position 3: 'Why do you interview me about this? I am not a radical'

During our interviews with Muslims in Aarhus about issues of radicalization and de-radicalization we were often met with skepticism. Many interviewees did not see what these issues had to do with them. While some dismissed radicalization/de-radicalization as irrelevant to their lives (see position 1), other saw the fact that they were being questioned about these issues as a part of the problem. In these interviews a sense of stigmatization and frustration with being asked about radicalization was aired. As one put it, 'Why do you interview me about this? I am not a radical' (Afif, 17 years). As interviews unfolded, it became clear that this sense of irritation and indignation stemming from the interview situation was very similar to the interviewees' feelings and perceptions of de-radicalization policies. The problem lies with the experience of being generalized into a

segment of society that is constructed as problematic or suspicious. A few quotes sum up the experience:

> The effect is that you become tired. When you generalize things many who are unaffected become affected. It is a very degrading feeling. The result is that some begin to isolate themselves more – to go against this (Jamaal).

> The young become tired of this generalized depiction of them – in policies and in the media. I experience firsthand through my work how many choose to go abroad and look for work there because they cannot stand hearing anymore. This has lasted for years now, and the debate about radicalization is just adding a layer. The approach to this topic is basically the same as to other issues concerning Muslims and Islam. Focus is always on the very few that have a problem with democracy, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir. Focus is on all the negative. And the larger group of Muslims pays the price for this. All those young people with Muslim background that are involved in the educational system are good and sensible young people. What does radicalization have to do with them? They become very tired of it all (Majid).

> What happens when young Muslims are confronted with this is that they are supported in the feeling that they are a problem – that they are under suspicion. This confrontation means that they become even more aware of their Muslim identity, as they feel stepped upon. This can be the seed for a negative reaction among some, a rollback of understanding (Taamir).

> All these soft measures in the government action plan are fine, if only they had not appeared in an action plan to combat radicalization. There is a need for more focus on democratic values, a need for more dialogue and knowledge. I have asked for this for years. But when it comes in this context I think it is problematic. If I was somebody who did not often meet Muslims I might see these initiatives as a sign that we need to keep an eye on all Muslims (Naadir).

The young Muslims interviewed feel that the de-radicalization policies put all Muslims under suspicion, and describe how this generates feelings of being 'tired of it all', 'degraded' and 'stepped upon'. The three first quotes also indicate how these feelings are seen as potential catalysts of different negative reactions vis-à-vis the majority society, in the form of isolation, distance and rollback of understanding. If we accept that isolation, lack of understanding and feelings of degradation and suppression are typical ingredients in radicalization processes, we see how official de-radicalization policies via negative perceptions can be counterproductive.

Several interviewees express that the stigma inherent in the de-radicalization policies are 'a part of a larger trend' (Umar). That is, the larger political context is considered when the initiatives are evaluated. Thus, de-radicalization policies are seen as fitting into a general skeptic atmosphere towards Muslims and Islam in Denmark, generated in the media,

by political elites, state authorities and ordinary people on the street. One interviewee puts it this way:

> If the general Danish population working in state ministries, public schools, private companies, in the streets, in the nightclubs, churches etc. does not calm down as far as co-existence with ethnic groups, with Muslims, and stop focusing on them as a potential threat and constantly being on guard with suspicion and exaggerated interpretations, then the de-radicalization action plan will fail. The action plan itself talks about the importance of de-mystification and communication, acceptance and inclusion, equality and participation, opportunities and community building, but where are we to find the ingredients, if not among ordinary Danes in all niches of society (Taamir).

Given the larger context in Denmark, de-radicalization policies are viewed as having slim chances of working according to intentions.

The negative impact of de-radicalization polices is also articulated in the interviews in evaluations of concrete, proposed measures, e.g., mentor and role model campaigns:

> I am so tired of role model campaigns. It has become a religion, you see. And some people have made a fortune on these role models. What this obsession with role model campaigns says is: 'There are few role models among Muslims, but large criminal networks among Muslims in Denmark'. That is not true – this is not what the real picture looks like. It is very discriminatory. In fact, there are many well-functioning, ordinary people who attend high school and university and few criminals. That is how it is – the picture needs to be turned upside down, and we need to make this happen (Racheed).

The implicit message and logic of role model campaigns are seen as discriminatory against the target groups as it suggests that these groups, i.e. young Muslims, are in particular need of role models. Another interviewee argues:

> The idea behind the mentor campaigns and role models is that if we make some immigrants have contact to some Danes, the immigrants cannot help but become a little bit more Danish, that is, a little bit better. I am not sure that this is the way to solve our problems (Umar).

Role models and mentor programs have been widely used in Denmark in integration policies targeting especially the education system and the labor market. However, the idea to extend such initiatives to the area of de-radicalization is questioned:

> I cannot see how role models can work in the area of radicalization. They work when we talk about education and employment. But who is to be matched here? The criteria are very unclear. I think role models should come in a natural way from within the milieu in order to work according to the goals (Taamir).

Together these evaluations of role models and mentor programs in the area of de-radicalization suggest that the initiatives could 'backfire' by adding to the pool of experienced discrimination and humiliation.

However, the biggest problem, according to many interviewees, is found in the proposals to make radicalization a new 'parameter of concern' in the preventive work of social workers, school teachers and employees at youth centers. This strategy is given particular weight in the local Aarhus initiatives on de-radicalization. Several interviewees express concern that it will create mistrust in public authorities among Muslims, and that representatives of authorities will begin to see radicalization where there is none. A selection of quotes illustrates this perception:

> All this surveillance, I mean, if you are told to look for ghosts you will most certainly start to see some. Or at least some things you think are weird. This is a dangerous development; it is bit STASI-like, where everybody is keeping an eye on the strangers. And in our society authorities are everywhere; in the school, social workers, kindergarten etc. Surveillance will be massive and it will certainly create distance. And that, I think, is dangerous. We are creating a surveillance society, which is exaggerated. If all of Denmark will start to keep an eye on each other because three tiny groups might have had plans to do something, I think it is exaggerated. It will create distance and then we have a problem. I don't think today any parallel societies exist in Denmark, but this would mean that they would develop. I would not trust anybody from the authorities. If my seven year-old daughter started to wear the headscarf, am I then a potential radical who needs to be kept under surveillance? Who defines that? (Naadir).

> This is very wrong. This will work completely opposite to the intentions. I imagine that one can counter radicalization tendencies by incorporating and supporting people close to the youngsters, but not by telling them that they should look out for signs and radicalization tendencies. This is the work of the police and PET, they will become 'informants'. These people should counter radicalization through their jobs and their teachings, by taking the debates with the young, not by doing the work of the police (Majid).

> These initiatives are bound to fail. Imagine a social worker who has no knowledge of a person's background, and who has very little knowledge about what it is to be a Muslim, and who is then told to evaluate whether a person or a family shows signs of radicalization. I cannot in my wildest dreams imagine how a few courses will enable such a person to make this evaluation. I cannot see how such a situation where they are told to evaluate people's thoughts, opinions, dress and reactions can lead to anything good. The effect will be negative, there will be a counter-reaction. Already a lot of Muslims believe that social authorities operate based on stereotypes and prejudice. Trust is already low (Jamaal).

Making radicalization a 'parameter of concern' is perceived as installing a layer of mistrust between targeted Muslims and authority representatives, who otherwise are in important positions as far as helping and guiding young Muslims. This will create distance and negative counter-reactions. Furthermore, the quotes point to the delicate question of what the signs of radicalization are, what should make frontline workers worried. Even though this is not specified in the national action plan or the local Aarhus initiatives, the only possible solution seems to be aware of sudden changes in behavior and appearances. That is, physical and behavioral changes should be evaluated as possible signs of radicalization. Interviews with police officers in charge of meetings with local frontline workers in Aarhus, implementing de-radicalization as a new 'parameter of concern', and frontline workers who have attended such meetings, testify that physical and behavioral signs will indeed be the basis for evaluations of possible radicalization. A power point presentation, produced by the district police, lists under the heading 'Indicators' the following items: 'clothing style and physical appearance'; 'group affiliations'; 'international contacts'; 'travel activities (re-educational travels)'; 'sports and physical activities'; 'reading and media-consumption habits'; 'isolation from established religious milieus and family'; 'opinions about sex and alcohol'; 'opinions about intersex mixing'; 'criticism of the West/Israel/Jews'.[44] The danger of these indicators – a danger mentioned in most of the interviews with Muslims in Aarhus – is obviously that religious orthodoxy or religious awakening is confused with radicalization. The general view expressed in the interviews is that people working with young Muslims through their positions in state institutions cannot be given the necessary skills to make this distinction by following a few courses. In fact, the diffusion of such a list of indicators is viewed as counterproductive:

> If such a folder on indicators of radicalization is distributed to SSP [an institutionalized collaboration between social authorities, schools and police focusing on crime prevention, eds.] it will destroy all trust among teachers and students. It would mean that my child's teachers would sit and evaluate me during meetings at the school. How many parents will accept that? (Naadir).

Thus, a widespread opinion in the interviews is that radicalization cannot be treated as yet another 'parameter of concern', for which there are objective indicators, in same way as there are concrete signs of drug abuse, criminal activities or child abuse. Several interviewees dismiss this analogy made by, for example, police officers involved in the de-radicalization project in Aarhus. One interviewee argues:

> I don't buy the argument that the education of school teachers etc. on radicalization is like other preventive measures. Because this is a very political area – everybody has an opinion about it. We all have opinions – so do those involved in SSP collaborations – they are not super humans. One can also have opinions about drug abusers, but we

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44 Presentation by Østjyllands Politi, leader of SSP collaboration – Municipality of Aarhus, 09 Nov 2008.

also have a fundamental sense that they need help. It is different with attitudes towards immigrants and Muslims and views that they are not doing enough to integrate; these attitudes are more difficult to sidestep and say 'oh we also need to help them'. It haunts me that SSP is asked to work with these issues – they can only fail (Muhammad, 29 years).

Another interviewee elaborates the point by saying:

This is about politics, not social issues or problems. This is about politics and opinions, norms and values. It is not the same thing. Here you are asking people to evaluate if people are dangerous. That is in my opinion something completely different (Majid).

The underlying logic of these arguments is that the individual opinions of Muslims and Islam will shape the way physical signs are evaluated. Thus, the implementation of this new 'parameter of concern' is believed to be highly personal and politicized.

So far we have dealt with the way some Muslims in Aarhus perceive de-radicalization policies as feeding radicalization by enhancing feelings of humiliation, discrimination, indignation, misrecognition, and creating further distance and mistrust between Muslims and non-Muslims. One can say that de-radicalization policies in this perspective can help further the *demand* for radical views. However, the interviews also show examples of how de-radicalization policies are believed to indirectly diffuse the *supply* of radical views in society. For example, one interviewee argues that de-radicalization policies can be used by radical groups 'as an amplifying factor' in their rhetoric of state suppression and state islamophobia (Umar). Put another way, de-radicalization policies can backfire and enhance mobilization into radical groups. Another frequent argument is that as radicalization and de-radicalization crawl up on the public agenda, the room of maneuvering for Muslim voices, presenting an alternative to radical views, shrinks as they face an increased risk of being labeled 'radicals':

It has become more difficult to engage in the public debate on integration, and now radicalization. One has to sound perfectly in tune in order to be accepted. You need to have the right views. Many just don't dare speak up anymore as they are scared of the label 'radical'. People can't stand to hear us Muslims say something that is contrary to majority opinions. If you do this you are seen as somebody who does not love Denmark, instead of somebody who is just asking if we cannot do things a little bit better. I never had second thoughts about speaking up in the media, but now I consider it a million times … The situation today is that all the progressive voices are silent in the public debate. They have left the room open to voices such as Hizb ut-Tahrir (Naadir).

The focus on radicalization/de-radicalization in public debates has introduced 'radical' as a sticker which is used to excommunicate Muslim voices from the public sphere, thereby leaving the floor to those who are in fact radicals and therefore have nothing to lose by

being called just that. The problem with this development is that the supply of radical views is left unquestioned as alternative voices withdraw from public debates:

> No one dares to speak their mind. They don't have the resources to confront the wave of criticism that follows. And maybe they give up and isolate themselves. This is very critical. It worries me that these voices become silent because it leaves more room for radical views, which are not questioned (Majid).

The alternative voices pointed at here are those who try to balance religious orthodoxy and integrationist views of society. To many interviewees these actors would constitute an effective alternative to radical groups:

> People need to understand that Muslim representatives in public debates have to balance on a knife's wedge. Danish Muslims have many more realities and concerns then the ordinary Dane. They care about foreign politics, problems in their home countries. Many are critical towards the US. As a representative you cannot just talk like Naser Khader [MP with Muslim background who is described by many practicing Muslims as a heretic, eds.], it does not reflect these realities. You lose legitimacy. If Muslim representatives should play a role in the fight against radicalization they cannot do it on the premises laid out by the government or the press. It is a balance, and these resource people need room to argue their case in their own language and without being called radicals (Taamir).

The quote suggests that in the current political climate in Denmark the supply of radical views is furthered by the fact that legitimate alternatives are excommunicated as radicals, while only Muslim voices perceived as illegitimate by the majority of Muslims are certified by politicians and the media (for similar arguments see Lindekilde 2008).

Summing up, the third main position on de-radicalization initiatives among Muslims in Aarhus is characterized by perceptions that see official de-radicalization initiatives as having negative, unintended consequences. Two basic mechanisms are outlined, which connect the implementation of de-radicalization policies with counterproductive effects, that is, the risk of increased radicalization. The first causal mechanism relates to the demand side of radical positions. Many interviewees felt that the de-radicalization policies throw suspicion on all Muslims, which generates feelings of irritation, frustration and indignation. The interpretation of the de-radicalization initiatives as stigmatizing and discriminatory was fuelled by the perception that these policies are a part of a larger political context in Denmark, where Islamophobia is thriving. The harshest critique was raised against the idea to make radicalization a new 'parameter of concern' among street-level bureaucrats along with existing preventive measures. Interviewees described how this initiative was bound to fail as it would only create mistrust and distance between Muslims and the 'system'. Common for these perceptions is that de-radicalization policies are believed to be counterproductive by feeding the pool of experienced frustration, discrimination, marginalization, suppression and humiliation among Muslims in Aarhus. The view builds on

the assumption that these experiences are some of the typical ingredients of radicalization processes.

The second causal mechanism relates to the supply side of radical views. Here de-radicalization policies are perceived as opportunities for radical Islamic groups to further their discourse of illegitimate repression of Muslims and islamophobia in Danish society. Furthermore, the focus on radicalization/de-radicalization in public debates is, paradoxically, by some believed to be an advantage for radical voices. The process described by interviewees is that the fear of being labeled 'radical' stops alternative voices, with a strong religious platform, from participating in public debates, thus leaving the floor to radical voices.

In both causal mechanisms, the impact of de-radicalization policies on radical mobilization is indirect. De-radicalization policies are perceived as entailing a risk of boosting either the demand or the supply of radical views in society. However, one case mentioned in a couple of interviews is believed to have had more direct implications on radical mobilization, i.e. to have triggered or accelerated radicalization processes (in terms of a 'crisis of confidence') for specific Muslim individuals in Aarhus. The case is often referred to as the 'Tunesian case' and involves the arrest on February 12 2008 of three young Muslims with Tunisian and Moroccan background living in Gjellerup, and the following administrative expulsion of one individual, on charges of plans to assassinate Kurt Westergaard, the newspaper illustrator who in 2005 drew the cartoon of the prophet Muhammad with a fizzing bomb in the turban, which became iconic of the Muhammad cartoons controversy (see also part II). The arrests were made preventively after months of surveillance by the Danish *Police Intelligence Service*. This type of operation, which is not really a part of the new preventive de-radicalization measures, but a product of more operative counterterrorism measures, was in some interviews, however, perceived as an extension and close relative of the de-radicalization programs. No matter the accuracy of making this link, the interviewees saw the arrests as part of a larger political de-radicalization effort with direct, negative implications:

> The case of the Tunisians was handled very wrong and people here have a very negative experience of it. It put the legitimacy of the police and PET in question as the ground for the arrests was so shaky. The arrests were very violent and then the transparency of the case needs to be very high. And that was not the case. It meant that a lot of people out here are questioning the work of the police and PET. It would have been better if they had gone before a judge. Of course, PET should be able to protect their sources, but they should have gone before a judge. Without, the entire sense of justice is jeopardized. We see that with some of the young here. This case has made some young people turn on the system (Majid)

The quote suggests that the way the police carried out the arrests, the lack of transparency as far as the evidence against the detainees and the fact that the young men never went

before a judge acted as a concrete trigger of radicalization among certain individuals. What differentiates the descriptions of the effects of this case from the descriptions of effects of other initiatives is that the negative impact here is framed more as a fact than as a potential risk. The perception that the handling of the 'Tunisian case', and other cases of apparent terrorist activities in Denmark, is causing further radicalization seems to be relatively widespread among Muslims as suggested by the results of a recent survey among Danish Muslims:

Table 9: 'The police/Police Intelligence Service is creating radicalization by arresting people without evidence'

		Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Valid	Disagree completely	159	14.3	14.3	14.3
	Disagree	193	17.3	17.3	31.6
	Neither or	413	37.1	37.1	68.7
	Agree	248	22.3	22.3	91.0
	Agree completely	100	9.0	9.0	100.0
	Total	1113	100.0	100.0	

Table 9 shows that 31.3 percent agree or completely agree with the statement 'The police/Police Intelligence Service is creating radicalization by arresting people without evidence'. One should always treat such survey results with caution, but the results seem to suggest that more than a few people in our interviews link the handling of these cases with negative consequences.

3.4. Concluding Remarks

This part of the report set out to answer the questions of a) how Muslims in Aarhus perceive policies of de-radicalization, and b) what, according to Muslims themselves, the likely effects of official de-radicalization polices are. The quick answer to these questions is that perceptions of de-radicalization policies and their effects are diverse and complex. Perceptions range from indifference over partial endorsement to outright disapproval. Often these different perceptions were mixed in the discourse of one interviewee. However, three main positions were identified as the most repetitive across the empirical material.

The first position, present in about one third of the interviews, viewed the de-radicalization initiatives with a degree of indifference or unawareness. Interviewees holding this position created a counter-image of the problem of radicalization in which de-radicalization policies become irrelevant and other issues, such as international conflicts or local problems of crime and unemployment, are much more salient. The problem of radicalization was perceived as exaggerated by authorities, and as something that did not concern the interviewees.

The second main position, present in about half of the interviews, was characterized by a generally positive view of the comprehensive and preventive nature of the de-radicalization action plans, a conditioned positive evaluation of specific initiatives, and a belief that the initiatives, however, are little but necessary symptom treatment of a deeper-lying problem in society. In contrast to the first position, this view recognized that radicalization is a concrete problem, but within very small groups of Muslims in Aarhus.

The third main position, present in all but two interviews, is characterized by perceptions that see official de-radicalization initiatives as having negative, unintended consequences. The most frequent perception is that de-radicalization policies, through different causal mechanisms, may increase the demand for radical views. Common for these perceptions is that de-radicalization policies are believed to be counterproductive by feeding into the pool of experienced frustration, discrimination, marginalization, suppression and humiliation among Muslims in Aarhus. To a lesser degree interviewees also express a belief that de-radicalization policies may promote the supply of radical views. A few interviewees think that more operative measures of de-radicalization, such as arrests and administrative expulsions, have an effect on radical mobilization, not through the demand or the supply side, but directly by triggering or accelerating radicalization processes.

One result cutting across these main positions is that perceptions of de-radicalization seem to depend on knowledge. In fact, the tendency seems to be that the more the interviewee knows about local and national initiatives of de-radicalization, the more negative their perceptions of the policies and their effects. However, this cannot be interpreted in the direction that if all Muslims were aware of the de-radicalization initiatives then all Muslims would perceive them in a negative way. It seems likely that some interviewees who hold negative perceptions learned more about the initiatives exactly because they saw them as problematic. One objection here could be that the reactions and perceptions of de-radicalization initiatives expressed in interviews were to some extend 'prompted' in the sense that it was an issue introduced by the researchers, and something that interviewees therefore did not have a reflected opinion on before the start of the interview. In fact, this was the case in interviews where prior knowledge of de-radicalization initiatives was minimal or non-existent. However, we have been interested in such spontaneous perceptions as they give a good impression of how the initiatives will be received. We cannot expect that young Muslims will sit down and read the government action plan and base their impressions on this reading. Most young Muslims will hear about these initiatives indirectly through the media and/or from friends, and perceptions will, thus, be built on limited knowledge and awareness of the larger picture of concrete measures.

Another general result is that while some initiatives are viewed as problematic in terms of content and design, e.g. the idea to implement radicalization as a new 'parameter of concern' among frontline workers, the evaluation of other initiatives seems to depend more on the style of implementation. Thus, initiatives such as role models, preventive talks and teaching of democratic values in schools are applauded as long as they are carried out in a

balanced and sensitive manner. If implementation ignores these criteria, the initiatives are perceived to have potential counterproductive consequences.

Furthermore, the evaluation of de-radicalization policies seems to be partly dependent on perceptions of the larger political climate vis-à-vis Muslims in Denmark. Many interviewees believed that Danish society is characterized by a general skepticism and mistrust towards the Muslim minority, and they see the de-radicalization policies as just another layer in this development, and, thus, evaluate the policies in this light. From this perspective several of the de-radicalization initiatives are likely to create further distance between Muslims and non-Muslims. One objection here could be that by introducing the government action plan as well as local initiatives in interviews in terms of 'de-radicalization' policies, and not in terms of e.g. general initiatives to prevent discrimination or marginalization, we were as researchers enforcing negative perceptions of the initiatives. In this perspective the framing of the initiatives as 'de-radicalization' would make interviewees evaluate the policies more negatively as the framing corresponded to existing perceptions of Danish authorities being 'out to get' Danish Muslims. To this it can be answered that our interviewees generally were positive towards the preventive measures in the action plan targeting discrimination, marginalization and active citizenship, but they also saw the initiatives as insufficient. Furthermore, several interviewees expressed concern towards the fact that such preventive initiatives were now gathered under the heading of prevention of radicalization and extremism. Whether or not we frame the initiatives as de-radicalization or prevention of discrimination the mere fact that such policies are formulated within the framework of an action plan to prevent radicalization and extremism is viewed as problematic. The underlying argument seems to be that prevention of radicalization is best achieved as a byproduct of other policies. That is, the direct focus on the issue of radicalization, whether or not it is in terms of de-radicalization or in terms of prevention of radicalization, entails the danger of being perceived as stigmatizing and as political eagerness to show a 'firm hand'. Jon Elster has formulated this paradox as the problem of 'essential byproducts' (Elster 1983). The point is that some goods (e.g. spontaneity and sleep) cannot be realized through rational focused pursuit. It can be argued following the results of the research presented here that the good 'absence of radicalization' to some extent only can be achieved as an essential byproduct of other general policies of e.g. inclusion and welfare providence. The conscious pursuit of the good 'absence of radicalization' through the formulation of distinct action plans to prevent radicalization may hinder the realization of the good. At least, there seems to be reasons to pursue the prevention of radicalization in an indirect manner. Following this, one can hope that the implementation of the preventive measures outlined in the government action plan, and locally in Aarhus, in practice is carried out in such a way that they are not associated with the pursuit of de-radicalization by the target groups.

The results presented here on the relationship between de-radicalization policies and radicalization processes resemble results generated in other studies, in particular studies on

the relationship between state repression and dissident mobilization within social movement research. De-radicalization policies may, like forms of hard and soft repression against protesters, serve as indirect vehicles of radicalization rather than as barriers to radicalization through different mechanisms of 'backfire'. However, it should be noticed that the results presented here have a more 'speculative' nature than most of the results from social movement research on the effects of state repression. As de-radicalization policies are a new phenomenon in Denmark, where action plans are just beginning to be implemented, Muslims interviewed have only had the opportunity to reflect on the *potential* effects of these policies. This obviously means that we have only identified a potential causal link between de-radicalization policies and radicalization processes. We have not proved that this link really exists; that would require further research in this area. However, the results suggest that there are reasons to worry that aspects of the de-radicalization initiatives could have negative, unintended consequences when fully implemented.

It could be argued that by focusing on the potential negative consequences of de-radicalization policies this research is in reality enforcing the danger of potential negative feedback. The rationale behind this kind of argumentation would be that by creating awareness of the possible negative impact of de-radicalization policies we are enforcing negative perceptions of the initiatives, not least among the target groups. However, we find it to be of outmost importance that the potential counter-productive sides of the de-radicalization initiatives are brought to the fore, so that they can be taken into consideration by authorities when presenting and implementing the strategy. In the following, some recommendations are given on how to avoid negative, unintended consequences of de-radicalization policies.

Recommendations

Obviously, the risk that some de-radicalization policies may work against intentions should not prevent authorities from imposing preventive de-radicalization measures. But it heightens the demands on how we formulate, implement and present these policies. Following the results of the empirical investigation presented above, this section proposes a number of recommendations on how to avoid negative, unintended consequences of de-radicalization policies. These recommendations can be grouped according to policy goal under three headings: 'Building legitimacy and ownership', 'Securing coherence between presentation and implementation' and 'Promoting communication and interaction'.

Building legitimacy and ownership

The investigation of Muslim perceptions of de-radicalization initiatives showed that evaluations depend on the degree to which such policies were viewed as relevant and legitimate; the more relevant and legitimate, the more positive evaluations. One important factor in building policy legitimacy is to secure a sense of ownership; that is to make sure

that affected groups are involved in policy formulation and implementation. Our concrete recommendations in this area are:

- *More bottom-up initiatives of de-radicalization*: Several interviewees expressed that the de-radicalization policies were the product of political elites and intelligence agencies who feel an urge to 'do something' rather than a product of demand from those who work closely with young Muslims. The top-driven nature of the policies seems to affect legitimacy in a negative way. In order to counter such perceptions, ownership of de-radicalization must be enhanced by incorporating local resource people, not necessarily those with the longest educations, but those who are in close contact with young Muslims in the communities, in the formulation of policies. Likewise, authorities should actively seek input in the policy formulation process, e.g. by supporting local initiatives of debate on radicalization/de-radicalization.

- *More incorporation of Muslim communities in implementation of policies*: Another way to secure the perceived legitimacy of de-radicalization policies among Muslims is to enhance ownership by strengthening Muslim actors' involvement in implementing policies (see TTSRL 2008 and Slootman & Tillie 2006 for similar recommendations). Current action plans of de-radicalization do recognize this point, but there is a sense among our interviewees that the good intentions will not be followed by necessary resources when the plans are actually implemented. It is important that the involvement of Muslim communities becomes more than symbolic politics. Concretely, our investigations show that religious authorities can play an important role in de-radicalization efforts. However, this takes recognition of the positive role played by Muslim religious authorities from politicians and state institutions. Denmark and the rest of Europe could learn something about how to use religious authorities in de-radicalization efforts from the Middle East. Likewise, it has proved important that state authorities do not de-certify and ex-communicate Muslim actors, which are religiously orthodox, but work for integration in Danish society, as these actors are the legitimate alternatives to radical views among most Muslims.

- *Role models should come from within, not be imposed from without*: Several interviewees articulated skepticism towards the use of role models in the field of de-radicalization. In order to secure that such initiatives do not become counterproductive, it is important that role models for young Muslims are found and recruited in a natural way within local networks close to the youngsters. Only in this way can the role model act with necessary legitimacy.

- *More transparency in cases of terrorist accusations*: Several interviewees expressed that the background for de-radicalization policies, i.e. recent cases of 'home-grown' terrorist plots, has been insufficiently justified. This touches on perceptions of relevance and legitimacy of de-radicalization policies. The intransparency, due to protection of the investigation process and security, has left many Muslims in doubt of the substance of the cases, and, thus, of the relevance of de-radicalization policies. The 'Tuni-

sian case' is particularly relevant in the context of Aarhus. Our recommendation here is that authorities make as much evidence as possible accessible to the public in these cases and abandon the use of administrative expulsions. The procedure is regarded as a threat to the sense of legal justice.

Securing coherence between policy wording, presentation and implementation

The investigation of Muslim perceptions of de-radicalization initiatives showed that evaluations depend on the content of policies, but also the context in which they are presented and implemented. Thus, positive evaluations of de-radicalization policies demand coherence between the wording of policies, their political presentation and the concrete implementation. This can be achieved by paying attention to the following recommendations:

- *Create coherence between the wording of action plans and political and media presentations hereof*: Several interviewees were positively surprised by the nuanced and balanced wording and design of local and national de-radicalization action plans. However, many also said that they experienced inconsistency between these careful formulations and the way the action plans were presented and portrayed by certain politicians and the media, who were perceived to make radicalization a particular Muslim problem and stigmatize all Muslims. Obviously, politicians and the media cannot be told what to say, but their responsibility in making sure that de-radicalization policies work according to intentions can be explicated by including these actors formally in the 'de-radicalization coalition'. One way would be to arrange meetings with media representatives, politicians and Muslim community leaders.

- *Avoid formulating and using 'checklists' of physical indicators of radicalization*: One of the most problematic initiatives in the eyes of Muslims in Aarhus is the idea to train frontline workers to spot signs of radicalization. The perceived problem was that such training could only in practice be based upon physical indicators of radicalization. Most interviewees believed that no matter how carefully formulated such courses and checklists were, they would undermine the intention, expressed in the wording of action plans, to keep religious orthodoxy and radicalization aside. Our recommendation is to avoid formulating and using such checklists in the context of de-radicalization.

- *Caution in implementing radicalization as a separate 'parameter of concern'*: The idea of implementing radicalization as a 'parameter of concern' for frontline workers, along the lines of other preventive social and criminal measures, was perceived by most interviewees as entailing an imminent danger of undermining declared intentions of combating feelings of stigmatization, mistrust and discrimination among Muslims. Spotting radicalization is not the same thing as spotting drug abuse and criminal activities. It requires an evaluation of norms and values, which quickly becomes a polit-

ical assessment. Our recommendation is that radicalization is not made a separate 'parameter of concern', but incorporated in a more holistic way into the work of frontline workers.

- *Implement preventive measures through universal institutions*: A way of securing that the message in de-radicalization policies that radicalization is a general phenomenon is not undermined, and perceived as a politically correct cover-up, is to implement de-radicalization policies through universal institutions like primary schools and the social security system. Thus, it would be recommendable to avoid special targeting of e.g. Muslim free schools, youth centers with high ratios of Muslim youths, or certain mosques (this is in line with argument in Schiffauer 2008).

Promoting communication and interaction

To avoid that the intentions behind policies are not misperceived and misunderstood it is important that authorities and affected segments of society establish channels of communication and interaction. Thus, we believe that negative, unintended consequences of de-radicalization policies can be partly sidestepped through promotion of interaction, constructive dialogue and feedback. Some recommendations:

- *From monologue to multilogue*: Most interviewees believed that dialogue initiatives are important in the battle against radicalization. However, many underlined that the conditions for this dialogue had to be changed, that there is a need to include more diverse Muslim actors in this dialogue with authorities, and lower the threshold of agreement. It seems very important that opportunities for dialogue are not only offered to Muslim voices who already fully share dominant views in society. This could be achieved by arranging, via local partners and/or Muslim activists with 'street credibility', open dialogue meetings in certain neighborhoods. Furthermore, channels of dialogue should be used by authorities not only to explain themselves, but also to listen and receive feedback.

- *Create a crisis team*: An enriched dialogue among Muslim actors, and between Muslim representatives and state and civil agents, could establish trust and understanding among central actors, which would render possible the creation of 'crisis teams' to take the lead in distributing information and airing opinions in heated situations. For example, it seems plausible that many misunderstandings and related escalations during the Muhammad cartoons controversy could have been avoided had there existed a forum where key representatives from state institutions, politicians, media and minority communities had met regularly and learned to accept one another.

- *Enhance the density of Muslim organizational networks*: One way to secure that authorities have legitimate and credible partners of dialogue in the Muslim community is to promote the creation and collaboration of Muslim organizations and associations. This could be done by considering giving state financial support to religious organi-

zations following a Swedish model. Another way would be to collaborate with former or current activists of Muslim organizations in promoting the creation of new organizations locally (see Slootman & Tillie 2006 for similar ideas).

- *Communicate via religious discourse also*: Radical Muslim groups are often experts in using the Quran and *hadiths* to justify their messages. It is important that this religious discourse is challenged by religious authorities holding other views of Islam. It is important that these voices are left free to use a religious discourse, also an orthodox discourse, without being excommunicated as 'radicals' by the media and authorities.

Overall Conclusions

There are Muslims in Denmark who believe that it is legitimate to go on jihad in Afghanistan or Somalia. Likewise, there are Muslims who think that Muslims should live in an Islamic state, and who dismiss democracy, arguing that Muslims should live under God's law only. This is not new. What is new, however, is that the Danish government is increasingly interested in such beliefs and that the term 'radicalization' is increasingly used to describe the process though which individuals come to hold them. Radicalization is increasingly perceived as a threat against society. The Danish Police Intelligence Service has elevated the term radicalization to a key concept, and in January 2009 the Danish government presented an action plan, which entails a long list of concrete initiatives designed to prevent radicalization among young people. Despite the growing reliance on the concept of radicalization among authorities, the academic foundation for talking about and dealing with radicalization has been limited.

Among Danish authorities radicalization is understood as a broad phenomenon, including leftwing extremism, rightwing extremism as well religious extremism, including militant Islamism. Emphasis in the government action plan is, however, on Islamist radicalization and this is also the focus of this report. The report is based on a qualitative study, informed by interviews and participant observation, in a youth Muslim milieu in Aarhus – what we have called, in lack of a better name, the Islamic Arabic-Somali-Convert activist milieu (ASC milieu). The report has had as its main objective to discuss the fruitfulness of the term radicalization, as defined by Danish authorities, in understanding religious currents and political views in the ASC milieu. We have tried to do this by, first, interpreting the collected data from interviews with young Muslims as well as relevant resource people (religious authorities, school teachers, social workers, youth club workers etc.) within and around the milieu in the light of official definitions of radicalization. Second, we have tried to re-analyze the material while paying close attention to the categories, distinctions and concepts used by the interviewees themselves when talking about the phenomenon of radicalization. Thus, the report builds on the underlying assumption that we can learn something new about radicalization, and the possibilities of de-radicalization, by listening to how parts of the 'target group' for preventive measures against radicalization reflect upon the phenomenon of radicalization.

The report concludes that used rigidly the definitions of radicalization provided by the Danish Police Intelligence Service and the Danish government are not very fruitful. Using these definitions, most if not all of the interviewees in the ASC milieu as well as many other people, Muslims or non-Muslims, who can hardly be termed radicals according to most standards, are in fact categorized as 'radicalized'. The definition overlooks important distinctions which are crucial for research as well as for policies in the area. The definitions of radicalization given by Danish authorities highlight two fundamental elements

of radicalism, namely, the participation in or support of the use of violence, including forms of terrorism, and undemocratic behavior or aims. In regards to the support of violence, including terrorism, this report has shown that some kind of support for organizations that appear on international lists of terrorist organizations, such as Hamas and Al-Shabaab, is common, also outside the ASC milieu. The support for such organizations is generally not due to a general accept of the use of violence, but comes from a belief that these movements are engaged in more or less legitimate resistance and freedom fights. The fact that this kind of support is relatively widely shared by Muslims in general and as a matter of fact also is common on the non-religious political left, calls for reflection on the fruitfulness of this defining property of radicalization. It is important to underline here that the report does not find any ground for believing that there is a link, or a general spill-over, between support for an organization like Hamas and support for Al Qaeda-inspired terrorism in the West. Such support can therefore hardly be regarded as an aspect of a general position of extremism.

A similar conclusion is reached regarding the aspect of undemocratic behavior and the lack of support for democracy included in definitions of radicalization. In the Muslim milieu studied in this report there are diverging views on the compatibility of Islam and democracy. Some believe that there is no contradiction between the two, while others think that Muslims should not engage in democracy as Muslims should only submit to the authority of God. Yet others believe that one should generally abstain from voting in democratic elections, but that voting can be legitimate if it is in the interest of Danish Muslims. The background for such reflections on democracy is the belief that Muslims should preferable live in an Islamic state. This is of great importance to some of our interviewees, but in no cases does this view lead to the perception that democracy accordingly should be fought. Even though many of the interviewees believed that the establishment of an Islamic state is a desirable goal, no one saw it as realistic or desirable to establish an Islamic state in Denmark, as they shared the view that an Islamic state can only be built on the voluntary commitment of the population.

Based on our research, the report recommends distinguishing between undemocratic behavior (lack of participation in and support of democracy) and anti-democratic behavior (active fight against democracy), and that only anti-democratic behavior should be made a part of the definition of radicalization. Thus, the report concludes that the concept of radicalization, as defined by Danish authorities, is not geared to capture, delimit and localize radicalization as it includes a lot of people who hold views and opinions vis-à-vis foreign organizations and participation in democracy, which can hardly be viewed as a threat against Danish society.

The second part of the report offered an attempt to formulate a new scientific approach to radicalization. Even though the concept of radicalization can be made more precise and thereby more useful for understanding religious and political convictions by incorporating the suggestions made in Part I of the report, it is argued that the concept of radicaliza-

tion, as approached by Danish authorities, is not fruitful as a starting point for academic research. The major problem is that radicalization as defined by the authorities is perceived as an individual process, whereas much existing research highlights the importance of group dynamics in radicalization. The concept of radicalization was earlier mainly used to describe processes where groups e.g. on the far left wing increasingly came to think of and frame the state and majority society as illegitimate. Research has shown how it was this process rather than the leftist ideas that led to the legitimization of the use of violence. This perception of radicalization seems to be more fruitful, but cannot, however, be applied to the ASC milieu in Aarhus, which is not an organized group, but rather a loose network of people, who are all Muslims, but seem interested in quite different aspects of Islam. Where some are preoccupied with the political aspects of Islam, others are much more concerned with daily religious practices. What unites the participants in the ASC milieu in Aarhus is that they all are 'seekers' in regards to obtaining more knowledge of Islam and finding ways of living as a good Muslim in the West. The sociology of religion uses the concept of a 'cultic milieu' to describe a milieu populated by religious seekers who share counter-cultural traits vis-à-vis majority society. The concept of 'cultic milieu' has been used primarily to describe esoteric, new-age-like milieus, where very different ideas and perceptions flourish, but it has been suggested that the concept can be used to analyze other types of religious, as well as non-religious, milieus. By viewing the ASC milieu as a cultic milieu this part of the report investigates how different factors, e.g. the so-called Tunisian case, where two Tunisian citizens residing in Aarhus were expelled from Denmark without court trial due to an apparent plot to kill cartoonist Kurt Westergaard, has contributed to a radicalization of the ASC milieu in terms of increasing de-legitimating of the Danish state. Many in the ASC milieu considered this procedure random and undemocratic, and proof that Muslims do not have the same rights as others in Denmark.

The third part of the report examines the relationship between radicalization and the preventive measures taken by the Danish government and local authorities in Aarhus against radicalization. This part of the report presented an investigation of how Muslims in the ASC milieu view such preventive measures and evaluate their effects. A central concern here has been to discuss whether or not de-radicalization initiatives can have negative, unintended consequences, and if so through which mechanisms such negative feedback can occur. It is argued that three main positions can be found on how young Muslims in the ASC milieu perceive and evaluate official strategies of preventing radicalization, which vary in terms of viewing the initiatives as positive/negative and relevant/irrelevant. The first main position views de-radicalization policies as rather unimportant and irrelevant to the lives of the interviewees. Interviewees expressing this position show indifference towards or unawareness of the official preventive measures against radicalization, and some question the necessity of such policies. The second main position views de-radicalization policies in a more positive light, but underlines that the likely effect of the

policies will be small. Common for this view is the perception of de-radicalization policies as only symptom treatment. Several of the interviewees see initiatives directed at combating the breeding ground for radicalization in society, i.e. anti-discrimination policies, as positive, but also as insufficient in terms of combating the real causes of radicalization. The third main position views the official de-radicalization measures with skepticism and points towards potential negative effects of their implementation. Our research shows that a large group of the interviewees perceive the entire strategies or specific initiatives of de-radicalization, such the implementation of radicalization as a new 'parameter of concern' within the existing collaboration between schools, social authorities and police, as misrecognition and discrimination. Thus, it is concluded that if we maintain that experiences of misrecognition, stigmatization and discrimination are typical ingredients in radicalization processes, then official initiatives to combat radicalization can indirectly work against intentions by adding to preexisting pools of experienced discrimination among young Muslims. An important conclusion is here that the perception, and hereby also the potential effect, of de-radicalization initiatives to a large degree depend on how the initiatives are formulated, presented and implemented. Rather than suggesting that the danger of negative feedback from de-radicalization policies should prevent us from addressing problems of radicalization this part of the report offered concrete recommendations on how best to avoid negative, unintended consequences of preventive strategies against radicalization.

Dansk resumé

Der findes muslimer i Danmark, der mener, at det er legitimt at tage på jihad til fx Afghanistan eller Somalia. Og der findes muslimer, som mener, at muslimer bør bo i en islamisk stat, og som undsiger demokratiet, fordi de mener, at muslimer bør leve efter Guds lov snarere end menneskets love. Det er der som sådan ikke noget nyt i. Det nye er, at den danske stat i stigende grad er blevet interesseret i disse grupperinger og betegner dem som 'radikaliserede'. Begrebet radikalisering benyttes i stigende grad til at beskrive disse fænomener, som optager danske myndigheder, der opfatter dem som en trussel mod samfundet. PET benytter sig af begrebet radikalisering, og den danske regering udarbejdede i januar 2009 en handlingsplan, *En fælles og tryg fremtid*, som indeholder en lang række tiltag, der skal forebygge radikalisering og ekstremistiske holdninger blandt unge. På trods af at begrebet radikalisering i disse år i stigende grad benyttes af myndigheder og sikkerhedstjenester, har det videnskabelige grundlag for at tale om radikalisering været mangelfuldt.

Danske myndigheder forstår radikalisering som et bredt fænomen, der inkluderer såvel venstre- og højreekstremisme som militant islamisme. Den danske regerings handlingsplan synes dog at lægge særlig vægt på det sidste, hvilket også er fokus for denne rapport. Rapporten bygger på et kvalitativt studie af et muslimsk miljø i Aarhus – kaldet det Islamiske Arabisk-Somaliske-Konvertit aktivist miljø (ASK-miljøet) – og har som sit hovedformål at diskutere, hvorvidt radikalisering (sådan som det defineres af danske myndigheder) er hensigtsmæssigt i forhold til at forstå religiøse strømninger og politiske synspunkter og holdninger blandt unge i det pågældende miljø. Dette er forsøgt gjort ved dels at fortolke det indsamlede materiale fra interviews med unge muslimer og religiøse ledere i ASK-miljøet samt relevante ressourcepersoner (herunder socialarbejdere, klubmedarbejdere, lærere) i lyset af officielle definitioner på radikalisering, dels ved at (re)analysere materialet under inddragelse af de kategorier, distinktioner og begreber som interviewpersonerne selv benytter sig af, når de taler om fænomenet radikalisering. Rapporten har således som en grundantagelse, at vi kan lære noget om radikalisering og mulighederne for de-radikalisering ved at lytte til, hvordan dele af 'målgruppen' reflekterer over fænomenet. Rapporten konkluderer, at definitionerne af radikalisering benyttet af PET og i regeringens handlingsplan overser nogle væsentlige distinktioner, som er centrale. De pågældende definitioner opdeler radikalisering i to grundlæggende aspekter, nemlig støtte til anvendelsen af vold, herunder støtte til terrorisme, og udemokratisk adfærd og holdninger. I forhold til støtten til anvendelse af vold og støtte til terrorisme viser rapporten, at støtte til bevægelser, der står på internationale terrorlister, såsom *Hamas* og *Al-Shabaab* er udbredt blandt muslimerne i ASK-miljøet, men også blandt muslimer såvel som ikke-muslimer, som vanskeligt kan betegnes som radikale i nogen forstand, og som støtter disse organisationer, ikke fordi de støtter brugen af vold som sådan, men fordi de

mener, at disse bevægelser fører en mere eller mindre legitim modstandskamp. Det faktum at støtten til disse organisationer er relativt udbredt i det muslimske miljø generelt, og i øvrigt også findes bredt på den politiske venstrefløj, bør føre til overvejelser om hensigtsmæssigheden af dette element i definitionen af radikalisering. Her er det vigtigt også at understrege, at rapporten ikke finder noget link mellem en sådan støtte til organisationer som *Hamas* og *Al-Shabaab*, og støtte til Al Qaeda-inspireret terrorisme i Vesten.

På samme måde når det gælder den udemokratiske adfærd og manglende støtte til demokratiet. I det undersøgte miljø er der forskellige holdninger til, hvorvidt demokrati er i overensstemmelse med islam. Nogle mener, at der ikke er noget modsætningsforhold, men andre mener, at muslimer bør afholde sig fra at involvere sig i demokratiet, fordi muslimer kun bør underlægge sig én autoritet, nemlig Guds. Andre igen mener, at man generelt bør afholde sig fra at stemme, men at det kan være i orden at stemme, hvis det er til gavn for danske muslimer. Baggrunden for overvejelserne om demokrati er forestillingen om, at muslimer bør bo i en islamisk stat. Dette er af stor betydning for nogle af interviewpersonerne, men ingen af dem mener, at forestillingen om, at det er ønskværdigt for en muslim at bo i en islamisk stat, leder til forestillinger om, at demokratiet skal bekæmpes. Og selvom mange af interviewpersonerne mente, at etableringen af en islamisk stat var et ønskværdigt mål, så mente ingen, at det var realistisk eller ønskværdigt at etablere en islamisk stat i Danmark, da der var enighed om, at en islamisk stat kun bør oprettes gennem befolkningens frivillige tilslutning. På grundlag af rapportens undersøgelser anbefales det, at der skelnes mellem udemokratiske synspunkter (manglende deltagelse i demokratiet), og antidemokratiske synspunkter (aktiv bekæmpelse af demokratiet), og at kun antidemokratiske ideer og handlinger opfattes som et aspekt af radikalisering. Rapporten konkluderer således, at begrebet radikalisering, som defineret af danske myndigheder, ikke er skarpt nok til at indfange, afgrænse og lokalisere radikalisering, da det inkluderer en masse mennesker, som har synspunkter og holdninger vis-a-vis udenlandske organisationer og deltagelse i demokrati, som dårligt kan betegnes som en trussel mod det danske samfund.

I rapportens anden del tilbydes et forsøg på at formulere en ny videnskabelig tilgang til radikalisering. Selvom begrebet radikalisering kan vinde i præcision og anvendelighed ved at inddrage de forslag til ændringer, som rapportens første del fremkommer med, så er begrebet radikalisering i den form, som danske myndigheder anvender det, ikke velegnet som udgangspunkt for en videnskabelig undersøgelse. Problemet er, at radikalisering, som det defineres af danske myndigheder, forstås som en individuel proces, hvorimod eksisterende forskning peger på den afgørende vigtighed af gruppedynamikker. Begrebet radikalisering har tidligere primært været anvendt til beskrivelse af processer, hvor fx grupper på den ekstreme venstrefløj i stigende grad kommer til at opfatte staten som illegitim. Det er denne proces snarere end de venstreorienterede ideer som sådan, der kommer til at legitimere anvendelse af vold. Denne forståelse af radikalisering opfattes som et meget mere frugtbart teoretisk udgangspunkt for forståelsen af radikalisering, men

kan dog ikke umiddelbart anvendes på fx ASK-miljøet i Aarhus, som ikke udgør en organiseret gruppe, men snarere et løst sammensat netværk af personer, der på trods af, at de alle er muslimer, er interesseret i ret forskellige aspekter af islam: Hvor nogle fx lægger vægt på politiske aspekter af islam, lægger andre mere vægt på den daglige praksis. Det, der forener deltagerne i ASK-miljøet, er, at de er søgende og opsøgende i forhold til at få mere viden om, hvad islam er, og hvordan man bedst muligt lever som Muslim, snarere end at de har en fælles fasttømret forståelse af det. I religionssociologien benyttes begrebet 'cultic milieu' til at beskrive et miljø, som befolkes af religiøst søgende, og som har modkulturelle træk. Begrebet 'cultic milieu' er tidligere især blevet brugt om esoteriske, new age-agtige miljøer, hvor en lang række forskelligartede ideer og forestillinger blomstrer, men det er blevet foreslået, at mange andre typer af religiøse såvel som ikke-religiøse miljøer kan analyseres med begrebet 'cultic milieu'. Med udgangspunkt i forståelsen af ASK-miljøet i Aarhus undersøges det, hvilke faktorer der kan siges at have bidraget til radikalisering af miljøet i form af en begyndende delegitimering af den danske stat foranlediget af Tunesersagen, hvor to tunesiske statsborgere bosiddende i Aarhus blev udvist fra Danmark uden at få sagen prøvet ved en domstol på baggrund af mistanke om, at de planlagde at myrde Kurt Westergaard. Denne procedure blev af mange i ASK-miljøet opfattet som en vilkårlig og udemokratisk beslutning, som afspejler et forsøg på at genere muslimer, og en test på, at muslimer måske alligevel ikke har samme vilkår som andre i Danmark.

Rapportens tredje del udgør en diskussion af forholdet mellem radikalisering og den danske regerings præventive indsats mod radikalisering og ekstremisme blandt unge. I denne del af rapporten præsenteres en undersøgelse, af hvorledes muslimer i ASK-miljøet i Aarhus opfatter tiltagene i regeringens handlingsplan samt vurderer deres potentielle effekter. Et centralt anliggende for denne del af rapporten er at undersøge, om de-radikaliseringstiltag kan formodes at have negative, utilsigtede konsekvenser og i givet fald gennem hvilke mekanismer. Rapporten argumenterer for, at der kan identificeres tre hovedpositioner i forhold til officielle de-radikaliseringstiltag blandt unge muslimer i Aarhus, som i varierende grad betragter tiltagene og deres potentielle effekter som positive/negative og relevante/irrelevante. Undersøgelsen peger på, at en stor gruppe af de interviewede forholder sig skeptisk til dele af eller hele regeringens handlingsplan og opfatter visse initiativer som udtryk for miskendelse og diskrimination. Således påpeges det, at hvis man godtager, at oplevelser af miskendelse, stigmatisering og diskrimination er typiske ingredienser i radikaliseringsforløb, så er der mulighed for, at officielle de-radikaliseringstiltag indirekte kan virke mod hensigten ved at lægge til puljen af oplevet diskrimination. En væsentlig konklusion er, at perceptioner af de-radikaliseringstiltag, og dermed potentielt også deres effekt, i høj grad afhænger af, hvordan tiltagene formuleres, præsenteres og implementeres. Denne del af rapporten afsluttes med en række anbefalinger af, hvordan negative, utilsigtede konsekvenser ved en præventiv indsats mod radikalisering og ekstremisme kan undgås.

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Appendix: List of Interviewees

(All names are fictive, but the real identities of the interviewees are known by the authors)

Young Muslims

Name	Age	Position	Date
Thomas	30s	Craftsman, Convert	23 Mar 09
Khalid	17	High school Student, Afghan background	15 Mar 09
Afif	17	High school Student, Somali background	15 Mar 09
Pernille	18	High school student Convert	02 Feb 09/21 Apr 09
Mette	18	High school student Convert	02 Apr 09/21 Apr 09
Idris	30s	Activist, Somali	04 Apr 09
Martha	29	Home maker, Convert	29 Apr 09
Ghaada	19	Student, African background	11 May 09
Kareem	22	Student, Arab background	13 May 09
Amr	35	Parent group, Arab background	18 May 09
Jamaal	34	Youth club, Arab background	20 May 09
Talha	20	Student, Arab background	24 May 09
Nasser	19	Student, Arab background	24 May 09
Hamza	19	Student, Arab background	24 May 09
Ali	20	Student, Arab background	24 May 09
Naadir	33	Activist/private firm, Pakistani background	01 June 09
Umar	28	University student, Arab background	24 June 09
Kamila	19	Student, Somali background	13 Aug 09

Imams and Religious Authorities

Name	Age	Position	Date
Abu	36	Shaykh, Arab background	05 Mar 09
Rabih	45	Shaykh, Arab background	05 Mar 09
Bilal	37	Religious teacher, Somali background	23 Apr 09
Yusuf	20	Imam, Arab background	28 Apr 09
Omar	40	Imam, Afghan background	01 May 09
Mahmoud		Imam, Arab background	22 May 09
Taamir	34	Imam, Arab background	01 June 09
Fadl		Religious teacher, Pakistani background	18 June 09

Social Workers

Name	Age	Position	Date
Kim		Police officer	17 Feb 09
Hassan	45	Municipality, Arab background	18 Feb 09
Maria		Priest	24 Feb 09
Imran	43	Municipality, Arab background	25 Feb 09
Helle		Consultant	26 Feb 09
Malene		Journalist	27 Feb 09
Louise		High school principal	04 Mar 09
Wisam		Primary school teacher, Arab background	23 Mar 09
Lotte		Langauge consultant	24 Mar 09
Racheed	42	Municipality, Arab background	31 Mar 09
Ditte		High school teacher	25 May 09
Hakim		Municipality, Somali background	26 May 09
Majid	47	Municipality, Arab background	02 June 09

Control Group (Muslims outside the ASC milieu)

Name	Age	Position	Date
Salah		Translator, Arab background,	02 Apr 09
Aisha	18	Student, Arab background	16 Apr 09
Ayan	18	Student, Arab background	16 Apr 09
Maryam	18	Student, Arab background	16 Apr 09
Muhammad	29	Layer, Arab background	24 Apr 09
Carsten		Convert/private firm	19 May 09