The Denmark School

House of War
Islamic Radicalisation in Denmark

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
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Islamism and Radicalisation – *the Denmark School*

The ambition of the Denmark School is to remedy the fragmentation between different fields of research in Islamism. The Denmark School wants to explore the phenomena of 'Islamism' in its different manifestations and to highlight the mechanisms of radicalisation processes among Muslim youth in Europe. One of the innovative approaches is the linkage between 'soft security' and 'hard security'. While other projects mainly focus on *terrorism*, this project first of all focuses on *Islamism*. The identification of Islamism requires a distinction between three possible phases: 1) ideology, 2) movements and 3) political regimes.

The study of Islamism in international relations is usually limited to treating only one aspect of Islamism as a transnational actor, namely terrorism and the corresponding anti-terror measures. But Islamist ambitions and strategies are expressed through a number of other means, such as foreign policy, boycotts, crises, strategic alliances and perhaps even the acquisition of WMD. These must be mapped in order to provide an empirical basis for studying contemporary Islamist world views and conceptions of international relations.

The Centre for Studies in Islamism and Radicalisation (CIR) is pleased to present the second research report on Islamic radicalisation in Denmark. The project has been conducted by Marco Goli, associate professor at Metropol – Copenhagen University College and Shahamak Rezaei, associate professor at the Department of Society and Globalisation, Roskilde University, Denmark.

This project is part of a more comprehensive study with the same overall theme in several middle-size European cities: Lille (France), Leicester (UK), Parma and Verona (Italy) and Aarhus (Denmark). The other projects will be published as they are completed.

For the sake of harmonisation, CIR organized meetings between the researchers to discuss and prepare the practical questions related to the process of investigation. At these meetings, the participating researchers coordinated their research and elaborated a common interview guide. It is important to stress the independent character of these investigations. The projects have been carried out in accordance with the standards for good research practice, and the Centre has in no way interfered in the research process.

In this delicate and highly sensitive field of research, carrying out interviews is a difficult task and the researchers have faced various obstacles during the process. The completion of the investigations has taken many months. The interviews have mainly involved three different groups: Young Muslims, religious leaders and social workers who work with activities and issues in relation to Muslims and immigrants on a daily basis.

The reports were finished during the autumn of 2009 and were submitted to an international committee of experts for evaluation. Based on the comments of this committee, the researchers revised their reports. I should like to thank the members of the evaluation committee for a wonderful cooperation.

Finally, it should be mentioned that the reports exclusively reflect the findings of the researchers and do not necessarily express the views of CIR. Comments to the reports are welcome.

Happy reading!

Mehdi Mozaffari

Head of CIR

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Islamic radicalisation among Muslim youth in Denmark. Motivation, values and behaviour

Marco Goli & Shahamak Rezaei

Abstract

Islamic radicalisation is widely appreciated as the very cognitive and ideological framework and denominator for the creation of a worldview that is hostile to the principles of pluralism and peaceful co-existence. Empirically tested knowledge of the phenomenon is, on the other hand, rather limited in regard to crucial questions such as: What motivates Islamic radicalisation of youth? How Islamic radicalisation shapes the values adopted by the individual radical Muslim? How Islamic radicalisation expresses itself through actual behaviour of those who are affiliated with it?

On the basis of a Danish nationwide representative survey, and through a statistical hypothesis test, this study provides empirical knowledge on Islamic radicalization. The study examines Islamic radicalisation as a sociological phenomenon as well as a sociological process in a specific national context within a globalised world. Our long-term scientific aim is to contribute to the development of an empirically supported theory on Islamic radicalisation in the west.

1. Introduction

Islamists, Fundamentalist Muslims, Radical Muslims, and Muslim Terrorists etc. are concepts that are used indiscriminately in the contemporary West and often with unspecified contents. Assuming that the role distinguished for the scientific community is to provide reliable knowledge in order to equip democratic society with insights that will enable them to address challenging disintegrative social forces in a proper manner, it is striking how little *empirical* knowledge is available on home-grown Islamic radicalisation.

Due to this lack of both a specific empirical focus and evidence, much of the existing ideas about Home-grown Islamic Radicalisation stem from other, though, related, fields such as home-grown terrorism, terrorism in general or social and psychological theories that have not been targeted at and have not been elaborated with the specific purpose of addressing the complex issue of Home-grown Islamic Radicalisation. (Berrebi, C. 2003, Brock Vlomberg & S. Hess, G.D. & Weerapana, A. 2004, ICSR 2008, Twenge, J.M., R.F. Baumeister & C. DeWall 2007, Linz. J, 200o & 2004, Jeffrey B. Cozzens 2008, Johnson, P.W. & Feldman, Jørgensen, C.R 2009, Krueger, A. & J. Maleckova 2003, Lake, D.A. 2002, McCAULEY C. & Moskalenko, S. 2008, Olesen, T. 2009, Reich,W. 1998, Rasmussen L., & Larsen, L. 2004, Silber, M. D. & A. Bhatt 2007, Whine, M. 2001, Scheffer, G. 2003, Lichbach, M. 1989, Laville, S., A. Gillan & D. Aslam 2005, Franz, B. 2007).

Other studies dominating the field have their focus, still supported by no or very limited empirical observations, on contemporary or historical development of certain branches of Islam. (Shepard. W.E. 1987, Shepard. W.E. 1987, Sadik J. Al-Azm 1994, Roy, O. 2002, Quintan Wiktorowicz 2004, Mozaffari, M. 2009, Kepel, G. 2004, Karamé, Kari H. 1996, Choudhury, T. 2007).

In spite of the poor empirical data directly addressing the phenomenon of Home Gown *Islamic Radicalisation* these studies, we believe, have somehow explicitly and implicitly established several widespread hypotheses about causal relationships between certain socioeconomic and psychological characteristics at the collective and individual levels on the one hand, and the development of home-grown Islamic radicalisation, (and Islamic terrorist activities) on the other. These ideas, however, neither being brought about as a result of comprehensive deductive articulations or reflections (as the field so far is characterised by the lack of general theories) nor as a result of *trial-and-error* inductive processes and hypothesis testing that could contribute to the development of such theories, can be, we believe, characterised as theoretical propositions at this stage. They can nevertheless be useful when attempting to identify hypotheses on the phenomenon, hypotheses that then can be subjected to empirical investigation.

Apart from being based on limited empirical data from relatively few sources, much of the existing ideas about the causal relationships between Islam and radicalisation are products of a certain methodology: They are almost exclusively retrospective case studies of a few, if any, captured terrorists and are characterised by *not* studying the phenomenon of home-grown *Islamic radicalisation* within the very context at hand, e.g. the specific society, e.g. Denmark, where those subjected to the study actually are involved in daily social and symbolic interactions. On the other hand these studies are characterised by the lack of explicit premises with regard to what kind of causality they operate with, mixing on the one hand material causes with formal, efficient and even final causes, and on the other hand Necessary, Sufficient and Contributory causes. These problems produce fallacies that are widespread in the field, partly stating that A (for instance Lack of Integration (what ever that might be) is the cause of Radical-Islamic world view; simply because the two phenomena are (supposed to be) in regular conjunction. . Some other time it is not quite clear what is considered as cause and what as effect.

Categorising the focus of the studies of the phenomenon of Islamic radicalisation during the last decade we therefore observe two tendencies: One that focuses on the relationship between Islamic radicalisation and terrorism, flourishing as a consequence of the shock of 9/11, while the other category has traditionally focused on Islamic radicalisation as a consequence of Islamic fundamentalism. The first group of studies explicitly or implicitly highlight a range of psychological factors (Laville, S., A. Gillan & D. Aslam 2005, ICSR 2008) at the individual micro level, and the individual disposal for radical tendencies as denominating ones. The other group of studies, as a branch of religious studies, focus on the core ideological features and political circumstances surrounding the formation of Islamic

radicalisation as inherent in the specific development of different religious branches or sub divisions of Islam. These studies implicitly highlight the ideological cores and the organisation of those religious branches as the motivating and driving forces behind Islamic Radicalisation, establishing rather controversially and highly politically contested that the roots of Islamic radicalisation and fundamentalism as two identical phenomena are to be seen as inherent and inseparable ideological elements or the very spirit of Islam, of the Quran and of certain interpretations developed historically.

We disagree with the focus, the methodology and certainly with the findings of these studies. Instead we propose a *sociological* study of the phenomenon:

A sociological empirical study of the tendencies towards "home-grown Islamic radicalisation" that is neither directly related to religious studies and terrorism, nor politically motivated. We propose a sociological study of the phenomenon that attempts to investigate home-grown Islamic radicalisation as a sociological phenomenon, a methodology that, rather surprisingly we believe, represents something quite new. It is, we believe, unfortunate, that core ideas, sometimes considered as facts, about motivating factors, values and behaviour with regard to processes or outcomes of Islamic radicalisation do not stem from sociological studies and are not elaborated through empirical sociological methodology, having taken into consideration that the findings of these studies have an impact on the general perception of the phenomenon and deliver the framework in which not only the perception of the problem is defined, but also recommendations towards policy reforms are defined. It is unfortunately due to the implicit neglect of the importance of the social and symbolic interactions that in a sociological perspective would be considered as the very arena where home-grown Islamic radicalisation develops. The non-sociological perspective also neglects that the feature, the structure, the scope and the intensity of the very arena as well as the character of social interactions taking place in it, are growingly shaped by the processes of globalisation. The result of this inherent and implicit neglect is that what we in a scientific environment would consider hypotheses about home-grown Islamic radicalisation today, as established matters of fact, contributing to the development of a common sense that is supportive to a certain paradigm. This paradigm, we believe, departs from a methodological reductionism that fosters a focus on the most extreme cases of Islamic radicalisation, e.g. terror, and, as far as the study of home-grown radicalisation in general is concerned, is supportive of and facilitates discourses of epistemological parsimony.

With regard to the study of home-grown radical Islamism within the field of integration (of Muslim immigrants in the western host societies) this paradigm recently began to support a certain neglect similar to the neglect that has dominated the Danish integration discourse for decades, indicating that Islamic radicalisation does not exist at all as objectively measurable, and that it is exclusively a social construction). Similar to the neglect of integration problems and challenges that dominated the Danish discourse on integration in decades prior to the new millennium, this discourse on what is good knowledge of

home-grown Islamic Radicalisation is exclusionary and justifies the exclusion by advocating for "the cross ethnic social cohesion" that in many European countries, not least of which include the Nordic countries, is a quite new challenge to the national identity itself.

An empirical identification of these widespread hypotheses has been the first step in our study. Alongside testing these hypotheses we attempt to bring about empirical clarification on the four core aims of this study:

- What motivates home-grown radical Islamism?
- What societal values and interpretation of Islam is associated with radical Islamic identification?
- How do the societal values adopted and certain interpretation of Islam affiliated with, actually shape the individual behavioural preferences?
- What strategies are to be preferred in order to meet the challenges of radicalisation?

In order to answer these research questions empirically first we need some clarification of the core concept used in the study, "*Islamic Radicalisation*". Besides the demarcation of the framework this process of concept clarification also serves to make the concept empirically operational and applicable. This attempt is concentrated on the following questions: What does "Islamic Radicalisation" mean? Is it possible to make an empirically applicable definition of this concept? And finally: Can we develop an operational definition in order to conduct valid and reliable empirical observations and elaborate on them?

Our answer to these questions, as we argue in the study, is yes. But the question is whether our operational definition, empirical application of the concept, and our method would be contested or questioned? Hopefully, they will. This is, we believe, how we can move on towards better understanding, more comprehensive and empirically testable theoretical propositions that hopefully can be developed in the future.

In chapter 2 we describe the methodology, the data collection process and the data.

In chapter 3 "The data – An overview" we introduce the major socioeconomic distributions of the survey population.

Chapter 4 concentrates on the elaboration process towards providing an empirically applicable definition of the concept "Islamic radicalisation" based on desk studies and our explorative interviews (described below).

Chapter 5 presents the identification and elaboration of hypotheses, the empirical results and the analysis. First we describe how we construct the group of Islamic Radicals in accordance with certain characteristics that again are in accordance with the empirically applicable definition of the concept in the previous chapter.

In order to emphasise the cautions that, we believe, are crucial, when discussing Radical Islamism especially as a home-grown phenomenon, we first demonstrate some pitfalls. Then we introduce the scoring list that helps us identify different groups according to

rated response options based on the questionnaire, alongside the scale of Islamic Radicalisation. The group specified data overview is a descriptive data-analysis, showing the correlation between major socioeconomic background variables and group distribution.

Chapter 5 proceeds with introducing 13 hypotheses about causal relations between some socioeconomic and psychological factors on the one hand and tendencies towards or disposal for Islamic Radicalisation on the other. These hypotheses are tested by statistical tests in accordance with our ambition to find out whether there are any obvious causal statistical relations in the first place. Due to the fact that many variations are not captured by causality tests, we future elaborate on the findings by more comprehensive descriptions of the data connected to the test of the specific hypotheses.

Being part of an European study on the character of and the variations between different countries (that is France, the UK and Italy) with regard to the question of radical Islamism, that is carried within the umbrella of CIR by it's specific focus on medium sized European cities, we have included a study of the character of Radical Islamism in Aarhus, the second largest city in Denmark and a medium sized city. This case study illustrates how the pattern differs from the general nation wide pattern that we establish on the basis of the whole survey population. It is important for us to mention that the number of those identified as Group 4 (that is those respondents with the most expressive tendencies towards Radical Islamism) in Aarhus is not large enough to justify such a specific focus, but it has been our obligation to do so. Saying that, it is also important for us to mention that, having taken into consideration the limitation of the number of the respondents in Aarhus, this study nevertheless brings about some very important findings that made us more cautious in drawing general conclusions.

Another important issue is the question of independent and dependent variables. When discussing the phenomenon of Radical Islamism, we found it very important to reconsider these aspects: With regard to socioeconomic factors it is justifiable to focus on whether income, education, housing, and similar factors have any impact on tendencies towards Radical Islamism. Having stated that, we believe it is to go too far to conclude that a statistical relation, if such is found, really means a causal relation. On the other hand, when we discuss the aspects of values and preferences with regard to alternative hypothetical value and action priorities, it is rather difficult to say, that the selected value and action priorities have any impact on the tendencies towards affiliations with Radical Islamic values and action scenarios. Following the construction of Group 4 (The most Radical Islamist) we found that it is the other way around: It is the affiliation with the Radical Islamic worldview that shapes the individual's preferences among values and actions introduced to the respondents as alternative options. This also goes for the case study of Aarhus.

Chapter 5, Results, also includes the results from our qualitative interviews with 40 respondents (Imams and other experts, young Muslims and civil servants), that on the one hand confronts these actors with the findings of our survey results on motivation, values

and behaviour of Radical Muslims, and on the other hand investigates the strategies these actors find proper in order to combat the process of Islamic Radicalisation.

The concluding chapter (Chapter 6) sums up the findings from this study and presents some relevant perspective on the core questions of this study and the character of the needed future research in the area of Home-grown Islamic Radicalisation.

The appendices provide more detailed information and documentation on the following:

1. Conducting the telephone interviews
2. Detailed distribution of respondents according to Zip-code
3. Logistic Regression analysis of selected variables (N=1,113) -Dependent Variable: Belonging to Radicalised Group 4
4. Logistic regression analysis of demographic variables.
5. Detailed tables on National origin distribution* Group Cross tabulation
6. Detailed tables gender distribution* Group Cross tabulation

2. Methodology, Data Collection and the Data

In order to empirically identify the content of the concept "Islamic Radicalisation", the motivating factors, the values adopted through the process of Islamic Radicalisation and the behavioural preferences (selected action scenarios among those introduced) of those who affiliate with and support them, besides the desk studies, we designed the collection of data to contain three interrelated elements in chronological phases:

1. **In-depth explorative interviews.** The first step was to find out what ideas about the content of the concept "Islamic Radicalisation", the motivating factors, values adopted and behavioural preferences that were commonly shared among experts/stakeholder and those individuals who in some way are in touch with the phenomenon. We conducted explorative interviews with 8 individual experts:

1 Imam

1 academic with special knowledge of Islam, but not in touch with radicalisation process on a practical level

2 young Muslims (who potentially could be among the survey population with regard to age and religious identification)

1 social worker

1 sociologist

1 leader of a "moderate" Islamic organisation and

1 psychologist, who through her practice is confronted by the challenges of Islamic Radicalisation.

Theses interviews were semi-structured circulating on the respondents' perspectives on the concept of Islamic Radicalisation, motivating factors, values adopted and behaviours of young Muslims, who in some way associate themselves with *radical Islamic interpretations of Islam* that each and every one of the interviewees had defined to begin with. Besides identifying the four aspects above, in the process of meaning condensation, we paid specific attention to what generalised ideas the interviewees expressed with regard to causal relations; e.g. what they think motivates Islamic Radicalisation among youth. Many ideas were represented, among which we chose the most widespread hypotheses through a meaning condensation process: We found that a majority of the experts/stakeholders mentioned the following as the most important motivating factors: Lack of Integration, Exclusion, Lack of social capital, Poverty, Birth order, Lack of Cultural Capital, Experience of discrimination, Lack of experiences of cross ethnic intimate relation, Philanthropic orientation and experiences of the political and public suppression of their religious identity.

The knowledge produced by these semi structured qualitative interviews, was thematically organised and further elaborated on through a process of meaning condensation around the core themes of the study. Ideas about casual relations were elaborated on further to hypotheses to be tested and to structure the main categories and questions of the nationwide survey.

2. **A Nationwide representative survey** Based on the findings in the explorative interviews (supported and complemented by desk studies – described in chapter 3) we developed the main categories in the survey that were elaborated on further in an operational manner and then scaled. The survey contains 108 questions, about a third of which clarify the socioeconomic background of the individual respondents. The vast majority of the remaining questions, addressing values, behavioural preferences, religiosity, are scaled explicitly, and very few of them, that were not scalable, followed the same scaling premises, in an implicit manner. One of the very few, implicitly scaled questions is: What individual public personality does the respondent think of as the best representative of true Islam? Another one is: What country or organisation in the world does the respondent think is representing true Islam? With regard to both the individual as well as countries and organisations, the scale goes from the most non religious /secular to the most radical, for instance Iran, the Taliban and Al-Qaida represent the most radical, while countries like Turkey represent the opposite end.

The survey was carried out in the period of January-March 2009 among 1113 interviewees aged 15-30. The vast majority of the respondents (but not exclusively) are immigrants and descendents with a national origin in countries where Muslims make up the majority of the population, in the public and political Danish debate addressed as "Muslim immigrants". Though we have had stratified certain urban areas of concentration of immigrants and descendents in Copenhagen, Odense and Aarhus, the latest is a part of the European study of radicalisation in medium-sized European cities. A group of 58 converts

that were Muslim, but neither immigrants nor descendants of immigrants has also been included in the study.

The data has been collected through telephone interviews by Catinét Research (Copenhagen, Denmark) in accordance with the specific guidelines and the purpose of the study. The explicit goal of the collection was to reach a population size that was necessary for the data to be representative for the target group with regard to socio-economic variables such as gender, geography, immigrants and descendents, national background etc.

In order to be included in the study as a valid case, the individual respondent, approached randomly by telephone, had to meet two requirements simultaneously: 1. Be between the ages of 15 – 30. 2. Have a national background in one of the countries, that in the public and political debate are categorised as Islamic countries, and therefore in the political and pubic discourse in Denmark are categorised as and addressed to implicitly as well as explicitly as "Muslim immigrants and descendents". We also operated with a 12.5 of non-Muslim respondents e.g. individuals of the same age, who do not profess Islam as their religion. This group has been included as a control group. To be more specific: This is *not* a study of immigrants and their decedents in general, nor is it a study of immigrants' tendencies towards Islamic Radicalisation. This is a study of immigrants with a *Muslim* background between the ages of 15-30 in Denmark. With regard to the question of religion we have departed from an understanding of religious identity as a subjective incident of identification. Individual immigrants of age 15-30 who have a background in a "Muslim country", and according to the political and societal discourse in Denmark are labelled as "Muslim immigrants", but who do not profess Islam as their religion, when being asked; are excluded from the study, as far as they are not included in the control group, because the share has been filled. It means that those individuals who do not profess Islam are excluded at the beginning of the interview, meaning that the interview is stopped if the respondent does not profess Islam. A recent Danish study of integration of immigrants towards "Danish values and norms" containing some of the same national backgrounds as those who are included in our study, indicates that professing Islam among these immigrant groups is as diverse as follows: Turkey 97%, West-Balkan 69%, Iraq 82%, Iran 55%, Pakistan 99%. (Gundelack & Nørregård-Nielsen, 2007: 104). Focusing on Islamic self-identification as the empirical point of departure, our study includes respondents from other countries (than that of the mentioned study) as well, these are: Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ex-Yugoslavia, Lebanon or other Palestinian origin, Stateless Palestinians, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, and Afghanistan.

The inclusion of converts, who are native Danes, in our study underlines the aspect of "self-identification" as a *Muslim* as a requirement for being included in the study. (See appendices 3 and 4 for age and national origin distribution).

The table below shows the share of conducted interviews as a percentage of those approached by phone, which potentially were among the target group based on our empiri-

cal point of departure. The interviews conducted make up 51.26%. (In total a number of 9737 telephone calls were undertaken, of which 7566 failed to reach the target group. The category of "Other" in the table below indicates the character of those calls. For more details see Appendix 1). 48.73% of the *almost* potential target group refused to participate in the survey after being introduced to the purpose of the study; "integration and values". It should be emphasised, however, that those who refused to participate are regarded as *almost* the potential target group due to the fact that they with regard to only one aspect of relevance, namely age, could be included, but we do not know whether they would have met the other requirement (professing Islam) necessary for being included in the survey).[1] They refused to participate after informing us of their age, and being introduced to the purpose of the study, but before informing us whether or not they professed Islam as their religion.

Table 1: Share of conducted interviews as a percentage of those approached by phone

Outcome name	Total calls	Percentage
Connection reached – interview conducted	1113	51.3
Connection reached – interview not conducted due to principal	1058	48.7
Total (potential and actual)	**2171**	**100.0**
Others (Outside target + lack of time (they would not know the purpose of the study)+ number failed after max call + wrong number, person not available etc.)	*7566*	
Total call	9737	

The overall participation rate for the whole population is 51.3%, corresponding to the stratified data collection, with regard to national origin, gender, settlement in specific urban areas of immigrant concentration etc. Tables below show the major socioeconomic distributions:

The structure of the survey: The construction of the survey questions has followed the findings in the explorative interviews with the experts, the operational definition of the concept "Islamic radicalisation" (as follows) and the in-depth review of existing related studies (Desk studies). Besides the questions referring to socioeconomic factors, the survey questions have been structured around three aspects: Motivating factors, values that include both identification and affiliation with Islamic values and radical Islamic values,

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[1] Based on the statistical information provided by the study mentioned above (Gundelach & Nørregård-Nielsen, 2007: 104) with regard to the share of those publically labelled as Muslim immigrants who actually profess Islam as their religion, at least around 20% of those who refused to participate in our survey by referring to principal reasons, and who by the condition 1, that of age, could be included, would be excluded by not fulfilling the second condition for participation in our study, that of professing Islam. That would bring the participation rate among those who meet both conditions to 57%.

and finally behavioural preferences. It should be emphasised that the last category of questions investigating the respondent's behavioural preferences refers to the respondent's *hypothetical* preferences between behavioural options presented to the interviewee, as we do not know whether the respondent actually will act if the options presented to him/her actually occur as a real situation.

3. **In-depth qualitative investigation**: The final part of the study includes 40 qualitative interviews with 3 categories of respondents, (a) Imams and experts, (b) Social workers, teachers, police officers and other civil servants who through their daily work are confronted with the challenges of Islamic radicalisation, and finally (c) young Muslims. Besides the issues of motivation, values and behaviours, we included one more aspect; strategies to combat Islamic Radicalisation of "Muslim Immigrants": These interviews were also semi-structured, as we tried to get answers to the question of "What should be done to prevent Islamic radicalisation among youths?"

3. The Data – a General Overview

Now before going any further, let us have an overview of the survey population:

Nearly ¼ of the survey population reside in Copenhagen municipality. Table 2 shows the geographic distribution of the survey population across the country. The numbers as well as the shares indicated in the table are aggregations of several different localities (in the data distributed with accordance to postal code. (See appendix for more detailed information).

With regard to national origin, the survey population is divided as indicated in Table 3. There are representatives with regard to the size of immigrants with specific national origin, e.g. immigrants with a national origin in Turkey, who make up a relatively larger share among immigrants in general in Denmark. They are also represented by approximately as large a share in the survey population.

Table 2 Residential area?

Copenhagen		260
		23.3%
Frederiksberg		30
		2.6%
Odense		67
		6%
Århus		90
		8%
Municipalities West of Copenhagen (except for Høje Taastrup)		128
		11.5%
Municipalities North of Copenhagen		67
		6%
Høje-Taastrup		41
		3.7%
Municipalities South of Copenhagen		68
		6%
Northern Zealand		31
		2.7%
Other areas in Zealand (Except for Kalundborg)		89
		8%
Kalundborg		7
		0.6%
Fyn (Except for Odense)		10
		0.9%
South Jutland		90
		8%
Mid-Jutland (Except for Århus)		66
		6%
North Jutland		51
		4.5%
Other Municipalities		11
		10%
No idea[a]		7
		0.6%
Total		1113
		100,0%

a. The respondent is not aware or would not give information on the postal code or the area he/she lives in.

Table 3 National Background distribution

Denmark	Count	59
	% within Group	5.3%
Turkey	Count	239
	% within Group	21.5%
Somalia	Count	58
	% within Group	5.2%
Pakistan	Count	100
	% within Group	9.0%
Yugoslavia (form. Rep.)[a]	Count	130
	% within Group	11.7%
Iraq	Count	207
	% within Group	18.6%
Iran	Count	51
	% within Group	4.6%
Lebanon / Palestine	Count	122
	% within Group	11.0%
Palestine / Stateless	Count	37
	% within Group	3.3%
Tunisia	Count	6
	% within Group	.5%
Morocco	Count	41
	% within Group	3.7%
Algeria	Count	4
	% within Group	.4%
Afghanistan	Count	59
	% within Group	5.3%
Count		1113
% within Group		100.0%

a. The national background includes Bosnia-Herzegovina (the majority of this group 99 individuals 8.2% of the total population, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia-Montenegro, Serbia).

With regard to the age distribution (Table 4), we operated with 5 categories in order to create sufficient numbers (and shares) that could give us the possibility of analysing across age differences. The majority of the respondents in the first two categories would be under education, whereas the majority of the last three age categories would be working, available for Active Labour Market, Active Social policies or on early pension.

Table 4 Age distribution

	15-17 Year	Count	232
		% within Group	20.8%
	18-20 Year	Count	232
		% within Group	20.8%
	21-24 Year	Count	273
		% within Group	24.5%
	25-27 Year	Count	152
		% within Group	13.7%
	28-30 Year	Count	224
		% within Group	20.1%
Total		Count	1113
		% within Group	100.0%

The gender distribution (Table 5) corresponds to the gender distribution among the general population.

Table 5 Gender distribution

	Male	Count	544
		% within Group	48.9%
	Female	Count	569
		% within Group	51.1%
Total		Count	1113
		% within Group	100.0%

Table 6 shows the occupational distribution of the survey population. The majority of the respondents (60%) are occupied with different kinds of studies (for more details see the following table on education). This is due to the age stratification of the survey population.

A respondent would be asked what kind of education he/she was following at the moment. Table 7 shows the distribution.

The majority of "the Muslims by birth" immigrants in Denmark originate from countries where Sunni Islam is more widespread. Table 8, indicating the distribution among the main branches of Islam, e.g. Shia and Sunni, indicates the difference. 17.7% profess Shia Islam, while 52.3% profess Sunni Islam, and 17.2% identify themselves with other branches of Islam. 12.9% of the population profess other (non-Islam) religions, do not profess any religion or would not give information about their religious attitudes.

Table 6 Occupation distribution

Self-employed	Count		32
	% within Group		2.9%
Blue collar	Count		111
	% within Group		10.0%
Unskilled worker	Count		86
	% within Group		7.7%
Skilled worker	Count		119
	% within Group		10.7%
Unemployed	Count		46
	% within Group		4.1%
Students (all kind)	Count		668
	% within Group		60.0%
Others	% within Group		4.6%
Total	Count		1113
	% within Group		100.0%

Table 7 Education distribution

Short term education	Count		37
	% within Group		5.5%
Vocational	Count		88
	% within Group		13.2%
Academic	Count		100
	% within Group		15.0%
High school	Count		227
	% within Group		34.0%
Other vocational (hairdresser. auto-mechanic etc.)	Count		40
	% within Group		6.0%
Elementary	Count		19
	% within Group		2.8%
Primary school	Count		141
	% within Group		21.1%
Other	Count		4
	% within Group		2.6%
Total	Count		668
	% within Group		100.0%

Table 8 Professed religion distribution

Islam, Shia	Count		197
	% within Group		17.7%
Islam, Sunni	Count		582
	% within Group		52.3%
Islam. Others	Count		191
	% within Group		17.2%
Catholic	Count		8
	% within Group		.7%
Greek Orthodox /Catholic Orthodox	Count		12
	% within Group		1.1%
Lutheran	Count		4
	% within Group		.4%
Other religions	Count		23
	% within Group		2.1%
No Religion / Atheist	Count		81
	% within Group		7.3%
No idea		Count	15
		% within Group	1.3%
Total	Count		1113

A total of 58 respondents who profess Islam as their religion were not born Muslims, but have converted to Islam. Prior to the conversion, 44.8% of the converts were Lutherans while 55.2% were irreligious or atheists (Table 9).

Table 9 The original religion of the converts – distribution

Lutheran	Count	26
	% within Group	44.8%
Irreligious/Atheist	Count	32
	% within Group	55.2%
Total	Count	58
	% within Group	100.0%

Due to socioeconomic circumstances that characterise living conditions and reasons for leaving the country of origin, a study of values, behaviour and motivation with regard to radicalisation can not ignore what more specific strata the individual respondent belongs to among the general category called "immigrant population". Table 10 indicates the count and percentage of refugees, immigrants and respectively their descendents in the survey population:

Table 10 Came to Denmark as – distribution

Refugee	Count	288
	% within Group	25.9%
Immigrant	Count	188
	% within Group	16.9%
Descendent of Refugee	Count	229
	% within Group	20.6%
Descendent of Immigrant	Count	408
	% within Group	36.7%
Total	Count	1113
	% within Group	100.0%

Another crucial aspect with regard to a stratification of the general category of "immigrant population" is where they have been born. This is due to the widespread idea, that being born in Denmark, compared to being born in one's country of origin and entering Denmark as a refugee or immigrant, all other things being equal would mean better chances for becoming integrated into the so-called Danish values. Table 11 below shows the counts and percentages of different categories with regard to the question of country of birth: Almost half of the survey population were born in their country of their origin, and also nearly half (43.2%) have been born in Denmark.

Table 11 Country of birth – distribution

Country of origin	Count	555
	% within Group	49.9%
Denmark	Count	481
	% within Group	43.2%
3rd country	Count	77
	% within Group	6.9%
Total	Count	1113
	% within Group	100.0%

Looking at the same aspect in a different light, the question of citizenship can be an interesting stratifying factor. Besides indicating a longer residence (due to fulfilling the residential requirements needed to become a Danish national) citizenship status also indicates a higher degree of knowledge about Denmark and supposedly also a higher degree of integration into the so-called Danish values. Table 12 shows the counts and percentages that belong to different categories of citizenship:

Table 12 Citizenship – distribution

Country of origin	Count	245
	% within Group	22.0%
Denmark	Count	644
	% within Group	57.9%
Both	Count	127
	% within Group	11.4%
3. country	Count	23
	% within Group	2.1%
Without citizenship	Count	66
	% within Group	5.9%
No answer	Count	8
	% within Group	.7%
Total	Count	1113
	% within Group	100.0%

The majority of the survey population (69.3%) are Danish nationals, of which a minority of 11.4% are both nationals of Denmark and nationals of their country of origin.

Table 13 Income (after tax and housing expenses) – distribution

> 0 (Negative income)	Count	8
	% within Group	1.4%
0	Count	19
	% within Group	3.3%
Between 0 – 3.700 kr.	Count	202
	% within Group	35.0%
Between 3.700 – 6.100 kr.	Count	143
	% within Group	24.8%
Between 6.100 – 7.200	Count	62
	% within Group	10.7%
Between 7.200 – 10.000	Count	60
	% within Group	10.4%
< 10.000 kr.	Count	83
	% within Group	14.4%
Total	Count	577
	% within Group	100.0%

The level of an individual's income has been traditionally linked to the question of attitude. In Denmark as in many other countries, the level of income, as it is usually linked to the level of education and economic success or failure, has also been considered as an indicator of integration and adaptation of values, as well as membership of closed and loose

socioeconomic ties. Table 13 indicates the distribution of the survey population among different levels of income: The categories have on the other hand been defined alongside the borders that usually are used to determine degrees of poverty in Denmark with regard to absolute poverty, and different categories of budget-based definitions of poverty: As indicated in the table, the total number N is 577, indicating that the income table only includes those who are economically self-sufficient.

Owning your own flat or house in Denmark usually indicates some kind of economic wealth. Looking at residential status, with regard to the question of whether the respondents own or rent the place in which they live, and whether it is a house or a flat, (houses are usually more expensive than flats) the survey population is stratified according to the pattern in Table 14.

Table 14 Housing – distribution

Rented flat	Count	773
	% within Group	69.5%
Rented house	Count	45
	% within Group	4.0%
Own flat	Count	52
	% within Group	4.7%
Own house	Count	170
	% within Group	15.3%
Shared own flat	Count	42
	% within Group	3.8%
Shared own house	Count	3
	% within Group	.3%
Other	Count	25
	% within Group	2.2%
No Idea	Count	3
	% within Group	.3%
Total	Count	1113
	% within Group	100.0%

Table 15 Arrested/charged by police – distribution

Yes	Count	138
	% within Group	12.4%
No	Count	968
	% within Group	87.0%
No idea/Will not answer	Count	7
	% within Group	.6%
Total	Count	1113
	% within Group	100.0%

Having children usually means that the individual has established him/her self as a family person. It is usually taken as an expression of the stability that is connected to adulthood, acting responsibility, and lower tendencies towards activities that can bring the safety of close family members in jeopardy. Table 16 shows how the survey population is distributed with regard to whether the respondents have parented children. Nearly ¼ of the respondents have children of their own.

Table 16 Parent of own children – distribution

Yes	Count	263
	% within Group	23.6%
No	Count	848
	% within Group	76.2%
No Idea/ Will not answer	Count	2
	% within Group	.2%
Total	Count	1113
	% within Group	100.0%

Table 17 indicates whether the respondents have experienced the death of their parents. The majority of the respondents have not experienced the death of their parents. Only a very small share of 1.2%, have lost both of their parents.

Table 17 Are both of your parents alive – distribution

Yes	Count	972
	% within Group	87.3%
No. My mother is dead	Count	29
	% within Group	2.6%
No. My father is dead	Count	99
	% within Group	8.9%
No. both are dead	Count	13
	% within Group	1.2%
Total	Count	1113
	% within Group	100.0%

The data also includes an evaluation of the individual respondent's language fluency by the interviewer. Table 18 indicates that the majority of the respondents (that is 83.7%) are completely or almost completely fluent in the Danish language.

Table 18 Danish language fluency (according to the interviewer) – distribution

Completely fluent (no accent)	Count	706
	% within Group	63.4%
Fluent	Count	226
	% within Group	20.3%
A few problems	Count	112
	% within Group	10.1%
Insufficient	Count	42
	% within Group	3.8%
Completely Insufficient	Count	27
	% within Group	2.4%
Total	Count	1113
	% within Group	100.0%

4. The concept of Islamism

Mozaffari (2007) defines Islamism as a complex phenomenon with multiple dimensions and various ramifications. Like other political doctrines, Mozaffari suggests, Islamism, in its contemporary shape, is an 'ideology', a 'movement-organisation' and a 'form of government'. Dealing with totalitarian Islamism (which would be identical to our proposed term "Islamic Radicalism", see our concept elaboration below) Mozaffari defines Islamism as containing four conceptual elements, that in our opinion should be understood as interdependent, in order to be empirically applicable:

Table 19 Radical Islamism – Requirements/Conditions

Requirement	Content
1. Religious ideology	*It is a (regressive[a]) **religious** ideology*: Islamism takes its legitimacy from a *double* source: *ideology* and *religion.* Due to its double character, persuasion of ideological goals and the use of means are perceived, explained and justified as religious duties.
2. Holistic interpretation	*It operates with **a holistic interpretation of Islam*** ('true' Islam' is holistic and embraces all aspects of Muslims' life in eternity). The holism is based on the absolute indivisibility of the trinity *Dîn* [Religion], *Dunya* [Way of life] and *Dawla* [Government].
3. Goal-Hegemony:	Its ultimate goal is **the conquest of the world**: Allah promised the regency on the earth to His 'virtuous servants', as claimed in the Qur'an:
4. Mean legitimating	To fulfil that goal, **all means are legitimate**.

a. Referring to Zeen Sternhell, (1982) Mozaffari defines Ideology as: '…sets of ideas by which men explain and justify the ends and means of organised social action, with the aim of preserving or reconstructing a given reality'. Mozaffari, then highlights regression as a core character of Islamism, due to its orientation towards the past (*salaf*), the Medina model under Prophet Muhammad as well as the caliphate of the first four caliphs (*Khulafâ al-Râshidûn*). The problem with this element of the definition by Mozaffari is, we believe, the inclusiveness of the definition: that any ideological and/or religious justification of goals and means can be labeled as regressive, including that of liberalism, socialism and democratic action.

4.1 Radical Muslims and others

Mozaffari, we believe, provides a definition that can be empirical applicable, only we find that the features he highlights, in accordance with the discourse dominating the study of home-grown Islamic Radicalisation, are characteristics, as we discuss in the following, *not* for Islamists, but for the category "*Radical Muslims*", that in Mozaffaris terminology would be identical to "Totalitarian Islamists". Mozaffari's lack of a conceptual distinction between Islamists and Totalitarian Islamists (that we in the following will understand as identical to Radical Islamism) will cause confusion when attempting to conduct empirical investigation as well as identify policy implications and certainly when proposing policy recommendations. It is due to the fact, discussed below, that many *Islamists* will disassociate themselves both in theory and practice in a relative but still explicit way from conditions 1 and 2, and in a rather absolute way from requirement/condition number 3 and certainly number 4.[2]

As far as the Muslim youths residing in western countries are concerned, we find – as illustrated in Figure 1, alongside the axes Religiosity and Politicising Islam, 4 categories:

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[2] Islamists and Islamic Radicals are quite often in conflict with each other. The most telling examples are the conflicts between Conservatives and Reformists in contemporary Iran.

Figure 1 Categories

Exploring the proposed categories above we have to pay earnest attention to two specific features:

1. We are not dealing with either/or categories, but more/less, e.g. a respondent's affiliation/association with different values and behavioural options, as far as it is empirically identified in a consistent and comprehensive manner, would give some indication to where on the scale regarding every category, the individual, can be placed.

2. The requirements inspired by Mozaffari (described previously) only deal with one category in the figure, namely the category of Islamist – Radical Muslims. The very precondition of doing so is that requirements are empirically applicable beforehand.

The consequence of the empirical focus of the study at hand is that we are only interested in identifying motivational factors, values associated with and tendencies towards certain behavioural options that are (can be) connected to Radical Islamism. Doing so, we would be able to find out whether or not respondents demonstrate tendencies toward radical Islamism. As long as they do not associate themselves with those values and behavioural priorities, they would be categorised as Seculars, but we would not be able to establish where on the secular scale they could be placed.

1. **The Seculars**: The seculars are Muslims by birth and/or belief, though they do not practice Islam in their daily lives, and they do not think that Islamic identity, whatever that might mean, is to be considered as a social relevant role. To put it in Banton's *operationalisation* of socially relevant and social irrelevant roles (Banton 1994), they would insist on the *relevance* or *irrelevance* of their religion in social relation, many would find it as an expression of discriminatory labelling.) Secular in our categorisation does not necessarily mean integrated, as it is usually understood – as the precondition- in the Danish context, they can be marginalised from different spheres of the societal life, and at the same time integrated culturally, as well as they can be marginalised and even hostile to the values of the host society, and at the same time be integrated in the major sphere of societal activities, e.g. labour market participation. (Rezaei and Goli, 2008). Putting it in a Merton ter-

minology they can even be those who resign from both the dominant goals and norms of the society, while at the same time not inclining to Islamic goals and values. The category Secular here indicates only that they do not associate themselves with a (Islamic) religious identity.

2. **Fundamentalists**: Are Muslims by birth and/or belief, and attitude. They associate themselves with an interpretation of Islam as a peaceful religion oriented towards changing the individual and civil society in an Islamic manner, not by all means, but through active disassociation, which is not the same as civil disobedience that is an expression of protest, but as an expression of resignation from dominant western goals and certainly means, though not as a protest, but as an expression of identity demarcation. They are conservatives and as such defensive in their attitude; their efforts are concentrated on preserving what they believe are Islamic values, that sometimes are, or are mixed in, expression of national, local and tribal traditions.

3. **Rebellious**: They are hostile to the society's goals and means (to put it in Merton's categories) and use Islam as a channel rather than practicing Islam at an individual level.

4. **Islamists/Radical Muslims**: This category contains two different sub-categories: **Islamists** are those who work for the establishment of an Islamic society and Islamic government by lawful means and do not submit to hostile attitudes toward society. **Radical Muslims** on the other hand are hostile and would not hesitate to take advantage of any means to reach their goal. They do not differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate means.

Our empirical investigation, specifically our survey provides opportunities for the indepth study of all 4 groups. Our concern and the empirical focus of this particular study however, is the sub-division of Radical Muslims.

By "Radicalisation" we refer to a *sociological phenomenon*; a *process* where individuals in concert adopt to an uncompromising attitude and affiliation towards a political doctrine, ideological framework or religious idea, and certain perspectives or principles in politics. The word *Radical* refers to root (Latin: *radix*, root), and although being appreciated as contextual, and also contested, it refers to political orientation towards preservation of the basics, the fundament, the essence of a framework, or in a situation characterised by the lack of it, to affiliate with and support efforts in any way that serves to recreate harmony between the fundamental ideas and reality. In other words: "changes at the roots".

Radicalisation is a double-edged sword, conservative (when in power) and revolutionary (when in opposition). Being sociological by nature and an expression of social identity, being both the cause (of something) and the effect (of others) like any other sociological phenomenon, being the independent variable and the dependent variable at the same time, it can't be created, maintained and reproduced and live on in total isolation.

What is Islamic Radicalisation then? The concept, in short, refers to a radical interpretation of Islam. But what does *A Radical Interpretation of Islam* mean? What are the complica-

tions, and more importantly; how can we establish the existence of a "Radical Attitude towards Islam" on macro, meso and micro level?

Dealing with the phenomenon as a sociological one, disassociating it from an understanding of *a priori*, and attempting to develop an *analytically* applicable definition, we emphasise that both the definitions and the institutional and practical consequences of words are subject to change politically, socially, and cognitively. Seen as a sociological phenomenon, this is of importance, and that is to our best of knowledge something that has not yet been done, which in the overall theoretical perspective is laid down on the phenomenon. As far as we can see by now, there can be 3 competing and completely different theoretical views:

The first is the perspective and the framework that traditionally has characterised the understanding of social problems and deviances in the universal welfare models, like the one in Denmark. In this perspective, social problems and deviances are considered objectively existing and the belief is that they are created, maintained and developed as the result of the lack of proper satisfaction of absolute and/or relative needs: The structure of the specific society in market economy allocate material, social and psychological resources, goods and services unevenly among social groups and individuals. As far as the government fails to bring about a sense and an experience of safety, equality and justice across socio-economic groups in society, social problems and deviances will be created, maintained and developed. The golden key to resolving social problems is an equality creating allocation and distribution of resources (Allardt, 1975, Duus and Stig, 1980, Scocozza, 1972).

This Scandinavian framework with its focus on the *national* universal welfare state, we believe, produces a certain perception on and certain hypotheses about deviances including that of home-grown Islamic radicalisation, as effects of the lack of economic capital, social capital and cultural capital, as a product of not-to-have, not-to love (and be loved) and not-to-be, which is the lack of self-esteem.

The second perspective is the Deviance perspective presented by Merton (1938), which is framed in relation to structural inequality at a national level. Addressing the challenges of *Home-grown* Radical Islamism which is quite new in history of Radical Islamism, as instances of deviance and anomy, would require, as our study will show, framing it in a structural inequality in a global perspective. Turning back to Merton, some individuals deviate/disassociate themselves from the social norms, and both the norms and the deviance are objectively existing. There are 3 major modes of deviance: One occurs when certain individuals alone or in concert try to achieve the socially appreciated goals (material affluence, social prestige, power etc.) through unaccepted/illegitimate innovative means (Merton, 1938). The second mode of deviance occurs when certain individuals and collectives resign, so to speak, from the competition; they withdraw or disassociate themselves from the appreciation of the goals as desired, but they do not develop other oppositional

values instead. They keep doing what they have to do – almost as a ritual. The third mode of deviance occurs when certain individual alone or in concert actually set up oppositional goals and means instead of those appreciated by the society.

By freeing the perspective of deviance and anomy from the national and welfare state framework and linking the discussion to more fundamental values of the society at hand and it's institutionalised norms of behaviour, (goals and means and the definition of "the good life"), this perspective, we believe, though never specifically and explicitly connected to the study of home-grown Islamic radicalisation, provides a wider room for more comprehensive elaboration on why home-grown radical Islamism, as an instance of deviance occurs in post-modern societies in the age of globalisation, also as an instance of deeper and broader expression of symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 1969).

The third perspective, social constructivism, suggests that social problems and deviances too do not exist objectively; rather, they exist and are reproduced as discursive constructs, as far as the society in general name them as social problems or (tolerable or intolerable) deviances, because some groups, be it political parties, media, interest organisations, etc. benefit from creating them as constructs. Once created, they develop a certain kind of inertia, which contributes to the reproduction of them and the reality they address (The Thomas Theorem). First of all through rejection and secondly by those marginalised accepting/taking over the outsider identity and developing it in opposition to the majority around value conflicts (Goffman 1963).

Needless to say, that departing from these theoretical perspectives would generate hypotheses on causes relations as well as justify focus that are very different from those presented earlier.

Home-grown Islamic Radicalisation as a concept or phenomenon is, we believe, somehow an exception due to its quite globalised nature. Sociological theories on social problems and even less so with regard to anomy and deviance, that conceptually and empirically involve the aspect of globalisation, are rather poor at this stage. The need for sociological theories of the Globalisation era is overwhelming (Bauman 2000). There is no doubt in our minds that a fully satisfactory understanding of the sociological phenomenon home-grown Islamic Radicalisation in the West should in a much higher degree involve this aspect.

But so far, while we are waiting for a more comprehensive and empirically testable (theoretical) proposition on the phenomenon, we can establish the following:

Like any other sociological phenomenon, home-grown Islamic Radicalisation is **Contextual;** it is specific to contexts such as the national one and others in which it is produced, activated and understood. It is **Situational;** it refers to the experiences of those people who are subject to those definitional and operational categories (Thomas 2002). It is **Gradual;** the character, the scope, the intensity and the implications and applications of it change and have different meanings and consequences depending on, among other fac-

tors, time, space and balance of power. And finally it is **Conditional;** it refers to the actual practice of formal and informal intuitions as a formal or informal response to the structural need of the national interest, be it political, geopolitical, economical, cultural or societal, in the era of globalisation.

Taking these complicated circumstances into consideration, the question is: How can we agree upon a definition, preferably an operational one, of a concept that has been in use in so many years with so many connotations? (Mozaffari 2009)

Efforts to develop such an empirically applicable glossary have been organised around the premise of furthering a convergence, a common ground, rather than deepening the instances of divergence within a European context. The research team's common understanding has been that words and terms are political, social, historical and cognitive constructions serving the fulfilment of certain needs of different countries and are subject to ongoing conceptual development and redefinition.

4.2 Secular, Fundamentalist, Islamist, Radical Muslim

To make sure that we don't mix up Islamic religiosity with Islamism or even worse, with home-grown Islamic radicalisation it has been crucial for us to distinguish between a "secular", a "Fundamentalist", an "Islamist" and a "Radical Muslim". At the same time we have to be aware that we, while we are dealing with those concepts as categories, we actually deal with theoretical constructs or ideals:

A "Secular" Muslim, in its broadest sense, is a Muslim by birth believing in rational reasoning and pragmatic problem solving as the only legitimate source with regard to making decisions, specifically political ones.

A "Fundamentalist" is not necessarily an "Islamist".

An "Islamist" is not necessarily "Radical".

A "Radical Muslim" is not necessarily a "Fundamentalist" in the strict sense of the word.

Table 20 Type of Muslim

Type	Field of relevance				
	Individual	Inter-Personal	Civil society	National politics	Global politics
Secular	?				
Rebellious				X	X
Fundamentalist	X	X	X		
Islamist	?	?	?	X	
Radical Muslim	X	X	X	X	X

Conceptual clarification and also empirical evidence reveal that Islamists are not typically revolutionary, as far as the overturning of an existing political structure *by all means* is concerned. They can be reformists – seeking to change the status quo into an Islamic state of art, they might on the surface share that goal with Radical Muslims, but they differ from them by not adopting and not legitimising overt and covert violence. Instead they might be involved in overt efforts and legally organised activities: And their ideal Islamic state does not look like the one that Radical Muslims imagine. Islamists emphasise compromises and peaceful coexistence and freedom of belief as the core features of Islam, while radical Muslims follow the opposite.

An Islamist can have (and usually has) a very different interpretation of Islam in an essential way, rather than taking the Quran and Sunna literary, they emphasise not the word of Sharia, but the purpose of it. They rely on the dynamics of Jihad and see no conflict between Islam and modernity. They will work for the establishment and development of an Islamic civil society, in accordance with Islamic ethical and moral prescriptions. The arena for the religious activity is far beyond the Mosque. While religion for a radical Muslim is mainly a private matter as it is a matter involving the individual and one's family matter and also a precondition for community building, an Islamist will explicitly emphasise the social dimension and be more insistent on the political mission of the ideology of Islam, but highlighting the purpose of the sharia and not the word of it. Islam and Sharia can be understood as a political and societal project rather than a description of religious duties.

Islamists are more adaptive to new circumstances; they can, in the relative sense of the word, be progressive, and they can easily adapt to and take advantage of the democratic system and the political opportunity structures it offers, the scientific development and they can accept (also political) pluralism, they can be tolerant in many ways, acting rationally and pragmatically and respecting the boundaries of rational choices. Islamists, in this way, can represent a peaceful interpretation of Islam and the Quran; they would understand Sunna and the Quran as contextual and not absolute, once for ever description of rights and duties, rights and wrongs.

Radicalised Muslims are more conservative with regards to many issues, e.g. the gender question, as they are opposed to women's equal and unconditional participation in the societal and political life. An Islamist, on the contrary, would appreciate the role of women in the society, not to forget their role in actions, targeted providing support for the movement, whatever that might be: Both Islamists and many, specifically the home-grown, Radical Muslims in the west agree that women can study, and have the right to work, only radical Muslims will incline to the idea that they should do so while simultaneously upholding a full Hijab. Both Islamists and Radical Muslims include women's associations. You can be a good Islamist without a full Hijab, and without a beard, but you can not be a Radical Muslim without a full Hijab and beard, unless a temporary violation of prescription on Hijab and prohibition on shaving or other forbidden acts "harams" is legitimised as the expression of the principal of Taghiyah/ dissimulation, cconcealing the

beliefs in accordance with the principal, that the goal, under specific circumstances, legitimates the means.

Being a "Radical Muslim" (in its extreme variation as those involved in the 9/11 attacks) is a radical, collective state of mind, a state of values and principals, a state of behaviour and finally a state of action. They can be more or less reluctant to act against Islamic moral and ethical code, if it is necessary to do so in pursuit of the higher goal. That is the establishment of the Islamic hegemony. A Radical Muslim, defined alongside these parameters, advocates for certain ideas and thoughts. He would prefer certain values over others, and he would act in accordance with those preferred values, so that he/she continuously approaches the state of a "righteous Muslim". Without that image he would lose legitimacy. Becoming a radical Muslim in values, behaviour and priorities requires efforts to achieve knowledge on those values and behavioural prescription. It is therefore justifiable to assume, that a radical Muslim's knowledge about Islam is greater than those who are not interested in knowing what is right or wrong according to the Quran and Sunna. Taking into consideration the many different competing perceptions of Islam, and the many contesting schools and interpretations within each and every one of them, on the other hand, there are at least as many models for the socially constructed perceptions of a 'righteous Muslim'. But there are many similarities too, above which we find knowledge of right and wrong, taking the script literally, and evaluating different aspects of life in accordance with sharia, on the top.

A Radical Muslim departs from, operates with reference to and makes explicit efforts to impose a very strict and rigid 'by the book'- interpretation of Sharia, the Quran and Sunna on the society, like the Taliban did when in power in Afghanistan and the hardliners in the Iranian government are doing contemporarily.

In a democracy with a rather open political opportunity structure, the Radical Muslim would most probably prefer to exit, like a fundamentalist would, though for different reasons, a radical Muslim's exit is a protest, while a fundamentalist's exit is an expression of resignation. A Secular and an Islamist would most probably prefer voice e.g. participation, also here due to different reasons: The secular would do so to play the game by the rules, while an islamist would do so as an effort to change the rules to some extent. The secular would use the common good and interest as the point of reference, while the Islamist would explicitly use the "Islamic good" as the point of reference. In cases where the religious belonging has been politicised, and the religious identity is imposed on certain groups, and where ethnicity and religiosity are considered socially relevant factors, (Banton 1994, Goli & Rezaei 2007) like that of Denmark, the situation can be completely different; the Secular would choose to exit, or an explicit and comprehensive disassociation with religion and ethnicity, while the Islamist would prefer voice and the Radical Muslim would prefer exit. Islamists are involved in local politics, while Radical Muslims are involved in a global battle on right and wrong, just and unjust, as defined in a religious terminology.

4.3 A common understanding?

In spite of all the differences, however, a certain understanding of Islamism has been developed in western literature, and recently in western politics, referring to quite different phenomena like the Islamic revolution in Iran, FIS in Algeria, Hamas and Hezbollah, Islamic Brotherhood in Egypt, Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Menhaj Ul Quran, Al Qaida and Taliban in Afghanistan, and many other organisations, networks and countries as well as Muslim intellectuals, revolutionary figures like Muhammad Iqbal, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Abul Ala Maududi, Sayyid Qutb and Ayatollah Khomeini. What do these different phenomena hold in common?

Searching for that answer leads us to the concept of Islamism (Arabic: *al-ʾislāmiyya*), defined as a set of ideologies holding that Islam is not only a religion but also a political system; that modern Muslims must return to their roots of their religion, and unite politically. At the centre of the concept of Islamism, as it is understood generally in the West, is the enforcement of Sharia, of pan-Islamic political unity; and of the elimination of non-Muslims, particularly western, military, economic, political, social, or cultural influences in the Muslim world, which they believe to be incompatible with Islam.

There are several fundamental problems with this definition. Just to mention a few:

The desire of going back to the roots can be common, but the interpretation of the roots can be very different.

The desire to establish the *Islamic Ideal State* can be common, but the image of the Islamic state and the Islamic society is not the same across the categories.

The desire to establish the *Islamic Ideal State* and society can be common, but there are major conflicts on what means should be taken in use to make it happen.

On the other hand Islamism also refers to a certain interpretation of the concept "The good life" and "Muslim identity and value politics". Islamism at its most extreme case (that is equivalent to the category of a Radical Muslim in the following) is considered to be a militant, anti-democratic movement, bearing a holistic vision of Islam whose final aim is the restoration of the Medina Model or the caliphate.

According to an Islamist, Islam is not only a religion, but a complete political programme for structuring the entire society at the macro level, containing civil and criminal low principles for the government and governance and a coherent economic system. At the civil society level it is a moral code and contains certain binding instructions for social, political and personal life, monitored and upheld by active social control as a major supplementary to the efforts of the government, when not in government, and by state control when they have the political power. It also refers to a certain definition of obligations and rights for the citizenship in the Muslim community, the Ummah[8]. It also indicates an active assertion and promotion of beliefs, prescriptions, laws or policies that are held to be Islamic in character.

It is nevertheless crucial to keep in mind, when attempting to make the definition to empirically applicable categories that Islamism on the other hand is not by definition hostile to western powers, or to western societies. At least two forms of Islamism can be distinguished, as far as the foreign policy of western countries and the hostile attitude is concerned: "…*We normally use the term "Islamist" to refer to Muslims who draw upon the beliefs, symbols, and language of Islam to inspire, shape and animate political activity. We do not automatically seek to exclude moderate, tolerant, peaceful Islamists who seek to apply their religious values to domestic political problems and foreign policy. We do, however, object strongly to Islamists who preach intolerance and espouse violence in the domestic and international arenas. Extremists in the Middle East as elsewhere can be secular as well as religious.*"[3]

5. Results

Answering the first empirical question we departed from the definition suggested by Mozaffari (2007): In order to be categorised as a Radical Muslim, the individual in question should fulfil 4 requirements:

1. Advocate for Islam as a religious ideology.

2. Join the interpretation of Islam as holistic, distinguishing between true and false Islam, acknowledging Islam as binding prescription for activities in Din [Religion], Dunya [Way of life] and Dawla [Government].

3. Submit the idea that the final goal of Islam is to conquest the entire world.

4. Agree that fulfilling that end legitimises the use of any means, including violence.

Let us be aware of the random nature of the data that, in our case, is the premise when one gathers data by asking the individual respondent a large number of questions for almost an hour. And let us not hesitate to draw conclusions. For example, if you consider any respondent who has selected the most radical response-option presented to him/her for *any* specific *single* question, whatever that question might be, the risk of drawing that kind of conclusion is overwhelming and actually a temptation: Let us take a brief look at the question in our survey: "What should a Muslim do, confronting with a "holy warrior"/"a terrorist" on the run, knocking on his/her door in the midnight, asking for shelter?":

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[3] (U.S. Department of State – 96/05/08 Address: Robert Pelletreau on Muslim Politics of Middle East Bureau of Near East Affairs (http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/bureaus/nea/960508PelletreauMuslim.html).

Table 21 Testing (Elaborating on pitfalls)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid percent	Cumulative percent
It is one o'clock at night. The doorbell rings. Outside is a holy warrior on the run from the police. He wants housing for one night. What should a Muslim person do?					
Valid	Close the door and say no thanks.	165	14.8	17.0	17.0
	Close the door and call the police	122	11.0	12.6	29.6
	Offer him housing and ask no further questions	**160**	**14.4**	16.5	46.1
	Offer him housing and try to convince him to go to the police	214	19.2	22.1	68.1
	Give him housing and call the police	71	6.4	7.3	75.5
	No idea	238	21.4	24.5	100.0
	Total	970	87.2	100.0	
Missing	System	143	12.8		
Total		1113	100.0		

In spite of the statistical distribution shown in the table that *obviously* indicates that 160 respondents or just about 15% of the population recommend "giving shelter to the holy warrior and asking no further questions", we believe that this table does not reveal any basis for the conclusion that just about 15% of the Muslim population age 15-30 in Denmark are sympathetic or supportive to Muslim terrorists, who are, we believe, to be examples par excellence with regard to fulfilment of the 4 conditions set up by Mozaffari. The selection of the most extreme response option could actually be an instance of protest, indicating that the respondent actually is a "rebellious" rather than an individual who actually is supportive of radical Muslims. In order to establish whether the selected response option could justifiably categorise the individual respondent as supportive of radical Muslims we need to first reduce as much as possible of the risk of concluding wrongly by widening and deepening the empirical basis and we can only do that by searching for and empirically establishing a certain degree of coherence in the patterns of responses given by respondents. The question is how do we do that?

5.1. The Construction of the group "Radical Muslims"

Through a process of refinement and elaboration, and just to begin with, we put (and later in data analysis process picked up) 10 questions that among their response-options included the most radical statements. We operated with a scale ranging from "Totally disagree to totally agree", and only picked up the group of totally agree or the equivalent

among response options. Respondents, who totally agreed with or joined the most radical response options, otherwise in a minimum of 6 out of 10 of cases, were categorised as "respondents with Radical Islamic tendencies". The questions and the most radical response options are presented in Table 22.

Table 22 First effort towards categorisation

To what degree do you agree or disagree with this statement: "If a Muslim turns his/her back on Islam by converting to another religion it is all right to kill him/her according to the Sharia"?	*Totally agree*
The publishing of the Mohammed cartoons led to a comprehensive crisis in Denmark and abroad as well as raising the awareness of Islamic identity. To what degree do you agree or disagree with this statement: "I considered travelling to an occupied Muslim country to fight for Islam"?	*Totally agree*
Do you agree in the statement that a true Muslim is a person who is willing to sacrifice his/her life in armed fight for Islam?	*Totally agree*
Do you agree in the statement that a true Muslim is a person who assists Mujahidin in their armed fight against the infidels?	*Totally agree*
Who in your opinion represents Islam the best in Denmark?	*Hizbut Tahrir / The terror detainees from Vollsmose[a]*
What country or group do you think represents the true Islam globally?	*-Taliban* *- Al Qaida[a]*
To aid the establishment of an Islamic state one should…	*- Expel the infidels by force* *- It can be necessary to use force and weapon[a]*
If the majority of the citizens in a country are Muslims would it be justifiable to institute Sharia and abolish democracy, and consequently submit the public will to the law of Allah?	*Yes[a]*
Question 1: When is it both legitimate and correct according to Islam for a Muslim to resort to weapon? Question 2: Do you experience that Islam is endangered or under attack currently?	*When Islam Is in Danger* *Yes[a]*
It is one o'clock at night. The doorbell rings. Outside is a holy warrior on the run from the police. He wants housing for one night. What should the Muslim person do?	*Offer him housing and ask no further questions*

a. We had categorized presented options on a scale ranging from the most secular to the most radical Muslims.

In order to categorise the whole population in groups and at the same time control the above mentioned observation we included 8 more questions that contain Islamist response options, and afterwards we made a rating: The most radical response options, de-

fined as sympathising with militant attitudes got the score of 5, the ones that were less than this received a 4, and those response options that are associated with "political Islam" or just dissatisfaction with the state of art in the world, without necessarily including support of Islamic militant tendencies received a score of 3 (Table 23). For accuracy's sake we should emphasise that the response options presented in the second column of the table are only the response options (in the original table only one or a few among many other ranging from the most neutral to most radical options[4]) that are rated. Considered as an ideal type, (non-existent in reality according to the definition but purposeful in comparisons) respondents with non-tendencies towards radical Islamism or Islamism would score 0 point.

On the opposite side a respondent with 100% radical Islamic tendencies would score 74 (the total score available). We operated with the idea that these extreme poles represent "ideal types" in the very definition of the concept, as it is rather impossible for a respondent to stay 100% clear through a telephone interview that lasts about an hour.

In multi response option questions only the highest score is counted in the single individual respondent's total score. Numbers in parentheses ( ) in column 5 (Score) in Table 23 represent other scores usually as indicators for the respondent's tendency towards a political interpretation of Islam, not taken as an indicator for Radical Islamism.

The questions and selected options are categorised in 2 categories according to their quality. The first category of questions and the respective point-giving response options is the Attitude Category. This category contains questions and the selected response options in the table (81, 82, 84, 90, 91, 98, 100, 101, 104 and 107). By selecting the presented response options in these questions the individual respondent can score a maximum of 35 points. The quality of these questions and the respective response options taken into consideration, even obtaining the absolute maximum of points does not reveal any indications of tendencies towards Radical Islamism in accordance with our operational definition presented before. It would express the *attitudes* of the single respondents, without letting us to know why they have those attitudes. It can be the expression of a general dissatisfaction with the state of art, tendencies toward conspiracy theories or something entirely different. By investigating the pattern of selected response options by individual respondents, we found, that even those who selected the most extreme response options in category one (Attitude Category) actually hesitated to select the most extreme response options in Category 2 (The Hypothetical Action Preferences). This category contains response options in questions 83, 85, 96, 97, 99, 102, 105 and 109).

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[4] For more details see Appendix 5

Table 23 A comprehensive effort towards identification of Radical Muslims

Req.[a)]	Question	Alternative options?	Point giving selected option	Score
1	What is your opinion on Jihad?	Presented	"Jihad means to go to war for Islam when it is attacked by infidels." "Jihad means at prepare for war and to spread Islam by the power of weapon."	(3) **4**
1	Do you think that Muslims should involve themselves in politics?	Presented	Yes, but as Muslims	**3**
2	What do you think of Sharia?	Presented	"Sharia should be followed literary, always and everywhere. All Muslim countries should implement it."	**4**
2	If there was a country that was ruled fully Islamic on the basis of a literary interpretation of Sharia, would you settle down there?	Presented	Yes	**4**
2	Do you think that Islam and Democracy can be combined	Presented	No	**4**
2	If the majority of the citizens in a country are Muslims would it be justifiable to institute Sharia and abolish democracy? Consequently submit the public will to the law of God?	Presented	Totally agree	**4**
3	Have any of following incidents made you consider your religious perspective?	Presented	**Israel-/Gaza conflict** Iran's nuclear program Guantanamo	**3** (3) (3)
3	To what degree do you agree or disagree with this statement: "Radicalisation has got nothing to do with Denmark, but is due to the suppression of Islam by the West".	Presented –	**Totally agree**	**3**
3	Who in your opinions stood behind the attack on the Twin Towers and Pentagon (9/11-2001)?	Not-presented	**Israel** Mossad	**3** (3)
3	When is it, in your opinion, both legitimate and correct according to Islam for a Muslim to resort to weapon?	Presented	When Islam is in danger	**3**

Req	Question		Answer	Points
3	What was the American invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan about in your opinion	Not-presented	The West wants to own and rule the whole world	**4**
			The West thinks its own culture is better than all the others	(3)
4	The publishing of the Mohammed cartoons led to a comprehensive crisis in Denmark and abroad as well as raising the awareness of Islamic identity. To what degree do you agree or disagree with this statement: "I consider travelling to an occupied Muslim country to fight for Islam"?	Presented –	**Totally agree**	**5**
4	To aid the establishment of an Islamic state one should	Presented	Expel the infidels by all means/forces	**5**
4	Do you agree in the statement that: "A true Muslim is a person who is willing to sacrifice his/her life in armed fight for Islam?" "A true Muslim is a person who assists Mujahidin in their armed fight against the infidels?"	Presented –	**Totally agree** **Totally agree**	**5** (5)
4	Who in your opinion represents Islam best in Denmark?	Presented	Hizb-Ut-Tahrir The terror detainees from Vollsmose	(4) **5**
4	What country or group do you think represents the true Islam globally?	Not presented	**Al-Qaida** The Taliban Hizb-Ut-Tahrir Hamas	**5** (4) (4) (3)
4	Do you experience that Islam is endangered or under attack currently?	Presented	Yes Islam is in danger	**5**
4	It is one o'clock at night. The doorbell rings. Outside is a holy warrior on the run from the police. He wants housing this single night. What ought the Muslim person to do?	Presented	Offer him housing and ask no further questions	**5**
Max point				**74**

a. Req. as the label of this column refers to the 4 requirements outlined before presupposed to be met in order to be supportive of Radical Islamic values and behavioural priorities, namely: Req. 1. Religious Ideology. Req. 2. Holsitic Interpretation. 3. Global Hegemony (of Islam) and Req. 4. Mean legitimating.

According to our categorisation we found that in order to get 40 points the individual respondent should select at least 7 response options that give 5 points or a combination of response options containing a quite large share of 5's, that are the most Islamic radical response options presented.

By in-depth investigation of the distributions at hand, we find that a majority of the respondents (Group 1) selected some of these response options in a very inconsistent way. We decided that these respondents demonstrated no or very low degree of attitudes that could be linked to Islamist, radical or radical Islamist tendencies. Those whose scores are between 15 and 24 are more consistent in their selection of responses connected to a radical Islamist worldview, but they are still far from a degree of consistency that could justify categorising them as Radical Islamists. Taking into consideration that all respective respondents actually have selected one or some (in multi response option questions) it means that they have selected some other response options that are completely dissociative with Islamist or Radical Islamist attitudes and preferences.

In the following we see the scoreboard, the number of respondents for each and every point, and how we categorised them into 4 groups, ranging from Least Radical /Non radical (Group 1) to Most Radical (Group 4). In order to be categorised in Group 4 (those with the highest degree of association with radical views of Islam) the individual respondent must show a very high degree of coherence in his/her attitude and preferences among the presented response options. Attention should also be drawn to the methodological problem of borderlines like in any other process of categorisation in survey studies that also exists here. It takes quite a bit more in-depth studies to establish the exact differences between for instance those respondents who score 39 and those who score 41 points. Saying that, we emphasise that without a certain kind of coherence in Muslim radical attitudes and behavioural preferences, it is impossible for the individual respondent to score 40 points.

We find that the vast majority of the respondents, that is Group 1 and 2 make up 852 or 76.5% of the population, while Group 3 make up 17.8%, and a much smaller percentage of the population, that is 5.6% are identified as associative and supportive of radical Islamic worldview.

The table provides two types of information; one is how many respondents that are categorised in different groups. The other is the degree of radicalisation; this information is specifically interesting when we through significance analysis attempt to establish what segments of the population, demographic or socio-economic group, demonstrates the highest degree (and not number or share) of radicalisation.

Table 24 Respondents divided alongside the scale of Islamic Radicalisation

Group 1 (The Non-Radical Muslims), Group 4 (The Most Radical Muslims) and the groups in between.

Score	Number of respondents	Number of individuals composing the group	Group name
0	23		
3	41		
4	21		
5	74		
6	24		**Group 1**
7	19	**551**	**Non-Radical Muslims (and others)** (Respon-
8	84	**(49.4%)**	dents in this category express almost no affilia-
9	47		tion with The Radical Islamic World view)
10	32		
11	54		
12	60		
13	42		
14	30		
15	44		
16	47		
17	36		**Group 2**
18	41		**The Least Radical Muslims**
19	23	**301**	(Respondents in this category express some
20	17	**(27%)**	opinions that are categorised as Islamic values
21	27		and worldviews.– They can be more fundamen-
22	21		talist in the sense of taking their religious belief
23	20		more seriously)
24	25		
25	25		**Group 3**
26	16		**The affiliated**
27	25		(Respondents in this category express more
28	18		tendencies toward Islamism, but not conse-
29	12		quently toward Radical Islamism. Some of these
30	11	**198**	respondents are probably more of Rebellious (in
31	21	**(18%)**	Figure 1) feeling harmed by what they experi-
32	14		ence as global discursive pressure on Islam, but
33	10		not inclining to Radical Islamism). They are
34	6		sympathetic to Radical Islamism but they do not
35	8		support it.

36	7		
37	10		
38	7		
39	8		
40	10		
41	10		
42	2		**Group 4**
43	5		**The Most Radical Muslims**
44	1		(Respondents in this category express Radical
45	4		Islamic views in terms of expressive, explicit
46	4		and consistent affiliation with and support for
47	2		militant radical Muslim groups) *
48	4		
49	4		
50	1	**63**	
51	4	**(5.6%)***	
52	1		_____
54	2		*This group makes up 5.6% of the whole survey
56	2		population. If one excludes 143 respondents or
57	1		12.8% that is the control group, Group 4 will make
63	1		up 6.5% of 970 respondents that profess Islam as
64	1		their religion.
66	1		Taken into consideration that the control group re-
71	2		spondents are almost exclusively categorised in
74	1		Group 1, and the focus of this study on Group 4, we
			decided to proceed with a group 4 containing 5.6% of
			the whole population.)
Grand Total	**1113**	1113	All Groups

Controlling the Group Categorisation

We have controlled the categorisation presented above in two different ways:

1. In order to be categorised as supportive to the most radical views of *Islam* we find that the basic precondition should be professing Islam as one's religion. In other words it would be very much unlikely to find respondents who do not profess Islam as their religion but at the same time are supportive of those values and behavioural priorities associated with the radical Islam. Another way of controlling is the Table below that shows the distribution of religious profession on the one hand and group categorisation on the other.

2. According to our operational definition elaborated on the basis of Mozaffari's suggested conceptual definition, the clear indication, that the individual respondent, in

order to associate with and be supportive of the Radical Islamic values and worldview and be able to advocate for the preference system with regard to behavioural options, the individual must have the knowledge of issues that are directly related to political Islam. There are many issues that can be related to Political Islam and to Radical Islam, but there can hardly be any disagreement on following core issues:

Dar-Ul-Harb is the concept opposite to "Dar-Ul-Islam, two areas demarcated from each other. Dar-Ul-Harb is the area (house) of war, where the infidels live, whereas Dar-Ul-Islam is the area (house) of peace, where the true believers live. This is the very core of the idea to divide the world between Muslims and Non Muslims.[5]

The battle of Badr stands as a tremendous milestone and symbolic monument in the Radical Muslims warfare, due to the belief that God sent 1000 angels to assist the Mujahidin who were underdogs in the battle, and helped them defeat an army that in number and equipment far exceeded the Muslim army.

Ummah: The whole idea of dividing the world in Dar-Ul-Islam and Dar-Ul-Harb, and the efforts that are to be made to establish the Pan Islamic Community has the concept of Ummah, the cross-ethnic and cross-national community of Muslims at the centre of it.

The charter of Medina: At the op of the scenarios for establishing the Islamic government is the way Mohammad governed the society of Medina according to the charter of Medina, Sahifat-al-Medina.

Hijab and other obligations: You cannot and will not be regarded and accepted as a true Muslim, if you as a female do not act in accordance with the prescription on wearing a Hijab. This is only one of the overt symbols to be evaluated on first sight. In order to be supportive to the worldview of radical Islam you cannot ignore the principal of Hijab. On the other hand wearing a Hijab is not in any way an indication of Radical Islam, which goes for many other prescriptions as well.

Arabic language: Arabic is the language of Allah and of the Quran, perceived among Muslims as the perfect expression of the perfect language. In order to adopt the worldviews of Islam, the individual Muslim should make efforts to understand the Qu-

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[5] DAR-UL-HARB. "Abode of War." A land ruled by infidels that might, through war, become the "Abode of Islam," DAR-UL-ISLAM. "Abode of Islam." A country where Islamic laws are followed and the ruler is a Muslim. (Columbia Online dictionary, http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00islamlinks/ikram/glossary.html. There is only one place on earth which can be called the home of Islam (Dar-ul-Islam), and it is that place where the Islamic state is established and the Shari[1]ah is the authority and God's limits are observed, and where all the Muslims administer the affairs of the state with mutual consultation. The rest of the world is the home of hostility (Dar-ul-Harb). A Muslim can have only two possible relations with Dar-ul-Harb: peace with a contractual agreement, or war. A country with which there is a treaty will not be considered the home of Islam. (Syed Qutb; A Muslim's Nationality and His Belief. – http://www.islaam.com/Article.aspx?id=257).

ran. Like the aspect of Hijab, making this effort is not necessarily an indication of a movement towards adopting a Radical Islamic worldview in and of itself, but (compared to Fundamentalist Muslims, who read the Quran without necessarily being concerned with whether or not they understand the words they read, and compared to the seculars who are not concerned with reading the Quran at all) efforts towards Radical Islam presuppose an understanding of the Quran.

Taliban: The Taliban in Afghanistan as one of the most expressive manifestations of Radical Islam and an organisation that arranges training for those interested in taking part in the battle for Islam, is a phenomenon that presumably is more known among those who follow the international battle that involves Radical Muslims.

In the following we first investigate the first control aspect by looking at whether respondents, who do not profess Islam as their religion, are represented in Group 4. The larger representation of this category of respondents in Group 4, the less valid our categorisation would be.

We find that none of respondents who profess other religions are represented in Group 4, the most radical Muslims. That also goes for their representation in Group 3, with some tendencies towards affiliation for the radical Islamic worldview. Even when we look at Group 2, we find only a very small share of these respondents that are almost exclusively respondents who do not profess any religion. A great majority of these respondents are categorised in Group 1, indicating that they do not share the Radical Islamic worldview.

Table 25 Religion and affiliation with Radical Islamic values and behaviour.

		Group				Total
		1	2	3	4	
Islam, Shia	Count	72	73	50	2	197
	% within Group	13.1%	24.3%	25.3%	3.2%	17.7%
Islam, Sunni	Count	266	148	124	44	582
	% within Group	48.3%	49.2%	62.6%	69.8%	52.3%
Islam, Other	Count	101	50	23	17	191
	% within Group	18.3%	16.6%	11.6%	27.0%	17.2%
Catholic	Count	8	0	0	0	8
	% within Group	1.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.7%
Greek Catholic/Orthodox	Count	12	0	0	0	12
	% within Group	2.2%	.0%	.0%	.0%	1.1%
Lutheran	Count	4	0	0	0	4
	% within Group	.7%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.4%
Other	Count	19	4	0	0	23
	% within Group	3.4%	1.3%	.0%	.0%	2.1%
Non / Atheist	Count	58	22	1	0	81
	% within Group	10.5%	7.3%	.5%	.0%	7.3%
No Answer	Count	11	4	0	0	15
	% within Group	2.0%	1.3%	.0%	.0%	1.3%
Total	Count	551	301	198	63	1113
	% within Group	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Controlling for the categorisation by looking at whether or not there is a relation between the extents of knowledge had on issues directly related to Radical Islam, we find the following distribution:

Table 26 Knowledge of issues related to Radical Islamism * Groups – Cross tabulation

Questions	Correct answer among options presented		Group				Total[a]
			1	2	3	4	
Dar-Ul-Harb" is a core concept for dividing the world in Islam, but what does it mean?	The house of war, or the infidels' area	Count	63	39	53	32	187
		% within Group	11.4%	13.0%	26.8%	50.8%	16.8%
In which battle did God send 1000 angels to assist Muslims?	Badr	Count	47	45	74	30	196
		% within Group	8.5%	15.0%	37.4%	47.6%	17.6%
What does Ummah mean?	Ummah is the Muslim community that every Muslim regardless of language, race, etc. is a member of.	Count	123	108	104	51	386
		% within Group	22.3%	35.9%	52.5%	81.0%	34.7%
What was the Medina Constitution (Dustur-al-Medina or Sahifat-al-Medina)?	An agreement on rights and duties among different faiths and people in Medina under Mohammad.	Count	53	28	31	21	133
		% within Group	9.6%	9.3%	15.7%	33.3%	11.9%
Do you wear Hijab (Female respondents)[b]?	Yes. Fully	Count	74	30	44	10	158
		% within Group	28.5%	21.1%	41.9%	66.7%	30.3%
Which of following languages would you like to master fluently, if you only had one option?	Arabic	Count	118	105	85	41	349
		% within Group	21.4%	34.9%	42.9%	65.1%	31.4%
What does the word Taliban mean? (Options not given)	Someone who study Islam/attend a Quran school	Count	36	21	15	13	66
		% within Group	6.5%	7.0%	7.6%	20.7%	5.9%

a. The column's total represents the total number of correct answers to the specific question, and the correct answers as the average percentage for the correct answers to the question.
b. Asked only to females that identifies themselves as Muslims (N=522).

Departing from the definition presented by Mozaffari, introduced above, Islamists (in our terminology Radical Muslims) believe in Islam not only as a religious faith, and individual duty, but a coherent and more importantly extroverted ideology based on a certain worldview. Changing the surroundings and the world to an Islamic state of art bears in itself the notion of a holistic character and a prescription for development of identity. We found that in order for our categorisation to be consistent with the operational definition (presented above) the logical expectation to be met would be: The Radical Muslims'

knowledge of core issues and concepts related to political and Radical Islam would exceed that of other groups. We would retreat from categorising those respondents as Radical Muslims, if this expectation was not fulfilled. Certain questions (with multiple response options) in the survey addressed this aspect. In other words as we move from the left end of the scale (Secular Muslims) to the right end (Radical Muslims) knowledge and the awareness of the core issues related to Islamism and Radical Islamism would increase. Below we present the result of our investigation:

The following Pearson test indicates clearly that that there is a relationship between the knowledge of issues associated to Radical Islam on the one hand and what groups the respondents have been categorised in.

Table 27 Chi Square tests Knowledge of Issues related to Radical Islamism * Groups

Pearson χ^2	Value	Number of degrees of freedom	Significance (2-sided)
Dar-Ul-Harb" is a core concept for dividing the world in Islam, but what does it mean?	174.26	18	<0.001
In which battle did God sent 1000 angels to assist Muslims?	204.31	15	<0.001
What does Ummah mean?	188.09	15	<0.001
Do you wear Hijab (Female respondents)[a)]?	34.91	9	<0.001
Which of following languages would you like to master fluently, If you only had one option?	114.72	24	<0.001
What was the Medina Constitution (Dustur-al-Medina or Sahifat-al-Medina)?			<0.001
What does the word Taliban mean? (Options not given)	50.73	24	<0.005

a. Asked only to females who identify themselves as Muslims. (N=522)

What we observe in the table is the following:

Group 4 respondents, not only select the right response options consequently, and at a far higher rate, but we can observe an upward sloping curve beginning with the lowest degree of correct responses selected by Group 1 and the highest degree of correct responses by Group 4 in almost 100% of the cases. Based on this observation, we concluded that our categorisation is empirically correct.

Following the construction/identification of the group "Most Radical Muslims" or Young Radical Muslims among the survey population, we could now test the hypothesis introduced above.

5.2. A Group-specific Data Overview

In the following we take a closer look at correlations between some socioeconomic background variables on the one hand and Group representations on the other. We should emphasise that at this stage we do not attempt, due to the complexity of the phenomenon as we argued before, to establish causal relations, but find incidents of over- and underrepresentation. (Dealing with the widespread hypotheses in the next chapter we attempt to test the presumed causal relations.)

Geographic

Nearly ¼ of the respondents in Group 4 (23.8% of the most radical young Muslims) reside in Copenhagen municipality, but young radical Muslims make up only 5.7% of the all the respondents that live in this municipality. The second relatively highest share of young radical Muslims (Group 4) is represented by Høje Tåstrup, a suburb to Copenhagen, with 14.3% of all young radical Muslims, which is 22% of all the respondents from this area. Number 3 on the list is Gladsaxe, also a suburb to Copenhagen, and they make up 7.9% of all respondents in Group 4, or approximately 21% of respondents from Gladsaxe. Next is Aarhus, the second largest city in Denmark, exceeded only by Copenhagen. Respondents from this area categorised in Group 4 make up 9.5% of this group's population. In other words: 6.6% of respondents from Aarhus are categorised in Group 4. Respondents from Odense, the third largest city in Denmark, make up 3.2% of all respondents in Group 4. They make up nearly 3% of respondents from this area. Also respondents from Kalundborg municipality make up 3% of all respondents in Group 4, but at the same time, due to the fact that the absolute number of respondents from this city is much lower than the others, they make up a rather large share of these respondents; that is to say 28.5% of young Muslims (respondents) from Kalundborg are categorised in Group 4.

These 6 areas represent 61.9% of all respondents in Group 4 (N=63).The remaining 38.1% are distributed throughout the country.

Male and female respondents respectively make up 48.9% and 51.1% of the survey population (N=1113). Male respondents are overrepresented in Group 4; they make up 76.2% of this Group's population, and females make up the remaining 23.8% of the group.

Table 28 Gender And Group distribution

			Group				Total
Gender			**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**Total**
	Male	Count	252	152	92	48	544
		% within Group	45.7%	50.5%	46.5%	76.2%	48.9%
	Female	Count	299	149	106	15	569
		% within Group	54.3%	49.5%	53.5%	23.8%	51.1%
Total		Count	551	301	198	63	1113
		% within Group	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 29 Age And Group distribution

			Group				Total
			1	2	3	4	Total
Age	15-17 Year	Count	101	70	54	7	232
		% within Group	18.3%	23.3%	27.3%	11.1%	20.8%
	18-20 Year	Count	101	74	44	13	232
		% within Group	18.3%	24.6%	22.2%	20.6%	20.8%
	21-24 Year	Count	129	65	55	24	273
		% within Group	23.4%	21.6%	27.8%	38.1%	24.5%
	25-27 Year	Count	93	36	17	6	152
		% within Group	16.9%	12.0%	8.6%	9.5%	13.7%
	28-30 Year	Count	127	56	28	13	224
		% within Group	23.0%	18.6%	14.1%	20.6%	20.1%
Total		Count	551	301	198	63	1113
		% within Group	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Looking at the distribution of ages across the groups, a relatively large share of respondents in Group 4 is made up of individuals between the ages of 21-24 years. Another interesting phenomenon is that respondents aged between 15-17 years old, make up a rather small minority (11.1%) and they are strongly underrepresented in this in Group 4.

In the following we take a closer look at the backgrounds of the respondents and their group categorisation:

Table 30 "Came to Denmark as …" & Group distribution:

| | | Group | | | | |
		1	2	3	4	Total
Refugee	Count	143	75	52	18	288
	% within Group	26.0%	24.9%	26.3%	28.6%	25.9%
Immigrant	Count	87	54	33	14	188
	% within Group	15.8%	17.9%	16.7%	22.2%	16.9%
Descendent of refugees	Count	112	72	39	6	229
	% within Group	20.3%	23.9%	19.7%	9.5%	20.6%
Descendent of Immigrants	Count	209	100	74	25	408
	% within Group	37.9%	33.2%	37.4%	39.7%	36.7%
Total	Count	551	301	198	63	1113
	% within Group	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

25.9% of the respondents came to the country as refugees, 16.9% came as immigrants, 20.6% are children of refugees and 36.7 are children of immigrants: It seems that refugees and especially children of refugees are relatively underrepresented in Group 4. On the other hand we observe that respondents who are immigrants are relatively overrepresented.

National background and groups

Looking at the distribution of respondents in Group 4 across national backgrounds, data indicates that respondents that are originally from Turkey are a bit overrepresented (they make up 25% of the respondents in Group 4, while they are 21.5% of the survey population.

One relatively overrepresented group is respondents with Somali national backgrounds: They make up 5.2% of all respondents, but make up 11.1% of the population in Group 4.

Respondents from Bosnia Herzegovina are heavily underrepresented in Group 4: They make up 8.9% of all respondents but only 1.6% among individuals in Group 4. Individuals with Iraqi national backgrounds are also strongly underrepresented in Group 4: They make up 18.7% of the total population, but only 7.9% of the respondents in Group 4.

The national backgrounds Lebanese and Stateless Palestinian are on the other hand overrepresented, while individuals with Moroccan national backgrounds are strongly underrepresented.

Table 31 National background and Group distribution

		Group				Total
		1	2	3	4	
Denmark	Count	38	6	9	6	59
	% within Group	6,9%	2.0%	4.5%	9.5%	5.3%
Turkey	Count	122	64	37	16	239
	% within Group	22.1%	21.3%	18.7%	25.4%	21.5%
Somalia	Count	13	18	20	7	58
	% within Group	2.4%	6.0%	10.1%	11.1%	5.2%
Pakistan	Count	49	30	16	5	100
	% within Group	8.9%	10.0%	8.1%	7.9%	9.0%
Serbia-Montenegro	Count	0	0	1	0	1
	% within Group	.0%	.0%	.5%	.0%	.1%
Croatia	Count	1	1	0	0	2
	% within Group	.2%	.3%	.0%	.0%	.2%
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Count	64	27	7	1	99
	% within Group	11.6%	9.0%	3.5%	1.6%	8.9%
Macedonia	Count	11	3	2	1	17
	% within Group	2.0%	1.0%	1.0%	1.6%	1.5%
Yugoslavia. (ex)	Count	10	0	1	0	11
	% within Group	1.8%	.0%	.5%	.0%	1.0%
Iraq	Count	100	61	41	5	207
	% within Group	18.1%	20.3%	20.7%	7.9%	18.6%
Iran	Count	31	12	5	3	51
	% within Group	5.6%	4.0%	2.5%	4.8%	4.6%
Lebanon / Palestinian origin	Count	38	40	33	11	122
	% within Group	6.9%	13.3%	16.7%	17.5%	11.0%
Other Palestinian / Stateless	Count	16	13	4	4	37
	% within Group	2.9%	4.3%	2.0%	6.3%	3.3%
Tunisia	Count	5	0	1	0	6
	% within Group	.9%	.0%	.5%	.0%	.5%
Morocco	Count	21	7	12	1	41
	% within Group	3.8%	2.3%	6.1%	1.6%	3.7%
Algeria	Count	3	0	1	0	4
	% within Group	.5%	.0%	.5%	.0%	.4%
Afghanistan	Count	29	19	8	3	59
	% within Group	5.3%	6.3%	4.0%	4.8%	5.3%
Total	Count	551	301	198	63	1113
	% within Group	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 32 shows the distribution of converts across the four groups:

Table 32 The converts' previous religious belief & Group distribution

		Group				Total
		1	2	3	4	
Protestant	Count	14	5	4	3	26
	% within Group	37.8%	83.3%	44.4%	50.0%	44.8%
No religion/Atheist	Count	23	1	5	3	32
	% within Group	62.2%	16.7%	55.6%	50.0%	55.2%
Total	Count	37	6	9	6	58
	% within Group	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Converts: 58 respondents, which are in absolute numbers, are converts. 6 of them or 10.3% of all converts are categorised in Group 4, which is a relatively larger share than the average for the whole population (5.6%). Half of the converts would declare themselves as Protestants, the other half atheists prior to the conversion. These two groups make up the same share (3 of each) in Group 4. 12 of the converts did so due to marriage to a Muslim, these respondents make up 12.3% of all respondents in Group 4. 2 other converts in Group 4 converted due to friendship with Muslims.

Education and Labour Market status are dealt with when testing the hypothesis on integration (H1) in the next chapter.

The country of birth & Group distribution

Looking at the table below, first of all we observe no indication that whether one is born in Denmark or abroad plays any role for affiliation with or support for Islamic Radical worldviews and values. On the contrary; respondents that are categorised in Group 4, and are born in Denmark, represent a larger share than they should (in accordance with their representation in the sample).

Table 33 The country of birth & Group distribution

		Group				Total
		1	2	3	4	
Born in the country of origin	Count	290	149	87	29	555
	% within Group	52.6%	49.5%	43.9%	46.0%	49.9%
Born in Denmark	Count	236	127	90	28	481
	% within Group	42.8%	42.2%	45.5%	44.4%	43.2%
Born in 3rd country	Count	25	25	21	6	77
	% within Group	4.5%	8.3%	10.6%	9.5%	6.9%
Total	Count	551	301	198	63	1113
	% within Group	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

These respondents make up 43.2% of the total population, but they make up 44.4% of respondents in Group 4. Respondents that are born in their country of origin, on the other hand, make up a smaller share of respondents in Group 4 than they should. (They represent 49.9% of the total population, but 46.0% of respondents in Group 4. The data also indicates that 10% of respondents in Group 4 have parents that originally come from Denmark.

Citizenship status & Group distribution

With regard to Citizenship status and Group distribution we find the following pattern:

Table 34 Citizenship status & Group distribution

		Group				Total
		1	2	3	4	
The country of origin	Count	123	72	41	9	245
	% within Group	22.3%	23.9%	20.7%	14.3%	22.0%
Denmark	Count	321	165	120	38	644
	% within Group	58.3%	54.8%	60.6%	60.3%	57.9%
Both (Denmark and the country of origin)	Count	58	41	18	10	127
	% within Group	10.5%	13.6%	9.1%	15.9%	11.4%
3rd country	Count	15	5	3	0	23
	% within Group	2.7%	1.7%	1.5%	.0%	2.1%
None	Count	28	17	15	6	66
	% within Group	5.1%	5.6%	7.6%	9.5%	5.9%
No answer	Count	6	1	1	0	8
	% within Group	1.1%	.3%	.5%	.0%	.7%
Total	Count	551	301	198	63	1113
	% within Group	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The striking finding here is that there is no indication of a negative relationship between being a Danish national on the one hand and supporting Radical Islamic worldviews and values. On the contrary; we find that those respondents who are citizens of Denmark are slightly overrepresented in Group 4; those who are supportive of the radical Islamic worldview and values. The finding here is quite consistent with the pattern from before that showed that the children of immigrants are more supportive of Radical Islam than their parents. This is also the case among those with dual citizenship, that of Denmark and that of their country of origin. We also find that those who do not have any formal citizenship are considerably overrepresented in Group 4; they make up 5.9% of the population while they make up 9.5% in Group 4.

Below we investigate whether there is a relationship between disposable income and representation in Group 4.

Table 35 Income after tax and rent & Group distribution

		Group				Total
		1	2	3	4	
> 0 (Negative income)	Count	2	4	1	1	8
	% within Group	.6%	2.5%	1.2%	3.4%	1.4%
0	Count	10	8	1	0	19
	% within Group	3.2%	5.1%	1.2%	.0%	3.3%
Between 0 – 3.700 kr.	Count	107	54	31	10	202
	% within Group	34.5%	34.4%	38.3%	34.5%	35.0%
Between 3.700 – 6.100 kr.	Count	78	35	24	6	143
	% within Group	25.2%	22.3%	29.6%	20.7%	24.8%
Between 6.100 – 7.200	Count	41	13	7	1	62
	% within Group	13.2%	8.3%	8.6%	3.4%	10.7%
Between 7.200 – 10.000	Count	25	22	9	4	60
	% within Group	8.1%	14.0%	11.1%	13.8%	10.4%
< 10.000 kr.	Count	47	21	8	7	83
	% within Group	15.2%	13.4%	9.9%	24.1%	14.4%
Total	Count	310	157	81	29	577
	% within Group	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The data indicates no relationship between income and support for the Radical Islamic worldview. But we observe that the very poor and the very rich (those with the lowest and highest incomes, are overrepresented in Group 4; respectively. We also observe that those with a disposable income of between 6.100 -7.200 Dkr, that could be the middle class income, are strongly underrepresented in Group 4; they make up 10.4% of the survey population while their representation in Group 4 is three times lower compared to a cor-responding representation. Investigating the relation between economic status and repre-sentation in Group 4 with regard to housing we find the following pattern:

Housing

The majority of respondents in Group 4 (82.6%) are either living at home with their par-ents (54.0%) or are married (28.6%).

Table 36 Housing & Group distribution

		Group				Total
		1	2	3	4	
Rented flat	Count	371	204	154	44	773
	% within Group	67.3%	67.8%	77.8%	69.8%	69.5%
Rental house	Count	22	11	10	2	45
	% within Group	4.0%	3.7%	5.1%	3.2%	4.0%
Own flat	Count	29	15	6	2	52
	% within Group	5.3%	5.0%	3.0%	3.2%	4.7%
Own house	Count	92	49	18	11	170
	% within Group	16.7%	16.3%	9.1%	17.5%	15.3%
Shared own flat	Count	22	12	6	2	42
	% within Group	4.0%	4.0%	3.0%	3.2%	3.8%
Shared own house	Count	1	1	0	1	3
	% within Group	.2%	.3%	.0%	1.6%	.3%
Other	Count	13	8	3	1	25
	% within Group	2.4%	2.7%	1.5%	1.6%	2.2%
No Idea	Count	1	1	1	0	3
	% within Group	.2%	.3%	.5%	.0%	.3%
Total	Count	551	301	198	63	1113
	% within Group	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The table indicates no relation.

Having been arrested or charged by the police is an objective experience, on the other hand, regarding the table below, it should be emphasised that it is impossible based on our survey to know what is the cause and what is the effect, e.g. whether affiliation with or support for a Radical Islamic worldview causes more experiences of being arrested or charged or whether it is the other way around. In the following we nevertheless observed a correlation (without knowing the causal direction) between having been arrested or charged by the police on the one hand and the degree of representation in Group 4 on the other.

The table indicates that only a minority of 12.4% of all respondents have the experience of being arrested or charged by the police, but among respondents who are categorised as supportive to an Islamic worldview there is a considerable share of 33.3 (that is every third respondent in this group) who have that experience. Only our data does not provide further information on whether this experience has been taking place prior to the development of the affiliation with and support for Islamic worldview or afterwards.

Table 37 Arrested/Charged by police? & Group distribution

		Group				Total
		1	2	3	4	
Yes	Count	47	40	30	**21**	138
	% within Group	8.5%	13.3%	15.2%	**33.3%**	12.4%
No	Count	501	261	166	**40**	968
	% within Group	90.9%	86.7%	83.8%	**63.5%**	87.0%
No answer	Count	3	0	2	2	7
	% within Group	.5%	.0%	1.0%	3.2%	.6%
Total	Count	551	301	198	63	1113
	% within Group	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

It is usually assumed that becoming a parent is an indication of settling down, that again means lower tendencies towards the extremes, e.g. also Radical Islamic views. The table below clearly indicates that this is not the case:

Table 38 Children of your own ? & Group distribution

		Group				Total
		1	2	3	4	
Yes	Count	148	65	33	17	263
	% within Group	26.9%	21.6%	16.7%	27.0%	23.6%
No	Count	401	236	165	46	848
	% within Group	72.8%	78.4%	83.3%	73.0%	76.2%
No answer	Count	2	0	0	0	2
	% within Group	.4%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.2%
Total	Count	551	301	198	63	1113
	% within Group	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

23.6% of all respondents are parents of children, but they are also represented almost correspondingly in group 4 by 27.0%. The other way around we observe that 76.2% of all respondents do not have children of their own, but they are not overrepresented in Group 4 as the representation of this group also corresponds with their relative representation in group 4.

It is also assumed that the death of very close family members has an impact on tendencies towards extremism, e.g. Radical Islamism. Table 39 indicates no proof for this idea.

Table 39 Are both of your parents alive? & Group distribution

		Group				Total
		1	2	3	4	
Yes	Count	479	264	172	57	972
	% within Group	86.9%	87.7%	86.9%	90.5%	87.3%
No. My mother is dead	Count	13	11	5	0	29
	% within Group	2.4%	3.7%	2.5%	.0%	2.6%
No. My father is dead	Count	51	25	18	5	99
	% within Group	9.3%	8.3%	9.1%	7.9%	8.9%
No. Both are dead	Count	8	1	3	1	13
	% within Group	1.5%	.3%	1.5%	1.6%	1.2%
Total	Count	551	301	198	63	1113
	% within Group	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Finally it is assumed that Islamic Radicalism correlates with (host country) language skills. The table below sheds light on this aspect:

Table 40 Language fluency (by the interviewer) & Group distribution

		Group				Total
		1	2	3	4	
Completely fluent (no accent)	Count	359	183	121	43	706
	% within Group	65.2%	60.8%	61.1%	68.3%	63.4%
Fluent	Count	102	73	39	12	226
	% within Group	18.5%	24.3%	19.7%	19.0%	20.3%
A few problems	Count	60	30	16	6	112
	% within Group	10.9%	10.0%	8.1%	9.5%	10.1%
Insufficient	Count	15	11	15	1	42
	% within Group	2.7%	3.7%	7.6%	1.6%	3.8%
Completely Insufficient	Count	15	4	7	1	27
	% within Group	2.7%	1.3%	3.5%	1.6%	2.4%
Total	Count	551	301	198	63	1113
	% within Group	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The table indicates quite clearly that there is no relation what so ever between language skills and tendencies towards Islamic Radicalisation.

Some of the information elaborated on in this chapter is investigated and tested more comprehensively in the next chapter where we examine the most widespread hypotheses about causal relations.

5.3. Hypotheses

The explorative interviews conducted in our study revealed several widespread ideas about causal relations between a range of phenomena on the one hand and affiliations with and support for a Radical Islamic worldview on the other. Among these ideas were the presumed impacts of:

- The lack of integration into the host society.
- The presumed impacts of their networks.
- The impacts of general dissatisfaction with life.
- Lack of possibilities for socioeconomic mobility, mostly unemployment and lack of finances.
- Experiences of discrimination in general and specifically related to work.
- General dissatisfaction with the state of the art in the international relations, mainly expressed through what respondents labelled as double standards, mainly with regards to the conflicts in the Middle East.
- The Danish public discourse on Islam and Muslims.
- Marginalisation.
- Diaspora.
- Lack of contacts with Danes.

Attempting to strengthen the process of identifying the most widespread hypothesis, and as a supplement to the findings in our explorative interviews, the refinement of Mozafferi's definition, presented above, along with other desk studies, we were inspired by the very recent international study, *"Radicalization, Recruitment and the EU Counter-radicalization Strategy"*[6], that is prepared for the European Commission, and another study on *Home-grown Terrorism and Islamic Radicalisation in Europe* (Precht, 2007). This was due to the fact that we found certain similarities between the ideas that were expressed by the respondents in our explorative investigation and the ideas in these publications, which again were in harmony with theoretical propositions expressed elsewhere.

Reviewing the literature on the issue of Radicalisation written in English, the very recent publication *Radicalization, Recruitment and the EU Counter-radicalization Strategy* presents a model for hypothesis generation and analysing the issue of radicalisation process. The publication suggests three levels specified by some general types of causes and a set of catalysts. Causal factors are categorised into two different axes, distinguishing between factors at the external and internal social and individual level. The international research team involved in this study does not, as a premise, expect that external factors influence

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[6] The publication involves scientists from a range of countries, and is financed by EU-Commission within the Sixth Framework Program with DI Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management (NL) as Co-ordinator and among others the Danish Centre for International Studies and Human Rights (2008). The study methodologically is very reminiscent of the equivalent study *"'Radicalisation in the West: The Homegrown Threat'*, New York City Police Department, 2007.

the process of radicalisation directly but that this relationship is influenced by social and individual causal factors that also as catalysts, subdivided into different dimensions, are manifesting themselves across all three levels. These assumptions are not based on or justified by any inductive empirical investigation, but are articulated on the basis of reviewing publications relevant to the field.

The external factors e.g. Political, Economic and Cultural, exogenous to the individual per definition, shape and constrain the individuals' environment, /the midrange Social Level, where individuals are supposed to have a minor influence on their environment. Social factors, the middle layer, "… *refer to mechanisms that position the individual in relation to relevant others and hence can include people from in-groups as well as out-groups … Identification processes, network dynamics and relative deprivation are examples of dimensions into which social factors can be subdivided*" (ibid.). The third and last layer represents causal factors at the individual level, such as psychological characteristics, personal experiences and rationality.

Among causal factors at different levels the publication suggests: – Poor integration (mentioned as a prominent cause of radicalisation.), e.g. that Muslims are underrepresented in public institutions and organisations, which, hinders identification with such institutions, and that exclusion of groups as entities can likewise instigate negative and aggressive attitudes and behaviours. – Political events are often thought to incubate Muslim Fundamentalism, not only at national or local levels, but also at the international and global levels. – Deprivation and poverty -Discrimination and stigmatisation of their religion. – Globalisation and modernisation facilitating transnational ideological movements and communication – Events that call for revenge or action, such as violence against in-groups, police brutality, and contested elections, but also acts committed by hostile out-groups or compromising speeches by public figures that are intended as provocation. – Lack of social identification. – Psychological characteristics like sensitivity to humiliation, disposal for radicalisation, impulsive personalities, personal emotional experiences,

Methodologically the study is based on 5 well-known selected cases, from the Netherlands and Britain, a presumed leader of the Dutch Hofstad Group, an alleged member of the Hofstad Group, an alleged ring leader of the first London 2005 bombings, and his companion and finally the famous 'shoe bomber'. According to the study the selected cases do not function as empirical tests of the proposed theoretical model, but as a framework to identify the most visible similarities and discrepancies between the different cases of radicalisation.

Ignoring the lack of empirical evidence, the deductive method with the overwhelming risk of what the researcher wants to have confirmed, becoming confirmed, the retrospective method, and finally taken in to consideration, that the five selected cases in the study are all so-called extreme cases, and as such not suitable for concluding anything about similarities, which is the purpose of the study. We've been inspired by the presented

model in the study and some of the conclusions, recommendations on further research and hypothesis, though some more controversial than others.

- The path of radicalisation is individual. (We believe this makes it rather difficult to approach a more comprehensive theory that can be practically applicable.)
- The major focus on psychological factors.
- … that it is hard if not impossible to categorise them into groups with specified social boundaries. Furthermore, research with the intention of profiling specific "ideal types" of individuals, who are more susceptible to enter into violent radicalisation, seems futile.
- Research should be conducted in which the individual and his or her social environment are the central focus of analysis.
- Social identification with allegedly harmed groups is an important indicator of vulnerability to radicalisation. For example, the degree to which people identify themselves with a relevant social group determines the extent to which they are affected by political, economic, and cultural circumstances.
- In other words: it is the perception rather than the objective situation that is relevant in the emergence of radicalisation.
- … young second generation European nationals, who are Muslim and who can be classified as identity-seeking and as high-identifiers with the perception of Muslims around the world being humiliated, who are poorly integrated and politically, socially and culturally marginalised, would as individuals have an incentive to be drawn towards Radical Islamism that is higher than normal.
- …the most important causes of radicalisation are to be found more closely to the individual and his/her direct environment than is often thought.
- Network dynamics (especially group dynamics) appear to play a central role in most processes of radicalisation.
- In this study radical ideologies or radical interpretations of religion are not seen as direct causes of radicalisation. The reason for this is that people differ in the extent to which they are susceptible to or appealed by radical ideologies – only a few of those exposed to radical ideologies become radicalised.
- "Cognitive dissonance: the more a person has 'invested' in a radical group, for instance by breaking with friends and family, the more that person choose to believe that membership of this group is worth it" – implying that radicals become more dedicated to the cause the more links they cut to the surrounding society.

Precht, 2007, in an explorative investigation, elaborating on the basis of the same type of data that empirically speaking is limited to the few most recent terrorist cases in Europe and a review of accessible intelligence information, public investigation, and existing academic literature etc. presents three categories of motivational factors influencing the radicalisation process:

1. Background factors including something he calls Muslim Identity crisis, personal traumas, experience of discrimination, relative deprivation, living environments and peers (segregation and something he calls Parallel society, alienation and perceived injustices, and relative absence of a critical Muslim debate on Islamist terrorism).

2. Trigger factors such as Western foreign policy and single provocative incidents, the myth of Jihad, a desire for activism and finally the presence of a charismatic person or spiritual leader.

3. Opportunity factors: The Mosque, Internet and satellite channels, School, Universities, youth clubs and work, prisons and sporting activities, and finally cafés, bars or bookstores.

It is important for us to emphasise once more, that *none* of these ideas, no matter how widespread they might be, and that includes both those hypotheses about causal relation that are expressed by the experts in our own explorative interviews, and the hypothesis that we have identified as the most widespread in the current international studies on Islamic radicalisation have been elaborated on by empirical research on Islamic radicalisation, also the vast majority of these studies do not actually have "Islamic Radicalisation" as their empirical field of study, but rather have terrorism as their field. Nevertheless we have identified 13 general and more or less widespread ideas about causal relations regarding what motivates attraction to radical Islamism, values and behaviours. These ideas were subjected to empirical investigation in the survey. The hypotheses are:

Table 41 Hypotheses

No.	Parameter	Hypothesis	True/false
H1	Integration	Integration and tendencies toward radical Islamism are correlated negatively.	?
H2	Cross-ethnic intimate relations	Lack of experience of cross-ethnic intimate relations (between immigrant and natives) has a positive impact on tendencies towards radical Islamism.	?
H3	Birth Order	The individual immigrant's birth order correlates somehow with tendencies towards radical Islamism.	?
H4	Psychological profile: Experience of success	The lack of socio-economic success (in terms of job, self-esteem, near death experiences, loneliness, and satisfaction with life) correlate positively with tendencies toward radical Islamism.	?
H5	Social Capital	There is positive relation between distrust and lack of cross-ethnic networks and tendencies towards radical Islamism.	?
H6	Economic capital	Lack of economic capital (in terms of income, savings and affluence) correlate positively with tendencies towards radical Islamism.	?

H7	Cultural capital	Lack of educational merits and lack of cross ethnic interest associations furthers the tendencies towards Islamic radicalism.	?
H8	Discrimination	Experience of discrimination and tendencies towards radical Islamism are correlated positively.	?
H9	Religious attitude and behaviour	Religious knowledge and commitment with regard to faith and praxis and the tendencies towards radical Islamism are correlated positively.	?
H10	Philanthropy and local social engagement	Philanthropic attitude, sense of justice and local social engagement goes hand in hand with tendencies towards radical Islamism among Muslim immigrants.	?
H11	Diaspora	Muslim immigrants become more radical because they miss their homeland	?
H12	Citizenship and belonging	Lack of formal and substantial citizenship furthers tendencies towards radical Islamism.	?
H13	Life form	Life form is somehow correlated to tendencies towards radical Islamism has got: Wage-earners are more disposed for radical Islamism.	?

In order to move further in our empirical investigation, that is attempting to test the presented hypothesises, we have to develop an operational definition of Radical Islamism. The first question is how do we construct the group, if any, of individuals who can be categorised as "Radical Muslims"? The second question is how can we make sure, and control, that the group, if any, is identified correctly?

H1. Integration

"Integration and tendencies towards Radical Islamism are correlated negatively."

Let us be aware that the issue of integration has always been, and still is, contested internationally as well as in a Danish context. Measuring integration is even more so.

The way one deals with the issue not only as a concept, but also as a framework for political action and societal debate, and therefore also the way of measuring it, is of course influenced by the political as well as the scientific discourse that is in operation in the specific contest (time and place). We have, in order to find out whether the degree of integration has anything to do with affiliation or association with Radical Islamism, decided to measure it in terms of the following aspect:

We believe that although none of the following aspects alone can be a denominator or indicator for the integration of an individual or a group, the totality of the following aspects can be taken as influencing the integration: The focus below has been on aspects of cultural integration (the more socio-economic aspects are addressed other places in this study).

Figure 2 Average score of "integration points" by group[a)]

a. All the figures related to hypotheses have been created on the same scoring scale, ordering response options by points. See appendices for an example.

Do the respondents have a spare time job, and if so, is the specific enterprise or office owned by immigrants or natives?

How often do the respondents use the native language (in this case Danish) at work?

How often do the respondents speak the native language (in this case Danish) at home?

How often do the respondents speak/use Danish in their spare time and/or in relation with spare time activities?

Are those persons the individual respondent considers as his/her closest friends natives (Danes) or of an immigrant background?

Does the respondent find it proper that his family members work at a bank, a super market, a Pub or Café, Slaughter house, or in the TV business?

What popular television programmes/series is the respondent viewing?

With regard to local and national elections is a candidate's religious attitude taken into consideration by the respondent when deciding to vote for?

Table 42 Integration * Group – Chi-Square Tests

		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Do you have a leisure time job? * Group	Pearson Chi-Square	6.669a	9	.672
	Likelihood Ratio	6.492	9	.690
	Linear-by-Linear Association	.026	1	.871
How often do you speak Danish at work * Group	Pearson Chi-Square	22.369a	18	.216
How often do you speak Danish at home * Group	Pearson Chi-Square	36.507a	15	.001
How often do you speak Danish in your leisure time (activities) * Group	Pearson Chi-Square	36.453a	15	.002
Are the very best friends of you of Danish or immigrant descent * Group	Pearson Chi-Square	86.342a	15	.000
Do you think it is in contrast with your religion if your relatives or close friends work in:				
A Danish bank* Group	Pearson Chi-Square	123.754a	3	.000
A Danish mall * Group	Pearson Chi-Square	53.025a	3	.000
In a café or a pub * Group	Pearson Chi-Square	139.791a	3	.000
A Danish slaughter house * Group	Pearson Chi-Square	144.243a	3	.000
Anchorman at a Danish Television network * Group	Pearson Chi-Square	21.060a	3	.000
Do you watch the following tv-programmes regularly?				
Krøniken * Group	Pearson Chi-Square	6.195a	3	.102
Matador * Group	Pearson Chi-Square	12.668a	3	.005
Paradise hotel * Group	Pearson Chi-Square	4.756a	3	.191
X-factor * Group	Pearson Chi-Square	10.089a	3	.018
Tv-avisen & Nyhederne * Group	Pearson Chi-Square	14.294a	3	.003
Livvagterne * Group	Pearson Chi-Square	2.341a	3	.505
Nikolaj og Julie * Group	Pearson Chi-Square	12.897a	3	.005
Forbrydelsen * Group	Pearson Chi-Square	3.780a	3	.286
Vild med dans * Group	Pearson Chi-Square	17.367a	3	.001
Hvem vil være millionær * Group	Pearson Chi-Square	.313a	3	.958
Robinson * Group	Pearson Chi-Square	.420a	3	.936

Smagsdommerne * Group	Pearson Chi-Square	2.829[a]	3	.419
Rejseholdet * Group	Pearson Chi-Square	5.905[a]	3	.116
Anna Pihl * Group	Pearson Chi-Square	.357[a]	3	.949
Go'Morgen Danmark * Group	Pearson Chi-Square	4.051[a]	3	.256
None of these * Group	Pearson Chi-Square	.181[a]	3	.981
When you vote for local or national parliament, do you vote for a candidate with a Muslim background? * Group	Pearson Chi-Square	120.990[a]	12	.000

Not all of the respondents have a spare time job. In order to have a spare time job the respondent must usually be a student or under the age of 18. 29.8% of the respondents have a spare time job, of which 3.3% work in enterprises owned by immigrants, and 26.5% work at "Danish" workplaces. There is no considerable difference among the four groups with regard to the share of those who have a spare time job. This was the case regardless of whether they worked at Danish or immigrant workplaces. There are no considerable differences with regard to the share of those who do not have a spare time job in the respective groups either. Data indicates that integration measured by the degree of spare time jobs does not have any impact on Radical Islamic attitudes and affiliations.

With regard to whether the dominant language of the workplace (not necessarily meaning at a spare time job) is Danish or a foreign language, a great majority of the respondents express that they exclusively or almost exclusively speak Danish at their workplace. But this majority is actually (moderately) larger among respondents categorised in Group 4 (66.7%), whereas the equivalent for Group 1 (the opposite end of the Radicalisation scale) is 61.7% – it is even lower for Group 2 (56.5%). At the same time none of the respondents in Group 4 expressed that they never speak Danish at work, whereas very small minorities among other groups actually do. Data indicates that integration measured by the use of the Danish language at the workplace does not have any impact on Radical Islamic attitudes.

As far as the use of the Danish language in the private home is concerned, over half (56.4%) of the population express that they almost exclusively or very often speak Danish at home. 42.9% of Group 4 do so, compared to 61.4% among respondents in Group 1. The tendency to speak Danish at home seems to slope downwards beginning from Group 1 which is the highest.

According to the data, the adaptation and the diffusion of the Danish language in the informal sphere is more widespread among groups other than Group 4.

With regard to the use of the Danish language in relation with spare time jobs and spare time activities there are no differences across the four groups, all around 80%. Data reveals no indication for the impact of the use of language in spare time on Radical affiliations.

With regard to the cross-ethnic close friendships between the respondents and natives, only a minority of 14.2% across the groups exclusively or almost exclusively have friends of Danish descent. Almost none of the respondents in Group 4 say so. It seems that cross-ethnic close friendships with Danes have a downward slope with the highest share being among Group 1. The opposite is the case with regard to close friendships with other immigrants. Here there is an upward sloping curve: 81% of the respondents in Group 4 (compared to 39% among Group 1) have close friendships or relations only with or almost exclusively with other immigrants. Data indicates that close friendships with natives exist among other groups but not among respondents in Group 4.

One indicator of whether the individual immigrant with a Muslim background takes the religious ethical code literally or not, is engagement in professional relations that include physical and mental contact with objects, artefacts or processes that are declared forbidden (haram) in Islam, for instance contact with alcohol, pork, contact with the opposite sex, interest rates /Reba', etc.

The question is whether or not the respondent experiences it as against his/her religion to work in places that are involved in those kinds of relations. Only a tiny minority of 5% of the population have that experience with regard to working in a Danish bank. Looking at the specific groups, though, a large minority of 33.3%, respondents in Group 4 had that experience, compared to only 1.5% of respondents in Group 1. Group 4 members would not work in a Danish bank that operates with Reba' (interest rates). Almost the same pattern characterises the population and groups' attitude towards working in a supermarket (20.6% in group 4 and 2.5% in group 1), the tendency is more expressive with regard to working in a PUB or an alcohol serving café (a majority of 66.7% among Group 4, and 18.9% among group 1 – an upward curve). It is almost the identical pattern with regard to working in a Danish slaughter house, and a much less expressive tendency with regard to working as a journalist on television (12.7% among Group 4, and 2% among Group 1). Data indicates that respondents in Group 4 are considerably uncompromising with regard to engaging in professional activities they experience as being in disharmony with religious prescriptions.

Which popular television programmes/series do the respondents view? Certain popular nationwide TV programmes and series gathers the nation, so to speak, and are often the issue people talk about, mirror themselves with, etc. We looked up the most popular and well-known TV programs during the past 3 years to find out whether the respondents watch them or not. As far as popular TV series with a historical review ("Krønikken", "Matador") are concerned, it seems that there is a downward sloping curve, starting with Group 1 as the highest rate (3 times more – about 15% compared to Group 4 – about 5%), and Group 4 as the lowest. "Vild Med Dans", has viewers of 33% for Group 1 and 11% for Group 4. Other kinds of TV shows that can be categorised as contemporary self-realisation programs are "Paradise Hotel", "Nikolaj og Julie", "Livvagterne", "Robinson", "X-factor" and also, "Anna Pihl", "Smagsdommerne", "Forbrydelsen", "Rejseholdet" and

"Go'morgen Danmark". With these programmes/series there are rather small to no differences at all. It seems that Group 4 is distinct in a positive way from the other groups by rating highest in relation to quiz shows and specifically to news programmes (74.8% for Group 1 and 90.5% for Group 4). All in all it is rather difficult to conclude any significant differences with regard to television preferences across the groups.

Regarding the questions of voting behaviour and religious attitude, data reveals, that individuals categorised in Group 4 are more likely to pay attention to the candidates' Muslim background when deciding to whom to vote for.

 We have an upward sloping curve with 7.8% of respondents in Group 1 and 19% among individuals in Group 4 who say Yes, or partially say Yes to the question.

With regard to possible relations between the respondent's lingual skills (that is fluency in Danish) a majority of respondents, most typical among members of Group 4, are fluent in Danish at a native level (68% in Group 4). The distribution of other levels of lingual fluency shows no significant differences across groups.

Regarding whether or not it is a good or bad idea that immigrants have been concentrated in certain residential urban areas, the dominant discourse, has been that, that sort of concentration (popularly addressed as "ghetto-isation") is a bad idea, due to the idea (not empirically proven) that ghettos hinder integration. Looking at the respondents' attitudes towards this aspect, it is revealed that 30.7% of all respondents find the residential concentration a good or a very good idea. The share of respondents in Group 4 that share this attitude is larger though (38.1%). We can observe an upward sloping curve beginning with the lowest degree of sharing this idea for Group 1 and ending with the highest for Group 4.

H2. Cross-ethnic intimate relations:

"Lack of experience of cross-ethnic intimate relations (between immigrant and natives) has a positive impact on tendencies towards Radical Islamism."

Figure 3 Did you ever have a Danish girlfriend/boyfriend?

About half (47.6%) of the population have had some sort of intimate relation with natives. We should emphasise that we do not know the depth and the length of these sorts of rela-

tions, but we are, on the other hand, talking about emotional and sexual (and not only sexual) relations as the question was: "*Have you ever had a Danish boy/girlfriend*". Rather surprisingly, the data shows that experiences of cross-ethnic intimate relations with native Danes are more widespread among individuals belonging to Group 4 (50.8%) compared to those of Group 3 (29.8%) and for Group 1 (40.1%). The Chi Square test below also indicates that there is a relation.

Table 43 Have you ever had a Danish boy/girlfriend*Group – Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	20.565[a]	6	.002
Likelihood Ratio	21.811	6	.001
Linear-by-Linear Association	.067	1	.796
N of Valid Cases	1113		

a. 2 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.58.

But the surprising element is, as mentioned, that this relation is the opposite of what is usually considered to be correct, in other words the opposite of what the widespread hypotheses indicate:

The scrutiny of this possible relation necessitates more focus and more comprehensive studies where the character of the relation, length of the relation, the experience of the relation and many other factors should be involved. But at this stage we can say that we don't have any empirical evidence to conclude that a lack of intimate relation can have any positive impact on the individual's tendency toward adapting Radical Islamic values.

H3. Birth Order:

"The individual immigrant's birth order correlates somehow with tendencies towards Radical Islamism."

In Group 4, as indicated in Table 44, middle born children make up just above a half of the group population (50.8), which is a slightly larger share than the average of 44.4% would justify. Last born children are also overrepresented 22.2% (compared to the average of 19.2%), but it is probably more striking that the firstborns are obviously underrepresented in Group 4. The Chi-square test below indicates, on the other hand that there is no significant relation:

Table 44 Birth Order * Group – Cross tabulation

		Group				Total
		1	2	3	4	
First born	Count	223	99	66	17	405
	%	40.5%	32.9%	33.3%	27.0%	36.4%
Middle born	Count	227	141	94	32	494
	%	41.2%	46.8%	47.5%	50.8%	44.4%
Last born	Count	101	61	38	14	214
	%	18.3%	20.3%	19.2%	22.2%	19.2%
Total	Count	551	301	198	63	1113
	%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 45 What is your Birth Order * Group

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	8.949[a)]	6	.176
Likelihood Ratio	9.036	6	.172
Linear-by-Linear Association	4.779	1	.029
N of Valid Cases	1113		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 12,11.

To make any further consideration of the Birth Orders possible impact, we need to investigate several combinations and intermediate factors, among them the distribution of age across and within the groups. These factors are investigated in the following:

H4. Psychological profile:

"The lack of socio-economic success (in terms of job, self-esteem, near-death experiences, loneliness, and satisfactory of life) correlates positively with tendencies toward Radical Islamism".

Figure 4 Average score of "psychological profile points" by group

Self-esteem: Looking at the individuals' self-esteem and self-confidence, we asked respondents whether or not he/she experiences him/herself in relation to those educational or professional peer groups.

Only a very small minority of all respondents (2%) feel that they are lower than others, but this share is relatively much larger among respondents in Group 4 (6.3%). Also, the share of respondents in Group 4, who see themselves as good peers, are a bit, though not in any specific way considerably, lower. On the other hand, at the top of the scale, we observe that a relatively larger share of respondents in Group 4 feel that they in general are better than their peers. It could mean that respondents in Group 4 to a higher degree think they are better or worse than their peer groups.

Satisfaction with life in general: Group 4 distinguishes itself from the other groups by a relatively lower "high degree of satisfaction with life in general" – (27% compared to 45.7% for Group 1). Although if we put the categories "satisfied" and "highly satisfied" together, there are almost no remarkable differences. On the other hand a relatively larger share of respondents in Group 4 expresses dissatisfaction with life in general compared to all other groups.

Searching for the reasons: The reasons for dissatisfaction with life in general among respondents can be for a wide range of different reasons. According to our data it is obvious that a rather large share of respondents in Group 4, that is 63.5% (compared to 18.9% for Group 1 and sloping upward from there) express that the authorities and the media's way of dealing with and treating the issue of Islam and Muslims are sources of dissatisfaction.

International conflicts: A majority of respondents in Group 4 (65.1%) mention the Israel/Gaza conflict as a source of dissatisfaction. Furthermore, this share is much lower for respondents in Group 1, sloping upward from here. The same is the case with Iran's Nuclear Programme as a source of dissatisfaction (25% for Group 4 and 2.0% for Group 1) and Guantanamo (50.8% mentioned by Group 4 and only 4.9% mentioned by Group 1). Gang crimes were mentioned by 41.3% of Group 4 and 6.2% of Group 1.

None: Finally the complete opposite tendency is observed with regard to the category "None"; meaning none of the proposed sources; this option were chosen by a majority of 55.9% of respondents in Group 1, sloping downward to 12.7% of respondents in Group 4.

Looking now to the psychological and social experiences among respondents we find:

Leisure-time interests: Respondents in Group 4 have a considerably larger degree of interests that they are occupied with in their spare time (74.6% compared to around 55% for the other groups).

Community lifting activities: Also relatively large shares of respondents in Group 4 are engaged in activities that aim to improve other immigrants' integration and school records (30.2% compared to 20.3% for Group 1, hence an upward sloping curve starting lowest for Group 1).

Near-death experiences: Also a rather large share of respondents in Group 4 (33.3% compared to 9.8% for Group 1, and sloping upward from there) count near-death experiences as a source of dissatisfaction.

Dissatisfaction with own life: The opposite tendency is observed when looking at dissatisfaction with their own lives. 27.0% of the respondents in Group 4 mention dissatisfaction with their own life as a source of general dissatisfaction with life. The equivalent share for Group 1 is only 6.2% (sloping upward from here).

Loneliness: The same tendency with an upward slope is observed when looking at "experience of loneliness" (23.8% of respondents in Group 4 feel lonely and the identical share for Group 1 is three times lower at a rate of only 7.8%, hence also an upward curve here).

Death in the family: A much larger share of respondents in Group 4, just above half of the population (50.8%) in this group, mentions death in the family as a source of dissatisfaction with life, compared to a number that is about three times lower in Group 1, sloping upward from here.

Discrimination: Experience of discrimination in daily life: A much larger share of respondents in Group 4 (36.5%) – compared to only 5.8% in Group 1 experience discrimination in daily life.

Table 46 Psychological profile*Group (Chi Square test)

Aspect	Test	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
General satisfaction with life	Pearson Chi-Square	19.920[a]	15	.175
Leisure time activities you are very good at	Pearson Chi-Square	9.299[a]	3	.026
Engagement in voluntary work in order to further immigrants and descendents integration	Pearson Chi-Square	10.297[a]	6	.113
The cause of dissatisfaction: The authorities' treatment of Muslim population	Pearson Chi-Square	81.988[a]	3	.000
Near-death experience	Pearson Chi-Square	52.821[a]	3	.000
Dissatisfaction with own life	Pearson Chi-Square	38.509[a]	3	.000
Guantanamo	Pearson Chi-Square	124.635[a]	3	.000
Loneliness	Pearson Chi-Square	26.159[a]	3	.000
Death in the family	Pearson Chi-Square	67.048[a]	3	.000
Experience of discrimination	Pearson Chi-Square	65.996[a]	3	.000
Israel-Gaza Conflict	Pearson Chi-Square	155.910[a]	3	.000
Iran's Nuclear program	Pearson Chi-Square	65.854[a]	3	.000

Arrested by police: 12.4 % of respondents have been arrested by the police, and this experience is also distributed rather unevenly across the groups. The share of respondents in Group 4 is actually 4 times bigger than that of Group 1 (8.5 %), and more than twice as big as those of Group 2 and 3.

Putting together this information we see the following pattern: Respondents in Group 4 are dissatisfied with life in general, mainly due to feeling lonely, death in the immediate family, near death experiences and dissatisfaction with their own life, and are more likely to experience discrimination in their daily lives and being arrested by the police than the other groups. But the interesting phenomenon is that they seemingly, in spite of the dissatisfaction and those experiences, have spare time interests more often, and they are more often occupied by social lifting activities targeted towards immigrants that probably paradoxically, could improve immigrants' integration defined as empowerment and socioeconomic mobility. It is rather paradoxical that theses activities and engagements apparently do not lead to a higher degree of satisfaction. This paradox can probably be explained by social indignation that can motivate social action and dissatisfaction at the same time.

H5. Social Capital

There is a positive relation between distrust and lack of cross-ethnic networks and tendencies towards Radical Islamism.

Figure 5 Average score of "social capital points" by group

Measuring the quality and (presupposing that it is measurable as stock and flow) the quantity of social capital is rather complicated. Besides the major conceptual variations on how to define social capital, among others with regard to whether social capital refers to something the individual or collective actor has in its disposal, something that can increase or decrease due to the scope, extent, quality and intensity of the relation at hand (Bordieau 1986). Or it is something embedded in the relation itself, not as a thing that can be owned in traditional use of the word (Coleman 1987). Others focus on certain kinds of functionality of social capital that can be divided into both positive and negative social

capital with regard to whether they improve or hinder the individual actor's attitudes, options and preferences with regard to progress alongside specific paths and the fulfilment of certain goals pined out by society as 'desirable', such as democracy. (Putnam, 1993).

It is however possible to make the concept of social capital into an empirically applicable one, only we have to be aware of the complexity of the concept and that the measurement empirically could and should include many other reflections, categories of activities and attitudes beyond the ones already included in the investigation. There is no doubt, however, that the concept of social capital in its very core refers to Trust (towards institutions and the process in the specific context) and to a relation the individual or collective actor is involved in.

Time spent with friends: There is no difference between groups with regard to the extent of time they spend with friends.

Level of education among friends: Data reveals that a larger percentage of respondents in Group 4 can count close friends with higher education (42.9% for Group 4 compared to 31.9% for Group 1).

Organised sport activities: With regard to membership in organised sport activities, there is a downward sloping curve, though not a very steep one with 11.4% among Group 1 respondents and it is the lowest among Group 4 with 7.9%. On the other hand, there is a larger share (though very small) of the population in Group 4, who are involved in organised sports activities with fellow countrymen, (3.2%) than it is the case for Group 1 (2.0%). The differences across groups with regard to these activities are too small to foster any idea about significance.

Membership in cultural associations with Danes: Very small shares of the whole population (3%) engage themselves in cultural activities with Danes, and none of the respondents in Group 4 are among them. On the other hand it seems that engagement in organised cultural activities in general is low, when looking at engagement in cultural activities with fellow countrymen, only 4.4% of the population across the four groups are engaged in those kinds of activities and there is no difference between the groups.

Membership of religious associations: Here, the picture is quite the opposite: Still only a tiny share of the whole population are members of religious associations, but a very steep and an almost geometrically perfect upward curve is observed, with only 1.3% for Group 1 and 15.9% for Group 4.

Membership in organisations with a focus on social aid and health related matters: We also find here that there is a poor rate of participation of only 3.3% for the whole population, distributed evenly across the four groups. Looking at the equivalent distribution with regard to membership in organisations with fellow countrymen with the same focus, we find an even poorer participation (1.3% for the whole population, of which a relatively

larger share is to be found among respondents in Group 4 (3.2%) compared to Group 1 (1.3%)).

Engagement in community lifting at local level: very poor participation (1% for the whole population) no significant differences across the groups.

Engagement in aid- and assistance associations with a global perspective targeted at poor and underprivileged Muslims: Also here the participation rate is rather poor: only 1.8% for the whole population (3.2% for Group 4 and 1.5% for Group 1). The same pattern is observed with regard to participation in organisations that provide educational and social programmes designed to improve the conditions of Muslims around the world (3.5% for Group 4 and 1.6% for Group 1 which is also the average for the whole population).

Table 47 Social Capital * Group (Chi-Square test)

Aspect	Test	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Time spent with friends	Pearson Chi-Square	21.934[a]	18	.235
Level of education among friends	Pearson Chi-Square	17.529[a]	9	.041
Organised sport activities	Pearson Chi-Square	2.508[a]	3	.474
Membership in cultural associations with Danes	Pearson Chi-Square	4.516[a]	3	.211
Membership of religious associations	Pearson Chi-Square	45.231[a]	3	.000
Membership in organisations with a focus on social aid and health related matters	Pearson Chi-Square	.431[a]	3	.934
Engagement in community lifting at local level	Pearson Chi-Square	.269[a]	3	.966
Engagement in aid- and assistance associations with a global perspective targeted at poor and underprivileged Muslims	Pearson Chi-Square	3.130[a]	3	.372
Trust: Danish media	Pearson Chi-Square	31.792[a]	15	.007
Trust: Own family	Pearson Chi-Square	54.649[a]	15	.000
Trust: Fellow believers	Pearson Chi-Square	29.082[a]	15	.016
Trust: Fellow Countrymen	Pearson Chi-Square	12.197[a]	15	.664
Trust: International media (CNN, BBC etc.)	Pearson Chi-Square	40.372[a]	15	.000
Trust: Muslim media (Al Jazeera etc.)	Pearson Chi-Square	54.164[a]	15	.000

Trust: To the question: If you would trust/believe that a specific version or interpretation of a happening is trustworthy who should you hear it from?

41.2% of respondents in Group 4 would to a high or a very high degree trust in their "Faith peers" compared to 34.1% for Group 1, and almost the same for the other two groups. Groups 1, 2 and 3 would believe in their families to a much higher degree. With regard to the Danish version of the truth presented by Danish media, no one in Group 4 (0%) finds them absolutely trustworthy, whereas, Danish media are considered absolutely trustworthy by 8.2% of respondents in Group 1. Also the share in Group 4 that find the Danish media to be trustworthy is smaller than in other three groups, 11.1% compared to 18.9% for Group 1. On the opposite end 22.2% of respondents in Group 4 find the Danish media to be absolutely not-trustworthy, whereas this share among respondents in Group 1 is 10.0%. The same pattern goes for the trust of the groups towards international media such as CNN, BBC, whereas the opposite pattern is observed with regard to the trust towards Muslim media, Al Jazeera and the like. Empirical evidence indicates a much lower trust in the Danish Media among Group 4 than in all the other groups.

Practical advantages of the social capital: The respondents have been asked who they would turn to if they needed assistance with education and work:

Almost all would equally turn to their close families (about 36% on average). The same pattern goes for turning to relatives, though at a much lower rate (about 7% for all groups). However, when it comes to turning to other immigrant friends the pattern is different: A bigger share of Group 4 (31.0%) would count on immigrant friends, whereas this share is only 20% for Group 1. The more interesting observation is that members of Group 4 also score higher, though not significantly, than the other groups with regard to turning to Danish friends to get help with their education and professional matters (25.4% for Group 4 and 22.7% for Group 1, and an even smaller share for Group 2 with 16.6%). A very small share of respondents across all the groups turn to "Faith Peers" in those matters (an average of 1.8%, though highest for Group 4 with 3.2% and 1.1% for Group 1).

Preferences in selecting close friends: The respondents have been asked what quality they think should be preferred when selecting close friends.

The majority of respondents (67.0%) find the personality to be the most important. But respondents in Group 4 relatively speaking pay much more attention to people's religious beliefs (17.5% for Group 4 compared to only 1.1% for Group 1). On the opposite side it does not seem that the person's morals and attitude should be emphasised (1.6% for Group 4 and 4.9% for Group 1). On the other hand it seems that Group 4 to a higher degree (4.8% compared to 2.5% for the whole population) find it important that the person has not been involved in criminal activities.

H6. Economic capital

The lack of economic capital (in terms of income, savings and wealth correlates positively with tendencies towards Radical Islamism.

Figure 6 Average score of "economic capital points" by group

Looking at the data, we find that almost half of the survey population (N=577) are living outside the family as self-sufficient.

Empirically we deal with the concept of economic capital referring to three parameters; Income, Housing, and Opportunities for loan, all related to the individual respondent's capability for making progress socio-economically.

Income: In the survey we have operated with levels of income that are approximately the same levels by which individuals are defined[7] to be poor or not poor in Denmark. Looking at the incomes below or around 0, (that is equivalent to absolute poverty) we find no significant differences between the poles of the continuum Group 4 and Group 1, even though there are some differences between Group 2 and Group 3, it cannot be interpreted as if the income level at this stage has any impact on the attitudes towards Islamic Radicalisation.

Looking at the opposite end of the scale of income, e.g. those self-sufficient respondents with higher incomes, we find that nearly 25% of the respondents in Group 4 have an -after the taxes and the housing expenses are paid – above 10,000 DKR in their disposal for private consumption, compared to about 12% on average for the whole population of self-sufficient (N= 577). It can be said that the respondents in Group 4 are relatively overrepresented among individuals who have higher income. If there is any relation between income and attitude, it is not about poverty, but rather the other way around.

Housing: A different way to look at the same relation is to observe where people actually live, whether they own their own housing, or whether they are paying rent: The great majority of the respondents (69.5%) are living in rented apartments, and very few in rented houses. It seems that fewer respondents in Group 4 own their own apartments

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[7] There is, however, no official definition of poverty in Denmark. The income levels are defined by consumer departments to indicate different levels of incomes necessary to uphold an affluent life, a normal life, a discount life, a life in relative poverty and absolute poverty.

(3.2% compared to 5.0% for Group 1.) This way around, data does not indicate any considerable relation between housing and radical attitudes.

Table 48 Economic capital * Group (Chi Square tests)

Aspect	Test	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Income after tax and rent (N of Valid cases 578)	Pearson Chi-Square	20.437[a]	18	.309
Housing N of valid cases 1113)	Pearson Chi-Square	18.070[a]	21	.645

Furthermore the respondents were asked whom they would ask for a loan of a considerable size if an emergency situation occurred:

Parents, close friends, a bank, or postponing the fulfilment of the need until having enough money saved up.

The striking difference here is that respondents in Group 4 at a much higher frequency will turn to close friends (15.9% compared to 4.9% in Group 1) and they will at a much lower rate turn to a bank (9.5% compared to 22.7% for Group 1).[8]

H7. Cultural capital

"Lack of educational merits and lack of cross ethnic interest associations furthers the tendencies towards Islamic Radicalism."

Figure 7 Average score of "cultural capital points" by group

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
[8] We find it as a very interesting phenomenon with regard to the discussion about social capital above: Should this phenomenon be considered as an indicator of higher social capital for Group 4 respondents, when highlighting the individual's possibilities to take advantage of social relations in order to improve the socio-economic mobility? Or should it be considered as the opposite, highlighting the element of trust when defining the concept of social capital, as respondents in Group 4 obviously demonstrate a much lower degree of trust to banks as established institutions?

a. Ongoing education: Looking at the respondents who are under education with regard to educational level, we find a relative overrepresentation of respondents with short academic educations (14.3% in Group 4 compared to 7.1% among Group 1, and an even smaller share for the other two groups e.g. 1.1% for Group 2 and 5.5% for group 3).

Looking at the opposite end of the scale of current education, e.g. longer education, we find a relative underrepresentation of respondents with that level of education for Group 4 (5.7%) compared to Group 1 (18.6%). Relatively larger shares of respondents in Group 4 are doing middle range (college) education; that is 20.0% for Group 4.

b. Educational merits: Below we look at educational records that are recognised in Denmark, obtained by respondents of the four groups:

With regard to the lower, primary school level, there is no difference between groups. On the other hand, it seems that a relatively larger share of Group 4 has educational merits oriented to professions, (15% for Group 4, and an average of 7.2% for the other three groups). Like the data presented above, we also find that they are underrepresented in short academic educations and non-represented in long academic educations, whereas they are represented at average in academic medium term educations.

It is reasonable to say that respondents in Group 4 are more typically represented in academic medium term educations, but there is no evidence to conclude that respondents in Group 4 are more educated than the others.

c. Very recent exam score: With regard to exam results we asked the respondents what level in the exam scale (-3 to 12) their very last exam was:

There are almost no differences until the level 7, where a majority of Group 4 (52.2%) have obtained these results compared to Group 1 with 45.0%. At level 10 the relative share in Group 4 is a lower than for other groups (14.0% compared to 21.1% for Group 1.) But the share of respondents in Group 4 that have obtained the highest possible score (12) is larger than the average (3.2% compared to the average of 2.6%). Looking at the higher end of the scale for all groups (that is exam scores of 7, 10 and 12, or C+ to A+) we find that 68.9% of Group 4 are to be found here, while the equivalent for Group 1 is 69.0%. There is therefore no evidence for differences with regard to exam scores across the groups.

Table 49 Cultural capital * Group – Chi-Square Tests

Aspect	Test	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Ongoing education	Pearson Chi-Square	39.907[a]	27	.052
Educational merits	Pearson Chi-Square	40.236[a]	21	.007
Very recent exam score	Pearson Chi-Square	13.127[a]	21	,904

Media consumption: There are no significant differences in the use of Danish national television channels (DR, TV2 and channels alike), as a majority of respondents (82.6%) usually spent time watching those channels.

The same pattern goes for international television channels such as CNN, BBC and the like, but at a much lower extent (25.8% watches those channels usually).

There are not any significant differences with regards to watching either television channels or broadcasting from the country of origin. On average, 41.0% of the respondents watch those channels regularly, the lowest being Group 1 (34.7%). There is a difference though with regard to Arabic channels like Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabia, MBC and the like: A much bigger share of respondents in Group 4 (39.7%) and Group 3 (42.4%) watch those channels on a regular basis. The average is 25.4%, lowest for Group 1 (15.1%).

There is also a difference with regards to those respondents that do not watch TV at all. 10.3% in Group 1 and only 3.2% in Group 4 is in that category.

H8. Discrimination

"Experiences of discrimination and tendencies towards Radical Islamism are correlated positively."

Figure 8 Average score of "discrimination points" by group

We measured the general, subjective experience of discrimination followed by a concrete incidence of the experiences of the "Danish Marriage Act", that substantially has been targeting immigrants who marry individuals under the age of 24, residing abroad, and want to settle in Denmark as a couple.

General experience of discrimination related to work situation: The majority of all the respondents (84.2%) have never or almost never experienced discrimination in relation to work.

On the other hand a bigger share of respondents in Group 4 says that they have experienced discrimination in work related situations now and then (17.1% compared to 8.2%

as an average for the whole population) and at the same time a smaller share of them say that they have never experienced discrimination in work related situations (48.8% compared to 62.2% as an average for the whole population).

In spite of the small differences here, there is no empirical indication that the experiences of discrimination related to work situations have any influence on attitudes towards Radicalised Islam.

A negative experience of the Danish marriage act: The share of those respondents with a negative experience of the Danish marriage act in Group 4 is almost the same as the average (19.0% in Group 4 compared to 17.5% as the average for the whole population). Also the same tendency is observed with regard to those who specifically refuse having that kind of experiences.

Table 50 Discrimination * Group – Chi Square test

Aspect	Test	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
General experience of discrimination related to work situation	Pearson Chi-Square	11.942[a]	12	.450
A negative experience of the Danish marriage act	Pearson Chi-Square	13.430[a]	6	.037

H9. Religious attitude and behaviour:

"Religious knowledge and commitment with regard to faith and praxis and the tendencies towards Radical Islamism are correlated positively."

Figure 9 Average score of "religious behavior and attitude points" by group

Children's school: The question here is what school one's child goes to/should go to? Surprisingly we find no one (0.0%) in Group 4 that would like to send their children to a public school with a majority of bi-lingual pupils. On average for the whole population, 8.4% would do that. A share of 23.5% in Group 4, almost identical to the average of 24.3%

for the whole population, send or would send their children to a public school regardless of the share of bilingual pupils. On the other hand almost half of the average (31.6%) in Group 4 (17.6%) would send their children to a public school with a majority of Danish pupils. The striking difference, however, is that a share that is three times larger than the average of 8.4%, in Group 4 (23.5%) would prefer an Islamic Free School.

It could be taken as an expression of Group 4's indifference to ethnic or national background and awareness about the value-orientation of the school in question.

Marriage: What quality would the respondents prefer when considering their own or their child's marriage?

An overwhelming majority find it of no importance that the person is a relative (though a bigger share of Group 4 (6.3%) than the average (4.1%) find it important that the person is a relative).

Language and culture: There is no difference across the groups with regard to identical lingual and cultural background. Over half of the population find it important or very important that they share the same lingual and cultural background with the coming bride/groom.

Professional and educational status: Over half of the average (34%) for the whole population in Group 4, find the professional and educational status of the coming bride/groom to be absolutely non-important.

Religiosity: 69.8% in Group 4 (compared to the average of 39% for the whole population and 24.8% for Group 1) find it very important that the person is a righteous Muslim.

National background: A rather small share of all groups (an average of 23.3% for the whole population, lowest in Group 4 with 12.7% and 26.5% in Group 1) find it important that the person is a native Dane.

Which law to follow: If elements of the national law, be it criminal, civil etc. is in conflict with Islam (Sharia), should Muslim immigrants then follow the Islamic law or the national law?

A majority of 55.6% of respondents in Group 4 declare themselves completely agreeing with that the Muslim immigrants should follow the Islamic law (that is a very big share compared to only 6.6% of respondents in Group 1 and 19.1% as the average for the whole population of those who mention Islam as their religious faith).

The extreme case: If a Muslim turns his/her back to the Islamic faith by converting to another religion, is it proper to kill him according to the Sharia?

30.2% of respondents in Group 4 agree completely (compared to only 1.1% of respondents in Group 1 and 5.3% as the average for the whole population).

Table 51 Religious attitude * Group – Chi Square test

Aspect	Test	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Children's school	Pearson Chi-Square	34.771[a]	18	.010
Marriage: Someone from the family	Pearson Chi-Square	14.503[a]	9	.106
Some one with the same language and culture	Pearson Chi-Square	32.512[a]	9	.000
Professional and educational status	Pearson Chi-Square	35.282[a]	9	.000
Religiosity	Pearson Chi-Square	120.173[a]	9	.000
National background	Pearson Chi-Square	15.436[a]	9	.080
Which law to follow	Pearson Chi-Square	177.222[a]	15	.000
The extreme case	Pearson Chi-Square	152.518[a]	15	.000
An occasionally righteous Muslim	Pearson Chi-Square	90.798[a]	15	.000
Inspiration to interpreting Islam Parents	Pearson Chi-Square	50.016[a]	3	.000
Education in a Mosque by Imams	Pearson Chi-Square	85.522[a]	3	.000
Private courses	Pearson Chi-Square	59.553[a]	3	.000
Study circles	Pearson Chi-Square	10.655[a]	3	.014
Books, article and the internet	Pearson Chi-Square	81.620[a]	3	.000
Understanding the Quran	Pearson Chi-Square	19.576[a]	9	.021
Paying Zakat and Khoms	Pearson Chi-Square	42.783[a]	6	.000
Daily prayer	Pearson Chi-Square	72.400[a]	6	.000
Juma (Friday Prayer	Pearson Chi-Square	102.896[a]	6	.000
Fasting	Pearson Chi-Square	94.357[a]	6	.000
Prayer/Petition	Pearson Chi-Square	81.372[a]	6	.000

An occasionally righteous Muslim? Is it all right for a Muslim to drink alcohol now and then, and still considering himself/herself a good Muslim?

Only a quite small share (1.6%) of respondents in Group 4, believe so, whereas 22.3% of the respondents in Group 1 and an average of 15.9% of the population find that practice proper. A majority of 87.4% of respondents in Group 4 declare themselves to be in complete disagreement with that idea.

Inspiration to interpreting Islam

To find out where the respondents get their religious attitude, we asked several questions.

Parents: A similar share of respondents in all groups (though with the exception of Group 1 that is considerably lower) about 25% have only had religious education by their parents (27% for Group 4).

Education in a Mosque by Imams: With regard to the roles of Imams and Mosques, we find an upward sloping curve, starting lowest for Group 1 (20.7%) and highest for Group 4 (60.3%), which is also twice the size of the average (app. 30%) for the whole population.

Also with regard to resolving religious questions we find that the share of respondents in Group 4 who turn to Imams to resolve religious questions are about 9 times larger than the equivalent for those in Group 1 (31.7% compared to 3.6%).

Occupation with religious questions: Respondents in Group 4 have more often questions of religious character than they seek to solve. While only 3.6% of respondents in Group 4 say they do not have any religious questions, the equivalent share for Group 1 is 22.5%.

Going to the Mosque: Of the respondents in Group 4, about half (46%) go to the Mosque a minimum of once a week. The equivalent share for Group 1 at the opposite end is only 10.9%. Looking at the data differently, close to half of the minority of respondents in Group 1 (42.8%) never or almost never go to the Mosque, whereas the equivalent for Group 4 is 9.5%.

Development in religiosity: A majority of the respondents (68.3%) in Group 4 experienced becoming more religious in the past 3 years. Only 15.9% of Group 1 have had that same experience.

Looking at the phenomenon differently, only 6.3% of Group 4 have experienced becoming less religious in the same period, while about a half of Group 1 experienced stability (no change whatsoever) in their religiosity, and 21.8% experienced even less religiosity in the same period of time.

Private courses in Religion: Here we observe the same pattern, almost geometrically: a complete upward curve, starting with 11.8% for Group 1, and highest for Group 4 with 42.9%.

Study Circles: Also, a share of 20.6% twice as large as the average (9.6%) in Group 4, have participated in Study Circles on Islam.

Books, article and the internet: 42.9% of the respondents in Group 4 mention reading books and journals, as well as surfing on the Internet as a source of their religious attitude. That goes for only 7.4% of Group 1 and 11.3% as the average for the population. On the other hand, close to half of the population in Group 1 have never had any religious education/teaching, while the equivalent for Group 4 is only 7.9%.

Understanding the Quran: A similar minority share (with the exception of Group 2 that is higher than the average) of the respondents in all respective groups have read all of the Quran (23.4% as an average). The interesting phenomenon is that Group 4 and Group 1 are very close to each other with regard to the share that has never read the Quran (36.4% for Group 1 and 31.7% for Group 4, and the average of 31.6% for the whole population).

Representatives of "true" Islam: Scaling publicly known individuals with a Muslim background who participate actively in the societal and political debate with regard to whether their agendas are secular to militant Islamism, we find the following:

According to 33.3% of respondents in Group 1, the best representatives of Islam in Denmark are those with the most radical tendencies (Hizb-Ul-Tahrir, and Terror detainees). These response options are only selected by 0.5% of respondents in Group 4 and very miniscule minorities in the other two groups. None of the respondents in Group 4 have selected secular Muslims as the best representatives of Islam in Denmark. Pointing out a single individual that enjoys the affiliation of respondents across the groups is the ethnic Dane Imam Abul Vahid Petersen, who at an average has been selected by 18.2% of the respondents, almost evenly across the groups.

Another striking point to be highlighted is that over half of all respondents find no one among the presented options as the best representative of Islam in Denmark, but with major variation between Group 4 on the one side (25%) and around half for the remaining groups.

Religious duties

Paying Zakat and Khoms: It is considered to be an obligation to pay Zakat and Khoms in Islam. Over half of the respondents in Group 4 and only a quarter (27.6%) of those in Group 1 always pay Zakat and Khoms. But there are also a quarter of the respondents (23.8%) in Group 4 that never do so in accordance with those obligations.

Daily prayer: Also over half of the respondents in Group 4 (55.6%) perform daily prayer, compared to 25.7% for Group 1 and an average of 36.2% for the whole population.

Juma (Friday Prayer): A majority of respondents in Group 4 (76.2%) always or occasionally participate in Juma, whereas a much smaller share of Group 1 (38.3%) does so.

Fasting: Close to an absolute majority of Group 4 take part in fasting (90.5%). That goes only for 49.4% of Group 1 (An upward sloping curve is observed).

Prayer/Petition: Also with regard to saying prayer/petition there is a major difference between Group 4 (73.0% – the same goes for Group 2) and 40.0% of Group 1 says prayer.

H.10 Global attitudes, Philanthropy and Social Engagement

"Philanthropic attitude, sense of justice and local social engagement goes hand in hand with tendencies towards Radical Islamism among Muslim immigrants."

Figure 10 Average score of "international orientation points" by group

a. The biggest current global issue: The groups' priorities among issues: Global Financial Crises, Economic Recession, Unemployment, Poverty and Hunger, Environmental Problems, Illness, Injustice, Child Abuse, The War in Afghanistan and Iraq, Inequality, are as following:

- Global Financial Crises concern a minority of the population (15.9%), least among respondents in Group 4 (11.1%) and most among Group 2 (18.9%).
- Economic Recession concerns a very small minority of 6.6% of the population, all groups close to the average.
- Global Unemployment concerns an even smaller minority across the groups, 4.3% as average, all groups around the average.
- Poverty and Hunger concern 19.7% of the population, highest among Group 1 (22.9%), lowest among Group 4 (11.1%).
- Environmental Problems concern only 8.1% of the population, and Group 4 distinctly have the lowest rate (3.2%).
- Illness concerns only 5.7% of the population, and is of highest concern among Group 4 (9.5%).
- Injustice in the world concerns 11.5% of the population, highest among Group 4 (15.9%).
- Child labour concerns almost no one (2.3% of the population) and absolutely none (0.0%) in Group 4.
- Inequality concerns 7.8% of the population, lowest among Group 4 (7.9%).
- The situations in Iraq and Afghanistan concern a much larger minority with 21.1% of the population, most respondents in Group 4 (31.7%).

b. Philanthropy: Which organisations have the respondents given a donation to, to help them in their work? We presented the following options:

- Cancer Fighting: An average of 31.3% for the whole population and distributed almost evenly across the four groups.

- Save the Child: The same average, but a lower share among Group 4.
- Red Cross and Refugee Council: An average of 40.7% and lowest among Group 4 (33.3%).
- Natural catastrophes in general: An average of 9.9%, lowest among Group 4 (6.3%).
- Aid to victims of natural catastrophes in Muslim countries: An average of 11.9%, but remarkably higher for Group 4 (28.6%), also compared to Group 1 (8.5%).
- Help to rebuilding Lebanon and Gaza: An average of 13.6%, but remarkably higher for Group 4 (36.5%) also compared to 7.1% for Group 1.
- There were no significant differences with regard to donation to other organisations with a general target.

c. Political preferences: What political topics are ranked highest among the respondents, when the decision of voting for alternative candidates/parties is evaluated: The options presented and the results are as follows:

- Environmental policy: Not ranked high at all. Only 3.2% in Group 4 consider it as among the most crucial issues. (An average of 7.7% for the whole population).
- Economic policy: Only ranked as highest priority by 19.0% of respondents in Group 4 (The average for the whole population is 16.7%).
- Financial policy: Ranked among the biggest concerns by 8.6% of the population, all groups around the average.
- Social policy: Ranked as the highest priority by 14.3% of the respondents in Group 4 (an average of 19.7% for the whole population).
- Integration (of immigrants) policy: Ranked as the highest priority among a relatively small share of Group 4 (15.9%) compared to 24.3% for the whole population.
- Immigration policy: Ranked as highest priority by 34.1% of the population, highest among Group 3 (45.5%).
- Labour market policy: Not mentioned as of highest importance – only by 6.9% of the population, lowest among Group 4 (4.8%).
- Foreign policy: Only mentioned by 4.8% of the population, none (0.0%) in Group 4.
- Educational policy: An average of 13.5% have pointed this out as one of the two most important political topics, similar distributions in Group 4 (11.1%) and Group 1 (10.5%).
- Cultural policy: An average of 2.2% across the groups, but a relatively much larger share among Group 4 (4.8%), also compared to 1.8% for Group 1.

Table 52 Global attitudes, Philanthropy and Social Engagement * Group – Chi Square test

Aspect	Test	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
The biggest current global issue:				
Financial crises	Pearson Chi-Square	3.592[a]	3	.309
Economic recession	Pearson Chi-Square	5.155[a]	3	.161
International Unemployment	Pearson Chi-Square	3.428[a]	3	.330
Poverty and hunger	Pearson Chi-Square	11.854[a]	3	.008
Environmental Problems	Pearson Chi-Square	3.967[a]	3	.265
Illness	Pearson Chi-Square	3.414[a]	3	.332
Injustice in the world	Pearson Chi-Square	5.036[a]	3	.169
Child labour	Pearson Chi-Square	5.231[a]	3	.156
Inequality	Pearson Chi-Square	.330[a]	3	.954
The situation in Iraq and Afghanistan	Pearson Chi-Square	5.158[a]	3	.161
Philanthropy				
Cancer Fighting	Pearson Chi-Square	4.557[a]	3	.207
Save the Child	Pearson Chi-Square	8.411[a]	3	.038
Red Crosse and Refugee Council	Pearson Chi-Square	9.451[a]	3	.024
Natural catastrophes in general:	Pearson Chi-Square	2.759[a]	3	.430
Aid to victims of natural catastrophes in Muslim countries	Pearson Chi-Square	24.314[a]	3	.000
Help to rebuilding Lebanon and Gaza	Pearson Chi-Square	56.784[a]	3	.000
Political preferences				
Environmental policy	Pearson Chi-Square	4.840[a]	3	.184
Economic policy	Pearson Chi-Square	.640[a]	3	.887
Financial policy	Pearson Chi-Square	2.793[a]	3	.425
Social policy	Pearson Chi-Square	4.190[a]	3	.242
Integration (of immigrants) policy	Pearson Chi-Square	15.204[a]	3	.002
Immigration policy	Pearson Chi-Square	20.013[a]	3	.000
Labour market policy	Pearson Chi-Square	1.089[a]	3	.780
Foreign policy	Pearson Chi-Square	3.860[a]	3	.277
Educational policy	Pearson Chi-Square	9.869[a]	3	.020
Cultural policy	Pearson Chi-Square	2.561[a]	3	.464

Party choice: With regard to party orientation, respondent in Group 4 distinguish themselves as well: Only 14.3% of them will vote for Social democrats, whereas a majority of all other groups will vote for that party. Also a very small minority will vote for the immi-

grant friendly party Radikale Venstre (Social-Liberal Party). With regards to Socialistic People's Party, Group 4's votes are almost identical to the other three groups, and only when it comes to the extreme left (The Red-Green Alliance) does the share of Group 4 that vote for that party exceed the other three groups.

H 11. Diaspora

"Muslim immigrants become more radical because they miss their native country"

Figure 11 Average score of "diasporal points" by group

Missing their native country: To find out whether Diaspora played a role in relation to the distribution of respondents in groups, we asked the respondents whether or not a source of dissatisfaction with their lives, was missing their country of origin. Only one person in the whole population said so, and that respondent is not in Group 4.

Feeling displaced/alienated: Almost none of the respondents express the feeling of being a stranger or that they don't fit in, in the country. Alienation as a source of dissatisfaction is only mentioned by 5 respondents in the whole population, more or less evenly (Though 1 individual in Group 4 that alone makes up a share of 1.6%, twice as big as 2 respondents in Group 2 (that makes up the share of 0.7 %).

Travel and stay in the native country: Diaspora can also be measured by considering how often the individual respondent actually travels to the country of origin. To our knowledge there is no country of origin that respondents cannot travel to. Sometimes it can be associated with difficulties and risks, but it is not in any case completely impossible. Data reveals the following distribution across the groups:

The relatively largest share of those who visit their country of origin more than three times a year is found in Group 1 (7.3%) and the smallest is found in Group 2 (3.3%) – said in other words, there is no pattern. Even with regards to those who visit the country of origin 1-3 times a year, respondents in Group 4 demonstrate the smallest share (3.2%). The share of respondents in Group 4, who visit the country of origin once a year, is also dramatically small compared to the share in the other groups (12.7% compared to 23.5% for

the whole population). At the lower end of the scale we find a relative overrepresentation of Group 4; 77.8% of respondents in Group 4 visit the country of origin every second year (30.2%), Even more seldom (27.0%) or Never (20.6%), a total of 77.8%. That aggregation (Every second year – Never) only goes for 63.6% of Group 1. The empirical findings here seem to strengthen the idea that Radical Muslims are not characterised by a radical national view or affiliation, but moreover by their global perspective.

Table 52a

Aspect	Test	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
How often do you speak Danish at home? * Group	Pearson Chi-Square	36,507[a]	15	,001
I miss my country of origin * Group	Pearson Chi-Square	2,700[a]	3	,440
How would you describe your national identity, as Dane, as....Turk, Somali, etc. Or both * Group	Pearson Chi-Square	49,845[a]	9	,000
I trust mostly television broadcast from the country of my origin* Group	Pearson Chi-Square	18,461[a]	3	,000
How often do you visit the country of your origin (if not Denmark)? * Group	Pearson Chi-Square	19,076[a]	15	,210
Which language, beside your mother tongue would you like to be fluent in (Arabic) * Group	Pearson Chi-Square	114,723[a]	24	,000

H12. Formal and Substantial Citizenship

"There is a positive relation between lack of formal and substantial citizenship and tendencies towards Radical Islamism."

Figure 12 Average score of "formal and substantial citizenship points" by group

Formal citizenship: Looking at whether or not there is a relation between the respondent's legal status and the group-categorisation, data reveals that the majority across all groups are Danish citizens (58.3% among Group 1, and 60.3% among group 4). Furthermore, data regarding dual citizenship indicates almost identical distribution across groups, though on a lower level. The legal status does not have any impact on the attitudes that have been the basic for group-categorisation.

Substantial citizenship: Substantial citizenship is usually defined as participation or the actual use of the formal rights that a person gets due to his/her citizenship. The issue has already been addressed elsewhere in this study. In the following we look at whether or not respondents define themselves as belonging to the national community – feeling as Danes themselves.

An almost identical share of both Group 4 (11.11%) and Group 1 (12.7%) identify themselves as Danes (both above the share for the whole population which is 9.3%). But on the other hand, we observe that a much larger share of respondents in Group 4 (41.3%) identify themselves in relation to their country of origin. That goes for only 17.8% of the respondents in Group 1 and for 24.5% of all the respondents. Dual national identities are also much lower among respondents in Group 4 than the average and that of Group 1 – the average is 62.2% and the equivalents for respondents in Group 1 66.2%.

Participation in elections and party preferences: One of the most highlighted aspects of formal citizenship is political participation. Looking at the groups' participation in elections as voters, we find major differences: 39.7% of the respondents in Group 4 do not/will not vote, that goes for only 4.0% of the respondents in Group 1, and almost the same level for the other 3 groups.

H13. Life form

"Life form and tendencies towards Radical Islamism are somehow correlated: Wage-earners are more disposed to Radical Islamism."

The theoretical proposition on Life form suggests that the form of life the individual has or has been brought up/grown up with influences the behaviour, preferences and worldview of the individual, it also plays a tremendous role in the way the person establishes him/herself in life.

The Life form of individuals is usually established by reference to the profession of the individual's parents through childhood and/or his/her actual professional position alongside three categories: Self-employment, Wage-earning and Carrier.

Figure 13 What was your father's occupational status during your upbringing?

Parent's profession through childhood – Father: Data reveals that a considerable share of Group 4 respondents have had a father who was a wage-earner as public or quasi-public officeholder (39.7% compared to 21.0% as the average for the whole population). On the other hand, a relatively smaller share of the group has had a father who was an unskilled worker (14.3% compared to 24.4% as the average for the whole population).

Table 53 Life form * Group – Chi Square test

Aspect	Test	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Parent's profession through childhood – Father	Pearson Chi-Square	56.661[a]	33	.006
Parent's profession through childhood – Mother	Pearson Chi-Square	54.131[a]	33	.012
Current profession	Pearson Chi-Square	56.952[a]	36	.015

Parent's profession through childhood – Mother: The same pattern is observed with regard to the mother's profession through the respondent's childhood, e.g. an overrepresentation as far as public or quasi-public employment is concerned, and an underrepresentation with regard to the mother as an unskilled worker.

Current profession: It seems that the relative share of wage-earners that are publicly or semi-publicly employed is considerably larger in Group 4 (17.5%) than the average of the whole population (10.0%), and the share of unskilled workers is similarly smaller than the average, though not as remarkably as was the case with the parents' profession. On the other hand the relative share of skilled workers is considerably smaller in Group 4 (6.3%) than the average (10.7%) and certainly smaller than what is the case for Group 1 (12.3%).

5.4. The Case of Aarhus – a Medium-sized European City

Table 54 shows the distribution of Groups 1 to 4, the least radical to the most radical.

Table 54 Distribution of Groups among Municipalities (N=1,113)

	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Total
Copenhagen	117	63	65	15	260
	45.0%	24.2%	25.0%	5.8%	100.0%
Frederiksberg	15	6	8	1	30
	50.0%	20.0%	26.7%	3.3%	100.0%
Odense	38	16	11	2	67
	56.7%	23.9%	16.4%	3.0%	100.0%
Aarhus	48	24	12	6	90
	53.3%	26.7%	13.3%	6.7%	100.0%
Suburbs West of Copenhagen. Except Høje Tåstrup	58	37	25	8	128
	45.3%	28.9%	19.5%	6.3%	100.0%
Municipalities North of Copenhagen	34	16	11	6	67
	50.7%	23.9%	16.4%	9.0%	100.0%
Høje Tåstrup	18	10	4	9	41
	43.9%	24.4%	9.8%	22.0%	100.0%
Municipalities south of Copenhagen	28	25	14	1	68
	41.2%	36.8%	20.6%	1.5%	100.0%
Northern Zealand	14	9	5	3	31
	45.2%	29.0%	16.1%	9.7%	100.0%
Zealand (All other municipalities (Except Kalundborg)	45	28	13	3	89
	50.6%	31.5%	14.6%	3.4%	100.0%
Kalundborg	3	1	1	2	7
	42.9%	14.3%	14.3%	28.6%	100.0%
Fyn (expect for Odense)	5	2	3	0	10
	50.0%	20.0%	30.0%	.0%	100.0%
Southern Jutland	51	24	9	6	90
	56.7%	26.7%	10.0%	6.7%	100.0%
Mid-Jutland	44	16	6	0	66
	66.7%	24.2%	9.1%	.0%	100.0%
Northern Jutland	26	16	8	1	51
	51.0%	31.4%	15.7%	2.0%	100.0%
All other municipalities	3	5	3	0	11
	27.3%	45.5%	27.3%	.0%	100.0%
No idea	4	3	0	0	7
	57.1%	42.9%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total	551	301	198	63	1113
	49.5%	27.0%	17.8%	5.7%	100.0%

At first glance, the middle range city of Arhus is characterised by not being remarkably different in either a negative nor positive way from the general pattern established above.

Looking at the share of those respondents who are categorised in Group 4, they make up a share of 6.7% in Aarhus, almost the same as 5.8% among those young Muslim residing in Copenhagen, but twice the size of another middle range city in Denmark, Odense, that also has been subject to public, political and media interest in relation to the question of radicalisation of young Muslims in Denmark.

The non-existing significance for radicalisation tendencies in Aarhus is also confirmed by following regression analyses:

Table 55 Residential area * Group 4 – Chi Square tests Group 4 (N=1,113)

	B	df	Sig.
Intercept		16	0.058
Copenhagen	**Offset**		
Frederiksberg	-0.574	1	0.585
Odense	-0.688	1	0.369
Aarhus	0.154	1	0.758
Municipalities West of CPH (Except Høje Tåstrup)	0.085	1	0.850
Municipalities North of CPH.	0.474	1	0.347
Høje Tåstrup	1.525	1	0.001
Municipalities South of CPH.	-1.411	1	0.176
Northern Jutland	0.560	1	0.399
Other areas Zealand (Except Kalundborg)	-0.563	1	0.383
Kalundborg	1.877	1	0.033
Fyn (Except Odense)	-18.410	1	0.999
South Jutland	0.154	1	0.758
Mid-Jutland (Except Aarhus)	-18.410	1	0.997
North Jutland	-1.119	1	0.284
Other municipalities	-18.410	1	0.999
No idea	-18.410	1	0.999
Constant	-2.793	1	0.000

The logistic regression analysis of municipalities of residence reveals that residents of Høje Tåstrup and Kalundborg have higher probabilities of belonging to the radicalisation Group 4 than residents of the comparing municipal Copenhagen. This difference is highly significant in the case of Høje Tåstrup and slightly significant for Kalundborg. However none of the estimates of the remaining municipalities are significant. Hence, these isolated observations must be taken only as weak indications and not as firm results.

In the following we take a closer look at the demographic distribution of the survey population in Aarhus. The following is the age distribution:

Table 56 Age Group * Group Cross-tabulation

Age Group	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Total
15-17 yrs	8	2	6	1	17
	16.7%	8.3%	50.0%	16.7%	18.9%
18-20 yrs	5	7	1	3	16
	10:4%	29.2%	8.3%	50.0%	17.8%
21-24 yrs	12	7	2	2	23
	25.0%	29.2%	16.7%	33.3%	25.6%
25-27 yrs	9	4	2	0	15
	18.8%	16.7%	16.7%	0.0%	16.7%
28-30 yrs	14	4	1	0	19
	29.2%	16.7%	8.3%	0.0%	21.1%
Total	48	24	12	6	90
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

With regard to the national origin, respondents in Group 4 are evenly divided in 3 national origins (33.3% of each): Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine. One national origin to be noticed is Lebanon that also is relatively overrepresented in Group 3.

Regarding the gender aspect we find an interesting feature: Females are rather underrepresented in the population from Aarhus (Following table): They make up 42.2% of the survey population. Knowing from the survey population that at a national level (including Aarhus) about ¾ of Group 4 respondents are male, while they make up nearly half of the survey population, it would be reasonable, only with regard to this aspect, that a larger share of males here would mean, all other things being equal, a larger share in Group 4. That could probably explain the exceeding percentage compared to that of the Copenhagen area.

Table 57 Gender * Group Cross-tabulation

	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Total
Man	25	15	7	5	52
	52.1%	62.5%	58.3%	83.3%	57.8%
Woman	23	9	5	1	38
	47.9%	37.5%	41.7%	16.7%	42.2%
Total	48	24	12	6	90
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

With regard to the geographical distribution in the Aarhus area, it is important to notice that nearly all (except for 16.7% that actually live in the city of Aarhus) live in suburban

areas of concentration of immigrants: concentrated in 2 areas: one is the postal code 8220 (where we find 50% of respondents in Group 4) and the other 8210 where we find 33.3%).

Another striking phenomenon, correlated with that of national origin, is that almost the total population of Group 4 in Aarhus has a background as refugees, either as children of refugees (50%) or as refugees themselves (33.%). It is only worth highlighting that 33.3% of respondents in Group 4 are born in Denmark, and 50% are born in another country (than that of origin and Denmark). Almost the total population (except for 16.7%) have parents who have not been born in Denmark. Furthermore, the total population of Group 4 (that is 83.3%) are Danish nationals.

None of the Group 4 respondents in Aarhus are married or living with a girl/boyfriend, as it is illustrated in the table below:

Table 58 Civil Status & Group Cross-tabulation

	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Total
Living with your parents	13	10	6	4	33
	27.1%	41.7%	50.0%	66.7%	36.7%
Married	19	6	3	0	28
	39.6%	25.0%	25.0%	0.0%	31.1%
Living as non-registered couple	3	3	0	0	6
	6.3%	12.5%	0.0%	0.0%	6.7%
Divorced	1	0	1	0	2
	2.1%	0.0%	8.3%	0.0%	2.2%
Single	12	5	2	2	21
	25.0%	20.8%	16.7%	33.3%	23.3%
Total	48	24	12	6	90
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

None of the Group 4 respondents in Aarhus have children. This is a slightly difference compared to other groups, but not considerably.

With regard to being arrested by the police, there are no considerable differences between groups in Aarhus; the majority of respondents across the groups have not had the experience of being arrested by the police.

Like the pattern we found in the distribution at the national level, also in Aarhus we find that almost all the Group 4 respondents are Sunni Muslim, except for 16.7% that belong to another branch of Islam than Shia and Sunni.

With regard to preferences in selection of close friends, a majority of Group 4 in Aarhus highlight personality as the main criterion, while almost none of the respondents emphasise the potential friend's religious belief. There is no considerable difference across the groups.

Looking at one of the main aspects of integration discussed publicly for many years, whether it is a good or a bad idea that many immigrants live in certain urban areas of concentration, a majority of respondents in Group 4 in Aarhus find that idea as a good or as a very good one. This is very different from the attitudes of the other three groups, specifically the attitudes of Group 1.

We observed that there is no considerable difference in fluency in the Danish language among respondents across the 4 groups.

With regard to intimate relations with natives, we observed that there are no considerable differences across the groups in Aarhus, but the general level is lower (that goes for almost all groups) than that of other areas' population.

Table 59 Birth order and Groups – Cross-tabulation

| | Other municipalities (N – Aarhus) | | | | | Aarhus Municipality | | | | |
	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Total	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Total
First born/ only child	198	90	63	16	367	25	9	3	1	38
	39.4%	32.5%	33.9%	28.1%	35.9%	52.1%	37.5%	25.0%	16.7%	42.2%
The middle	213	130	87	28	458	14	11	7	4	36
	42.3%	46.9%	46.8%	49.1%	44.8%	29.2%	45.8%	58.3%	66.7%	40.0%
Last born	92	57	36	13	198	9	4	2	1	16
	18.3%	20.6%	19.4%	22.8%	19.4%	18.8%	16.7%	16.7%	16.7%	17.8%
Total	503	277	186	57	1023	48	24	12	6	90
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

With regard to Birth Order, we find the same pattern as that of the whole survey population: The majority of the Group 4 respondents are Middle children. Only this tendency is much more explicit among Aarhus' population:

With regard to Spare Time Activities, we find no considerable difference across the 4 groups in Aarhus. But in Other Areas, Group 4 actually exceed considerably in a positive way as far as having a Spare Time Activity that they are good at. This is considerably lower in Aarhus, where the 4 groups are almost identical.

None among the respondents in Group 4 in Aarhus have lost their parents. That is rather different both from the distribution at the national level, and also somewhat different among other groups in Aarhus.

Personally, with regard to the aspect of Self-esteem, a relatively larger share of Group 4 experiences themselves as less valuable than their peers. But the majority of them experience themselves as equally good as the peers. On the other hand, the share of those who experience themselves as "generally better" than the peers is larger among Group 4 than the other groups in Aarhus.

Table 60 Causes of dissatisfaction and Groups – Cross-tabulation

| | Other municipalities (N – Aarhus) | | | | | Aarhus Municipality | | | | |
	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Total	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Total
N	563	437	331	157	1488	47	44	32	13	136
Authorities attitudes towards Islam	98	100	72	36	306	6	9	8	4	27
	17.4%	22.9%	21.8%	22.9%	20.6%	12.8%	20.5%	25.0%	30.8%	19.9%
Near death experience	51	53	52	19	175	3	7	5	2	17
	9.1%	12.1%	15.7%	12.1%	11.8%	6.4%	15.9%	15.6%	15.4%	12.5%
Dissatisfaction with life	33	37	30	17	117	1	5	4	0	10
	5.9%	8.5%	9.1%	10.8%	7.9%	2.1%	11.4%	12.5%	0.0%	7.4%
Loneliness	42	34	34	14	124	1	3	3	1	8
	7.5%	7.8%	10.3%	8.9%	8.3%	2.1%	6.8%	9.4%	7.7%	5.9%
Death in family	81	82	69	30	262	7	10	6	2	25
	14.4%	18.8%	20.8%	19.1%	17.6%	14.9%	22.7%	18.8%	15.4%	18.4%
Discrimination	31	39	31	23	124	1	3	7	0	11
	5.5%	8.9%	9.4%	14.6%	8.3%	2.1%	6.8%	21.9%	0.0%	8.1%
Israel-Gaza conflict	43	70	68	37	218	6	8	7	4	25
	7.6%	16.0%	20.5%	23.6%	14.7%	12.8%	18.2%	21.9%	30.8%	18.4%
Iran's nuclear program	10	14	14	15	53	1	2	3	1	7
	1.8%	3.2%	4.2%	9.6%	3.6%	2.1%	4.5%	9.4%	7.7%	5.1%
Guantanamo	25	37	37	30	129	2	4	4	2	12
	4.4%	8.5%	11.2%	19.1%	8.7%	4.3%	9.1%	12.5%	15.4%	8.8%
Gang crimes	33	34	29	24	120	1	3	4	2	10
	5.9%	7.8%	8.8%	15.3%	8.1%	2.1%	6.8%	12.5%	15.4%	7.4%
None	283	111	55	7	456	25	8	3	1	37
	50.3%	25.4%	16.6%	4.5%	30.6%	53.2%	18.2%	9.4%	7.7%	27.2%

Surprisingly we find that the Group 4 respondents in Aarhus do share the idea that it should not be a requirement to remove scarves and other Muslim clothing symbols in order to get a public job, as judges, jurors, police, and soldiers.

With regard to whom the respondents discuss religious questions with; a minority among all groups say that they discuss those issues with their families and friends. But Group 4 respondents are more distinguished by the fact that they to a considerably higher degree discuss those matters with their Imams (33.3% for Group 4 and only 2.1% for Group 1). None of the respondents in Group 4, or in any other groups for that matter, mention the Internet as a forum for religious discussions. With regard to how often respondents go to the Mosque, there are major differences between Group 3 and 4, and the two other groups. 33.3% of the respondents in Group 4 go to the Mosque almost every day, and another 33.3% go almost once a week. Putting these two categories "almost every day", and "Almost once a week" together, we find an identical share of Group 3 that can be placed here. The other two groups are to be found among those who go to the Mosque once year, on special occasions or almost never.

With regard to the aspect of Diaspora, measured in the way that was done for the whole survey population, we find the same pattern: The majority of Group 4 visits the country of origin only every other year or almost never, whereas visiting the country of origin actual-

ly is more widespread among the other groups. Group 4 respondents are also characterised by the experience of becoming more religious during the last 3 years (50% compared to 16.7% for Groups 1 and 2, and 33.3% for Group 3). While no one in Group 4 experiences "no change with regard to the degree of religiosity", that is the case for the majority of Group 1, half of Group 2, and a considerable minority of Group 3 (33.3%).

Investigating the background of that experience further we found, in a multiple choice questionnaire, that the political discourse has inspired 30.8% of respondents in Group 4 in Aarhus to take a closer look at their religiosity, whereas it is mentioned by 22.9% in other areas. Death in the family, Near-Death experiences, Guantanamo and Gang crimes have affected approximately 15% in each. Discrimination has not had any impact, whereas it is mentioned by approximately 15% in other areas. The conflict between Israel and Palestine has also inspired the respondents to revise their religiosity (30.8%).

Have any of the following had any impact on renewing your religious attitude?

As with regard to the question that, according to the respondents, represents Islam best in Denmark, we found it completely different from the pattern we observed in the distribution at the national level – that no one selects the most radical representative of Islam, Hizb-Ul-Tahrir, and the terror detainees (From Vollsmose-Odense). And the most radical Group 4 actually in a higher degree associate themselves with the Islamic Belief Society or they do not find any among the response categories presented to them in the survey.

Comparing Aarhus and Other areas with regard to involvement in community lifting at local level, we find an interesting difference: It is apparent that Group 4 respondents in Aarhus are more involved with those activities both compared to other groups in Aarhus (at an average of 27%) and compared to Group 4 in other areas (28.1%).

Table 61 Voluntary activities in helping immigrant children in Denmark or in your locality to improve their integration, e.g. school help etc & Groups?

	Other municipalities (N – Aarhus)					Aarhus Municipality				
	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Total	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Total
Yes	100	70	56	16	242	12	7	3	3	25
	19.9%	25.3%	30.1%	28.1%	23.7%	25.0%	29.2%	25.0%	50.0%	27.8%
No	397	204	127	41	769	34	16	9	3	62
	78.9%	73.6%	68.3%	71.9%	75.2%	70.8%	66.7%	75.0%	50.0%	68.9%
No idea	6	3	3	0	12	2	1	0	0	3
	1.2%	1.1%	1.6%	0.0%	1.2%	4.2%	4.2%	0.0%	0.0%	3.3%
Total	503	277	186	57	1023	48	24	12	6	90
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

In the following we investigate the city further by comparing the population from this city to the rest of population:

Table 62 Knowledge of political Islam: Knowledge of the meaning of "Dar-Ul-Harb"

| | Other municipalities (N – Aarhus) | | | | | Aarhus Municipality | | | | |
	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Total	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Total
Unanswered	103	26	1	0	130	9	4	0	0	13
	20.5%	9.4%	0.5%	0.0%	12.7%	18.8%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%	14.4%
House of peace	7	5	0	1	13	1	0	0	0	1
	1.4%	1.8%	0.0%	1.8%	1.3%	2.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.1%
Eden on earth	6	6	3	1	16	0	0	1	0	1
	1.2%	2.2%	1.6%	1.8%	1.6%	0.0%	0.0%	8.3%	0.0%	1.1%
A city in Saudi Arabia	2	5	10	1	18	0	0	1	1	2
	0.4%	1.8%	5.4%	1.8%	1.8%	0.0%	0.0%	8.3%	16.7%	2.2%
House of war or the infidels' area	52	36	52	30	170	11	3	1	2	17
	10.3%	13.0%	28.0%	52.6%	16.6%	22.9%	12.5%	8.3%	33.3%	18.9%
Islamic Court	6	1	3	4	14	0	1	1	0	2
	1.2%	0.4%	1.6%	7.0%	1.4%	0.0%	4.2%	8.3%	0.0%	2.2%
No idea	327	198	117	20	662	27	16	8	3	54
	65.0%	71.5%	62.9%	35.1%	64.7%	56.3%	66.7%	66.7%	50.0%	60.0%
Total	503	277	186	57	1023	48	24	12	6	90
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The data reveals some differences between the respondents from Aarhus and other respondents. First of all, a rather small share (33.3% compared to 52.6%) of those in Group 4, among Aarhus respondents and all other respondents respectively, have the exact knowledge of the concept "Dar-Ul-Harb", which is a central issue related to political and militant Islam, dividing the world. On the other side we observe a larger share of Aarhus respondents who do know the right meaning of the concept without a Radical Islamic attitude (that is 22.9% among Aarhus' population compared to 10.3% among the rest of the population). Putting data from Group 3 and 4 together, it indicates that the share of those who know the right meaning of the concept of Dar-Ul-Harb, and at the same time express Radical Muslim views, are twice as large among all other respondents, compared to those from Aarhus. It could mean that knowledge of political Islam is not necessarily associated with Radical Muslim attitudes in Aarhus, while it is in other areas. We have to keep in mind that the majority of respondents with Radical Muslim attitudes are in and around Copenhagen. On the other hand it is too soon to conclude a relation between on one hand municipalities, where respondents live, and on the other hand whether knowledge of issues related to Radical Muslim attitudes are associated with Radical Muslim tendencies. We investigated the phenomenon further.

Keeping in mind that the correct answer to the question is The Battle of Badr, we found almost the same pattern; Respondents from Group 4 who live in the municipality of Aarhus, know obviously less about this issue too. Another issue is the meaning of Ummah; here we found the same tendencies. Respondents in Group 4 residing in Aarhus demonstrated a considerably lower rate of correct answering of the question: That is 66.7% for

Group 4 respondents residing in Aarhus, compared to 82.5% for the rest of the population.

Table 63 Knowledge regarding the war, where God sent 1000 angels to assist Muslim Muja-hidin in the battle against the infidels

| | Other municipalities (N – Aarhus) | | | | | Aarhus Municipality | | | | |
	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Total	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Total
Un-answered	103	26	1	0	130	9	4	0	0	13
	20.5%	9.4%	0.5%	0.0%	12.7%	18.8%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%	14.4%
Khey-bar	9	4	7	3	23	6	2	0	0	8
	1.8%	1.4%	3.8%	5.3%	2.2%	12.5%	8.3%	0.0%	0.0%	8.9%
Saf-fin	4	7	2	1	14	1	1	0	0	2
	0.8%	2.5%	1.1%	1.8%	1.4%	2.1%	4.2%	0.0%	0.0%	2.2%
U-hod	10	12	15	7	44	0	0	1	0	1
	2.0%	4.3%	8.1%	12.3%	4.3%	0.0%	0.0%	8.3%	0.0%	1.1%
Badr	43	44	70	28	185	4	1	4	2	11
	8.5%	15.9%	37.6%	49.1%	18.1%	8.3%	4.2%	33.3%	33.3%	12.2%
No idea	334	184	91	18	627	28	16	7	4	55
	66.4%	66.4%	48.9%	31.6%	61.3%	58.3%	66.7%	58.3%	66.7%	61.1%
Total	503	277	186	57	1023	48	24	12	6	90
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The same pattern goes for the knowledge of the Medina Constitution (Sahifat-al-Medina). The share of Group 4 respondent residing in Aarhus who came up with the correct answer is less than half of that of the rest of the population (16.7% compared to 35.1%).

An interesting phenomenon appears when we look at the question of whether female respondents in Aarhus and the rest of the municipalities (that is N – Aarhus) wear Hijabs:

First of all, almost no one among the population wears a Burqa/Nighab (2.3% of the female population). Looking at those who wear Hijabs fully, we found that a majority (71.4% of the Group 4 population (N – Aarhus) wear Hijabs fully. No one in Group 4 residing in Aarhus does that. On the other hand we found twice as large a share of Group 4 respondents residing in Aarhus (that is the other least radical groups) that actually fully wear the Hijab. That could indicate a more widespread Islamic conservatism/ traditionalism among young Muslims in Aarhus, without this behavioural feature having an influence on those respondents' attraction to a Radical Islam or Islamism

Taking a last instance of political and militant Islam, data indicates that no one in Aarhus picked the correct response option with regard to the question "What does Taliban mean?" Almost ¼ of Group 4 respondents in the rest of the country selected the correct answer.

Integration, Values and Behaviour

Looking at the priorities regarding learning a language other than the mother tongue, fluently, we observe major differences: Half of the Group 4 respondents from Aarhus prefer English. That goes for almost 5% of other Group 4 respondents. The other half would prefer Arabic, which goes for a majority of 2/3 of the Group 4 respondents in the rest of the country. No one in Group 4 from Aarhus would prefer Danish, but a tiny Group of respondents in Group 4 in the rest of the country do prefer to master Danish fluently.

Taking the data presented above into consideration, it seems that Group 4 respondents residing in Arhus have less knowledge regarding political and militant Islam, and that also goes for bearing symbols of Islam, such as a Hijab. It seems that Group 4 respondents in Aarhus also act to a lower degree in accordance with Islamic prescription. On the other hand, we observed no indication of a relationship between committing oneself to the Islamic code of conduct and Radical Muslim tendencies. It is actually the opposite of the pattern we observed among the rest of the population, where a large majority can be found in and around the capital.

In the following, we take a closer look at the issue of integration along with the parameters that have been defined in this study.

Looking at spare time jobs, data shows that those respondents in Group 4 who live in Arhus and work in immigrant-owned enterprises are 4 times larger than their equivalent in Group 1 (16.7% of Group 4 living in Aarhus are occupied in that kind of job relation whereas only 4.2% of Group 1 living in Aarhus work at an immigrant-owned business). Comparing that distribution to the equivalent for respondents in Group 4 living in other municipalities, we find that only a very small minority (3.5%) of those who have a spare time job work in a immigrant-owned enterprise. On the other hand, the share of those in Group 4 who have a spare time job in businesses owned by native Danes is almost the same as for the other groups as far as the distribution for all other municipalities than Aarhus is concerned. Respondents in Group 4 who live in Aarhus and have a job in a business owned by native Danes are considerably fewer than the equivalent Group 1 living in Aarhus and Group 4 living in other municipalities. At the same time, the relative share of respondents in Group 1, who do not have a spare time job, is half the population of this Group, as far as respondents living in Aarhus is concerned. That goes only for ¼ of respondents in Group 4 in all other areas than Aarhus.

With regard to another aspect of integration, that of the Danish language, we find that a majority of 68.4% of respondents in Group 4 living in all areas other than Aarhus, Always (56.1%) or Often (12.3%) use the Danish language when they work. That is only the case for 50.0% of Group 4 respondents who lives in Aarhus.

Looking at the use of the Danish language at home we find that 45.6% of the most Radical Muslims use Danish Always or Often, the equivalent for the Group 4 respondents living in Aarhus is only 16.7%. Looking at the distribution differently, half of the Group 4 res-

pondents living in Aarhus (50.0%) say that they Never or Seldom use Danish at home, whereas the equivalent for Group 4 living in all other areas is 21.0%.

With regard to the use of Danish in social relations and spare time activities, it seems that Group 4 respondents, who live in all other areas, (Respondents who Always or Often use Danish as the language of communication make up 84.2%) exceed their counterparts that live in Aarhus (the identical share here is 66.7%). Looking at the close friends, 21.1% of the Group 4 respondents in all areas other than Aarhus (and none among Group 4 living in Aarhus) say that the majority of their close friends are native Danes. On the other hand, over 63.3% and 83.3% of Group 4 (respectively from all other areas than Aarhus and Aarhus) say that the majority of their close friends have an immigrant background.

Immigrants' integration into the labour market in Denmark has traditionally been associated with the question of whether they extend the domain of religious prescription and codes of behaviours, and though their individual religious preferences to also be relevant in the public sphere (Habermas, 1995,
Banton, 1994), specifically that of the labour market, e.g. priorities regarding the type of job: As discussed before, certain job categories involve processes or results that according to many Muslims are in conflict with the world or the purpose of Sharia, e.g. Haram meat, interest rate (Reba'), alcohol servings in pubs, cafés and supermarkets, public appearances on television especially for females, etc. The multiple choice questionnaire was about whether the respondent would be against relatives working in certain areas, due to the idea that it is in conflict with the Islamic prescriptions:

Looking at the table we first of all observe that there is a close-to-perfection pattern among respondents in Other Areas: An upward sloping curve going from Group 1 to Group 4 with regard to whether the respondents experience involvement in the kind of job that is in conflict with their religious prescriptions (There is only one exception in column 3, row 1 in the table that shows the distribution for Other areas; Here we could expect that respondents in Group 3 would oppose involvement in those jobs to a higher degree).

The biggest opposition we find for respondents in Group 4 are in the categories: Danish Slaughter house, (71.9%) Danish Cafés (70.2%) and Danish Banks (36.8%).

Looking now at the other side of the table, the distribution for respondents who live in Aarhus, we find no pattern. On the other hand we find another probably more interesting phenomenon: Respondents in Group 3 represent a higher degree of opposition to those kinds of jobs in general. This could be an indication that Islamic Radicalisation goes hand in hand with the prescriptions of the Sharia, while there is no such relation in Aarhus: One can be more committed to Islamic prescriptions of values and behaviour without becoming radical for that reason.

Table 64 Would you find it in conflict with your religion that your relatives work in one of the following areas of occupation?

| | Other municipalities (N – Aarhus) | | | | | Aarhus Municipality | | | | |
	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Total	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Total
N	503	277	186	57	1023	48	24	12	6	90
A Danish Bank	8	11	14	21	54	0	1	1	0	2
	1.6%	4.0%	7.5%	36.8%	5.3%	0.0%	4.2%	8.3%	0.0%	2.2%
A Danish Supermarket	13	25	30	12	80	1	0	0	1	2
	2.6%	9.0%	16.1%	21.1%	7.8%	2.1%	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%	2.2%
A Danish Pub or Café	97	119	107	40	363	7	10	5	2	24
	19.3%	43.0%	57.5%	70.2%	35.5%	14.6%	41.7%	41.7%	33.3%	26.7%
A Danish Slaugther house	83	105	100	41	329	11	8	6	3	28
	16.5%	37.9%	53.8%	71.9%	32.2%	22.9%	33.3%	50.0%	50.0%	31.1%
Anchorman at a Danish Television network	10	14	12	8	44	1	1	1	0	3
	2.0%	5.1%	6.5%	14.0%	4.3%	2.1%	4.2%	8.3%	0.0%	3.3%
No Idea/Would not answer	248	92	43	7	390	16	7	4	2	29
	49.3%	33.2%	23.1%	12.3%	38.1%	33.3%	29.2%	33.3%	33.3%	32.2%

What popular television programmes/series is the respondent watching? Certain popular nationwide TV shows gather the nation, so to speak, and are often the issue people talk about and mirror themselves with.

We selected the most well-known and popular TV shows (relative in different categories) for the past 3 years to find out whether or not the respondents are viewing them.

With regard to the distribution for the whole population, we found that as far as popular TV series with a historical view ("Krønikken", "Matador") are concerned, there is a downward sloping curve, starting with Group 1 with the highest rate (3 times more at app. 15%) compared to Group 4 (app. 5%), with the lowest.

"Vild med Dans" is viewed by 33% of the respondents in Group 1 and 11% in Group 4. Other kinds of TV shows that could be categorised as a contemporary self-realisation programme ("Paradise Hotel", "Nikolaj & Julie", "Livvagterne", "Robinson", "X-factor", "Anna Pihl", "Smagsdommerne", "Forbrydelsen", "Rejseholdet" and "Go'morgen Danmark") has rather small or no differences at all.

It seems that Group 4 at the national level is distinct in a positive way from the other groups by rating highest in relation to quiz-programmes and specifically to News programmes (74.8% for Group 1 and 90.5% for Group 4). All in all, it is rather difficult to conclude any significant differences with regard to television preferences across the groups. Not finding a difference is actually interesting, due to the fact that we had an expectation that the Group 4 respondents would disassociate themselves from Danish television series, while they obviously do not.

Looking now at the distribution for respondents in Aarhus compared to other areas, we find no considerable differences between the distribution in Aarhus and the distribution at the national level: News programmes are more popular among Group 4 respondents in Aarhus, though a bit less, but in no way significantly. Furthermore, they watch TV-programmes that in their appearance, language and scenes could be understood as in disharmony with Islamic codes of behaviour and values. With regard to these programmes there is no coherence, what so ever, in terms of down- or upward curves in Aarhus, that is, though not coherent, somehow to observe with regard to distribution in "Other Areas."

Table 65 Television programmes and groups

| TV-Programs | Other municipalities (N – Aarhus) | | | | | Aarhus Municipality | | | | |
	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Total	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Total
N	503	277	186	57	1023	48	24	12	6	90
Krøniken	81	39	21	4	145	5	2	0	0	7
	16.1%	14.1%	11.3%	7.0%	14.2%	10.4%	8.3%	0.0%	0.0%	7.8%
Matador	85	40	16	4	145	8	2	0	0	10
	16.9%	14.4%	8.6%	7.0%	14.2%	16.7%	8.3%	0.0%	0.0%	11.1%
Paradise Hotel	186	88	50	17	341	12	9	6	1	28
	37.0%	31.8%	26.9%	29.8%	33.3%	25.0%	37.5%	50.0%	16.7%	31.1%
X-factor	287	168	90	25	570	24	16	10	2	52
	57.1%	60.6%	48.4%	43.9%	55.7%	50.0%	66.7%	83.3%	33.3%	57.8%
Tv-avisen & Nyhederne (The news)	383	232	144	52	811	29	19	9	5	62
	76.1%	83.8%	77.4%	91.2%	79.3%	60.4%	79.2%	75.0%	83.3%	68.9%
Livvagterne	91	39	26	10	166	4	2	2	0	8
	18.1%	14.1%	14.0%	17.5%	16.2%	8.3%	8.3%	16.7%	0.0%	8.9%
Nikolaj og Julie	80	39	11	6	136	5	1	0	1	7
	15.9%	14.1%	5.9%	10.5%	13.3%	10.4%	4.2%	0.0%	16.7%	7.8%
Forbrydelsen	83	41	23	5	152	10	6	2	1	19
	16.5%	14.8%	12.4%	8.8%	14.9%	20.8%	25.0%	16.7%	16.7%	21.1%
Vild med dans	170	89	43	7	309	12	7	4	0	23
	33.8%	32.1%	23.1%	12.3%	30.2%	25.0%	29.2%	33.3%	0.0%	25.6%
Hvem vil være millionær	288	159	103	34	584	19	13	9	3	44
	57.3%	57.4%	55.4%	59.6%	57.1%	39.6%	54.2%	75.0%	50.0%	48.9%
Robinson	155	85	58	18	316	12	7	6	0	25
	30.8%	30.7%	31.2%	31.6%	30.9%	25.0%	29.2%	50.0%	0.0%	27.8%
Smagsdom-merne	26	15	4	3	48	2	2	1	0	5
	5.2%	5.4%	2.2%	5.3%	4.7%	4.2%	8.3%	8.3%	0.0%	5.6%
Rejseholdet	111	57	27	11	206	7	4	0	0	11
	22.1%	20.6%	14.5%	19.3%	20.1%	14.6%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%	12.2%
Anna Pihl	166	95	56	18	335	11	7	7	2	27
	33.0%	34.3%	30.1%	31.6%	32.7%	22.9%	29.2%	58.3%	33.3%	30.0%
Go'Morgen Danmark	227	135	71	26	459	14	8	5	2	29
	45.1%	48.7%	38.2%	45.6%	44.9%	29.2%	33.3%	41.7%	33.3%	32.2%
None of these	29	15	10	3	57	2	2	0	1	5
	5.8%	5.4%	5.4%	5.3%	5.6%	4.2%	8.3%	0.0%	16.7%	5.6%
No idea	25	6	1	0	32	1	0	0	0	1
	5.0%	2.2%	0.5%	0.0%	3.1%	2.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.1%

5.5 The Character of Radicalisation in Practice

Following the test of hypotheses, the following compelling task was to find out how the participants, who in one way or another are met by the challenge of radicalisation, be it at a personal level as peers, friends, family and so on, as professionals somehow representing the formal institutions like teachers, social workers, psychologists, police officers etc., or finally as representatives of the informal institutions like Imams, leaders of civil society organisations including those with a religious agenda.

The following empirical findings are based on in-depth interviews with 13 representatives of each of the following groups, corresponding to categories mentioned above, e.g. young Muslims (peers, friends, and families), formal institutions, and informal institutions.

Thematically the in-depth interviews were circulating around 4 subjects: Motivation, Values/attitudes, Behaviours and finally Strategies:

Motivation factors (Push & Pull)

Group 1: Religious and organisational leaders and other experts

Among the most important push-factors is the most prominent in the form of discursive exclusion, explicit public announcement of Islam and principal of a Danish life as opposite poles.

Exclusion, especially among those involved in education also implies a lack of possibilities to get practical merits as part of their education.

The discriminatory generalisation of Islam and Muslims, nearly all forms of it, pushes the young Muslim to the extreme and motivates youth to seek alternative communities with different collective identities.

International conflicts: Is mainly expressed in the young Muslim's experience of what experts call injustice and differentiated and discriminatory bias against Muslim countries and Muslim population abroad. These acts of international discrimination make young Muslims feel they have to do certain things in order to increase their collective self esteem.

On the individual basis experts emphasise the issue of identity, having a standpoint and a general and fixed perspective to life and the world. This aspect as a push-factor combined with social groups who offer packages of simple and fixed identities in a changing world create good conditions for an increase in the radicalisation process.

Group 2: Young Muslims age 15-30

Almost all respondents in this group and a majority of them exclusively, emphasise exclusion as the most important push-factor.

The expression of the exclusion can be stigmatisation, and the practical experience of it discrimination. They feel that they are not accepted or respected for who they are, and

they experience a rather intense pressure with regard to changing their identity, in order to be accepted and respected.

A majority of these respondents emphasise the cartoon as a demonstration of power from the majority imposed on Muslims.

Many refer among push-factors to the Danish political and public debate on Islam and radicalisation that does not seem to stop.

Young Muslims usually get attracted to radicalisation because of a lack of identity and roots as well as insecurity – they do not fully belong in what they refer to as an exclusive national value-community. They emphasise the need to belong to something or some-where.

In addition it is rather easy to become a part of those societies, because the element of exclusion in the majority's society is actually what binds them together as the very common denominator: Islam.

The role of family and social networks is also emphasised.

Group 3: Professionals

A feeling of substantial exclusion from the community is also emphasised as the number one push factor by professionals.

According to their experiences, a feeling of being marginalised and feeling like "second-ranked citizens" is a common denominator and is widespread among young immigrants in general.

The expressions of this exclusion are difficulties in finding jobs, or to finish education when a period of internship is included.

They feel discriminated in general by an ongoing public debate where their view is not represented: They feel that the media talks about them – and not to them.

The professional almost exclusively emphasise the pull-factors as the most important factors – many of them state is as the only factor.

International conflicts, specifically that involving Israel and Palestine, is emphasised as the factor that continually and on a regular basis creates frustration, anger and aggression among Muslim youth towards the western world.

This frustration, along with the feeling of being excluded make the identity of a fighter, the one who fights for justice for their people, brothers and sisters in the Middle East, very attractive.

Values adopted during the process

Group 1: Religious and organisational leaders, and other experts

The process of radicalisation is characterised by efforts towards becoming a "true Muslim". That is adjustments of values in accordance with the Quran.

Most expressive is the voluntary and oppositional retreatment from parties that involve drinking alcohol, disassociation from individuals who do not share and join the same values, considering them "the ignorant", and the creation of "Us" and "Them", the true Muslims and the ignorant ones.

They oppose to the plurality of "the right way", moving from relativism to absolutism, leading to a disassociation towards democratic values both with regard to goals and the means.

Group 2: Young Muslims aged 15-30

The internal and exclusive solidarity is the arena, the domain and the values themselves.

The disassociation changes soon into hatred towards both the majority of the society and "the ignorant ones".

Accepting any "western values", what so ever is considered a disqualification.

The concept of "the good life" is defined based on the prescriptions of the Quran and Sharia, and it gives prestige to quote "the sources", Quran, and Sunna, and to refer to the prophet with utmost respect.

Group 3: Professionals

The professionals stress more the variation of values, as a dependent variable than that of the values of the specific groups.

They also stress that the individual who undergoes a process of radicalisation suddenly begins to value the family, they become more dedicated to their tasks, and they are pushed into a period of an overall reflexivity[9], and tend only as a passage towards committing themselves to absolute ideas, while they move away from the "Danish values".

Defining and identifying him/herself, the individual tends to a more macro-identity marker, more non-contextual identities, moving away from liquid identities like "student, worker, teacher, driver" to Muslim.

Also other macro-identifiers like "Man", "Husband", "Citizen", "Pakistani" to Muslim, as the overall identity.

Others among respondents refer to experiences, where these individuals develop an aggressive brotherhood, where they sort of become "outlaws". They don't feel committed to the society's standard of behaviour. And they appreciate "working against authorities."

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[9] This is not the kind of "reflexivity" that Giddens refers to as condition of the post-modern society.

Behavioural change during the process

Group 1: Religious and organisational leaders and other experts

They quit smoking and they stop drinking alcohol. They go to a Mosque more often.

They adapt to the religious way of saying hello or goodbye, or welcoming friends, by e.g. laying the hand on their heart. They dress in" Muslim" clothing. They stop shaving.

Many of the respondents warn that none of these behavioural attitudes necessarily indicate that the individual is a "Radical Muslim". It is the other way around:

The minority of the share of respondents in this group emphasise isolation as a typical behaviour among those who become recruited to radical networks. That is due to the increasing awareness of their priorities with regard to relation; whom they want to have an association with and whom they want to avoid. They usually spend most of their time with radical peers, where they according to some respondents develop a hateful or disgusted relationship towards authorities.

Group 2: Young Muslims age 15-30

These respondents emphasise the tendency among Radicalised Muslims to take religious matters and a religious worldview very seriously, and all kind of discussion with them suddenly turns into religious and political perspectives. Besides changing the way they dress and their physical appearances, they are usually very active in preaching and attempting to convince others to join their ideas about "the good life in accordance with Sharia".

Group 3: Professionals

The experience among professionals is that the radicalised individuals become more aggressive in their attitudes, presenting rather revolutionary ideas about overturning the existing order. Their language become harsh, their faces serious, they stick together with their own kind, collectively disassociate themselves from their old friends that do not join them, and recognisable for them by not going in the same clothes (with an explicit Muslim image).

Strategies to combat radicalisation

Group 1: Religious and organisational leaders and other experts

An overwhelming majority among this category of respondents find it necessary to make strategies towards a bigger inclusion of those radicalised or subject to the radicalisation process. On the macro level, they think of a more constructive public (media and political) discourse towards Islam would help.

One specific experience that professionals emphasise is to not hesitate to challenge each others' ideas and worldviews. They actually find tendencies, towards not confronting each other, dangerous.

If you want to do something about prejudices and generalisations, you should be ready to put it on the agenda for discussions and mutual reflections.

Group 2: Young Muslims age 15-30

Also respondents in this category emphasise the importance of dialogue, tolerance and inclusion. The individuals who are close to getting attracted to, or already are subject to radicalisation programs should get to know that there are several definitions of reality – that it is not fixed once for all, and that it is contextual. At the same time you should explicitly disassociate yourself from racism, ignorance and arrogance, otherwise you won't be able to get through to them. If they think you are on the same side as their enemies, they get the idea that there is nothing to be said. You should give them a feeling of being home in Denmark, even if they think completely different. The politicians and the media should get more pragmatic and present some more nuances when they argue for or against migration, integration and so forth.

Another strategic option, strongly recommended by respondents in this group, is to involve resourceful friends, colleagues, family members and relatives in the process. The best result would be created if the individuals who approach those radicals, that are Muslims themselves, can create an atmosphere of balanced dialogue, mutual respect, but represent another interpretation of the same holy book , Sunna, Sharia etc.

There should be more projects that involve the young Muslims, so that they can develop democratic identities, substantial citizenship, a sense of belonging and so forth.

A minority among respondents in this group experience that the educational merits can hinder the development of radicalisation.

Group 3: Professionals

Professionals find a change in the societal and political discourse on Islam very important.

Besides that, they find dialogue as the most effective means to combating radicalisation. According to them, there should be a much higher awareness of the problem and a presence of those that know how to combat the problem. They can among other things introduce a variety of informational sources for young Muslims and other youngsters, so that they do not easily accept a one-sided and hostile interpretation of things. They should also be in contact with families, as far as school children are concerned.

They also emphasise the importance of the Media that according to some respondents in this group by their specific perspective creates more distance.

6. Conclusions

The aim of this study, as mentioned in the introduction, was to provide empirical evidence on three aspects:

• Motivational factors influencing the process of radicalisation

- Values adopted through the process

- Behavioural preferences due to those adopted values.

Our general conclusion on these aspects, to be elaborated in the following, is that we, based on this specific study with its specific focus and methodology, have falsified certain ideas about *interrelations* between development of the Islamic-Radical worldview and certain other phenomena. On the other hand we have established incidents of interrelations too. When it comes to establishing patterns of inter-dependency understood as causal relationships, we are, we believe, at the very beginning of a long process. Due to the widespread fallacies dominating the field, we believe that the first step in this process should be a clarification of the very question of causality it self..

Our method in this study was to approach a clarification of motivation, values and behavioural preferences through a testing of the most widespread hypotheses or common sense views on Home-grown Islamic radicalisation.

Before presenting our conclusion on the core issues of this study, e.g. motivation, values and behaviour, we present our conclusion on the hypotheses.

H1. Integration: "Integration and tendencies toward Radical Islamism are correlated negatively."

With regard to a possible correlation between selected aspects of integration and Radical Islamic views we found:

- No correlation between leisure-time job, Radical Islamic attitudes and affiliation.
- No correlation between Danish language at work place and Radical Islamic attitudes.
- A weak negative correlation between use of the Danish language in the informal sphere (speaking Danish at home) and Radical Islamic views.
- No correlation between the use of Danish language in spare time and Radical Islamic views.
- A correlation between close friendship with natives and Radical Islamic views
- Strong correlation between Radical Islamic attitude and engagement in professional activities they experience as being in disharmony with the religious prescriptions.
- No correlation between following Danish popular television series and Radical Islamic attitudes.
- Strong correlation between Radical Islamic views and watching news programmes.
- A weak positive correlation between Radical Islamic attitudes and fluency in Danish.

Our conclusion is that the data does not provide empirical evidence on any significant relations between integration (measured by these parameters) and the adaptation of a Radical Islamic attitude. The lack of correlation and integration is further supported by other dimensions of integration we have dealt with in other categories, like Cultural Capital, Economic Capital and Social Capital, Intimate relations with natives, etc. in the following.

H2. **Cross-ethnic intimate relations:** "Lack of experience of cross-ethnic intimate relations (between immigrant and natives) has a positive impact on tendencies towards radical Islamism."

There is no empirical evidence supporting the idea that there is a positive relation between intimate relations with natives and Radical Islamic Attitudes. Rather surprisingly, the data shows that the experience of cross-ethnic intimate relations with native Danes is slightly more widespread among individuals belonging to Group 4 – the most radical (50.8% compared to those of Group 3, 29.8% and 40.1% for Group 1, the least radical ones).

H3. Birth Order: "The individual immigrant's birth order correlates somehow with tendencies towards radical Islamism."

According to our data there is a correlation between Radical Islamic Attitudes and Birth Order: Middle range children make up just above half of the group population (50.8%), which is a slightly larger share than the average of 44.4% would justify. On the other hand, the firstborns are obviously under represented in Group 4.

H4. Psychological profile: Experience of success: "The lack of socio-economic success (in terms of job, self-esteem, near-death experiences, loneliness, and satisfaction with life) correlate positively with tendencies toward radical Islamism."

- Self-esteem: We found that respondents in the most radical group are more represented among those who feel themselves as better as or worse than the others.
- Satisfaction with life in general: They are a bit more dissatisfied with life in general.
- They are more critical to the authorities and the media's way of dealing with and treating the issue of Islam and Muslims as a source of dissatisfaction.
- They are more occupied by the international conflicts in Muslim countries, specifically that of Israel/Palestine as a source of dissatisfaction and certainly that of Guantanamo.
- Spare time interests: The most radical ones have a considerably larger degree of interests that they are occupied with in their spare time.
- Community lifting activities: They are more active in activities that aim to improve other immigrants' integration and school records.
- Near-death experiences: Near-death experiences as a source of dissatisfaction is much more widespread among the most radical ones.
- Dissatisfaction with own life: They are considerably more dissatisfied by the course of their own lives.
- They feel much lonelier. (Conclusion on the following Hypothesis (H5) clearly indicate that one should distinguish between being alone, and the feeling of loneliness, two phenomena that with regard to the most radical group in no way correlate positively with each other – quite the contrary).
- They have experienced death in their families to a considerably higher degree.

- They have experienced a considerably higher degree of discrimination in daily life.
- They have been arrested by the police to a considerably higher degree.

Respondents in the most radical group are dissatisfied with life in general, mainly due to the feeling of loneliness, death of close family members, near-death experiences and dissatisfaction with their own lives, and experience both discrimination in their daily lives and being arrested by the police more often. But the interesting phenomenon is that they seemingly, in spite of the dissatisfaction and those experiences, more often have spare time interests, and are more often occupied by social lifting activities targeting immigrants that probably paradoxically enough could improve immigrants' integration defined as empowerment and socio-economic mobility. It is rather paradoxical that these activities and the engagement apparently do not lead to a higher degree of satisfaction. This paradox can probably be explained by social indignation that at the same time can motivate social action and dissatisfaction.

On the basis of these findings, it is impossible to provide any empirical support for the notion that radical tendencies are due to the individuals' characteristics. It should be obvious that any attempts to establish any kind of relation between the individual and the tendencies towards Radical Islamism should be based on a perception of the phenomenon as relational in the very best sense of the word.

H5. Social Capital: "There is a positive relation between distrust and lack of cross-ethnic networks and tendencies towards Radical Islamism."

Testing this hypothesis alongside the following parameters we found:

- Time spent with friends: There is no difference between groups with regard to the extent of time they spent with friends.

- Level of education among friends: The friends of the most radical ones are considerably better educated.

- Organised sport activities: The most radical ones participate to a lesser extent in organised sport activities with native Danes, but to a larger degree in equivalent activities with their fellow countrymen.

- Membership in cultural associations with Danes: A very small share of the whole population of young Muslims engage themselves in cultural activities with Danes. This is specifically the case for the most radical group.

- Membership of Religious associations: The most radical ones participate in a significantly higher degree in religious associations.

- With regard to participation in organisations we found a rather poor participation across all possible organisations.

- Engagement in community lifting at local level: We found small nuances across groups.

- Engagement in aid- and assistance associations with a global perspective targeted at poor and underprivileged Muslims: Also here the participation rate is rather poor; only 1.8% for the whole population, 3.2% for Group 4 and 1.5% for Group 1.

- Trust: Empirical evidence indicates a much lower trust in Danish Media among Group 4 than among other respondent groups. Evidence on the practical advantages of the social capital (the following) on the other hand indicates clearly that this distrust can not be taken as an indicator for lower social capital.

- Practical advantages of the social capital: The most radical group can to a considerable higher extent take advantage of their friendships with other immigrants when they need it. They also turn to friends of Danish decent when they need help with education and professional matters, to a higher degree. A very small share across all groups turn to fellow believers in those matters (an average of 1.8% for the whole population).

- Preferences in selecting close friends: The majority of all respondents find the personality most important when it comes to selecting friends. But the most radical group pay relatively much more attention to those individuals' religious belief (17.5% for Group 4 compared to only 1.1% for Group 1). On the other hand it seems that Group 4 to a greater degree find it important that the person has not been involved in criminal activities.

Our conclusion is that there is no evidence, whatsoever, supporting the idea that the most radical group suffer a shortage of social capital compared to the other groups – quite the contrary. It should be emphasised that we oppose to the idea presented by Putnam (1993) that social capital should be measured by their functionality with regard to certain goals, for instance that of democracy. Rather, we propose, whether there is a positive or a negative social capital should be measured with the subjective idea of "the good life" set by those in question.

H6. Economic capital: "Lack of economic capital (in terms of income, savings and wealth) correlate positively with tendencies towards Radical Islamism."

We found that respondents in the most radical group are relatively overrepresented among individuals who have higher incomes. If there is any relation between income and attitude, it is not about poverty, but the other way around. Supporting this idea, data also indicates that there is no indication for a relation between housing and radical attitudes. Taking economic capital as a relational matter, here with regard to opportunities for loan, we found, quite surprisingly, that respondents in the most radical group in a much higher degree will turn to close friends (15.9% compared to 4.9% for the least radical group), and they will turn to a bank to a much lower degree (9.5% compared to 22.7% for Group 1).

H7. Cultural capital: "Lack of educational merits and lack of cross-ethnic interest associations furthers the tendencies towards Islamic radicalism."

- With regard to current educational status we found a relative overrepresentation of respondents from the most radical group in the lower levels of education. Looking at the opposite end of the scale of current educations, e.g. longer educations, we found a relative underrepresentation of respondents with that level of education for Group 4 that is 5.7%, whereas it is 18.6% for Group 1.

   But the most radical groups are more typically represented in Medium Term academic/vocational educations. There is however no empirical evidence supporting the idea that members of the most radical group are more educated than the others.

- We did not find any evidence of considerable differences with regard to exam scores across the groups either.

- Neither did we find any significant differences with regard to the use of Danish national television channels (DR, TV2 and the like), and the same pattern of no difference goes for international television channels such as CNN and BBC.

- On the other hand we found a considerable difference with regard to consumption of Arabic channels such as Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabia, MBC and alike: A much bigger share of respondents in the most radical group watch those channels on a regular basis. On the other hand we found that a much lower share of the most radical group does not use television. That could actually mean that the most radical group are the most well-informed among the groups.

H8. Discrimination: "Experience of discrimination and tendencies towards radical Islamism are correlated positively."

- We measured the general, subjective, experience of discrimination followed by a concrete incidence of the experiences of the "Danish Marriage Act", that substantially has been targeting immigrants who marry individuals under the age of 24, residing abroad, and who want to settle down in Denmark as a couple.

- We found that a great majority of the respondents have never or almost never experienced discrimination in relation to work. With that being said, a bigger share of the respondents in the most radical group has experienced discrimination in work related situations now and then. But there is no empirical indication that the experiences of discrimination related to work situations have any influence on attitudes towards radicalised Islam. That is also the case with regard to the specific experience of the Danish marriage act.

H9. Religious attitude and behaviour: "Religious knowledge and commitment with regard to faith and praxis and the tendencies towards radical Islamism are correlated positively."

- With regard to choice of school, we found that members of the most radical group are rather indifferent to the ethnic or national background composition of the pupils, but they would at a much higher degree choose a school with an Islamic orientation. That goes for marriage as well. It seems that they distinguish themselves from the other groups remarkably only with regard to the religious belief and commitment of the coming bride/groom.

- A majority of respondents in the most radical group declare themselves completely agreeing that the Muslim immigrants should follow Islam (that is a very big share compared to respondents in the least radical group in a situation where national law contradicts with Islamic law). Also a considerable minority of the most radical group take the extreme attitude towards those who convert to other religions. Besides, an overwhelming majority of the most radicals oppose the idea that one can do certain things, prohibited according to Sharia, such as drinking alcohol etc. and still call themselves Muslims.

- With regard to the roles of Imams and Mosques we find an upward sloping curve, starting lowest for Group 1 and highest for Group 4 – twice as big as the average about – 30% for the whole population.

Also with regard to resolving religious questions we find that the share of respondents in Group 4 who turn to Imams to resolve religious question is about 9 times bigger than the equivalent for those in Group 1.

Respondents in the most radical group more often have questions of a religious character that they seek to solve, and about half of the respondents in Group 4 go to the Mosque once a week at minimum.

- A majority of respondents (68.3%) in the most radical group experience becoming more religious in the last 3 years. Only 15.9% of the least radical Group 1 has had that experience. We also observe the same pattern, almost geometrically complete upward curve with regard to taking private courses and study circles in religion, reading books and journals on Islam. The interesting phenomenon is that Group 4 and Group 1 are very close to each other with regard to the share that has never read the Quran.

- Representatives of "true" Islam pointing out a single individual that enjoy the affiliation of respondents across the groups is the only ethnic Dane Imam Abdul Vahid Petersen, who at an average has been selected by 18.2% of the respondents – almost evenly across groups. The other striking point to be highlighted is that over half of all the respondents find no one among the presented options as the best representative of Islam in Denmark, but with major variation between the groups.

- We found that respondents in the most radical group are generally much more committed to religious duties like paying Zakat and Khoms, daily prayer, participation in Juma prayer, fasting, and prayer/petition than the other groups.

H10 Global attitudes, Philanthropy and social engagement: "Philanthropic attitude, sense of justice and local social engagement goes hand in hand with tendencies towards Radical Islamism among Muslim immigrants."

We found that respondents with the strongest Radical Islamic affiliations are the least philanthropic with regard to the problem of poverty and hunger in the world; they are not concerned with global Economic recession and global unemployment, only a bit more occupied with the general injustice in the world, but more occupied by the occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan. On the other hand their sense of philanthropy is more directed towards disaster, inequality, injustice and poverty in Muslim countries. They do not donate to general national or global purposes. And many of them do not vote for national and local elections. Those who do, on the other hand, do not follow the general pattern of the population in general which is, with some exceptions, more or less identical to that of young Muslims.

H11. Diaspora: "Muslim immigrants become more radical because they miss their native country."

We found that individuals with the strongest affiliation with Radical Islamic views can not in any way be considered as Diaspora-people as far as the term is defined in relation to ethnic or native country. They are a specific kind of "globalists" occupied by global problems concerning Muslims, and they do not feel displaced or alienated in Denmark – a feature they share with the totality of the survey population. Furthermore, they are actually among those who less often visit their country of origin.

H12. Formal and Substantial Citizenship: "There is a positive relation between lack of formal and substantial citizenship and tendencies towards Radical Islamism."

We found that the legal status does not have any impact on the attitudes that have been the basic for group categorisation. With regard to Substantial citizenship, on the other hand, we found that a much larger share of respondents in the most radical group identify themselves in relation to the country of origin – and not to Denmark.

H13. Life form: "Life form and tendencies towards Radical Islamism are somehow correlated: Wage-earners are more disposed to Radical Islamism."

We found that a considerably large share of respondents in the most radical group have had a father who was a wage-earner as a public or quasi-public officeholder. Besides the relative share of wage-earners that are Publicly or Semi-Publicly employed, there is a considerably larger share in the group than the average.

Motivating factors

Our first main question was: "What motivates the attraction to Radical Islam?"

Due to the hypothesis testing exercise we have done in this study, we know by now that Radical Muslims share some features that differentiate them from all the other groups. We

also know that in general, and with regard to many aspects, we have observed upward sloping curves and downward sloping curves in a rather consistent way. We know that Radical Muslims go to Mosques more often, they are more often the middle child, they are more often children of wage earning fathers, and they make up a relatively larger share among certain national origins, certain urban areas, and many other features. We also know, on the other hand, that many hypotheses/ideas must in the light of the empirical findings of this study be considered as more or less theoretical speculations. Has this knowledge brought us closer to the identification of the causes of Islamic Radicalisation?

The answer is No – the answer is Yes. And it is most probably a wrong question to ask! And all these three answers are usable.

No. We haven't gotten any closer to the identification of the causes of Radical Islamism. Radicalisation, like any other sociological phenomenon, is the product of social interactions. Radicalisation, on the other hand, is the cause of other tendencies and phenomena. Do people become more radicalised because they go to the Mosque more often? Or do they go to the Mosque more often because they submit a radical interpretation of Islam?

Through our hypothesis testing we have established statistical correlations or the lack there of e.g. phenomena that perform together. But it does not mean that one, for example, going to the Mosque, is the cause of the other, becoming more radicalised. This is elementary methodology, nevertheless very useful to remember when investigating the issue of radicalisation, just to avoid the absurdity of declaring that exogenous macro level phenomena like political, economic and cultural factors do not have any direct impact on radicalisation of Muslim youth (in Denmark or any other places). There is no way to make sure, and no way to falsify, or for that matter verify that idea. That brings such a statement very close to a 'non-sense' proclamation that both positivists and critical rationalists have warned us about. Yes the answer is no, but let us acknowledge that this very basic realisation can actually have some very useful practical implications. To begin with we could ask: by questioning: How can we make sure that common occurrences (like that of radicalisation and going to the Mosque, radicalisation and being from Somalia as a national background, radicalisation and living in certain urban areas, radicalisation and the concern for Muslims in other countries, and the others established in this study) do not happen?

Yes. We have actually come closer to the causes of Radicalisation. We have done that by falsifying many common sense hypotheses about radicalisation. We know for instance, that there is no positive relation between socio-economic and even cultural integration, on the one hand, and not being radicalised on the other. This process of falsification, that we believe is the major contribution of our study, will sharpen the focus on factors at all levels, macro, meso and micro, that probably have major impacts on the process of radicalisation of Muslim youths.

And the question "What factors create radicalisation?" is probably the wrong question. The right question is probably "What other phenomenon occurs together with radicalisation?" This study has illustrated many of them, and many others have not been investigated.

Values adopted through the process

The second main task was to find out what attitudes and values characterise a Radical Muslim.

- First of all, in relation to our efforts to identify "the most radical group", we actually operated with multi-response questionnaires. Some responses were related to the individual respondent's attitudes, others to hypothetical action preferences.

- Obviously they appreciate the respect for religious belief more than they do the respect for freedom of speech.

- They value commitment to Islamic prescription much higher than to that of society. They value the words of God much higher than the words of people.

- They value the interests of Islam more than their own interests or those of their family and friends. In other words, they will under certain circumstances not act in order to maximise their own benefit, rational or pragmatic/functional, but rather ideologically.

- They will be supportive and sympathetic to the struggle for establishing the Islamic state.

- They believe that Sharia must be the guideline for the daily priorities.

- They value the social and political aspect of jihad high and also the aspect of self-realisation.

- They value the missionary aspect of Islam higher, and base a great deal of their identities on Islam.

- They find the distinction between a true/righteous Muslim and a false Muslim important as an instance of identification, and they recognise and value righteousness in relation to those individuals' explicit commitment to the religion. They are not sympathetic to individuals only because of their Muslim faith, and certainly not to their national background, but on the basis of those individuals' actual behaviour.

- They are explicitly sympathetic and supportive to the Muslims' struggle against western powers in other countries.

- They will explicitly join the idea of moving to/settling in a Muslim country, if the country introduced certain interpretation of Sharia. They would at a minimum be envious to those who do that.

- They know much more about the political elements of Islam, and they feel they are part of a global value conflict. Having that attitude, they are less interested in an active way towards national policies that do not involve the value conflict.

- They think that Muslims should involve themselves in politics, but the arena of politics is considered as a battleground for conflicting values.

These are only the most expressive manifestations of Radical Islamic tendencies. It is possible, we believe, on the basis of our study to produce a more comprehensive and much more detailed guideline/to recognise, identify, categorise and evaluate Radical Islamic tendencies among collectives, networks and also at the individual level. Saying this we should emphasise, as this study has shown, that there is no positive relation between Integration and Radical Islamism, or the other way around, between Radical Islamic Tendencies and Integration. To understand this, one should consider the paradoxical issue of the selection of loyalty strategies, at the national level, mainly as a response to the formal and informal institutions' practice, as we have described in 2007 (See also Sheffer, 2003). Otherwise the selection between Ambivalent, Divided or Dual loyalties in relation to the national and international context could be explained/studied as a response to internal and external identification through their affiliation with globally conflicting blocks.

Behavioural preferences due to those adopted values

The third empirical question we asked in this study was: "how the values and attitudes adopted manifest themselves in the collectives' or the individuals' behaviour".

Our qualitative research following the survey has shown that all three groups of respondents, (Religious and organisational leaders and other experts, Young Muslims aged 15-30, and Professionals) have almost identical observations, experiences and perception of behavioural changes due to the process of Islamic Radicalisation:

First of all, one would observe as an indication of Islamic Radicalisation that the individual in question would stop participating in and actively disassociate themselves from a range of phenomena that are considered "normal" for young people, such as drinking, smoking, dancing, going to parties that involve contact with the opposite sex, and so forth.

It should be emphasised that the occurrence of such behavioural changes cannot by itself be taken as an indicator for involvement in a radicalisation process. But when a change in attitude, values and corresponding behaviour is observed, it would strengthen that idea. This condition goes for any other phenomenon mentioned below. It is the parallel occurrence, or combined appearance of changes in attitudes, values and behaviour that is important.

- They would go to the Mosque more often and express preferences with regard to what Mosque they find to be the more right one and on the basis of what criteria.

- They would change their personal dress code. They adapt certain religious ways of saying hello and goodbye, and welcoming friends, for instances by laying a hand on their chest/heart, and they will stop shaving, or do that in certain ways. They would usually call each other brother and sister, and by their behavioural preference they would underline their priorities with regard to substantial membership of certain religious groups. The most radical ones will stop looking at or into the eyes of the opposite sex.

- They become more selective, evaluative and aware of what they are doing and whether or not the things they are doing at the time, or are about to do, are in accordance with the behavioural prescriptions of the Quran. They spend more and more time with their fellow believers, they express a specific kind of disgust or disassociation with authorities, and they get more analytical.

- They divide the world into an "Us" and "Them", not only by their attitudes, but also by actual behavioural preferences: where to go, what to eat, whom to talk to and so forth.

- Another expression of Radical Islamic tendencies is their quite unstoppable desire to turn any discussion into a religious and political one, and involve the issues of morality, ethics and societal, religious and individual responsibility in it, usually preaching the distinction between right and wrong, between justice and injustice, legitimate and illegitimate and the definition of "the good life".

Professionals experience that individuals in a radicalisation process become more aggressive due to their eagerness to proclaim their new worldviews, presenting rather revolutionary ideas about overturning the existing order.

- Their language becomes harsh, their faces serious, they stick with their own kind, collectively disassociate themselves from their old friends that do not join them and recognisable for them by not going in the same clothes (with an explicit Muslim image).

- They take religious duties more and more seriously, and according to the survey they go to Juma more often, get more interested in news from abroad, and disassociate themselves with the specific version of the truth that is broadcasted in national news programmes.

As with the attitudes and values adopted, these are the most expressive manifestations of Radical Islamic behaviours. It is possible, we believe, on the basis of our study to produce a more comprehensive and much more detailed guideline to recognising, identifying, categorising and evaluating Radical Islamic tendencies among collectives, networks and also at the individual level, with regard to behaviour.

Turning back to our introductory notions and Islamic Radicalisation as a sociological phenomenon, it is our conclusion that the form, content, degree and expression of Radical

Islamic Tendencies can be different in different contexts. The case study of Aarhus serves as a good example of this. Taking up just one of the instances from this study, going to the Mosque is more an indicator of becoming more of an Islamic Radical in general, than it is the case in Aarhus, as the empirical evidence indicates.

With regard to Values and Behaviours, we would drag the attention to our introductory categorisation of Young Muslims alongside the axes Religiosity and Politicisation of Religious as follows:

- Fundamentalist/Conservative Muslims will take religion seriously, it would shape their values and behaviour, but not in an outwardly visible way.

- Islamists' values would be shaped by Islam to a much lesser extent. They would submit to the purpose of Sharia, instead of the word of it. They would be more easy-going and more participatory in all areas of social activities.

- Radicals would take the Sharia literally, emphasising the word of the Sharia. They would think, talk and act in accordance with the most rigid interpretation of Islam.

- The Rebellious would not adopt the Islamic values, nor would it bother them to act in accordance with Sharia and Islamic values. They would not be committed to religious obligations. They would be more expressive with regard to their dissatisfaction with local and national matters, and they would use Islam as a means of expressing their dissatisfaction with the existing world order, sometimes even more radical than the Radical Muslims.

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Appendices

Appendix 1 Telephone calls – Overview

Outcome name	Total calls	Percentage
Connection reached	1272	13.1%
Appointment - sure	13	0.1%
Busy	12	0.1%
Call again later (appointment)	94	1.0%
No answer	629	6.5%
Wrong number	2133	21.9%
Refusal - time	548	5.6%
Refusal - principal	1058	10.9%
Outside targetgroup	2371	24.4%
Respondent not available (sick, traveling etc.)	44	0.5%
Not private household	24	0.2%
Laps - language	183	1.9%
Firmaet eksisterer ikke/er lukket	8	0.1%
Er allerede interviewet	82	0.8%
Number failed after max calls	1266	13.0%
Total	9737	100.0%

Appendix 2 Postcodes and Groups

		Group				
		1	2	3	4	Total
0	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0.20%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.10%
50	Count	0	0	1	0	1
	% within Group	0.00%	0.00%	0.50%	0.00%	0.10%
1000	Count	0	1	0	0	1
	% within Group	0.00%	0.30%	0.00%	0.00%	0.10%
1014	Count	2	0	1	0	3
	% within Group	0.40%	0.00%	0.50%	0.00%	0.30%
1017	Count	0	0	0	1	1
	% within Group	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.60%	0.10%
1123	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0.20%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.10%
1308	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0.20%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.10%
1367	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0.20%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.10%
1561	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0.20%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.10%
1620	Count	1	3	0	0	4
	% within Group	0.20%	1.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.40%
1650	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0.20%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.10%
1661	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0.20%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.10%
1663	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
1705	Count	0	0	1	0	1
	% within Group	0,00%	0,00%	0,50%	0,00%	0,10%
1720	Count	0	1	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,00%	0,30%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
1721	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
1758	Count	0	1	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,00%	0,30%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
1762	Count	0	0	1	0	1
	% within Group	0,00%	0,00%	0,50%	0,00%	0,10%
1800	Count	0	1	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,00%	0,30%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
1819	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
1864	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
1900	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
1999	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%

2000	Count	13	3	5	1	22
	% within Group	2,40%	1,00%	2,50%	1,60%	2,00%
2100	Count	4	2	6	1	13
	% within Group	0,70%	0,70%	3,00%	1,60%	1,20%
2160	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
2200	Count	23	19	16	2	60
	% within Group	4,20%	6,30%	8,10%	3,20%	5,40%
2300	Count	18	9	11	3	41
	% within Group	3,30%	3,00%	5,60%	4,80%	3,70%
2400	Count	25	10	8	3	46
	% within Group	4,50%	3,30%	4,00%	4,80%	4,10%
2410	Count	0	0	1	0	1
	% within Group	0,00%	0,00%	0,50%	0,00%	0,10%
2450	Count	5	4	3	0	12
	% within Group	0,90%	1,30%	1,50%	0,00%	1,10%
2500	Count	18	8	8	3	37
	% within Group	3,30%	2,70%	4,00%	4,80%	3,30%
2520	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
2600	Count	8	5	1	1	15
	% within Group	1,50%	1,70%	0,50%	1,60%	1,30%
2605	Count	2	4	0	1	7
	% within Group	0,40%	1,30%	0,00%	1,60%	0,60%
2610	Count	12	4	4	1	21
	% within Group	2,20%	1,30%	2,00%	1,60%	1,90%
2620	Count	7	4	3	2	16
	% within Group	1,30%	1,30%	1,50%	3,20%	1,40%
2625	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
2630	Count	14	8	4	8	34
	% within Group	2,50%	2,70%	2,00%	12,70%	3,10%
2635	Count	9	8	2	0	19
	% within Group	1,60%	2,70%	1,00%	0,00%	1,70%
2640	Count	4	2	1	1	8
	% within Group	0,70%	0,70%	0,50%	1,60%	0,70%
2650	Count	8	11	5	0	24
	% within Group	1,50%	3,70%	2,50%	0,00%	2,20%
2655	Count	0	1	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,00%	0,30%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
2660	Count	10	8	5	1	24
	% within Group	1,80%	2,70%	2,50%	1,60%	2,20%
2665	Count	3	2	0	0	5
	% within Group	0,50%	0,70%	0,00%	0,00%	0,40%
2670	Count	6	2	5	1	14
	% within Group	1,10%	0,70%	2,50%	1,60%	1,30%
2680	Count	0	2	0	0	2
	% within Group	0,00%	0,70%	0,00%	0,00%	0,20%
2690	Count	1	0	1	0	2
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,50%	0,00%	0,20%
2700	Count	9	8	3	2	22

	% within Group	1,60%	2,70%	1,50%	3,20%	2,00%
2720	Count	1	1	3	0	5
	% within Group	0,20%	0,30%	1,50%	0,00%	0,40%
2730	Count	7	2	4	1	14
	% within Group	1,30%	0,70%	2,00%	1,60%	1,30%
2740	Count	1	0	1	1	3
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,50%	1,60%	0,30%
2750	Count	7	2	5	1	15
	% within Group	1,30%	0,70%	2,50%	1,60%	1,30%
2765	Count	0	1	1	0	2
	% within Group	0,00%	0,30%	0,50%	0,00%	0,20%
2770	Count	5	2	3	0	10
	% within Group	0,90%	0,70%	1,50%	0,00%	0,90%
2780	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
2800	Count	9	2	1	0	12
	% within Group	1,60%	0,70%	0,50%	0,00%	1,10%
2830	Count	1	1	0	0	2
	% within Group	0,20%	0,30%	0,00%	0,00%	0,20%
2840	Count	0	1	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,00%	0,30%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
2850	Count	2	0	2	0	4
	% within Group	0,40%	0,00%	1,00%	0,00%	0,40%
2860	Count	6	3	3	3	15
	% within Group	1,10%	1,00%	1,50%	4,80%	1,30%
2880	Count	2	2	0	1	5
	% within Group	0,40%	0,70%	0,00%	1,60%	0,40%
2900	Count	1	1	0	0	2
	% within Group	0,20%	0,30%	0,00%	0,00%	0,20%
2920	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
2970	Count	2	1	1	0	4
	% within Group	0,40%	0,30%	0,50%	0,00%	0,40%
2980	Count	1	1	3	0	5
	% within Group	0,20%	0,30%	1,50%	0,00%	0,40%
2990	Count	2	1	1	1	5
	% within Group	0,40%	0,30%	0,50%	1,60%	0,40%
3000	Count	5	3	2	1	11
	% within Group	0,90%	1,00%	1,00%	1,60%	1,00%
3050	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
3200	Count	2	1	1	0	4
	% within Group	0,40%	0,30%	0,50%	0,00%	0,40%
3230	Count	0	1	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,00%	0,30%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
3300	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
3360	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
3400	Count	3	1	0	0	4
	% within Group	0,50%	0,30%	0,00%	0,00%	0,40%

3450	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
3460	Count	2	0	0	0	2
	% within Group	0,40%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,20%
3500	Count	1	1	1	0	3
	% within Group	0,20%	0,30%	0,50%	0,00%	0,30%
3520	Count	4	3	1	1	9
	% within Group	0,70%	1,00%	0,50%	1,60%	0,80%
3550	Count	0	2	0	0	2
	% within Group	0,00%	0,70%	0,00%	0,00%	0,20%
3600	Count	1	0	0	1	2
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	1,60%	0,20%
3650	Count	0	1	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,00%	0,30%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
3660	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
3700	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
3720	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
4000	Count	10	1	0	0	11
	% within Group	1,80%	0,30%	0,00%	0,00%	1,00%
4020	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
4070	Count	0	1	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,00%	0,30%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
4100	Count	1	4	1	1	7
	% within Group	0,20%	1,30%	0,50%	1,60%	0,60%
4160	Count	2	0	0	0	2
	% within Group	0,40%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,20%
4180	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
4200	Count	6	5	7	0	18
	% within Group	1,10%	1,70%	3,50%	0,00%	1,60%
4220	Count	2	3	1	0	6
	% within Group	0,40%	1,00%	0,50%	0,00%	0,50%
4270	Count	0	1	1	0	2
	% within Group	0,00%	0,30%	0,50%	0,00%	0,20%
4300	Count	6	6	3	0	15
	% within Group	1,10%	2,00%	1,50%	0,00%	1,30%
4330	Count	1	0	0	1	2
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	1,60%	0,20%
4340	Count	0	1	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,00%	0,30%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
4400	Count	2	1	0	2	5
	% within Group	0,40%	0,30%	0,00%	3,20%	0,40%
4450	Count	0	2	0	0	2
	% within Group	0,00%	0,70%	0,00%	0,00%	0,20%
4500	Count	0	0	1	0	1
	% within Group	0,00%	0,00%	0,50%	0,00%	0,10%
4520	Count	1	0	0	0	1

	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
4550	Count	2	0	0	0	2
	% within Group	0,40%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,20%
4600	Count	2	4	3	0	9
	% within Group	0,40%	1,30%	1,50%	0,00%	0,80%
4620	Count	0	1	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,00%	0,30%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
4681	Count	0	1	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,00%	0,30%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
4683	Count	0	0	1	0	1
	% within Group	0,00%	0,00%	0,50%	0,00%	0,10%
4690	Count	2	0	0	0	2
	% within Group	0,40%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,20%
4700	Count	4	1	1	0	6
	% within Group	0,70%	0,30%	0,50%	0,00%	0,50%
4760	Count	2	1	0	0	3
	% within Group	0,40%	0,30%	0,00%	0,00%	0,30%
4800	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
4850	Count	0	0	1	0	1
	% within Group	0,00%	0,00%	0,50%	0,00%	0,10%
4900	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
4960	Count	0	1	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,00%	0,30%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
5000	Count	11	2	1	2	16
	% within Group	2,00%	0,70%	0,50%	3,20%	1,40%
5042	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
5062	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
5100	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
5200	Count	4	0	1	0	5
	% within Group	0,70%	0,00%	0,50%	0,00%	0,40%
5210	Count	3	0	0	0	3
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,50%	0,00%	0,20%
5220	Count	3	1	2	0	6
	% within Group	0,50%	0,30%	1,00%	0,00%	0,50%
5227	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
5230	Count	5	1	1	0	7
	% within Group	0,90%	0,30%	0,50%	0,00%	0,60%
5240	Count	6	6	3	0	15
	% within Group	1,10%	2,00%	1,50%	0,00%	1,30%
5250	Count	2	3	0	0	5
	% within Group	0,40%	1,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,40%
5260	Count	1	1	3	0	5
	% within Group	0,20%	0,30%	1,50%	0,00%	0,40%
5270	Count	0	1	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,00%	0,30%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%

5471	Count	2	0	0	0	2
	% within Group	0,40%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,20%
5492	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
5550	Count	1	0	1	0	2
	% within Group	0,50%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,30%
5220	Count	3	1	2	0	6
	% within Group	0,50%	0,30%	1,00%	0,00%	0,50%
5227	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
5230	Count	5	1	1	0	7
	% within Group	0,90%	0,30%	0,50%	0,00%	0,60%
5240	Count	6	6	3	0	15
	% within Group	1,10%	2,00%	1,50%	0,00%	1,30%
5250	Count	2	3	0	0	5
	% within Group	0,40%	1,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,40%
5260	Count	1	1	3	0	5
	% within Group	0,20%	0,30%	1,50%	0,00%	0,40%
5270	Count	0	1	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,00%	0,30%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
5471	Count	2	0	0	0	2
	% within Group	0,40%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,20%
5492	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
5700	Count	0	1	1	0	2
	% within Group	0,00%	0,30%	0,50%	0,00%	0,20%
5705	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
5800	Count	0	0	1	0	1
	% within Group	0,00%	0,00%	0,50%	0,00%	0,10%
5854	Count	0	1	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,00%	0,30%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
5900	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
5953	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
6000	Count	6	1	2	1	10
	% within Group	1,10%	0,30%	1,00%	1,60%	0,90%
6100	Count	2	2	0	0	4
	% within Group	0,40%	0,70%	0,00%	0,00%	0,40%
6200	Count	2	2	0	0	4
	% within Group	0,40%	0,70%	0,00%	0,00%	0,40%
6210	Count	0	1	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,00%	0,30%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
6230	Count	0	1	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,00%	0,30%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
6263	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
6270	Count	2	0	0	0	2
	% within Group	0,40%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,20%
6300	Count	0	0	1	0	1

	% within Group	0,00%	0,00%	0,50%	0,00%	0,10%
6400	Count	5	2	0	0	7
	% within Group	0,90%	0,70%	0,00%	0,00%	0,60%
6510	Count	0	0	1	0	1
	% within Group	0,00%	0,00%	0,50%	0,00%	0,10%
6580	Count	0	1	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,00%	0,30%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
6600	Count	1	0	0	1	2
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	1,60%	0,20%
6622	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
6640	Count	0	1	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,00%	0,30%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
6670	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Gruppe	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
6700	Count	1	2	1	0	4
	% within Gruppe	0,20%	0,70%	0,50%	0,00%	0,40%
6705	Count	6	3	0	1	10
	% within Gruppe	1,10%	1,00%	0,00%	1,60%	0,90%
6710	Count	0	2	0	0	2
	% within Gruppe	0,00%	0,70%	0,00%	0,00%	0,20%
6760	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Gruppe	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
6770	Count	0	0	1	0	1
	% within Gruppe	0,00%	0,00%	0,50%	0,00%	0,10%
6800	Count	0	1	0	1	2
	% within Gruppe	0,00%	0,30%	0,00%	1,60%	0,20%
6950	Count	3	1	0	0	4
	% within Gruppe	0,50%	0,30%	0,00%	0,00%	0,40%
7000	Count	3	0	0	0	3
	% within Gruppe	0,50%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,30%
7100	Count	9	5	2	1	17
	% within Gruppe	1,60%	1,70%	1,00%	1,60%	1,50%
7150	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Gruppe	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
7190	Count	2	0	0	0	2
	% within Group	0,40%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,20%
7200	Count	1	0	0	1	2
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	1,60%	0,20%
7400	Count	9	3	0	0	12
	% within Group	1,60%	1,00%	0,00%	0,00%	1,10%
7430	Count	3	1	3	0	7
	% within Group	0,50%	0,30%	1,50%	0,00%	0,60%
7441	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
7500	Count	5	6	1	0	12
	% within Group	0,90%	2,00%	0,50%	0,00%	1,10%
7700	Count	2	1	0	0	3
	% within Group	0,40%	0,30%	0,00%	0,00%	0,30%
7760	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%

7800	Count	0	3	1	0	4
	% within Group	0,00%	1,00%	0,50%	0,00%	0,40%
7860	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
7900	Count	0	0	1	0	1
	% within Group	0,00%	0,00%	0,50%	0,00%	0,10%
8000	Count	8	2	1	1	12
	% within Group	1,50%	0,70%	0,50%	1,60%	1,10%
8010	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
8200	Count	4	3	0	0	7
	% within Group	0,70%	1,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,60%
8210	Count	14	8	2	2	26
	% within Group	2,50%	2,70%	1,00%	3,20%	2,30%
8220	Count	7	6	8	3	24
	% within Group	1,30%	2,00%	4,00%	4,80%	2,20%
8230	Count	2	0	1	0	3
	% within Group	0,40%	0,00%	0,50%	0,00%	0,30%
8240	Count	4	0	0	0	4
	% within Group	0,70%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,40%
8260	Count	5	3	0	0	8
	% within Group	0,90%	1,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,70%
8270	Count	3	0	0	0	3
	% within Group	0,50%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,30%
8350	Count	0	1	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,00%	0,30%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
8355	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
8381	Count	3	1	0	0	4
	% within Group	0,50%	0,30%	0,00%	0,00%	0,40%
8400	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
8450	Count	0	0	1	0	1
	% within Group	0,00%	0,00%	0,50%	0,00%	0,10%
8500	Count	2	1	0	0	3
	% within Group	0,40%	0,30%	0,00%	0,00%	0,30%
8520	Count	0	1	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,00%	0,30%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
8600	Count	0	2	0	0	2
	% within Group	0,00%	0,70%	0,00%	0,00%	0,20%
8660	Count	5	0	0	0	5
	% within Group	0,90%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,40%
8680	Count	0	1	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,00%	0,30%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
8700	Count	2	3	2	0	7
	% within Group	0,40%	1,00%	1,00%	0,00%	0,60%
8722	Count	2	0	0	0	2
	% within Group	0,40%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,20%
8740	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
8780	Count	1	0	0	0	1

	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
8800	Count	2	2	1	0	5
	% within Group	0,40%	0,70%	0,50%	0,00%	0,40%
8840	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
8870	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
8900	Count	2	0	0	0	2
	% within Group	0,40%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,20%
8920	Count	2	0	0	0	2
	% within Group	0,40%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,20%
8930	Count	2	1	0	0	3
	% within Group	0,40%	0,30%	0,00%	0,00%	0,30%
8981	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
9000	Count	4	1	0	1	6
	% within Group	0,70%	0,30%	0,00%	1,60%	0,50%
9210	Count	5	1	1	0	7
	% within Group	0,90%	0,30%	0,50%	0,00%	0,60%
9220	Count	1	0	1	1	3
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,50%	1,60%	0,30%
9300	Count	0	1	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,00%	0,30%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
9382	Count	0	0	1	0	1
	% within Group	0,00%	0,00%	0,50%	0,00%	0,10%
9400	Count	3	2	1	0	6
	% within Group	0,50%	0,70%	0,50%	0,00%	0,50%
9500	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
9670	Count	0	2	0	0	2
	% within Group	0,00%	0,70%	0,00%	0,00%	0,20%
9700	Count	1	0	1	0	2
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,50%	0,00%	0,20%
9800	Count	0	3	0	0	3
	% within Group	0,00%	1,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,30%
9870	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
9990	Count	1	1	0	0	2
	% within Group	0,20%	0,30%	0,00%	0,00%	0,20%
9999	Count	1	0	0	0	1
	% within Group	0,20%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,10%
Count		551	301	198	63	1113
% within Group		100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%

Appendix 3 Logistic Regression analysis of selected variables (N=1,113) -Dependent Variable: Belonging to Radicalised Group 4

	B	Df	Sig.
Residing in Gladsaxe, Høje-Taastrup or Kalundborg municipality	18.286	1	<0.0001
Of Somali origin	0.963	1	0.0300
Middle child amongst a series of children in the same family	0.374	1	0.1632
Father was employed as white-collar during childhood	0.907	1	0.0010
The person is employed as white-collar self-employed	0.471	1	0.2043
Has status as a child of a refugee	-0.836	1	0.0590
Constant	-34.887	1	<0.0001

The analysis reveals that residents of the municipalities of either Gladsaxe, Høje-Taastrup or Kalundborg have a strongly significant probability of belonging to the radicalised Group 4.

Respondents of Somali origin have a moderately significant probability of belonging to Group 4.

If your father was a white collar employee during your childhood your probability of belonging to Group 4 is slightly higher than if your father had another occupation. This probability is highly significant.

Being a white collar worker yourself also means a higher probability of belonging to Group 4. However this probability is not at all significant. Neither is being the middle child in a series of children significant.

Children of refugees have a lower probability of belonging to Group 4 than respondents with other immigrant/refugee statuses. This tendency however is only slightly significant.

Appendix 4 Logistic regression analysis of demographic variables

The table below shows a logistic regression analysis where the dependant variable is affiliation to the most radicalised segment of the examined population (Group 4) or not. The independent variables are all describing demographic characteristics of the respondents. These variables are:

- country of origin
- gender
- age group
- year of arrival (grouped)
- region
- refugee/immigrant status
- citizenship
- fathers occupation during upbringing
- mothers occupation during upbringing
- marital status
- number in children series
- relationship to Danish boy-/girlfriend
- present occupation
- residential status
- spare time job status
- highest educational level achieved
- usage of Danish language at work
- usage of Danish language at home

The analysis reveals that most of the demographic parameters indicate no significant influence on belonging to the most radicalised segment of the examined population (Group 4). There are only two exceptions: refugee/immigrant status and mothers occupation during childhood seems to have some influence on being radicalised.

Especially children of refugees have a significantly higher probability of being a member of Group 4. Also immigrants have a higher probability. Children of immigrants, however, have a lower probability. The significance level of the two latter tendencies are however somewhat lower.

Children of mothers who were unskilled workers, under certain labour market measures , pensioners and students during their childhood have significantly lower probability of being radicalised. None of the other occupational categories however indicates any significantly higher probability, so these results must be taken with some caution.

Single categories of other variables show high levels of significance. For instance 25-27 year olds of the variable age group. The categories of a variable however, must be seen in its entirety, and a single significant category cannot be singled out.

Logistical Regressions Analysis of demographic variables (N=1.112)
Depending variable: Belonging to Group 4

		B	Df	Sig.
Which country is your family originally from?			10	0.550
	Lebanon, Palestine, Stateless	**Offset**		
	Ex-Yugoslavia	-26.626	1	0.999
	Turkey	-83.447	1	0.997
	Somalia	-43.634	1	0.999
	Iran	-26.294	1	0.999
	Iraq	-31.485	1	0.999
	Pakistan	-35.930	1	0.999
	Afghanistan	-38.251	1	0.999
	Lebanon	-29.659	1	0.999
	Morocco	-68.462	1	0.998
	Algeria	-51.746	1	0.998
Gender	Male	**Offset**		
	Female	-1.910	1	0.322
Age group			4	0.143
	15-17 years	**Offset**		
	18-20 years	2.463	1	0.526
	21-24 years	10.734	1	0.053
	25-27 years	13.406	1	0.017
	28-30 years	0.752	1	0.810
Year of arrival to Denmark, grouped			8	0.521
	Do not know/mention	**Offset**		
	1974 or before	-18.285	1	1.000
	1975-1979	-12.384	1	0.999
	1980-1984	-33.049	1	0.989
	1985-1989	-8.351	1	0.195
	1990-1994	-9.682	1	0.099
	1995-1999	-20.633	1	0.017
	2000-2004	-17.453	1	0.040
	2005-2009	-22.720	1	0.017
Region			2	0.615
	Copenhagen area	**Offset**		
	Zealand & Islands	-0.937	1	0.657
	Jutland	1.087	1	0.611
Do you have status as a refugee or immigrant or are you a child of an immigrant or a refugee?			3	0.032
	As Refugee	**Offset**		
	As Immigrant	7.249	1	0.024
	As child of a refugee	13.006	1	0.004
	As child of an immigrant	-14.612	1	0.029
Have you citizenship in … (TO INTERVIWER: Read the options)			5	0.398
	In	**Offset**		
	Denmark	63.485	1	0.995
	Both in Denmark and in {{ get the text from the database: insert Country of Origin }}	55.037	1	0.996
	Another country	62.734	1	0.996
	No Citizenship/Stateless	16.116	1	0.999
	Does not want to answer	62.215	1	0.996

			11	0.553
What was your father's occupation during your childhood?	Self-employed	**Offset**		
	White-collar	30.908	1	0.996
	Specialized blue-collar or not trained blue-collar	28.808	1	0.996
	Trained blue-collar	23.983	1	0.997
	Transfer income. (Public sup-ported/subsided jobs etc.)	19.778	1	0.997
	Assisting spouse	6.665	1	1.000
	Unemployed	85.798	1	0.998
	Early retired	23.007	1	0.997
	Transfer income (På overgangsydelse og nogle få der kan være på efterløn)	11.583	1	0.999
	Housewife (not registered on the la-bour market)	103.062	1	0.998
	Retired	22.747	1	0.999
	Student or under education (Studeren-de under uddannelse, Heri indgår OGSÅ lærling\elev, sprogkurser, AOF kurser, AMU kurser etc.)	46.535	1	0.994
What was your mother's occupation during your childhood?			11	0.611
	Self-employed	**Offset**		
	White-collar	-77.709	1	0.990
	Specialized blue-collar or not trained blue-collar	-19.234	1	0.006
	Trained blue-collar	-62.706	1	0.978
	Transfer income (Pulje- og aktive-ringsjob, offentlig løntilskud samt skåne og flex job)	-17.831	1	0.009
	Assisting spouse	-14.584	1	0.999
	Unemployed	-70.242	1	0.991
	Early retired	-6.756	1	0.134
	Transfer income (På overgangsydelse og nogle få der kan være på efterløn)	-6.869	1	0.998
	Housewife (not registered on the la-bour market)	24.180	1	1.000
	Retired	-19.092	1	0.006
	Student or under education (Studeren-de under uddannelse, Heri indgår OGSÅ lærling\elev, sprogkurser, AOF kurser, AMU kurser etc.)	-34.242	1	0.004
Are you .... (TO INTERVIW-ER: READ IT UP)			7	0.357
	Housewife (spouse – Hjemmegående)	**Offset**		
	Married	14.297	1	0.011
	Living with a partner	8.011	1	0.106
	Divorced/earlier have been living with a partner	-0.146	1	0.981
	Unmarried (Have never lived with a partner)	7.974	1	0.233
	Widow (widow man)	-6.468	1	0.999
	Does not want to answer	16.369	1	1.000
	Single	-0.607	1	1.000
Which number of child are you in the child series in your own family?			2	0.170
	First born (Also register if the person is an only child)	**Offset**		
	Middle	-5.042	1	0.060
	Youngest	-4.231	1	0.110

			2	0.055
Have you ever had a Danish partner (boyfriend/ girlfriend)?	Yes	**Offset**		
	No	49.684	1	0.998
	Does not want to answer	40.549	1	0.998
What is your main occupation at the moment			12	0.956
	Self-employed	**Offset**		
	White-collar	-56.720	1	0.990
	Specialized blue-collar or not trained blue-collar	-49.618	1	0.991
	Trained blue-collar	-62.221	1	0.989
	Transfer income (Pulje- og aktiveringsjob, offentlig løntilskud samt skåne og flex job)	-55.842	1	0.990
	Compulsory Military Service	-74.061	1	0.996
	Assisting spouse	7.533	1	1.000
	Unemployed	-99.695	1	0.996
	Early Retired	1.893	1	0.690
	Transfer income (På overgangsydelse og nogle få der kan være på efterløn)	53.843	1	0.988
	Housewife (not registered on the labour market)	0.143	1	1.000
	Retired	-2.150	1	0.558
	Student or under education (Studerende under uddannelse, Heri indgår OGSÅ lærling\elev, sprogkurser, AOF kurser, AMU kurser etc.)	-2.022	1	1.000
Which kind of residential type do you live in?			7	0.704
	Rented Apartment (Lejelejlighed)	**Offset**		
	Rented House (Lejet hus)	-46.401	1	0.999
	Owned Apartment (Ejerlejlighed)	-85.977	1	0.998
	Owned House (Ejet hus)	-50.549	1	0.999
	Semi owned Apartment (Andelslejlighed)	-41.742	1	0.999
	Semi owned House (Andelshus)	-93.784	1	0.998
	Other (Andet)	17.236	1	1.000
	Do not Know	-54.122	1	0.999
Do you have parttime/after school job? (Har du et fritidsjob?)			2	0.275
	Not Answered	**Offset**		
	Yes, with immigrants (Ja, hos indvandrere)	N/A		
	Yes, on a Danish site (Ja, på en dansk arbejdsplads)	-60.923	1	0.989
	No	-68.408	1	0.988

[What is your highest FINALISED education which is recognised in Denmark?			7	0.441
	Primary school (Folkeskoleuddannelse eller tilsvarende – Herunder også folkeskole for voksne på VUC)	**Offset**		
	Youth Education (Ungdomsuddannel-se eller tilsvarende, Gymnasium, HH, HF, HTX, eller den fri ugdomsuddan-nelse)	14.565	1	0.998
	Vocational training (Erhvervsuddan-nelse eller tilsvarende)	18.528	1	0.997
	Short education (Kort videregående uddannelse)	17.495	1	0.997
	Middle academic education (Mellem-lang videregående uddannelse	18.948	1	0.997
	Long academic education (Lang vide-regående uddannelse)	16.598	1	0.997
	Non of the above	-9.712	1	0.999
	Don't know/ Do not want to answer	10.777	1	0.998
How often do you use Dan-ish at work?			6	0.332
	Not Answered	**Offset**		
	Always (almost always)	-54.917	1	0.999
	Often	2.543	1	1.000
	Sometimes	20.368	1	1.000
	Seldom	-37.468	1	0.999
	Never	-14.655	1	1.000
	Don't know	-12.037	1	1.000
How often is Danish spoken in your house?			5	0.147
	Always (almost always)	**Offset**		
	Often	-38.622	1	0.999
	Sometimes	-24.614	1	0.999
	Seldom	-21.787	1	0.999
	Never	-24.769	1	0.999
	Don't know	-12.593	1	1.000
Constant		20.201	1	1.000

Appendix 5 National origin distribution* Group Cross tabulation

Country		Group 1	2	3	4	Total
Denmark	Count	38	6	9	6	59
	% within Group	6.9%	2.0%	4.5%	9.5%	5.3%
Turkey	Count	122	64	37	16	239
	% within Group	22.1%	21.3%	18.7%	25.4%	21.5%
Somalia	Count	13	18	20	7	58
	% within Group	2.4%	6.0%	10.1%	11.1%	5.2%
Pakistan	Count	49	30	16	5	100
	% within Group	8.9%	10.0%	8.1%	7.9%	9.0%
Serbia-Montenegro	Count	0	0	1	0	1
	% within Group	.0%	.0%	.5%	.0%	.1%
Croatia	Count	1	1	0	0	2
	% within Group	.2%	.3%	.0%	.0%	.2%
Bosnia-Hercegovina	Count	64	27	7	1	99
	% within Group	11.6%	9.0%	3.5%	1.6%	8.9%
Macedonia	Count	11	3	2	1	17
	% within Group	2.0%	1.0%	1.0%	1.6%	1.5%
Yugoslavia Former rep. (ex)	Count	10	0	1	0	11
	% within Group	1.8%	.0%	.5%	.0%	1.0%
Iraq	Count	100	61	41	5	207
	% within Group	18.1%	20.3%	20.7%	7.9%	18.6%
Iran	Count	31	12	5	3	51
	% within Group	5.6%	4.0%	2.5%	4.8%	4.6%
Lebanon or other Palestinian origin	Count	38	40	33	11	122
	% within Group	6.9%	13.3%	16.7%	17.5%	11.0%
Other Palestinian Country, but State-less	Count	16	13	4	4	37
	% within Group	2.9%	4.3%	2.0%	6.3%	3.3%
Tunisia	Count	5	0	1	0	6
	% within Group	.9%	.0%	.5%	.0%	.5%
Morocco	Count	21	7	12	1	41
	% within Group	3.8%	2.3%	6.1%	1.6%	3.7%
Algeria	Count	3	0	1	0	4
	% within Group	.5%	.0%	.5%	.0%	.4%
Afghanistan	Count	29	19	8	3	59
	% within Group	5.3%	6.3%	4.0%	4.8%	5.3%
Count		551	301	198	63	1113
% within Group		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Appendix 6 Age * Group Cross tabulation

			Group				
			1	2	3	4	Total
Age Group	15-17 years old	Count	101	70	54	7	232
		% within Group	18.3%	23.3%	27.3%	11.1%	20,8%
	18-20 years old	Count	101	74	44	13	232
		% within Group	18.3%	24.6%	22.2%	20.6%	20,8%
	21-24 years old	Count	129	65	55	24	273
		% within Group	23.4%	21.6%	27.8%	38.1%	24,5%
	25-27 years old	Count	93	36	17	6	152
		% within Group	16.9%	12.0%	8.6%	9.5%	13,7%
	28-30 years old	Count	127	56	28	13	224
		% within Group	23.0%	18.6%	14.1%	20.6%	20,1%
Total		Count	551	301	198	63	1113
		% within Group	100,0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Biography of the authors

Marco Goli, **PhD** studied political Science at Copenhagen University. He wrote his PhD. thesis on: "Discursive inconsistency and institutional inefficiency" (2002). During the following years Dr. Goli has published several studies on welfare studies (Labour Market policy, Social Policy and Integration policy).

Currently Dr. Goli is associate professor at Metropol – The University College of Copenhagen.

Shahamak Rezaei, PhD studied Economics at Aalborg University in Denmark and obtained his PhD in Business Administration from University of Southern Denmark. He is currently is affiliated as associate professor at Roskilde University, Denmark, Department of Society &Globalisation.

He has special expertise in network analysis, quantitative analysis, small enterprises research, ethnic businesses, migration and labour market relations. In 2001 he submitted his Ph.D. dissertation with the title of "Business Dynamics Amongst Immigrants: Self-Employment and Network Relations – Blockage or Initiator of Socio-Economic Mobility?". Dr. Rezaei has recently focused his studies on the role of immigrants in the socio-economic development of host societies and on the labour market structures. One of his recent research work was on the "Dual labour market in welfare state perspective: a study on the dilemma between informal economic praxis and immigrants socio-economic integration" with the aim to analyze informal economic activities in a dual labour market within the framework of the Danish welfare state, and had include an analysis of the positive and negative consequences of the dual labour market in relation to welfare and the integration of immigrants in 5 European countries. The study was conducted in Denmark, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden in the period of 2002-2005. During 2005-2007 he has been appointed as country expert and conducting his research in connection with various research projects initiated by the European Commission.