Link to Abstract Book updated 22 September

(3)

Discrimination without comparison  

Lennart Ackermans¹ 

¹Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Germany 

Direct discrimination is widely believed to involve two things. First, the discriminated person is treated worse than a comparable individual would be treated (the comparative condition). Second, the difference in treatment is because of a protected characteristic such as race, gender, or age (the causal condition). Of these two aspects, the first is often considered to be essential. For example, the entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy for Discrimination states that “discrimination is necessarily comparative” (while noting that some thinkers reject this claim). 

At the same time, courts across North America and the EU have disagreed on whether a comparison is needed to prove discrimination, and the requirement of a comparison has been criticized by legal commentators. Similarly, in social science, discrimination is often defined or operationalized to involve only the second, causal component. Moreover, noncomparative concepts of discrimination that rely only on a causal condition have been proposed in philosophical discussions of the concept of discrimination. 

Hence, it seems that there are two camps in legal practice, social science, and philosophy: one in favour of the standard definition – which has both a comparative and causal component – and one in favour of a purely causal definition. (There is a third camp, in favour of a purely comparative discrimination, that I will not discuss.) However, I argue that the distinction is largely inconsequential. The standard definition of discrimination, on a plausible interpretation, is almost coextensive with the causal definition: all cases of standard discrimination are cases of causal discrimination, and almost all cases of causal discrimination are standard discrimination. 

I show this using tools from the philosophical analysis of concepts. In particular, I will use a possible worlds analysis to clarify the counterfactuals involved in both conditions of the standard definition. The analysis is strengthened by testing it on countless real-world cases from European and U.S. jurisprudence. The upshot is that the distinction between standard discrimination and causal discrimination is not meaningfully different for practical purposes. 

This result has implications for both courts and researchers. The hard requirement of a comparison in some courts in the U.S. and EU makes it unduly difficult to prove legitimate cases of discrimination, as argued by legal scholars such as Suzanne B. Goldberg. My result shows that this requirement can be removed without a risk of overinclusion, which would make it easier for claimants to prove their case. Similarly, social scientists will be able to rely on existing non-comparative causal definitions without having to worry about overinclusion. 

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How is discrimination a component in the concept of stigma?  

Martin Marchman Andersen¹

¹National Institute of Public Health, University of Southern Denmark, Copenhagen, Denmark 

The by far most renowned and cited definition of stigma was proposed by Link and Phelan (henceforth L & P) in their 2001 article “Conceptualizing stigma”. Since then, this definition has become the standard reference in most of the relevant literature. As of 13/5 2025 it has been cited 15,275 times according to Google Scholar. L & P suggest that there are five components of stigma, namely 1) labeling (of human differences) linked to 2) negative stereotypes, accomplished by 3) some degree of separation between “us” and “them”. Furthermore, there must be 4) status loss and discrimination and 5) power asymmetry. But how should we understand the component of discrimination in this definition?  

I see two possible readings. First, discrimination in some basic, minimal, and purely descriptive sense such that those who otherwise satisfy the stigma criteria are being looked at and listened to differently because of the stigmatized trait, e.g. mental illness, obesity or leprosy. Second, morally wrong discrimination. In either case, I will argue that discrimination is not part of what stigma is and therefore that L & P’s definition is at least partly wrong.  

If we understand discrimination in the first, basic and minimal sense, then, I will argue, the discrimination component in stigma is trivially true given labeling and would be trivially true for any labeled group. It seems that holders of all traits that we bother to put a label on are being discriminated against in this basic and minimal sense. For we understand and interpret the wordings of actors, football players, philosophers, biologists, Americans, the socialists, and etc. at least partly in light of those labels. If this is true, it has no explanatory force to include the component of discrimination in the definition of stigma. This makes the component redundant. 

If we understand discrimination in the second, morally wrong sense, then it has quite counterintuitive implications. For instance, convicts could not be stigmatized if our discrimination against them, e.g. deprivation of liberty, is morally justified. Indeed, it seems to imply that stigmatization necessarily is morally wrong. But while stigmatization probably is morally wrong rather often, it might well, at least in theory, have some positive consequences that make it right.  

If this reasoning is right, discrimination is not part of stigma, and L & P’s definition, accordingly, is at least partly wrong. This, however, is compatible with discrimination in the second sense being a common consequence of stigmatization and even the explanation as for why stigma is bad psychologically and health-wise. 

(16)

Transgressing sex or gender? Support for trans inclusion in sports across category frames  

MJ Balezina¹  

¹Department of Political Science, CEPDISC, Aarhus University 

In January 2025, President Trump issued an executive order directing federal agencies to prioritize “sex”-based over “gender”-based policy language, with the stated aim of affirming “the biological reality of sex.” Assuming that framing choices by political actors are strategic, such a shift is likely to shape public opinion. But what effects does a move from a “gender” frame to a “sex” frame seek to produce? To investigate this question, I examine the contentious issue of trans inclusion in sports and ask: Are individuals more supportive of trans inclusion when male/female categories are framed as gender-based rather than sex-based? If so, why? Using a 2x2 survey experiment, I test whether framing sports categories in “gender”-based versus “sex”-based terms produces different levels of support for trans athlete inclusion. Preliminary findings suggest that respondents exposed to the “gender” frame are more willing to support trans inclusion. I propose two competing mechanisms to explain these framing effects: (1) motivated reasoning and advantage assessment, and (2) perceived category permutability. According to the first, participants in the “sex” frame are more likely to perceive significant differences in the athletic performance of male and female athletes, whereas those in the “gender” frame are more likely to view men’s and women’s performances as relatively equal. The alternative mechanism posits that “sex”-based framing constructs sports categories as more fixed and immutable, fostering greater category essentialization and, consequently, stricter gatekeeping against the boundary-crossing that trans athletes represent.

(Keynote 1)

Neat and Messy Kinds: The Case of Discrimination

Erin Beeghly¹

¹The University of Utah

Analytical philosophy is known for its love of order, and analytic discrimination theory is no exception. The goal of this talk is to problematize out discipline’s neat and tidy tendencies and reveal new, messy theories for discrimination theorists to stake out and explore.

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Affirmative Action and State Irrationality 

Andreas Bengtson¹ 

¹ Department of Political Science, CEPDISC, Aarhus University

Several prominent objections have been raised against affirmative action, such as the merit objection, the mismatch objection and the balkanization objection. In this paper, I will discuss a relatively neglected objection that some have raised against affirmative action, namely that it is objectionable for the state to pursue affirmative action because the state thereby treats its citizens irrationally, and the state has a duty not to do so (Hellman, 2016: 916). We may call this the irrationality objection to affirmative action. It can be laid out, in standardized form, as follows:  

The Irrationality Objection 

P1: It is objectionable for the state to treat its citizens irrationally.  

P2: By pursuing affirmative action, the state treats its citizens irrationally.  

C: Therefore, it is objectionable for the state to pursue affirmative action.  

My discussion of this objection aims to show, inter alia, that: (1) affirmative action may be objectionable for both moral and non-moral reasons, and it is important that we distinguish the two (e.g., showing that an affirmative action policy is morally unobjectionable is not always sufficient to let the policy off the hook; (2) just as we may distinguish between a comparative and a noncomparative conception of discrimination (cf. Hellman, 2016), we may also distinguish between a comparative and a noncomparative objection to affirmative action; (3) in some cases, the irrationality concern ultimately reduces to a moral concern; (4) we should understand rationality as a matter of substantive rationality, and this means that, in many cases, affirmative action does not amount to irrational treatment.

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Unpacking the Relationship Between Antisemitism and Islamophobia  

Tabitha Bonilla¹, Nazita Lajevardi² 

¹Northwestern University, Evanston, USA 

²Michigan State University, East Lansing, USA 

This paper examines the relationship between Antisemitism and Islamophobia among ~900 Black and ~900 White Americans, using original survey data collected on Cloud Research in Spring 2024. We find that Antisemitic and Islamophobic attitudes are strongly correlated across both racial groups (r = 0.458 among Whites; r = 0.492 among Blacks), with magnitudes comparable to the relationship between Antisemitism and favorability toward American Jews. Although levels of Islamophobia are similar across groups, Black respondents express slightly higher levels of Antisemitism. Attitudes toward Palestine are also modestly associated with Islamophobia, with similar correlations across both groups. Our analyses show that Islamophobia significantly predicts Antisemitic attitudes, but Antisemitism is a weaker predictor of Islamophobia. Finally, both Antisemitism and Islamophobia are individually and jointly predictive of support for Donald Trump in 2020 and 2024. Together, these findings suggest that while Antisemitism and Islamophobia are distinct constructs, they are meaningfully intertwined in both attitudinal structure and political consequence. 

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Examining experiences of social unsafety among Dutch employees: a holistic and intersectional approach

Nina Branten¹, Ashwin Rambaran¹, Bas Hofstra¹ & Niels Spierings¹

¹Radboud University, Nijmegen, the Netherlands 

The #MeToo movement has heightened awareness of sexual harassment and, more broadly, social unsafety in the workplace. Social unsafety is an umbrella term primarily used in the Netherlands encompassing a host of socially undesirable behaviors, ranging from more overt transgressive behaviors to more covert behaviors. Despite the increase in media attention, our scientific understanding of social unsafety lags behind. While scholars recognize that different dimensions of social unsafety are interrelated, research provides a rather fragmented view because social unsafety behaviors are predominantly examined in isolation. Furthermore, intersectionality is rarely considered, although people likely experience social unsafety differently based on the intersection of their various socio-demographic characteristics. To address these gaps, this study uses large-scale, representative survey data on Dutch employees (Netherlands Working Conditions Survey, 2022), taking a holistic and intersectional approach to understand patterns in experiences with various dimensions of social unsafety in the workplace and its differences across intersectional groups. We conducted latent class analyses on items related to experiences with transgressive behaviors (bullying, intimidation, unwanted sexual attention and physical violence), workplace conflicts and the overall social climate (incivility and psychological unsafety). A seven-class solution was identified, for which we now focus on the three classes (altogether, 8.64 percent) showing a relatively high probability of experiencing the four mentioned transgressive behaviors. All three classes were likely to experience conflicts at work, but varied greatly in their experiences with the overall social climate. The three classes further diverged in terms of perpetrator power: one class experienced social unsafety from coworkers, one from supervisors, and one from both supervisors and coworkers. Next, we will examine how (intersections of) gender, migration background, educational level, and age influence the probability of Dutch employees to belong to the identified social unsafety classes, using Multilevel Analysis of Individual Heterogeneity and Discriminatory Accuracy (MAIHDA).  

(Keynote 2)

How to be politically polarized

Michael Brownstein¹

¹John Jay College and The Graduate Center, CUNY

Suppose I disdain someone for their support of a vile political party. Is my disdain discriminatory? Is it at odds with compassion and perspective-taking? Is it useful? I consider these questions and offer a description of four learnable individual skills that can help direct political disdain into non-discriminatory, useful, and compassionate forms, without abandoning its moral force.

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Multiple Intersectional Discrimination Impact on Labour Income     

Raimonda Bubliene¹ 

¹Law Institute of the Lithuanian Centre for Social Sciences, Vilnius, Lithuania  

Multiple intersectional discrimination is a frequent and widespread phenomenon, as there are many perceptual stereotypes with personal features or characteristics such as culture, ethnic origin and religion, gender, migrant status, age or a combination of these characteristics. Different social groups, such as women with disabilities, women of other racial and ethnic origins, and young or older women, may more frequently face discrimination in employment, pay, and dismissal. Employment income inequality is relatively high in the European Union. The 2014 report by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) thoroughly examines stereotypes' role in fostering inequality and discrimination conditions. There is abundant evidence, both globally and within Europe, indicating that women continue to bear a disproportionate burden of unpaid work compared to men. The substantial issue of access to employment and equal pay directly impacts inequality levels. This issue is also prevalent in Europe. According to the 2015 report by the European Commission, working women still do three-quarters of housework and two-thirds of parental care duties. These reports highlight how prevailing gender stereotypes contribute to the undervaluation of women's unpaid care work, leading to women working shorter hours or having intermittent work experience. The multidimensional reality in the light of social and economic inequality within the concept of multiple intersectional discrimination plays an important role in ensuring gender equality to stimulate employment and labour income. 

Considering the complex social and economic landscape and the prevalence of inequality, multiple intersectional discrimination plays a crucial role in ensuring gender equality with the principle of work of equal value between men and women or equal pay for equal work. The substantial issue of access to employment and legal regulation in European Countries on work of equal value between men and women or equal pay for equal work directly impacts labour income levels. Recently, the Directive (EU) 2023/970 came into force to strengthen pay transparency in terms of the application of the principle of equal pay for equal work and the principle of work of equal value between men and women. It is necessary to take into account any situation of disadvantage arising from multiple intersectional discrimination as women of diverse racial and ethnic origin, young or older women and women with disabilities are among groups which may face the following disadvantage. The research examines the impact of multiple intersectional discrimination in employment relations with a comparative aspect of labour income, including recognition of multiple intersectional discrimination and the necessity to decide on the appropriate comparator. 

The project “Multiple Discrimination and Labour Income: A Comparative Analysis of Legal Regulations in European Countries” (MEDALIC) is funded by the Research Council of Lithuania (LMTLT), agreement No. S-PD-24-155. 

(21)

Whorephobia and discrimination on dating platforms 

Simone Sommer Degn¹

¹ Aalborg University 

Dating platforms typically ban commercial sex and deplatform users engaged in the sex market. Yet, sex workers report exclusion even when seeking personal, non-commercial relationships, which raises concerns of whorephobia. In this presentation, I analyze the concept of whorephobia, propose revisions, and argue that deplatforming sex workers qua daters constitutes wrongful discrimination on three influential accounts. While potential justifications for exclusion are considered, they prove unconvincing. I conclude that platforms are not justified in deplatforming sex workers as daters, even while remaining justified in prohibiting sex work, and I outline governance solutions for more ethical platform moderation. 

(29)

A conjoint experiment on reducing nativity discrimination 

Diana Roxana Galos¹, Christian Bøtcher Jacobsen², Florian Keppeler², Mogens Jin Pedersen³   

¹ University of Copenhagen & CEPDISC, Aarhus University 

² Aarhus University  

³ University of Copenhagen   

Extensive research has documented nativity discrimination in the labor market, but less is known about which interventions successfully reduce bias in hiring decisions. This gap is particularly pressing as public sector organizations in Western countries—especially in healthcare and nursing—struggle with severe staffing shortages. International recruitment is a promising response, yet little is known about how international candidates are perceived and evaluated in these hiring processes.  

Our study makes two primary contributions. First, we expand the limited understanding of preventing and reducing discrimination by testing the relative potential of promising anti-discriminatory interventions. We consider structured evaluation and nudging to be two interventions that may reduce the preference for majority applicants compared to international ones in the hiring process. This addresses a critical gap in the discrimination literature by robustly testing two interventions at the initial stages of the hiring process. Currently, research does not have a compelling answer to the urgent question posed by scholars and practitioners alike: “what works” in preventing/reducing discriminatory hiring outcomes. Second, by focusing on the healthcare sector – a highly regulated sector - this project investigates one of the least studied yet important sectors in discrimination literature.  In this context, we employ a conjoint experiment in Denmark to investigate whether structured evaluations and/or a text nudge can help prevent discrimination against international applicants during the hiring process. Furthermore, we conduct an exploratory analysis to examine i) if grades can mitigate the disadvantages associated with foreign nationality and ii) if candidates from EU countries have an advantage in hiring compared to non-EU countries.  

(17)

Unequal perceptions of sexism in the workplace 

Diana Roxana Galos¹, Peter Thisted Dinesen², Kim Mannemar Sønderskov³  

¹ University of Copenhagen & CEPDISC, Aarhus University 

² University of Copenhagen  

³ Aarhus University  

Studies show that sexism is prevalent, but is there a gender difference in perceptions of sexism? This paper aims to test two interlinked hypotheses on this question: (i) do women react more strongly towards acts of sexism than men and, (ii) is this due to them expecting women being more likely to be victims of such sexism. Drawing on original survey data from Denmark regarding perceptions of various acts of sexism in the workplace, we confirm the first hypothesis, showing that women perceive acts of sexism toward non-specific targets (i.e., the gender of the target being unknown) as transgressive to a significantly higher extent than do men. To test the second hypothesis, we use an embedded survey experiment, which randomly varies the gender of the victim of sexism (a suggestion that someone receives a position due to their gender [being a man/woman]). We disconfirm the second hypothesis, in showing that women do not discriminate when it comes to the gender of the victim of sexism. In short, women are more skeptical of sexism against any gender, rather than simple in-group preference. The results have implications for the broader discourse on gender equality, and more specifically, sexism in the workplace. 

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On the very concept of discrimination: Toward a radical publicity of normative theorizing 

Marion Godman¹ 

¹CEPDISC , Aarhus University  

Many individuals and groups face or experience discrimination in their everyday life and as such it is also an important theoretical concern in political theory and philosophy. At the same time, one might think that much of anti-discrimination policy and practice ultimately rests on some form of public legitimacy or publicity. This requires not only that there is broad support for anti-discrimination measures (for some evidence see Strolovitch 1998; Ziller & Helbling 2019; however, cf. Schaeffer 2023), but that anti-discrimination policies also in some way reflect or correspond to the concerns held by the public regarding the moral wrongs of discrimination.  

Until recently political theorizing about discrimination has been carried out with very little attention to what (if any) the public's concerns about discrimination are. To be sure, it is not uncommon for political theorists on discrimination with a legal bent to make clear that their theorising should fit with legal frameworks and real legal cases (Moreau 2020, esp. section 1.5; Khaitan 2015, section 1). However, as Deborah Hellman writes, while the law is a useful starting point for political theorizing, it is not conclusive “because the law is itself vague and open to interpretation” (2011, p. 4). Instead, or at least in addition to, the focus on legal contexts and cases it seems relevant to turn to the public more directly regarding the status of the normative theories of discrimination.  

Although there are hitherto very few attempts from political theorists to address the explicitly public justification and legitimacy of anti-discrimination policy and law, recently there has been some results from experimental philosophy in this direction. Here one seeks evidence from the public’s intuitions and support for existing normative principles regarding discrimination (Albertsen et al 2024; Nørregaard forthcoming).  

But now another problem emerges because it is both unclear and controversial how one should interpret the contributions from experimental philosophy to philosophy in general, and especially for political theorizing. As others have suggested, the typical reasons given for experimental philosophy being relevant and challenging do not automatically apply to normative political philosophy (Floyd 2017; Chapman 2023 pp. 12f.; Lindauer 2023; Dowding forthcoming).  

In this article, I therefore aim to contribute to these two debates: the one about greater publicity for theories of discrimination and the other about the role of empirical evidence from experimental philosophy for normative theorizing more generally. I argue that the public does have a key role in the investigation of political concepts such as 'discrimination', and ipso facto argue for the key role of empirical evidence from experiments in political philosophy more generally. I coin the term, radical publicity, in relation to the publicity of concepts in normative theorizing. Radical publicity means that the understanding and definition of partly normative concepts themselves – not merely the principles – should be open to public dispute and debate. 

(7)

The Dirty, Huddled Masses: Immigration, Race, and Perceptions of Public Health Threat  

Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien¹ 

¹San Diego State University, San Diego, CA, USA 

The COVID-19 pandemic revived narratives of health threat as a legitimation for immigration restriction in the United States. Figures such as Donald Trump and Ron DeSantis regularly used the pandemic as a justification for restrictionist immigration legislation at the state and national level, while also demonizing immigrant groups as potential vectors for disease. Narratives that immigrants pose a threat to public health were a long-dormant trope in immigration policymaking but claims that immigrant groups were more prone to illness had been used in the past as a justification for race-based policymaking. From trachoma being used to limit Asian immigration in the late 19^th century, to tuberculosis referenced as a reason to prohibit Mexican immigration in the 20^th, claims that immigrants pose a racialized threat to public health has served as a means of justifying restrictionist legislation.

This paper explores contemporary public perceptions of health threat through an analysis of data from the 2020 CMPS survey, which included two questions on the linkages between immigrants and illness in the wake of COVID-19. It is found that a belief that immigrants are prone to disease or live in conditions more likely to spread illnesses has no relationship to anxiety related to COVID-19. Instead, support for the health threat narrative is more likely among those higher in symbolic racism and who express anxiety about immigration more broadly. This demonstrates that as with narratives of criminality, the perceived health threat posed by immigrants is driven largely by racial or anti-immigrant attitudes, and not by anxieties related to public health. While there is a vast literature on perceptions of criminal, cultural, and economic threat from immigrants, health threat narratives have received less attention in the public opinion literature. The findings of this study suggest that these tropes can be used to appeal to racial animus or anxiety among the public and thus are deserving of greater scholarship.  

(20)

Non-discrimination as a filter on reasons   

Kalle Grill¹ 

¹Umeå university, Umeå, Sweden  

The property of being discriminatory is ascribed either to actions, policies or laws (Influential examples include Alexander 1992, Gardner 1998, Arneson 2006, Hellman 2008, Lippert-Rasmussen 2014, Eidelson 2015, Moreau 2020, and Altman 2020). Typically, discrimination is thought of as a form of differential disadvantageous treatment, whether by people, organizations or institutions. I propose we reject the standard approach and instead define discrimination primarily in terms of reasons for action. Differential disadvantageous treatment influenced by discriminatory reasons may still be thought of as discriminatory, but only in a derived sense. The core idea is that discrimination takes place in our minds, as we consider how to treat others and are moved to treat them one way or another.  

While not moralized, this reason-focused approach is motivated by moral concerns. The starting point is that the distinct moral wrong involved in discrimination is to be influenced in one’s deliberation or motivational processes (conscious or unconscious) by certain group properties that are not or should not be relevant. Oftentimes, these processes cause disadvantageous treatment, but other times they do not. For example, aversion to an applicant because she is a woman may not be sufficiently strong to outweigh her superior qualification, and racist motives may be held in check by social pressure so as not to materialize in action. Whether or not they lead to action, these attitudes should not influence our motivation or deliberation. In a useful metaphor, non-discrimination positions and principles can be described as filters on what properties may justifiably operate as reasons for us, psychologically and deliberatively, when we treat someone worse than others. 

Non-discrimination as a reason-filtering principle can be specified along several dimensions. First, there is the content of the reasons that are filtered out: typically, the fact that someone belongs to a certain group, such as a gender, a race, or an ethnicity. Second, the reason content should be filtered out only when it occurs in relation to some action alternatives: typically, either differential disadvantageous treatments or the orchestrations of future disadvantageous treatment. Third, the principle may only apply to particular social roles: for example, the personal or intimate sphere of romance and friendship may be exempt. Non-discrimination principles could also be restricted in the dimensions of what kinds of reasons they catch and the extent to which these reasons are discounted, but they should arguably catch all kinds of reasons and discount them completely. 

The filter approach to non-discrimination should be preferred over traditional approaches mainly because it is conceptually clearer, which facilitates the specification of normatively plausible non-discrimination principles or positions. Different normative principles can co-exist and complement each other. One particularly promising principle is the rejection of group properties as ultimate reasons for disadvantageous treatment, i.e., to be moved to treat some people worse just because they are different than others. The filter approach, however, allows for wider principles, such as rejecting the invocation of group properties as statistical or instrumental reasons. 

(24)

Not Fit for Office: Does Weight Bias Impact Evaluations of Political Candidates?  

Claire Gothreau¹, Nicholas Haas², and Amanda Friesen³   

¹Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, USA 

²Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark 

³University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada 

Voters often use metrics to evaluate political candidates that are entirely unrelated to ideology, competence, or policy positions. Factors such as height, facial appearance, physical attractiveness, and vocal pitch can impact candidate selection. Less understood is the role of body weight in how voters evaluate political candidates. This is surprising given the pervasiveness of rhetoric regarding “fitness” for office, the way in which the health of candidates is speculated about in the media and popular culture, and the growing proportion of overweight and obese individuals worldwide. In this paper, we propose a novel theory to explain how and why weight might impact perceptions of political candidates. We first show, using a pre-registered conjoint experiment, that voters are more likely to vote for thin and average weight candidates as compared to overweight and obese candidates, and that they perceive heavier candidates as less competent. This effect is robust to the inclusion of so-called “statistical” discrimination variables such as education level and health status. In line with our theory, we find that those who conceive of weight as more mutable are less likely to vote for obese candidates as compared to those who perceive weight to be less mutable. We also find support for our hypothesis that those with weaker norms around weight discrimination are less likely to vote for overweight and obese candidates as compared to individuals with stronger norms. In a second follow-up incentivized experiment, we investigate whether weight mutability and the strength of norms around weight discrimination can be shifted to mitigate discrimination against heavier political candidates. 

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Direct, indirect, and in-between discrimination: An experimental-philosophical analysis  

Viki Lyngby Hvid¹, Andreas Bengtson¹ and Claire Gothreau¹ 

¹ CEPDISC, Aarhus University, Denmark 

The difference between direct and indirect discrimination has been highlighted in philosophical and legal discussions of discrimination. For example, in anti-discrimination law, indirect discrimination is treated as easier to justify than direct discrimination (Khaitan 2017, 34-35: Moreau 2020: 14). Interestingly, since both facially neutral disparate impact and facially non-neutral differential treatment can be brought about intentionally and non-intentionally, we possibly overlook important nuances when we categorize discrimination as being either direct or indirect. Instead, Berndt Rasmussen (2020) suggests that we should pay attention to four forms of discrimination: 

1. Standard Direct Discrimination: Intentional and facially non-neutral differential treatment. 

2. Intentional Disparate Impact Discrimination: Intentional and facially neutral treatment with disparate impact. 

3. Non-intentional Disparate Treatment Discrimination: Non-intentional and facially non-neutral differential treatment. 

4. Standard Indirect Discrimination: Non-intentional and facially neutral treatment with disparate impact. 

Whether one form of discrimination is morally worse than another depends, among other things, on what makes indirect discrimination less wrong than direct discrimination (if it is). If the wrongness of direct discrimination primarily lies in the intention to treat people differently (rather than the act of actually treating people differently), then intentional discrimination that only appears impartial might not be preferable to alternatives that treat groups differently. On the other hand, disparate treatment may be morally worse than facially neutral treatment with disparate impact, e.g., because only disparate treatment discrimination “involves a shift in treatment, due to the presence of P [a socially salient group characteristic]” (Berndt Rasmussen 2020: 733). 

In this study, we use a vignette-based survey experiment to investigate whether lay people’s moral evaluation of discrimination is sensitive to differences in the two dimensions highlighted above, that is, i) intention vs. non-intention, and ii) disparate treatment vs. disparate impact. Thus, the article provides empirical evidence of the broader public’s views on the moral and conceptual relevance of the differences between direct, indirect and in-between kinds of discrimination.  

Given that alignment with commonsense morality and thinking supports a philosophical view, at least all else equal, the findings update the philosophical debate on the matter. If we were to find, say, that intentional disparate impact discrimination is judged to be more objectionable than standard direct discrimination, this would suggest that the dichotomous treatment of direct and indirect discrimination might not capture the moral nuances involved in judgments of discriminatory acts.

(25)

What’s relational about relational egalitarianism?   

Masaya Miyamoto¹, Takafumi Abe², and Shu Ishida³   

¹ School of Political Science and Economics, Meiji University, Tokyo, Japan  

² Department of Law and Political Science, Takushoku University, Tokyo, Japan  

³ Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Hiroshima University, Hiroshima, Japan  

The philosophical discussion on relational egalitarianism (RE) has explored the defining features of RE contrasted with distributive egalitarianism (DE), the possibility of DE–RE hybrid theories, and the variety of RE theories. However, the very concept of “relational equality” has usually been assumed to be a single one, even if it allows for different interpretations.  

We take this debate further by highlighting the difference between two concepts of relational equality, which roughly correspond to the two tasks for egalitarian theories, respectively. One is substantive relational equality, or equality in everyday social interactions like non-discrimination and inclusion, which describes the nature of the equality in question. The other is justificatory relational equality, or equality in a more abstract sense anchored to ideals like equal respect and concern, which explains what makes a particular instance of inequality unjust.  

Table 1. Taxonomy of egalitarian theories according to the two concepts of relational equality 

The two concepts jointly offer a systematic taxonomy encompassing not only typical DE and RE but also partially relational theories (Table 1). On the one hand, the badness of distributive inequality may be explained in relational terms, as in Dworkinian luck egalitarianism. On the other, substantive relational equality may be endorsed by a non-relational ideal of equality, as in ethical theories of discrimination appealing to the intrinsic value of equal opportunity.  

They also have implications for the ethics of discrimination. For instance, some theorists suspect that “indirect discrimination” is not discrimination but a form of distributive inequality. Whatever the correct answer, egalitarians can meaningfully ask an independent question of what makes it unjust. This observation indicates the potential for a common normative framework applicable to all forms of discrimination and, ultimately, non-discriminatory inequality.

(8)

The Long-Term Consequences of Childhood Interethnic Exposure on Discrimination  

Peter Thisted Dinesen¹, Mathias Kruse², and Kim Mannemar Sønderskov² 

¹ University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark 

² Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark 

Does exposure to out-group members in childhood have long-lasting effects on discriminatory behavior into adulthood? Whereas a wealth of studies have focused on the short-term implications of interethnic encounters, we know little about the extent to which encounters in the formative years affect attitudes and behavior in adulthood: Do childhood encouters ease or increase discrimination? Such knowledge is essential to understand the consequences of rising ethnic diversity and is critical for evaluating whether promoting encounters in institutions and local settings during childhood is a viable policy tool to reduce discrimination. We invite Danish citizens with an ethnic majority background born in 1992, 1994,1996, 2005, and 2006 along with their sibling(s) to participate in a survey (N ~300,000). To measure present-day discrimination, we use a donation game as well as survey questions and conjoint experiments. We combine the survey data with the Danish registers which allows us to link respondents’ responses to the peer composition experienced in their elementary school setting. To identify the causal effect of childhood encounters on discrimination, we use two approaches. First, we use the variation in ethnic concentration across respondents in adjacent school cohorts within the same school; variation that arises largely due to idiosyncratic, non-systematic cohort differences. Second, we use the variation in ethnic concentration arising across siblings who attended the same school but entered different school cohorts due to their year of birth. This within-school, within-family approach allows us to hold constant all time-invariant family-specific factors. Data will be collected in the coming months. 

(1)

Complex intersectionality and stereotypes. Investigating intersections of gender, sexuality, ethnicity, and religion with a survey experiment in nine European countries  

Ely Strömberg¹, Bram Lancee¹, and Eva Zschirnt¹  

¹University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands 

Intersectional and discrimination research has shown that stereotypes simultaneously vary across categories such as race and gender. Predominately, this is done by estimating stereotypes separately for groups such as white men and women, and black men and women. Such an approach, however, has two main limitations. First, it only captures stereotypes at specific intersections, for specific groups, rather than how the effect of race varies with gender. Second, such comparisons are often limited to two categories, even as people can identify and be ascribed to many more. To understand the extent to which intersectionality shapes stereotypes and consequently, discriminatory behaviour, one would need to test how the effects of social categories (such as gender) vary over many other categories (such as ethnicity, religion, and sexuality).  

Using an intercategorical approach, we investigate this through a multifactorial survey experiment. As part of a European multi-country survey, we measure stereotypes of warmth and competence for profiles that are simultaneously varied on the categories of gender, ethnicity, religion, and sexuality. Group stereotypes of warmth and competence are root causes to justify unequal treatment and are connected with both emotions and actual discriminatory behaviour.  

We contribute to the literature by analysing to what extent stereotypes are intersectionally complex, that is, better explained looking at intersections of categories, or by focusing on one category at a time. Following developments from quantitative intersectionality research, especially research on intersectional stereotype complexity in the US, and on multilevel modelling (e.g. MAIHDA), we investigate stereotypes over 48 unique intersectional identities. We first compare the explained variance from main effects (primary categories) with that from interactions (intersectional effects) and secondly use random slopes to estimate how effects of specific categories (e.g. woman) varies over our 48 identities. We are currently finishing data collection and will be able to present the findings at the conference. 

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Ideological drivers of “identity politics” attitudes in Denmark and the United States  

Lasse Laustsen¹, Claire Gothreau¹ & Benedicte Omand Grønhøj¹ 

¹Aarhus University, Denmark 

“Identity politics”—issues revolving around the degree to which majority groups should accommodate minority groups to respect individual or collective identities often relating to ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation or religion—has become center of political attention causing strong ideological disagreements across countries. Interestingly, a substantial number of identity politics disagreements relate to seemingly non-political issues like product names, packaging styles, choices of influencers to promote products etc. The name of a Danish ice cream, “Giant Eskimo”, and American food brand “Uncle Ben’s” use of a Black American butler on their packaging, both drew criticism with companies viewed as disrespectful or derogatory towards specific minority groups. Despite the high prevalence of these ideologically rooted disagreements, research has not yet illuminated the psychological mechanisms underlying such debates. This project generates two competing theoretical accounts suggesting that ideological disagreements about identity politics possibly reflect i) preferences for group-based (in)equality (as measured by Social Dominance Orientation), or ii) traditionalism and conventionalism (as measured by Rightwing Authoritarianism). We pit the two accounts against each other in three well-powered studies with Danish (N_Study1=1100; N_Study2=2000) and American (N_Study3=2600) representative samples and measure attitudes towards salient identity politics issues related to ethnic, sexual and religious minority groups. Our results provide strong and robust support that ideological disagreements about identity politics are driven by individual differences in both i) preferences for group-based (in)equality, and ii) traditionalism and conventionalism, but with the latter explanation as the substantially stronger driver. We discuss the broader theoretical and practical implications of the results. 

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The Extension of Older Women's Employment: Legal Framework, Guarantees, and Intentions 

Aiste Leščinskaitė¹

¹Institute of Law at the Lithuanian Centre for Social Sciences 

The extension of older women's working lives has become a central topic in contemporary labor markets, as aging populations demand policies that support the active participation of older individuals in the workforce. However, older women face significant challenges, both legally and practically, that hinder their continued employment. These challenges often stem from a combination of age discrimination, gender inequality, and the lack of effective legal safeguards to protect their rights in the workplace. 

Older workers, particularly women, are increasingly subject to psychological workplace violence, which negatively impacts their well-being and employment sustainability. In the context of Lithuania, research has shown that older employees, especially those over 55, are vulnerable to such mistreatment. However, many older women do not report these issues due to a lack of trust in their employers' willingness to take action, fearing potential retaliation, including job loss or worsening working conditions. 

The legal framework surrounding the protection of older workers is crucial in understanding the extent of these challenges. In Lithuania, the Labour Code obligates employers to provide a safe and healthy work environment free from hostile, unethical, and humiliating actions. This includes taking preventive measures to stop psychological violence and harassment. However, despite these legal requirements, there is often a gap between the law’s intentions and its practical implementation. Surveys of both employers and trade unions indicate that while many employers claim to have measures in place to prevent psychological violence, such measures are often insufficient or merely formal. Workers, especially older women, are rarely familiar with these procedures, which reduces their effectiveness in real-world scenarios. 

International legal standards, such as those outlined in the European Union’s directives and the International Labour Organization’s conventions, also provide a framework for protecting older workers. However, the application of these standards is inconsistent across different countries, and in many cases, the legal safeguards for older women remain inadequate. Age discrimination in hiring, unequal pay, and a lack of workplace accommodations for older employees contribute to the marginalization of older women in the labor market. 

Moreover, the reluctance of older workers to report incidents of psychological violence points to a broader issue of workplace culture and the failure of employers to address the unique needs of this demographic. Many older women fear that raising complaints will jeopardize their careers, especially in industries where job opportunities for older individuals are already limited.  

In conclusion, the extension of older women's working lives depends on both legal guarantees and a supportive workplace culture. Legal reforms, along with stronger enforcement of existing regulations, are necessary to protect older women from discrimination and workplace violence. Only through comprehensive legal, social, and organizational changes can we ensure that older women are able to continue contributing to the workforce in a safe, respectful, and sustainable manner. 

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Is political-partisan discrimination wrongful?  

Désirée Lim¹

¹The Pennsylvania State University, State College, USA 

The world is more politically polarized than ever. Polarization is accompanied by a rise in social partisanship, where individuals’ set of political or ideological beliefs is a salient determinant of who they choose to associate with. Such partisanship has been characterized as negative partisanship, wherein partisans are driven by negative emotions towards the other party rather than their own policy preferences, and works in tandem with “affective polarization”, where there is a tendency to dislike and distrust those with oppositional political views (see Abramowitz and Webster 2016 and 2018).  

In my paper, I investigate how negative partisanship plays out within the occupational sphere, and how it may contribute to discrimination on the basis of political affiliation. Statistics show that, in the US, there is a strong correlation between one’s political affiliation and occupation. An infographic by Verdant Labs reveals, for example, that the vast majority of academics, teachers, and psychologists are left-leaning, while the vast majority of oil workers, insurance agents, and businessowners are right-leaning. In Brazil, political affiliation constitutes a bigger factor than other preferences like gender and race when it comes to hiring decisions and employment success (Colonnelli, Neto, and Teso 2024). The study also found that workers who share a different affiliation from their boss receive lower pay, obtain fewer promotions, and have a shorter tenure at the firm than average. These conclusions seem to hold despite the fact that discrimination on the basis of political affiliation in Brazil is illegal. It seems, then, that there is a legitimate concern – especially within heavily politically segregated occupational fields – that workers may be affected by discrimination on the basis of political affiliation. I will be concerned with discrimination at the point of hiring (i.e. being a denied a job on the basis of one’s affiliation), as well as discrimination within one’s workplace, such as one’s opportunities for advancement and promotion, the tasks one is assigned, or how one is treated by colleagues more generally. 

The moral permissibility of political-partisan discrimination in the workplace seems indeterminate. On the face of it, familiar theories of wrongful discrimination (e.g. those relating to systemic disadvantage and demeaning attitudes) are unable to provide satisfying accounts of why discrimination on the basis of political affiliation is impermissible. More worryingly, political-partisan discrimination may sometimes be desirable in order to prevent other forms of wrongful discrimination. In response, I tentatively propose that political-partisan discrimination may be wrongful on at least two grounds: (1) if differences of political affiliation are demonstrably morally irrelevant to prospective employee’s ability to satisfyingly perform their roles and tasks (which may be true of some occupations and not others), rendering such discrimination arbitrary, and (2) if political affiliation is used as a proxy for identifying prospective employees’ capacity for moral judgment, which I take to be a violation of the principle of moral equality.  

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Discrimination by classification  

Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen¹ 

¹ Aarhus University, Denmark 

In my talk I will analyze a form of treatment that, intuitively, is discriminatory – discrimination by classification, I will coin it – and yet neither qualifies as such on standard definitions of discrimination, nor has received any sustained attention in the discrimination literature.  

To see what I have in mind suppose discriminator treats persons whom he perceives as men or as women equally well, and better than persons whom he considers to be neither - those people he treats equally disadvantageously whoever they are. However, it is also the case that it takes much less gender non-conformity for him to regard someone as not a (real) woman than to regard someone as not a (real) man. Given that disproportionately many of those people whom discriminator in effect does not classify as having the gender they in fact have (in some sense to be explicated) are women, intuitively, this should be considered a form of classification-based discrimination against women. After all, because of his setting the bar for being a (real) women much higher than the bar for being a (real) man, women are much more likely to be treated disadvantageous by him than men are. Yet, it does not satisfy a standard necessary condition for something’s being direct discrimination against women, to wit, that the discriminator treats women worse because of his representation of the discriminatees as women (e.g., Lippert-Rasmussen 2013). After all, the discriminator does not represent those, whom he treats disadvantageously, as women at all. 

Some might take this to suggest that this we simply define direct discrimination of women as disadvantageous treatment of a group of people, who in fact are women, whether discriminator treats them disadvantageously because discriminator represents them as women or not. However, this will not do either. To see this, consider an employer who systematically misidentifies the gender of applicants. The employer is a misogynist who intends to hire men only, but because of his inability to correctly identify the gender of an applicant from their name, he ends up hiring only women and no men. On the present proposal, despite his misogynist motivations, this employer engages in gender discrimination in favor of women. We want a concept of discrimination that does not license this inference. 

Others might suggest that we should think of discrimination by classification as a form of indirect discrimination. On this view, my first discriminator treats people whom he perceives to be men and women equally and hence does not directly discriminate against women relative to men. Yet, his classificatory dispositions-cum-resulting-equal-treatment-of-individuals perceived to be men- and-individuals perceived to be women has a negative disparate impact on women. However, this suggestion does not work either. We can imagine (rare) cases of discrimination by classification that, incidentally, have no adverse impact on those groups of people who are more likely to be classified in such a way that they are more likely to be subjected to disadvantageous treatment by the discriminator. As argued in Lippert-Rasmussen (2013), one can be treated disadvantageously and yet ironically benefit overall from being so treated. 

The key takeaway point from the talk is that we must reject the widespread idea that the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination is exhaustive. The concept of discrimination by classification shows this idea to be false. Instead, we must embrace a richer taxonomy of different types of discrimination. In closing, I will briefly sketch my preferred richer taxonomy. 

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Philosophy and Identity Competition 

Andreas Bengtson¹, Claire Gothreau¹, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen¹, and Ida Nørregaard² 

¹CEPDISC, Aarhus University

²Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, München

Philosophers often discuss questions, where what intuitions that one reports having on the correct answers to those questions have important consequences for what sort of person one is deemed to be. For instance, how one answers “When is an act of differential treatment an act of discrimination?” might well affect whether one is thought to be (in)sensitive to the wrongs of discrimination and, thus, a political opponent or a political in-group member. Hence, it is interesting to know whether these intuitions are affected by the intuiters’ beliefs about the relevant consequences for what sort of person they are seen to be – negative or positive – of reporting or having certain intuitions. To the extent that philosophers’ intuitions are so affected, this points to the need to exercise epistemic care when appealing to such intuitions. Moreover, to the extent that philosophers’ intuitions are no less affected by identity competition than those of lay people, this casts doubt on the expert status that some ascribe to philosophers when it comes to philosophical questions. In this study, we are interested in a particular form of consequence, namely, whether an intuitor’s expressed intuition shows the intuiter to do well in comparison with their interlocutors, e.g., by manifesting greater sensitivity of the relevant sort or a more sophisticated view than the views of their interlocutors. To experimentally test the degree, if any, to which this form of identity competition affects philosopher’s and lay people’s intuitions, we field a chat-room based experiment, where respondents – non-philosophy students and philosophy students (first-year BA and last year BA) respectively – are asked to either discuss an identity-relevant or an identity-irrelevant question and where respondents either have or do not have an audience to whom they can signal their identity superiority. Respondents are invited to answer a set of questions before and after the chatroom interaction allowing us to make inferences about the degree to which identity-competition plays out under different conditions.

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The intergroup folk psychology of spatial resource patchiness  

Wilson N. Merrell^1,2, Lei Fan^1,2, Jennifer Sheehy-Skeffington³, and Lotte Thomsen^2,1 

¹Centre for the experimental-philosophical study of discrimination, Aarhus University, Aarhus, DK 

²University of Oslo, Oslo, NO 

³New York University-Abu Dhabi, Abu Dhabi, UAE 

Across the animal kingdom, patchy ecologies—where resources like food, water, and shelter are spatially clumped—engender territorial behavior and facilitate the emergence of social hierarchies. We propose that, in line with this behavioral tendency, humans hold a deep-seated belief that patchy ecologies give rise to hierarchical social structures. In Study 1 (N = 516), we developed a geospatial measure of resource patchiness where U.S. participants mapped perceived resource locations in their zip code. The spatial clustering of these maps predicted self-reported perceptions of local hierarchy and abstract representations of patchiness. A series of experiments then showed that people perceived places as more hierarchical—and intergroup relations more contentious—when exposed to patchy resource distributions: in a board game (Study 2a, N = 216), a fictional society (2b, N = 608), and when considering foreign countries (2c, N = 938). These effects held after controlling for perceived scarcity. Finally, we found consistent evidence for this patchiness-to-hierarchy belief across five countries (UK, Germany, Ghana, Brazil, India; Study 3, N = 2,637) and preliminary support among Norwegian preschoolers (pilot, N = 46). Together, these studies suggest that people represent patchiness as a meaningful ecological cue shaping intuitions about hierarchy and intergroup relations. 

(5)

Discrimination without (?) groups   

Lauritz Aastrup Munch¹ and Søren Flinch Midtgaard²  

¹Aarhus University, Philosophy

²Aarhus University, Political Science and CEPDISC

In this paper we argue that we have significant reasons to question if there exists any theoretically interesting sense in which discrimination concerns groups. Hence, we argue against the group condition. If we succeed, we must reconsider the consensus view that we can make progress on understanding what discrimination is via a notion of ‘groups’. Our argument revolves around the underexplored case of discrimination against celebrities: patterns of disadvantageous treatment that appear to instantiate discrimination yet not concern a group per se.

(4)

Statistical Discrimination and Democracy Protection  

Tore Vincents Olsen¹  

¹ Aarhus University, Denmark

This paper explores the pros and cons of employing statistical discrimination to protect democracy from specific parties. Statistical evidence suggests that if for example, antipluralist parties win elections, there is a 23 per cent risk that it will lead to the destruction of democracy. This speaks in favor of using statistical evidence to exclude such antipluralist parties from elections. In favor is also that it resolves some issues regarding detecting with certainty parties that constitute a threat to democracy and importantly that it does not conflict with the reasons that make certain types of statistical discrimination wrong. A possible factor against is that excluding parties with a winning chance might lead to increased support for them. The paper argues that while it is morally permissible to employ statistical discrimination to protect democracy, it could be politically imprudent to do so.

(6)

Attributional processes and perceived discrimination: Experimental evidence from West Africans in Germany 

Irene Pañeda-Fernández¹ 

¹ WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Berlin, Germany 

Emerging evidence suggests the existence of the so-called integration paradox: better integrated immigrants report higher levels of discrimination than those that are more marginalized. While this could be explained via better integrated immigrants having more contact with natives and thus more negative encounters, another potential explanation operates via attributional processes if immigrants with higher educational and socio-economic attainment are more likely to interpret events through the lens of discrimination. While recent experimental work shows that an increased awareness of the extent of ethno-racial discrimination in society leads to greater reports of discrimination (Schaeffer and Kas 2024), the extent to which better integrated immigrants are more likely to interpret the same ambiguous event as discriminatory remains untested. An important limitation of the literature on perceived discrimination is that it is mostly based on survey data where respondents are asked how often they felt discriminated against in the past year. Without an ability to keep the event and the characteristics of the migrant constant, the attributional processes that may be at play remain poorly understood. In this paper, I use experimental methods to overcome these shortcomings. I present a representative sample of the registered population of West Africans in Germany with a vignette of a hypothetical migrant and I vary gender, migration status, religion, skin color, and socio-economic origin. I then present respondents with two ambiguous scenarios where the vignette individual (1) was not given a job that was given to a native German and (2) was not given a rental apartment that was given to a native German. Results suggest respondents generally do not take individual attributes into account when judging whether discrimination was at play, with the exception of gender in the hiring scenario. These results suggest migrants are generally unaware of the individual attributes that have been shown to make discrimination more likely, which is quite remarkable as there is ample evidence that being black, being Muslim, and coming from a poor socio-economic origin increase the likelihood of being discriminated against in both the job and housing markets. In a second step, I test whether better integrated immigrants (operationalized through level of education, occupation status, German skills, or contacts with natives) are more likely to interpret the same ambiguous event under the lens of discrimination. I find evidence that, holding vignette characteristics constant, immigrants who are better educated and have high occupational status are no more likely to see discrimination. Surprisingly, those with better German skills and more frequent contact with native Germans are less likely to interpret the vignette event as due to discrimination.  

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How Do Cultural Omnivores Create Distinction: Breath, Depth, or Consecration of Tastes?

Rikke Haudrum Rasmussen¹, Mikkel Haderup Larsen² & Mads Meier Jæger¹ 

¹University of Copenhagen, Denmark

²ROOCKWOOL Foundation

Cultural capital theory argues that familiarity with highbrow culture facilitates distinction by eliciting favorable perceptions of status and competence (Bourdieu 1984). Recent research proposes that omnivorous tastes, i.e., crossing cultural boundaries by combining highbrow and lowbrow culture, represent a new form of distinction (Peterson 1992; Peterson and Kern 1996; Peterson and Simkus 1992). Some studies even claim that the difference between omnivorous (“broad” and boundary-crossing) and univorous (“narrow” and boundary-maintaining) tastes has replaced the highbrow-lowbrow divide as the main form of distinction in contemporary societies (Chan 2019; Coulangeon and Lemel 2007; Vander Stichele and Laermans 2006). 

In this project, we design a survey experiment and pre-register hypotheses to test if omnivorous tastes in music elicit favorable perceptions of status (social rank) and competence (economic competence, cultural sophistication, sociability, trustworthiness, and cosmopolitanism). We focus on music tastes because research finds that music genres are ordered on a status dimension corresponding to a highbrow-lowbrow axis of distinction (Jæger and Larsen 2024). In the experiment, we present respondents with a vignette showing a hypothetical individual’s top 10 most-streamed music artists in the past 30 days. We manipulate three attributes in the playlist: 

First, we manipulate the number of genres (1-6: classical, jazz, pop, rock, schlager, heavy metal) in the playlist and hypothesize that listening to more genres (i.e., having more omnivorous tastes) leads to more positive perceptions of status and competence. Second, we manipulate the number of playbacks of each artist to measure the effect of musical voracity (i.e., listening to more vs. less music). Third, we manipulate the level of consecration of artists in the playlist, to test if a taste for more (vs. less) consecrated artists leads to more favorable perceptions. In the empirical analysis, we distinguish genre-level consecration from artist-level consecration (measured in a separate survey (N = 1,284)). Figure 1 summarizes the mean artistic recognition of the 60 artists in the experiment, which differ significantly across and within music genres. The aim of the experiment is to estimate the separate and combined effects of omnivorousness (number of genres), voracity (number of playbacks), and artistic consecration (artist recognition) on others’ perceptions of an individual’s status and competence. This is a rigorous test of whether (and how) omnivorous music tastes shape perceptions and, by implication, distinction. 

Figure 2 presents the results. More omnivorous tastes (i.e., listening to more music genres) increase perceptions of sociability (“social,” “would be fun to talk to at a party”) and cosmopolitanism (“open-minded,” “creative,” “has diverse tastes”). In contrast, more consecrated tastes at the genre level increase perceptions of status (“social rank”), economic competence (“makes a lot of money,” “will probably get a better job soon”), trustworthiness (“trustworthy,” “sincere”), cultural sophistication (“cultured”), and some aspects of cosmopolitanism (“creative,” “urban”) but decrease perceptions of sociability. More consecrated tastes at the artist level shape perceptions less, while more voracious tastes do not affect perceptions of status or competence. These results show that in music, omnivorousness and consecration create different impressions of status and competence, while voracity does not. 

(Keynote 3)

Advances and Challenges in Intergroup Interventions in the Field

Alexandra Scacco¹

¹WZB and University of Hamburg, Germany

Field-based research on intergroup relations has grown rapidly in recent years, but has often yielded nuanced results, including the finding across studies that well-designed contact can shift discriminatory behavior even when explicit attitudes barely shift. Drawing on recent field experiments across different types of social divides, the keynote will discuss what works, highlight design advances, and map open challenges around dosage, durability, and scale-up.

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Political Misperceptions about Ethnic Minority Groups and Their Consequences 

Samuel Bjerg Serup¹

¹Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark 

To what extent are ethnic majority citizens’ perceptions about ethnic majority political views biased and how do these misperceptions shape attitudes toward minorities and immigration? Ethnic majority citizens hold wide ranging and persistent misperceptions of ethnic minority groups, from consistently overestimating the size of immigrant groups in the country to overestimating crime rates and welfare dependency of ethnic minorities. Consequently, these misperceptions relate to outgroup animosity and opposition to immigration. However, while prior research has documented demographic and behavioral misperceptions, little attention has been paid to how majority citizens politically misperceive minority groups. These misperceptions pertain to what ethnic minority groups think and believe, what policies they support and what norms and values they hold. In this paper, I argue that ethnic majority citizens overestimate the extremity of ethnic minority groups’ opinions, and that correcting these misperceptions may be a promising avenue for improving intergroup relations. Using a nationally representative sample of Danes, I conduct a large-scale survey experiment to examine (1) the prevalence of political misperceptions about ethnic minorities, and (2) the effect of correcting these misperceptions on attitudes toward minorities and support for liberal immigration policies. I rely on multiple samples of ethnic minority groups’ political opinions, norms and values in Denmark as sources of correct information and as a benchmark of the accuracy of perc